

Cherkassk without serious resistance and without an order for Moscow, covering their banners with disgrace"), and the Germans captured a number of bridgeheads on this bersg. Gotha's army did not turn to Rostov, but remained on the parade ground

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darmakh, occupied on the southern coast of the Donau Konstanti povskaya and Nikolaevskaya. R

On July 28, the Southern Front was disbanded,

As a result of the defeat of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, by the middle of July, the strategic line of the Soviet troops in the south was broken through to a depth of 150-400 km, which allowed the enemy to launch an offensive in the large bend of the Don and Stalingrad. The Germans managed to capture the Donbass, Rostov and seize a number of bridgeheads on the left bank of the Don. The Soviet troops escaped encirclement similar to Kyiv or Kharkov, suffered heavy losses: 568347 soldiers and officers (almost 3 divisions daily), in

including about 80 thousand prisoners, 2436 sneakers, 13716 guns and mortars, 783 combat aircraft, almost half a million pieces of small arms. Poue

During the month of the Wehrmacht, bosp on the entire Eastern Front amounted to 91,400 people, of which just over 19,000 were killed and lost without respite.

w%e

The main reason for the summer catastrophe of 1942 is still the same - the self-confidence of the Soviet "experienced and far-sighted" generals and the psumsnis to fight either "on the land of Le", PI "in isbes", or "on the sea". "Hitler's general staff officers" once again outplayed the Stalinists, and "experienced" Paulus defeated the "inexperienced" Timoshenko, Moskalenko and Ryabyshev. Staliy once said that the German strategy is "deficient, because the enemy, as a rule, exhausts the strength and capabilities of the enemy and overestimates his own strength."

Supreme as in a mirror looked.

Marshal Rokossovsky was the only one who directly, without any reservations, pointed out the illiteracy demonstrated by the Soviet commando during the Voropezh-Voroshilovgrad defensive operation:

"The mistake of the initial period of the war was repeated,

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when directives that did not correspond to the situation were issued. that was only in the hands of the enemy. The troops hurriedly advanced to meet him, not having time to concentrate, immediately went into battle in a disorganized manner ... Everything was not going the way I had taught military science in schools, academies, military games and maneuvers, contrary to what was acquired the experience of the two previous wars (our italics. - Auth).

In the real case, a "Solomonic solution" was not required. The enemy is known, we have lost the battle (this was also known) - it was only necessary to calculate *rsal* but when and where the forces capable of stopping the enemy and inflicting counter labor could be concentrated. In this particular situation, closer than on the Don River, we The natural solution suggested itself: for the defeated troops to withdraw, slowing down the enemy with the use of mobile defenses, and then to meet him in an organized way with fresh forces advanced from the Stavka reserve at the turn of the Don River...

The Deputy Supreme Commanders-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff at this crucial moment should have been in Stavks, at the helm of control of all the Armed Forces, where the main decisions were made on the actions of the troops, and not be interrupted from their direct duties by military visits.

Only the optimism of Moskalenko pleases: "Yes, we learned a lot during the May and June battles in 1942. They began to see and foresee the plans of the enemy more deeply, to better plan and manage military operations.

Oh really? Finally!

The enemy also noted some improvement in the skills of Soviet commanders - the Russians learned to retreat, there were unexpectedly few prisoners and abandoned equipment. But the constant retreat, the abandonment of ever new territories, the continuous successes of the Wehrmacht demoralized the troops,

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"The armies were retreating," Vasily Grossman wrote, "The faces of the people were gloomy. Dust covered their clothes and weapons;

modans, bags, carts. Dry gray dust seeped into my nostrils and throat. Her lips were dry and cracked. This dust penetrated into people's souls and hearts, it made people's eyes restless, it stuck in the arteries and veins, and the blood of the fighters became gray with fire. It was a terrible dust - the dust of retreat, It corroded the nerve, quenched the heat of the heart, it appeared dimly before the eyes of the gunner and the shooter. There were moments when people forgot about their dolte, their strength, their formidable weapons, and a feeling of darkness took possession of them, German tanks, waking up, moved along the roads. Day and night the German dive-bombers hung down with dope rights, the Msesers swept past with a whistle. Smoke, fire, dust, mortal stuffiness.

Special departments recorded the growth of "anti-Soviet, defeatist and treacherous statements" by military personnel:

"... The commander of the 214th artillery regiment of the 38th SD, Lieutenant Colonel Gurylsv, among a number of commanders, said: = ... It is necessary to tear off the insignia when leaving so that they don't shoot. In this war, you will die for nothing. Where is our avnation? The newspapers write about our aviation - all this is nonsense. German aviation is good, but we have coffins. I became somewhat of a witness, as soon as our planes fell under them, they immediately knock them out and burn them ... "

And further: "... Peace will soon be concluded with! Germanis, because with this the struggle is meaningless, and there's nothing for us to fight; The Germans have technology, and we have even more blood ... "

... The commander of a platoon of 1055 joint ventures, 297 SD Kutek, during a German air raid, said among his subordinates: "... They fly, knowing well that there will be no our aircraft, and if they appear in the air, then it will be fruitless. The German planes are afraid of ours and are slow to kill them, Therefore, our planes are rising from their airfields ... "

Note of one. the Red Army soldier that the Pasha's troops were already prepared and a decisive blow to the fascists at the mercy of the Nazis, Kutek continued: "... Enough, they have already struck and proved their courage. Two shots of dalut, and then pemsts like pachpet to give, that they don't even find a place. Pasha's operations, as a rule, all fail ... "

The junior sergeant of the PTR company 293 SD Bagatikov Ivan Matosevich ... in a conversation with the soldiers about the actions of our units in the Lozovoy area, said: "... 70 thousand soldiers and commanders, which are discussed in the gas station, were not missing, but they went over to the enemy, I will also take a machine gun, I will shoot the commanders and then I will go over to the Yemians ... "

.. The Red Army soldier of 1059 SP Pilipchuk, in the presence of a number of Red Army soldiers, stated: "... It is clear during the course of the war that the Red Army will defeat the German army and the Ukrainian army will go nowhere. Happy is he who stayed in the rear of the Germans, live in tune with himself and work at home ... "

... Kraspoarmseyts 349 SD Makagonov told the Red Army men of his unit: "... If everyone were to return weapons against commissars and commanders, then in ten minutes the war would end and individual farming would be restored again and there would be plenty of food ... » at

..Commander of 855 joint venture, 278 SD, Major Fedorov, among the commanders of the regiment, spoke out that Timo Sheiko was a bad warrior and he was ruining the army.

The head of the artillery staff of the 76th Rifle Division, Captain Svechkii, said in a meeting with the workers of the Igsab: "... They gave us the prs. Five armies threw the claimant tsa edsnis. someone

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curry favor with IT rum The front is open and the situation is hopeless...

LJ

The situation is deteriorating every day and the Stalinist "barometer" shows a "storm". On July 23, the Supreme Commander writes a letter to Churchill: "Based on the situation that has arisen in the Soviet-German front, I must declare in the most catastrophic manner that the Soviet government and can come to terms with the postponement of the vatsism of organizing a second front in Europe.

1943". But England alone is unable to carry out a landing in Europe, the United States have barely begun to overcome the crisis in the Pacific theater of operations and are not yet able to provide sufficiently effective assistance to their allies. Yes, and Hitler, under the influence of the June Anglo-American-Soviet statements, on the one hand, and the "grailing" successes in the East, on the other, took certain steps. As early as July 9, he issued an order stating:

"Swift and tremendous successes in the East may present England with an alternative: either launch a major landing operation immediately to open a second front, or lose Soviet Russia as a political and military factor. Therefore, it is highly probable that the

soon the enemy will land in the command area of the West.

This order ordered the departure of the SS Motorized Division "Adolf Hitler" from the 1st Taik Army and the SS Motorized Division "Reich" from the Army Group "Center" to the West. Further, the command of the army of the reserve was to immediately complete 3 infantry divisions and transfer the West to the West as much as possible, which could only be done to the detriment of sending replenishments to the East. Two more infantry divisions were withdrawn from Army Group A in the second

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WE CRUSH THE ENEMY  
WITH A STEEL PAVINA!

A.  
RUBY POV!

WHAT DROPPED FROM THE WHO

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TO

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SHA ZEMAE AND NAL ZEMAE  
WE WILL LOOP THE ENEMY!

YOUTH AND GIRLS  
DEFEND FREEDOM. HOMELAND AND  
HONOR. CONQUERED BY YOUR FATHERS

TO THE UNWANTED GUEST

be  
====

KRASNOLOTSKII  
HOTEL!

to RAS! FRZNTOSYT 1307  
9 ASSISTANT & AT

FIGHTER SURROUNDED

UCHEE & m ©

DON'T READ IT!

TO PARTISANS  
DESTROYING  
THE FASCIST YOU

partisans, take  
revenge without mercy!

PERFORMED-Wessled

Fascism  
is the worst enemy  
of women.

late July. Approximately 200 new coastal defense artillery batteries  
and 25 fortress battalions were deployed along the Atlantic and  
Mediterranean coasts. Finally, the Air Force was to immediately transfer  
two air groups of bomber aircraft from East to West.

LJ\*

Alexander Werth writes about these days: "What happened in Rostov?  
Both in the press and in private conversations, many vague allusions were made  
on this subject. They all boiled down to the fact that some formations of the  
Red Army fell into a panic and fled from the frenzied onslaught of the  
Germans ... From press reports it was clear that no order was given to  
the troops to leave the city. Many generals and officers were demoted in rank  
and rank. The demand "Pull yourself together!" went through the whole  
country, and this demand met with a loud response in the press. In the  
days that followed, more and more was written about the introduction of "iron  
discipline"; the blame for the fall of Rostov was openly laid on "cowards and  
paniksrov" who had not fulfilled their duty to defend the city.

There are some puzzling sides to this whole "Rostov case". From a  
military point of view, it is extremely doubtful that in the situation  
created in July 1942 it would be possible to defend

city more or less for a long time. It was even said that any attempt to turn Rostov into a second "Sevastopol" could only end in encirclement, and this would entail the unnecessary death of many thousands of very necessary people. Be that as it may, the abandonment of Rostov without an order gave impetus to the conduct of: a wide psychological and organizational campaign... It was after the fall of Rostov that the Red Army command took decisive measures to prevent further cases of disorderly retreat (italics ours. - Auth. ).".

1! Year 1942 - toothbrush 289

As noted in the official publication "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the failures in the Crimea, in the Kharkov region, near Voroiyevsk and in Doibas negatively affected the combat effectiveness of our troops. There were facts of cowardice, alarmism, violations of discipline and military order. This caused great concern to both the party and the government.

On July 28, 1942, the obspokosin government issued the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227.

**\*NO STEP BACK!"**

The order, on the whole, is mentioned in all works devoted to the events of 1942, in the memoirs of all generals and negesrals, including German ones, as a landmark event and as a document that played an outstanding role in organizing a rebuff to the German invasion.

"... Order No. 227 had an extremely beneficial effect on the combat capability of the troops. Each was deeply imbued with the idea of the need to stand to the death in battle and did everything he could to win "(Army General S.M. Shtemenko).

"Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the past years in terms of the depth of patriotic content, in terms of the degree of emotional tension ... I, like many other generals, saw some sharpness of the order's blunders, but they were justified by a very severe and anxious time . In the order, he was primarily attracted by his social and governmental content" (Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky).

"... the mortar company of senior lieutenant Popov, and did not suspect that it already exists, this is a tough, but Bolshevik truthful word of Stalin" (general colonel K.I. Provalov).

On the other hand, such a seemingly important historical

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For a long time, almost until the collapse of the CCSE, we did not have the opportunity to read the classical documents. For more than forty years it was buried in the recesses of secret archives and was first published in 1988, although its general content was known to every citizen - after all, at one time the order was brought to "all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, commands and headquarters » Red Army.

What was so special about him?

Why he was hidden in special funds is understandable: "The order outlined measures to strengthen the morale and discipline of the troops, pointed out the need to declare a decisive war against the alarmists, the destroyers of discipline,"

The following measures were proposed to improve morale: to remove from their posts and give half to the tribe of fallen commanders of armies, corps and divisions, who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops without orders to be commanded by froit; ordinary alarmists and cowards to be exterminated on the spot; to form defensive detachments in each army and "put them in the rear of unstable divisions"; create shgrafiys companies and penal battalions.

In the next 2 months, 193 barrage detachments were formed - 3-5 in each army, up to 200 people in the detachment. Their main task was "in the event of a daddy and a disorderly retreat, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters of the divisions to fulfill their duty to Rolina." According to the NKVD certificate, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the guards detained 140,775 servicemen. In total, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,961 were sent to guard companies and battalions, the rest were returned to their units and to transit points.

Penal units were created on the basis of the Regulations introduced by NPO order No. 298 of September 28, 1942 (approved by the Regulations, by the way,

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Zhukov). Their goal was declared "to enable those guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability to atone for their crimes against the Motherland by a brave fight against the enemy in a more difficult area of hostilities."



Tsprafnye battalions were intended for senior and middle-level commanders and political workers, and the commanders and commissars of battalions and regiments could be sent to the penal battalion only by the verdict of the Military Tribunal of the Front, others - simply by order of the division or army. Ordinary Red Army men and junior commanders were sent to the penal companies by order of the regiment, without any fuss by tribunals. Syula, on the other hand, found those convicted of criminal offenses with a suspended sentence and those imprisoned in the camps, who expressed a desire to "attenuate their guilt with blood." In 1942-1943, more than 157,000 former prisoners were sent to the front. All shggrafniki were subject to demotion to the ranks and were deprived of awards for the duration of the "recovery".

The commanding staff of the penal subunits was appointed from among the "strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers" who received unlimited power over their subordinates. So, the commander of the penal battalion used the disciplinary power of the division commander in relation to the penalty box and could simply shoot any of them on the spot.

The rotation of personnel occurred quite quickly, but for different reasons. The commanders and political workers changed for economic reasons: one month of service was counted as six, and the terms of service in ranks were reduced by half compared to other officers of the active army (and in the latter there were also reduced terms of service, so for seven to eight months in the penal ba they could grow from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel)

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The personnel, for obvious reasons, also changed rapidly. The term of punishment was determined not very long - from one to three months, after which the serviceman was restored to the ranks. awards and rights. But the chances of survival were slim. Penal battalions were sent to "difficult areas", where there were the most favorable conditions for "redemption", and were completely spent in one attack or reconnaissance in force. The basis for early release and rehabilitation was a wound in battle (if you were lucky) or the accomplishment of something especially heroic (usually posthumously).

On each front, there were from one to three penal battalions (800 men each) and five to ten penal companies (150-200 men each). 442,000 military servicemen passed through the penal battalions.

So what? Extreme circumstances require extreme

of them, the ancient Romans already knew this. Stalin did not invent anything fundamentally new. Blitzkrieg failed - and the Fuhrer of the German Patience also had to plant penal battalions and barrage detachments; It makes all the difference - that dslatopi will be cultured, but bsz matyukov.

After the war, for ideological and senile reasons, the Soviet party leaders decided to pretend that we did not have all this, but there was solid mass heroism in order to defend the "gains of socialism". But today Order No. 227 gives the impression of being cruel, albeit forced. And how can he twist the fighters and commanders of the Red Army then?

After all, in August 1941 Stalin issued with the same good intentions - the fight against cowards and the strengthening of discipline - a much more cannibalistic order No. 270, which none of the memoirists praised. They tried not to remember him at all. By this document, which was in force until 1956, all military

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those who were taken prisoner were declared traitors and deserters, and their families became hostages of the proletarian state:

"Commanders and political workers ... who have surrendered to the enemy, are considered deserters, whose families are subject to arrest, families who have violated the oath and betrayed their homeland deserters. To oblige all higher-ranking commanders and commissars to shoot in the place of such deserters ... the families of the Red Army soldiers who have surrendered to captivity to deprive state benefits and assistance (our italics. - Auth).

Many of the leaders and political workers of those who wish to be "holier than the pope" proposed much harsher measures. For example, the forgotten G.K. Zhukov, commanding the Leningrad Front, ordered the shooting of the families (!) of servicemen who had surrendered, and Pervomaisky, the Poet-"scribbler," called for the introduction of warmia "measures of physical influence to strengthen discipline." Iosif Vissarionovich is just a slobbering humanist compared to Georgy Konstantinovich.

Former prisoners of the Soviet camps so "redeemed their guilt" from the first days of the war, at the same time detachments appeared - General Sandalov placed them behind the 4th Army already on June 25, 1941. On July 17, 1941, the head of the Political Propaganda Department of the South-Western Front reported to Mekhlis: "... According to incomplete data, 54,000 people were detained by detachments during the war period ..."

Arbitrariness, unauthorized executions and scuffles flourished in the Red Army so much that it was necessary to issue order No. 0391 "On the facts of replacing educational work with repressions." It admitted that in the troops "the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, the method of repression against subordinates took first place; daily educational work in units in a number of cases is accompanied by swearing, repressions and assault ... Unjustified repressions, illegal executions, self-inflicted

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equality and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and ruthlessness, often leading to the opposite results, the method:

fallenizo Noin discipline and political and moral state and can push unstable fighters to defect to the side of the enemy (*italics pash. - Auth.*).

Here, for example, are excerpts from the results of checking the progress of the military training of the 1437th Regiment] of the Tank Corps of the Western Front dated June 13, 1943 (it seems that they have already saved their Motherland, and learned how to fight, and the "radical change" has happened):

"Due to the poor organization of combat training and poor educational work, the regiment as a combat unit cannot be completely broken and completely unable to fulfill the tasks assigned to it ... , and management and reconnaissance ka ... the driver's staff is poorly prepared. Out of 21, more or less 5 people can drive. The rest require serious attention in preparation for driving military vehicles ... The food in the regiment is poor and of good quality ...

For 2-3 months, educational work to strengthen Soviet military discipline in the regiment was replaced by mass repressions ... The regiment commander, Major V.S. Gaevsky, his deputy for political affairs, Major G.L. Babkin and Chief of Staff Major A.I. Avdeev systematically used physical measures of influence against their subordinate fighters and commanders. In a number of cases, ilbeen was performed by the persons mentioned in a state of intoxication. So, in April, Glevskiy beat the senior technician-leith Nantes P.Ya. Doroshina, inflicting several blows on his head with a fist and a pistol, and then ordered him to stand up for execution ... The chief of staff of the regiment, Major Avdeev, in March, in a state of intoxication, exceeded his rights and illegally shot the elder

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Go sergeant Navak. As a result of the shot, Navak was seriously wounded in the head). For the attempt of the Red Army soldier N.S. Vinogradov and foreman D.M. Chistilin to help the wounded, Avdeev threatened them with execution and ordered to throw the raped Navak out of the car into the snow, and to the sentry to shoot Navak if he got up. After a short time, Navak tried to get up and, in accordance with the order of Avdes, was finished off by sentries. After the murder of Navak, Avdeev, together with Gevsky, sent a notice to Navak's mother that her son had been shot as a coward and a traitor ... "

Did the fighter of the 1437th self-propelled regiment gloriously gloried?

So, Verkhovna could not "surprise" the army with repressions. On the contrary, this part of the order was perceived by many as a sign of weakness in power. The "underwoods" of the special departments were knocking, summarizing the information about the "reaction of personnel" to Order No. 227:

"The head of a separate degassing company, a doctor of the 3rd rank, Olshanetsky, said in a conversation: "... The order of the Headquarters is the last cry of despair, when we are no longer able to resist the Germans. Anyway, nothing will come of this event ... "

..The Red Army soldier of the 121st Tbr brigade, Shselopaev, stated the following about the order: "For our parodl, write whatever order you want, anyway, carry out what previous orders will not be. Indeed, other orders of the People's Commissar also said that a merciless struggle must be waged against cowards and alarmists, up to and including execution on the spot, but no measures were taken. All the same samosas will be with this joke. Soon he will be forgotten... "

..Saniistruktor 41 SP 14 TeSD 63 army Demchenko after the announcement of the order said: "... All this will not help. Either they will kill their VSS, or everyone will surrender, but ours will not take it ... "

By the way, on May 1, 1942, Staliy issued a more severe document, GKO Decree No. 1227c, which

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Crimea banned the "mass daily issuance of vodka" in the army (introduced by the same GKO in August 1941). Froit one hundred grams now relied only on the front line military personnel who conduct offensive operations and "having success in combat operations against the German invaders" -

that was a hit below the belt!

From the point of view of tactics, calls to stand still in fear of death are stupidity, depriving the commanders of the initiative, and the troops of the opportunity to maneuver. It was this tough defense tactic that led to the grandiose "cauldrons" of 1941.

So what all the same "has a beneficial effect on the boss help", and that this is true, even the counter-peak admitted, order No. 22772

And the fact that for the first time in the war (and, perhaps, in the 25 years of its existence), the Soviet government, instead of fairy tales © about ten million killed Fritz, anti-fascist uprisings in Europe, victories near Kharkov, disabled people with physical disabilities and the pessimism of "decomposed and bloodless "blue" Wehrmacht to offensive operations, told the army and the people the truth - the country is on the verge of death, further retreat from where, the only question now is: win or die.

"Enemy forces are coming to the front with more and more new forces, and, considering that they have suffered heavy losses, they are pushing forward, tearing deep into the Soviet Union, capturing new areas, devastating our cities and exiles, raping, robbing and killing the Soviet population, Fighting is going on in the area of Voronezh, on the Don, in the south at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to seize the Kuban, the Northern Caucasus with their oil and grain wealth at any cost ...

Some wise people on the front deceive themselves by talking that we can retreat further to the East, because there is a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of bread ...

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Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, zheps, brothers, children. The territory of the SSNE that the enemy has captured and is striving to capture is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants that reduce the army with weapons, ammunition, railways, after the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other areas, we have much less territory, therefore, there are much fewer people, grain, metal, hoards, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain a year and more than 10 million tons of metal a year. Step back -

means to ruin yourself and at the same time ruin the niche of the Motherland

ÿ (italics pash. - Auth.) Each new piece of territory left by the pami will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense in every possible way ...

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.

No step back! This should now be our main call," s

This appeal to parody patriotism (it is noteworthy that Stalin spoke about the defense of socialist gains, but about the salvation of the Motherland), without embellishing bitter facts and empty promises, had an effect. "Here, the psychology of a soldier is very complex, and no one will ever get to the bottom of the true," writes "ordinary infantryman" M. Abdulip. - According to ours. understanding, we could retreat until this order appeared. The op worked as a way out of the uncertainty, and we stopped. They all stopped together. The soldier stopped, convinced that the neighbor had also stopped. We stood up to the death all together, knowing that no one would rush to run. The order turned out to be a strong psychological weapon for the soldiers. Although not

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it was clever to be aware of the fact that a barrage detachment was standing behind me.

The German generals assert that around the 1st of August, an increase in enemy resistance was noted in all sectors of the front.

"ON THE WESTERN FRONT  
WITHOUT CHANGE..."

Frankly speaking, such operations, so to speak, of local significance, carried out in isolation from the general ones, in separate army sectors, never justified themselves and entailed significant losses.

Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky

Throughout 1942, the commander of the Western Strategic Direction, concurrently the commander of the Western Front, and then the Deputy Supreme Commander General of the Army Zhukov, "the great and terrible", bloody and

unsuccessfully fought with the Army Group "Center", trying first of all to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead. The troops of the Western Front, while Zhukov commanded them, never stood in defense. They continuously attacked the enemy. This was a training ground for the commander. .

The Pobedonosets (he loved being called that) never counted his losses in orgies, but the Germans really had a hard time. Hitler threw almost all the population to the south of Field Marshal Klugs, only crumbs fell, which they could make up for the losses in people and equipment. The number of infantry in the city

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visions was reduced from nine battalions to six. Almost no tanks arrived, reductions of cospules and other branches of the military,

The four armies of the Center group, which had about 70 divisions as of July 1942, were opposed by 20 armies of the Kalinin, Western and right wing of the Bryansk fronts - 140 divisions. In addition, all the strategic levers of the Headquarters were concentrated in the Moscow government.

#### PRIVATE OPERATIONS

Let's start with the fact that there is no concept of "private operation" in military science.

In accordance with it, with the military spider, an operation is a set of battles, battles, strikes of heterogeneous troops that are coordinated and interconnected in purpose, tasks, place and time, carried out simultaneously and sequentially according to a single plan and plan to solve the problem of military operations, strategic or operational direction, a fixed period of time has been established,

According to the nature of the actions, defensive and offensive operations are distinguished. An offensive operation, depending on the scale, can be:

strategic - to achieve strategic goals;

froit - carried out by the troops of the fleet yoke according to a single plan and concept in order to defeat the opposing enemy groupings and seize the territory on one strategic or several operational directions);

army - carried out by one army in order to

thunder of the opposing enemy grouping and ovs of the ladepiy by districts of operational importance; as a rule, carried out as part of a front-line ops

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walkie-talkies, in interaction with other armies, forces and means of the front.

Soviet warlords invented another variation - a private operation. This is such a froit or army offensive operation of the Red Army, which ended in complete failure. That is, the goals in the beginning of the operation were set in accordance with science! d - to defeat and capture, and the corresponding forces were involved, and | The lats were usually characterized by the words "In view of the lack of strength", "bleed LI", "felt", "forged", "reserves were drained", etc. n. (if a strategic operation failed, whether it was the persecution of Kharkov or the liberation of the Crimea, then it was promoted to the "rank" to the front). True, taking into account the requirements! The idea that an organized battle must be "coordinated and interconnected" in all its links - what our commanders did in general cannot be called operations, just the generals "studied the ABC".

and\*\*

At the end of May 1942, Zhukov decided to conduct another operation to defeat the Bolkhovo-Bryansk enemy group by the forces of the left wing of the Western Front. Enveloping strikes on Bryansk were to be carried out by the troops of the 10th Army of Rokossovsky and the 01st Army of Popov. front. To develop success in the second echelon of the 16th Army, a tank corps was concentrated. As for "coordination" and "relationship", Rokossovsky directly indicates that the final goals of the operation were known to him: "It was also bad that the front commander for some reason did not always consider it an obligation to devote the commander of the army to his plans, t . With. did not notify

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what role is assigned to the army in this operation on a frontal scale. In this case, it was."

Where can interaction come from if each



did the person involved perform his narrow task in the allotted lane?  
In addition, the armies had to strike in turn.

After a 30-minute artillery preparation, Popov's troops were the first to go on the offensive, a day later - Rokossovsky's divisions. The Germans retreated to the second position, pursued by Soviet tanks, which selflessly fired at them from cannons. According to the observation of the commander, "our tankers almost did not use machine guns. heavy fire, accommodating to conduct cannon fire where it is necessary and even where it is not necessary. Quite successfully, the troops overcame the second position.

The time has come, in accordance with the plan of the operation, to introduce a tank corps into the breakthrough, but it appeared on the battlefield in time. It turned out that the army headquarters developed plans for the introduction of this formation and set tasks for the corps headquarters on the map. But in advance to scout the area, check the degree of passability of the planned route, and others somehow "forgot" to do it. At the intimidation of the advance of the corps was a river with swampy banks, where the tankers successfully got stuck. Therefore, it took more than 2 hours of patho to bring the mobile group to the Kukazain line. During this time, the enemy managed to transfer fresh forces from different directions and from the depths.

By the time the tank corps appeared on the scene, German aviation had already firmly dominated the air: "Forty dive bombers formed a circle over the battlefield, First of all they attacked the lead tank brigade. which, beautifully unfolding, passed a height of two or three kilometers behind the advancing infantry. And then something incredible happened: instead of rushing forward, Bri

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the gala stopped. She stood on a bare height, and the "junkers" poured bombs on her."

The tankers, it turns out, were "stunned"! "Our infantry lay down and barely held back counterattacks. Under the bombardment, the tank corps was marking time, scattering all over the field ... "- except for beautiful turns, nothing has worked out for him so far. Under the cover of aviation, the Germans brought up new units. A similar picture was observed in the offensive zone of the 61st Army,

The commanders asked the front for fighter support, and their request was granted, however, the "@Thalia Falcons" who arrived in the battle area were afraid to fight the "Falist vultures" because of the obvious superiority of the latter: "Enemy fighters, obss-

pschivavitis their bombers (something like cunning: their bombers melt away unaccompanied. - Auth.), did not allow ours even to approach the battlefield ... nimble "Mseserschmitts", like a pack of greyhounds; pounced on the pashas and drove them away. On this day, there was even no case for Soviet aircraft to enter the bl (!) (our italics. - Auth.) ”.

This was the end of the offensive, it was possible to defeat someone and open the gates to Bryansk, the Soviet troops in some areas moved forward up to 10 km. “On the whole,” writes Rokossovsky, “they didn’t do anything for the dachams, the enemy was beaten up and scared a lot.” This is called a private operation: "scared" - that's "great."

General Voronov, a representative of the General Headquarters, took part in the preparation and conduct of this offensive, who stated his opinion: “It was not clear to me why to expend forces and means on a number of fronts to carry out private operations with limited goals ... Why is it necessary to start an offensive of two armies of the same front with a time difference of one day? Whom did you want to deceive? Against Nick? Mia thinks that they were more deceived by ssbya. It is hard to imagine that with active aerial reconnaissance

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the enemy could not notice our regroupings. This was not taken into account. So it turned out that enemy aviation first launched its attacks on the battle formations of the advancing grouping of the 61st Army, and then just as fiercely began to bomb the troops of the 16th Army that had gone on the offensive, the Infantry was still poorly prepared for the offensive ... "

+:

In early July, it was decided to repeat the operation in the Bryansk direction with the forces of the 10th, 16th and 61st armies, which were attached to the 10th tank and 1st guards cavalry corps. They were to launch an offensive against the enemy's 2nd Panzer Army from the Kirov-Bolkhov line towards Bryansk. That is in the changed Zhukop style: from the previous directions, but with greater forces. After the war, it was stated that the purpose of the operation was "to test the strength of the German defense" on the southern flank of the Western Front. Already by this wording it is not difficult to guess how it ended.

From 5 to 12 July, under the personal leadership of the commander of the Western Front, fierce hostilities broke out in the area between Zhizdra and Bolshoi.

howom. In battles, new types of weapons and tactics were tested.

In particular, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command instructed the commander of the guards mortar units, General V.V. Aborenkov to test the new M-30 rocket-propelled system in front-line conditions, and because of the characteristic shape of the 300-mm gun, it was nicknamed "Luka Mudishchev" by the soldiers. The general went to the area of the city of Belev, where at that time the 61st Army, now commanded by Gsieral P.A. Belov, was preparing for the offensive. Eight newly formed M-30 divisions were urgently sent there, dispersed into regiments for ease of control, the Commander determined the targets - enemy resistance centers in the villages of Anino and Upper Doltsy.

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The Ogie positions were chosen in such a way that firing could be carried out at a range close to the limit: 2400-2600 m. In this case, the scattering of projectiles was expected to be less. But the launchers had to be installed at a dangerous distance from the front line of the enemy - they fell into the zone of his rifle and machine-gun fire. It was impossible to bring shells in cars. I had to help to deliver them in the hands of the personnel of the divisions.

Diem on July 5, 7 regimental volleys hit the enemy in Anino and Upper Doltsy. Both knots of resistance were wiped out, after which the infantry occupied the villages without any losses.

Combat tests showed that the M-30 divisions fired 384 shells at a range of 2600 m to create a post-fire raft on an area of 18 hectares, equal to 14 shells per kilometer. This was enough to reliably suppress the strongholds. It was planned to fire at such a density with less than 20 shells, i.e. it was necessary to connect another battery.

At the same time, it turned out that it was difficult to select and equip a firing position for 96 stacks of the M-30 division - it turned out to be elongated along the front for a few meters.

Taking into account the test results, the headquarters of the formiropia GMCH in July proceeded to the creation of separate M-30 divisions of a two-battery composition, 24 machines per battery. The salvo of the battalion now amounted to 288 rockets. The required density of the ogy could be reached in a whisper, attracting two or three divisions to shoot at one area.

An attempt was made to significantly increase the efficiency of aviation.

This time, the ground forces were supported by the Air Division of the 1st Air Army, Lieutenant General of Nantes S.O. Khudyakov. The commander was one of the first, having adopted the experience of the Luftwaffe, tried to use aviation massively, sending large

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groups of aircraft in the direction of the main attack. Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, covered by fighters, literally hung on the battlefield. Persvss in the first days of the offensive was clearly on the side of Soviet aviation. However, mere numerical superiority was not enough. The squadrons that had gone on the mission, having left the airfield, were no longer controlled by anyone, the fighters were not brought from the ground, the Iggurmoviks did not interact with the ground troops, since there were no radio stations on the Soviet planes.

Nevertheless, the first experience received a positive assessment from both flight and combined arms commanders. Khudyakov reported to the commander of the Red Army Air Force, General A.A. Novikov: "I was convinced that it is possible to concentrate on the narrow sector of the front: seven hundred  
seven hundred aircraft and use them on the main on  
command of the advancing troops. During the war, I was not ashamed to be in the troops (units (our italics, -Ayat.). Aviation literally hung under the enemy and made way for the infantry... Help us, Comrade Commander, to quickly equip our fighters and attack aircraft with airborne radios. It seems to me that this is all the salt now, "x

Indeed, the "whole point" was that the 1st Air Army, in addition to bombers, included 4 fighter and 4 Iggur air divisions, and only aircraft were equipped with radio stations, and not all of them, of the 18th Guards Fighter shelf. One radio regiment for the entire army! Moreover, only a third of the machines in it had receiving and transmitting radio stations, and half had only receivers. But even this was considered a great achievement. "So far, one could only dream of such equipment in other parts," recalled the former deputy postal officer of communications in the army, Colonel E.V. Koyap der. One must think that other air armies did not even have this.

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The consequence of the small number of on-board radio facilities in the fighter and assault units was a drop in the level of professional training of communications officers. They were looked at as people, not burdened.

exchanged jobs, which the army does not tolerate. Therefore, signalmen were loaded with airfield duty and other matters little related to their immediate duties. The communications chiefs of the regiments for the most part had a flight education, they knew staff business well. They were more and more attracted to work in the headquarters, put forward in positions of chiefs of staff of the regiment. They put in their place unprepared people - all the same, there are no radio stations and their receipt is not expected.

The pilots did not want to learn radio engineering, considering it a waste of time, in which the direct bosses tacitly agreed with them. As a result, even having received radio stations, the pilots did not know how to use them. So, before the offensive, the commanders of the 1st air army equipped two kilometers from the front line in the zone of the 16th army, the point of guidance would be destroyed, but he did not justify his appointment. According to the report of Deputy Khudyakov, Colonel L.G. Kuldina: "The vast majority of his attempts to direct the exterminators at the targets of the ns yielded no results. Sometimes ... it even seemed that the pilots deliberately did not get in touch with the guidance radio station, or even performed maneuvers that were directly opposite to those indicated. Colonel Kuldin spent 2 days on pointing points. Then, realizing that you would not achieve any sense, he spat and returned to the army headquarters.

The period of combat operations also showed the need for changes in tactics, primarily in fighter aviation. Soviet pilots, in accordance with pre-war theories, were mainly trained in strikes against ground targets and were poorly prepared for air combat. Did the squadrons walk in tight formations, which, too, from one side,

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corresponded to the tasks of the attack, on the other hand, it was due to the lack of radio communications. For air combat, these "swarms" were of little use, in the confusion of the battle, the pilots quickly lost visual contact with each other and acted independently, without interaction and mutual cover.

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The main tactical unit in fighter and attack aviation was a flight of three aircraft. We had no communication between each other, the pilots in flight kept compact, wing to wing, carefully observing the actions of the flight commander. He also managed his subordinates according to the principle "do as I do". Such a system fettered the maneuver, did not allow continuous observation of the air situation, and limited the initiative.

The German pilots operated in pairs - the leader and

slave. The presence of radio stations on board allowed them to disperse over considerable distances and quickly approach if necessary, exchange information about the situation, carry out complex combat maneuvers, interact with each other and other pairs, and provide assistance - to act intelligently and tactically competently in battle. Ground guidance points helped them to quickly fall in the air of the enemy, an advantageous position in relation to them. Whether the fighters kept in touch with the bombers in conjunction with them, the latter with the ground forces.

The Navskh Me-109 installed a short-wave radio station with a range of up to 100 km, while the Me-110 had two stations, one of which was long-wave, covering a distance of about 300 km. They also have ultrashort range stations that allow access to the terrestrial telephone network.

All this, and technical equipment, and a well-functioning organization, and adequate tactics. in the Soviet Air Force had yet to be created, moreover, in the course of hostilities, at the cost of the lives of pilots who were trained for a completely different war.

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By order of General Khudyakov, one squadron in each fighter regiment was fully equipped with airborne radio equipment. Instead of links in these units, pairs became the main tactical units. On the machines of the leaders, a receiving and transmitting station was installed. Since there were still not enough of them, many followers had to be content with only prisms. In such cases, in order to check the connection, the leader after takeoff asked the follower: "If you hear, shake your wings" or "If you hear, make a "slide". He responded with appropriate evolutions, in battle he strictly followed the instructions of his commander, transmitted by radio, trying not to lose sight of him in any space case. Having lost visual contact even temporarily, the pilot could confirm whether he accepted the transmitted command.

Finally, at the end of August 1942, a GKO decree was issued on equipping all manufactured fighters and attack aircraft with transceiver radio stations and receivers at a rate of 1:5, and later 1:3. The decree had yet to be carried out, the pilots had to be trained correctly, ensuring secrecy of control, and using communications. Meanwhile, even the Air Force Headquarters published a book of call signs only in the middle of the war. The radio interception service was organized only in 1944. It is amazing that after all the miscalculations in the organization of communications and control, cybernetics in the Soviet Union was declared "bourgeois false science."

For whom, the increase in the number of radio stations has not yet solved all the problems: "If all radio stations had quartz master generators and receivers with high tuning accuracy, it would be simple and reliable to work in radio networks. But such radio

We didn't have stations and pickups at that time. Radio operators of ground stations and pilots had to constantly adjust, looking for the right correspondents on the air. Finding one, they lost others.

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Therefore, the pilots who were in the air could not easily establish two-way communication with their air representatives or aircraft operator, and even with each other. And at this time, the "German", and walking in the air, could negotiate "with any of his commanders, even if he was walking in his apartment."

The situation with the adjustment of radios improved with the adoption of new RSI-4 radio stations operating on six fixed frequencies, and the allocation of "their own will" for aviation, on which all other correspondents were strictly forbidden to work.

A lot of time passed before the pilots understood, in the words of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel S.P. Danilin, that "radio and machine guns are equal in battle", and the combat pair became the main tactical unit in Soviet fighter and attack aviation.

Similar problems were experienced by all branches of the armed forces. For example, tankers had radio stations only on command vehicles, while they were not on line vehicles, which made it much more difficult to control the battle.

The German generals also studied and by this time they had mastered well the peculiarities of Russian offensive tactics: "In the offensive, as a rule, there was no flexibility in command and control on the field and the interaction of military branches. Gradually, however, the Russians created a certain template for themselves, according to which they conducted the offensive, sometimes making only minor changes to it. In this way, they made it easier for the Germans to conduct a defense in cases where the balance of forces was capable. The Russians usually started the offensive with strong blows, fired on a wide front in order to probe for weaknesses in the enemy's defenses ... Using this enemy defense and air support, the infantry, accompanied by tanks,

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support. as a rule, in thick chains, ignoring significant losses, crossed the lavatak and literally bit into the enemy's defenses. When a breakthrough was planned in any place, mobile forces were introduced into the battle ... Elevated to a template, this method of attack crushed the defender with greater opportunities for preserving and conserving his forces {our italics. -Aat.}."

Indeed, six German divisions were successful. repelled all the attacks of twenty Soviet.

After a week of fighting, the Rovetian troops were forced to return to their original lines. The results of the operation, as always, are inspiring: "The offensive of the armies of the Western Front, due to the lack of superiority over the enemy and the strength of its defense, did not bring any special territorial successes, it pinned down the rather strong forces of the Nazis. Although it was not possible to break through the enemy defenses, the enemy was forced to transfer to this direction from the operational reserve of the tridivision.

So what? Operational reserves exist for this purpose, in order to fend off the blows of the enemy by pushing them out of the depths to threatened areas. Kluge characterizes their presence as a competent military leader.

In 19342, no operational reserves were observed during the withdrawal of our commanders, and they were not able to create them. They lined up all their troops in the front line, which allowed the Germans, after breaking through the front in narrow sectors, to go with impunity to the deep encirclement of the Soviet troops, and, surrounding them, to destroy them without hindrance. Timoshenki, Konevs, Sremenki at that time were begging for new divisions and armies from the Stavka reserve. .

It is quite natural that this failed front operation also fell into the category of "local battles". However, in connection with this "immemorial" battle, General Galitsky told an absolutely amazing story, shedding light on the secrets of our defense.

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The Soviet military doctrine developed before the war was aggressive, pardon me, offensive. It did not consider questions of strategic defense at all. It was believed that the Red Army could conduct episodic defensive operations on individual sectors, but only within the framework of a general strategic offensive. On June 22, 1941, the war began completely, which was planned by the red marshals: Since we were not preparing for a defensive war, in



the troops did not have mines, shovels, anti-tank grenades, barbed wire and much more - everything that Marshal Kulik called "cowards' weapons,

The Red Army did not have instructions for creating field defensive lines. Tochies, the instruction was. It was developed back in December 1940 by specialists from three academies - Vosno-izhenerno! Vosipoy Academician named after Frunze and the Artillery Academy. At the same time, the instructions were considered, approved, and even printed out at the printing house. But they didn't manage to somehow approve, yes, apparently, there was no special need for it. No one needed it, it lay in the isdra of the Main Military Engineering Directorate (GVIU) for almost half a year, although it "contained the most valuable information from the government on how to tactically competently build defensive lines."

On the first day of the war, it occurred to the head of the GVIU that such a document should still exist in the active army, and his deputy carried out the "approval" procedure for five minutes: he put his own signature on the instructions and ordered that the EU be sent to the troops. But even there, for a long time, it remained unclaimed, again there were not enough shovels and crowbars. looking at the great construction projects of socialism. And most importantly, until the fall of 1942, the Red Army, singing unimaginable losses, ceaselessly shed and coptra, burdening itself with the construction of defensive lines (in general, there were hundreds of thousands of civilians in the rear, women in the axis, they dug something and

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they were building something, but in most cases the Soviet troops did not occupy these positions; much more often they were later used by the Vets).

To be honest, the instruction adopted for service was written in accordance with the "most advanced" military theory, which completely rejected the "trench war". They did not intend to stay in the trenches, so they did not dig trenches, but invented an individual shooting cell - an earthen "hole" for one soldier. Simple and economical, no communication moves, spare positions and other hassle. Smart mathematicians proved that the probability of a direct hit of a projectile in such a cell is small, therefore, there will be less loss of enemy fire. Moreover, as a reminder, they were going to dig in "episodic" in separate directions as part of a general offensive with the aim of freeing the foreign proletarians from the oppression of their foreign exploiters.

In fact, it turned out that it was not enough to be able to go on the attack behind a barrage of fire, you still need to be able to beat off enemy attacks, create defenses and gain a foothold

reached boundaries. It turned out that the Sollat in the cell does not feel the elbow connection with the neighbors and is unstable in defenses. The transport of ammunition and provisions to the front line, the evacuation of the wounded, the maneuver of weapons and subunits—everything had to be done in open areas, in front of the eyes of the enemy, who opened fire on any moving target. But if “before the wind” can be done at night, then how can a company commander during the battle, for example, transfer a squad of machine gunners or a machine gun crew to a threatening direction? As a result, the troops suffered senseless, if not justifiable, losses. I didn't even talk about living conditions in the zhyamki.

So, on the mountainous day of the aforementioned pasture, the head of the engineering troops of the Western Front, together with the patching of the 16th Army, decided to inspect the front line of defense that had been beaten by the Germans. Their inquisitive

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The view was full of trenches equipped with machine guns and firing ranges, communication halls leading to dugouts for the rest of the soldiers, minimal according to froit, according to "conveniences".

And here is the chief engineer of the army “out loud zarazmyn lal”: “Chepopatyio, why is the Ismians so committed to the traishs?”

and the chief engineer of the froit had to explain to his youngest colleague that the trashis “ensure covert movement, reliable camouflage of the battle formation, maneuver of subdivisions and fire weapons along the rear, constant protection of the defenders from enemy fire, a wide possibility of preparing spare sites for firing from all types of weapons. At the same time, traishing forces the enemy to disperse fire along the entire length of the trap, as a result of which the density and effectiveness of fire is sharply reduced, and also allows the personnel of the divisions to rest in normal conditions, leaving on-duty and observers and machine gunners in positions. In general, the Germans, even when they staked on the blitzkrieg, did not begin to reject the accumulated experience of the previous war and to acquire a “forward-thinking spider” based on the pacist method. th

Nats and Reasons The head of engineering in the risk and mission (!) responded with a fral, loystoy to go into the treasures of Nitsus's military thought:

- Traish, perhaps a good pgtguka. But try to open it! How much work to put in!

Here it is, the mysterious Russian soul! Digging mass graves is, of course, easier. Here is the key to solving the riddles

ki: why the Soviet division could not break through the defenses of the Nugerman battalion, aarmich - divisions. And vice versa: why did the Pemtsy overcome the Soviet positions with such ease in any sector they chose.

His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, before the storming of the Narva, reassured the doubting Istra: "Go ahead, sir. Enough of the lulishki." Stalin's regiment

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Vodtsy thought apologically. The Red Army in 1942 was losing about 20,000 killed and wounded every day in 1942 - internal combustion forces divisions. Every day. And in 1943, and in 1944, and until the very Victory. And the liberation of Europe cost less than the defense of Salingrad and the Caucasus.

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All these "intimidation" and "probes" were used to shawl von Kluge and Model to carry out the offensive operation "Seillitz" in order to improve the operational position of their troops. Opa was launched on July 9 by the 9th German Army of the 39th Army of the Kalinian Front, which occupied a vystun in the area of the city of Bely. The Germans struck at the narrowest part of the corridor that connected this army with the main forces of the froit. In Igoga, they managed to break through the defenses of Maslennikov's army, cut the weight of communications and surround all formations and the 11th Cavalry Corps. Konev's attempts to break through the ring had no success.

By July 20, the Yemtsy liquidated the "cauldron" and began combing the area. Only a few Soviet subunits managed to get out of the circle in the sectors south and north of Bely in the zones of the 30th and 22nd armies. An important foothold of the Soviet troops southwest of Rzhev was lost. Komapdarm-39 escaped, but sgo deputy 'elgsieral I.A. Bogdanov is dead. The troops of the Kalinin Front were sent out to retreat from Velizh and Demidov to the north.

UNDER RZHEV AND SYCHEVKA

From July 16 Zhukov to  
Tellis

he planned the offensive of the operation in the Rzhev-Sychevsky direction, "organizing this operation" as a large pastuple pis within the framework of the strategic defense of the Soviet

Army (2)b.

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Post-war historiography claims that "the main goal of the operation was to pin down the enemy's forces in the Western direction, deprive him of the opportunity to transfer formations from the Army Group Center to the south, where the German troops dealt the main blow in the summer campaign, and force him to regroup part of their strategic reserves to the central sector of the front. The version of the ego is thought up in hindsight as a fictitious target. It was at this time that Hitler withdrew divisions from the southern wing of the Eastern Front and transferred them to the West, near Leningrad and ... to Army Group Center (in particular, the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions and the Motorized Division were transferred to Field Marshal Kluge "Great Germany").

Just the presence of an enemy bridgehead 120 km from Moscow unnerved the Zerkhov Commander-in-Chief,

The idea of operation was to defeat the main forces of the German 9th Army, liquidate the Rzhev salient, capture the cities of Rzhev, Zubtsov, Sychevka, and with luck - My elm and firmly gain a foothold on the Volga, Gzhat and Vazuza rivers. The main role was assigned to the Western Front under the command of Zhukov. Kalinin Front General I.S. Konev was to use the forces of the 30th and 29th armies to nance the main blow from the north to Rzhev and the auxiliary one along the left berg of the Volga to Zubtsov. The Western Front, with the forces of the 31st and 20th armies, was to break through the enemy defenses on the Derzha River and, having defeated the enemy's Zubtsov-Karmanov grouping, reach the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers. After that, the 31st Army was to advance on Zubtsov, assisting the troops of the Kalinin Front in the liberation of Rzhev. And the 20th Army developed a strike in the direction of Sychevka. Yuzhisa was to strike at Sychevka and Vyazma to the 5th and 33rd armies.

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Two weeks were allotted for preparation.

"During the preparation of the operation, a set of measures was carried out aimed at educating the personnel of an offensive impulse, explaining the significance of the operation, the combat missions of the troops, studied

all the experience of conducting offensive battles with a breakthrough of prepared defenses.

But not a single political work.

In order to fulfill the assigned task, the fronts received a significant amount of artillery, armor of tank and mechanized troops.

Thus, the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front, commanded by Major General D.D. Lelyusheiko, who attacked Rzhev from the north, received 9 armored brigades, of which 6 were used for direct support of the infantry, and 3 brigades - 35th, 238th and 240th - made up the army's mobile group. In total, the army had over 400 tanks.

In the offensive zone of the two right-flank armies of the Western Front, the 6th and 8th tank high corps, 11 separate tank brigades and a scooter motorcycle brigade (which numbered about 1000 tanks), the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were concentrated.

31st Army General V.S. Polenov, which had in its composition 7 rifle divisions (118, 164, 336, 247, 88, 239 and 20th guards), six tank brigades were attached - 34, 71 and 212th for joint operations with infantry, and 92, 101st and 145th were part of the army mobile group under the command of Major General Bychkovsky. They were ordered to capture Zubtsov in the first laziness of the operation, and advance detachments to go south of this city to Vazuza.

20th Army of Lieutenant General M.A. Reiter = six rifle divisions (251, 331, 354, 82, 312 and 415th), the 40th rifle brigade was reinforced by five tank brigades, of which the 17th and 20th were transferred to the rifle divisions of the first echelon, and 11, 188, 213th

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the slipper and 1st scooter brigades constituted an army mobile group under the command of Colonel P.M. Armand. She was to defeat the opposing enemy and by the end of the first day of the operation, with solid forces, reach the line of Podberszki - Ovsyaniki. At the same time, Arman's group had the task of seizing the Gzhat crossings with forward detachments and, with part of its forces, capturing the regional center of Karmanovo.

In addition to tank brigades, General Reuter was additionally assigned the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - the 26th Guards Rifle Division, the 153rd, 148th, 129th and 150th Rifle Brigades, a number of artillery and mortar units. By the beginning of the offensive, the army had 255 slippers, 1517 guns and mortars.

libra 76 mm and above, atakzhs 1105 - caliber 25-50 mm.

It was planned to deploy army mobile groups on the first day of the operation with the task of completing the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and seizing a bridgehead on the zhat and Vazuza rivers with forward detachments. The development of success in the operational depth was entrusted to the front mobile group consisting of the spirit of the tank and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps under the overall command of General Major I.V. alapina. The group was to enter the gap on the second day of the operation between the armies of Polenov and Reiter and advance in the general direction towards Sychevka.

Thus, Zhukov and Konev, for a private operation, were going into battle with about 1,400 tanks, more than their armies on the front of the decisive German offensive.

For the first time, it was planned to edit on a large scale the ideas of the "artillery offensive" set out in the Stavka directive of 10 January. The set of rules drawn up for the front-line commanders, as we think, was simple; make maximum use of the firepower of the artillery, increase its mobility, and strengthen its interaction with the infantry at all stages of an offensive battle. All this was written long ago in

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instructions and instructions. It's just that the instructions weren't written for generals, but the instructions of "Comrade Vasily", whether you like it or not, had to be studied and accepted for execution,

As a result, 1323 guns and mortars and 80 rocket launchers (140 barrels per kilometer, and this is almost at the same time when Mashiteyi was proud of his most powerful artillery grouping in the entire war) were concentrated on the 10-kilometer breakthrough section of the 30th Army ); on the 8-kilometer section of the 29th army - 936 guns and mortars;; in the 20th army, 978 guns and 16 rocket artillery battalions accounted for 8 kilometers. In addition, second-echelon slippers were involved in the artillery preparation.

Each rifle division in the shock groups of the armies was supposed to break through the enemy defenses on an average front of 22.3 km.

Since the Soviet troops had to cross the water barriers, the advancing armies were reinforced with engineer units and Pontoino-pseer crossing means.

The total number of troops in the four armies was 345 thousand people.

To ensure the secrecy of the preparations for the operation, a number of camouflage and disinformation measures were carried out, to which Zhukov had been a great hunter since the time of Khalkhia-Gol. These actions were intended to hide preparations for delivering a strike in the chosen direction and to simulate preparations for an offensive in the zone of the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies. A limited circle of people was involved in the direct organization of the operation, no written documents were issued, the commanders gave tasks and orders to their subordinates orally. Arriving troops hid in the forests 25-40 km from the planned breakthrough site, their headquarters and rear establishments were strictly forbidden to be located in populated areas.

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To mislead the Ismians. on the left wing of the Western Front, the creation of a powerful group of troops was depicted. To show the concentration of troops in the wrong direction, 4 camouflage guns, 3 rifle companies, 122 vehicles and 9 vehicles, a machine gun installation, 11 radio stations were involved. Sa pens produced 833 max tanks, cars, guns, tank trucks and camping kitchens.

Groups of camouflagemen demonstrated the advancement of tank and motorized heating squadrons into areas of false concentrations and troopers. For a period of time they placed mock-ups of tanks and vehicles along the routes indicated by them. Such an impromptu colopia "moved" until the enemy self-propelled guns surrounded it. After that, the material part was rolled up and transferred to new routes and sections. In order to attract enemy aerial reconnaissance to lodge areas, their living activities were demonstrated: with the help of attached tanks and cars, they towed mock-ups of military vehicles, leaving traces of caterpillars and wheels on the group, and lit bonfires. During air raids, accompanied by bombing, on-duty squads with bottles of combustible mixture imitated boils and fires at the locations of mock-ups of military equipment, opened rifle-machine-gun fire on descending aircraft. Radio stations demonstrated the active work of the "arriving" headquarters.

Provsdepye activities have yielded positive results. The enemy repeatedly bombed and fired at false areas, German reconnaissance was diverted to reveal the false grouping. But what is especially important, the Germans stepped up defensive work in this direction and, according to Soviet data, transferred two infantry divisions here.

Offensive preparations were also intensively demonstrated on the left flank of the 20th army: commanding reconnaissance posts were openly carried out

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Intensified reconnaissance searches were undertaken, artillery shooting was spotted, mock-ups were built, and the concentration of troops in the depths of battle formations was discovered. In the meantime, the main attack was planned at the junction with Polenov's army from the Pogoreloe Torodishe region.

In a word, once the enemy air force was diverted to the opening of a false grouping, the advance turned out to be for Kluge in the regrouping and concentration of forces in the offensive zones of the strike groups was achieved more than 7 times the superiority of the enemy in tanks, 6 times the artillery and 4 times the people. The concentration of troops began to rain heavily.

The Germans in the zone of the forthcoming offensive had six infantry (five of them reduced, 6 battalion pogo pigat) and two motorized (14th and 36th) divisions. Their main line of defense reached a depth of 5-8 km and consisted of a system of strongholds with a well-thought-out system of various types of ogya, connected by full-profile trenches, covered with mypiy fields and barbed wire. Each strong point had several positions for anti-tank guns and mortars. The operational reserves were located west of the Valuzha River: the 6th Infantry Division was in the Sychsvka area, the 1st Infantry Division was in Rzhev, the 5th Infantry Division was in Vyazms, the 2nd Tank Division was in Smoleisks, the 253rd Infantry Division was fighting partisans in the Dorogobuzh area . I can't help but add Sonst's appraisal of the morale of the German troops in July 1942: "Tebbels' propaganda, boastful reports of victories in the south, still continued to fool many German soldiers, especially the youth."

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The first on July 30 at 7.30, with the support of "artillery music" of twenty artillery regiments of the RGC and eight

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tsati divisions of guards mortars went on the offensive troops of the Kalinin Front. The power of this blow was so great that the infantrymen of the 30th army



The missions passed the first line of defense, almost meeting resistance. Lelyusheiko's troops broke through the first line of enemy defenses, but the second, having met stubborn resistance and organized fire, were forced to stop. Artillery and even tanks lagged behind, bogged down in the slippery mud.

General Khlebnikov recalled: "Whoever advanced then, in the pits and swamps near Rzhev, is unlikely to forget these days. Water pours in streams from above, water makes its way from behind, momentarily filling the freshly dug trenches. In humid vapors, in fog, the infantry marches. Feet get stuck in a black liquid mess so firmly that tarpaulin boots grab you like tongs. The artillerymen harnessed a dozen horses to pull out a light 76mm cannon, but that doesn't help either. The horses sit down in the mud almost up to their belly, they have to be pulled out with ropes. Mud was our main enemy, it made us lose a lot of time to overcome each kilometer.

When "the unfinished Hitler's Hetzerals" wrote about a similar situation during the Typhoon operation, our historians immediately exposed them: it was, they say, the weather, but it was the weather of our proletarian military leaders and the mass heroism of the Red Army soldiers. But now "Gsieral Dirt" is preventing them too. Although, if you think about it, launch 400 tapkop and artillery through the swamp? And without rain, there will be sandbox.

The offensive stalled, Lelyushenko's army was drawn into protracted battles for the fortified area of Po Lunino. The actions of the Soviet troops took on the character of a methodical gnaw through of the defense in depth. Rifle divisions advanced slowly - 1-2 km per day, recapturing every meter of land at a high price.

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did not have a success group. Tank brigades could not break away from the infantry and acted with it as close support tanks. Five divisions and 400 Lelyusheiko tanks trampled in the mud in front of the positions of the enemy's 256th infantry division. 29th Army Major General V.I. Shvetsova was unable to advance at all. Fierce fighting north of Rzhev continued for the next 3 weeks without any visible result.

The command of the Army Group "Center" was slowed down, but began the transfer of reserves to the threatened area. On July 31, the 6th Infantry Division arrived in the Sychevka area, where the headquarters of General Maudsl was located. In early August, the 5th Panzer Division began to advance from Vyazma to Rzhev, pulling up

the 1st tank was going down. Their concentration was to end on August 5-7.

Zhukov planned to strike on August 2nd. But this proved impossible because of the rain. The water level in the river Derzha, through which the lipia froita and the breakthrough site passed, rose sharply. The turbulent stream tore off two of the four bridges. The depth of the fords, which was usually 0.2–0.7 m, increased to 22.5 m, making them impassable. Dirt roads also fell into disrepair. In addition, the results of the combat operations of the Kalinin Front turned out to be very modest, especially at the junction with the 31st Army. Given all this, the command of the Western Front, in agreement with the Headquarters, postponed the start of the offensive to August 4,

5 days after Konev, at 6.15, with powerful support from artillery and aviation, Zhukov delivered his blow. The fire of all guns and mortars of the two armies suddenly fell on the front line of the enemy in the area of Pogoreliy Torodishche. The Germans managed to capture the vras badly. During an hour and a half processing the front edge, the defense of the 161st Infantry and 36th Motorized

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divisions, in the words of General of the Army Iotman, was "literally swept away." The final chord was the simultaneous salvo of 18 Katyusha divisions - about 3600 rockets of 132 and 82 mm caliber, fired within 10 seconds,

After such fire training, which lasted an hour and a half, the shock groups of the 31st and 20th armies broke through the first and second defense positions of the 161st infantry and 36th motorized divisions along a front of up to 15 km without any special difficulties. Before dark, the troops of the first echelon advanced to a depth of 6-8 km, defeating the 161st division of General Rex. a brothel with the "Aryan brigade" serving it. The Germans, having abandoned heavy weapons, plowed a hasty retreat, hiding behind the fire of small rearguard groups, mining roads and settlements.

The mobile groups of both advancing armies crossed the Derzha by 1600 hours and, encountering no resistance, entered the gap. By the end of the day, the group of General Bychkovsky with the main forces went to the district of Staroe, Revyakino, and advanced units reached the settlement of Yemelyantsvo. The group of Colonel Armap at the same time was approaching Koprakovo, while its Persian units were approaching Praslovo. Onsetpis continued

pity at night.

Kutru On August 5, formations of the Western Front completely overcame the main line of defense, expanding the breakthrough to 16 km and deepening into the disposition of German troops by 8-10 km. In the evening, parts of the army mobile groups approached the rear defensive line of the enemy on the approaches to the Vazuza River, but could not break through it immediately. The 8th Rifle Corps at that time made its way through the forests to Karmanovo, overcoming the fierce resistance of the 36th Motorized Division.

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Thus, the troops of the 31st and 20th armies basically completed the task of breaking through the tactical defense zone to the full depth. At the same time, on the whole, the tasks set by them were not fully implemented. As already noted, the plan of the operation provided for the capture of the city of Zubtsov on the second day for the 31st Army and access to Vazuza, for the 20th Army - the liberation of Karmanovo and the capture of the crossings to Gkati by advanced detachments. These goals have not yet been achieved because of the slowness of the general army mobile groups both when crossing the Derzha and after entering the gap. They literally stomped in the mud.

Again, problems arose in command and control of the troops, which do not stand still, but are constantly on the move. Mobile radio stations in the Red Army were no longer invented, the main means of communication remained mounted delegates: "Half of the radio stations of the hub. communications of the army and most of the radio stations of the soldiers drank out of order or got stuck in the mud of the rear roads ... To strengthen communications with the troops, a cavalry squadron was allocated from the cavalry corps to the army headquarters. Due to the poor organization of supplies, by the end of the second day of the operation, the units of the first echelon had 0.2-0.5 ammunition and three-quarters of the refueling.

Kromstoy, German aviation, exerting a rather significant impact on the advancing formations of the 31st and 20th armies, directed all its efforts to their rear and front reserves. Despite Soviet superiority in the air and heavy losses, the Pemsy Samo- leges, operating in groups of 10-30 vehicles, carried out bombing strikes throughout the second half of the day on August 4. The crossings over the Derzha suffered especially from them. All of them were destroyed. Measures to restore them were not taken in a timely manner. As a result, the conditions for bringing the front-line mobile group into the gap turned out to be much more favorable than expected. Nevertheless, according to Zhukov, the operation began successfully.

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The mobile group of the front began to move out of the starting areas at 2000 hours on August 4. All the roads turned out to be clogged with convoys, artillery, the roads were in exceptionally poor condition. Cars traveling at night with darkened headlights got stuck in the mud. All this slowed down the movement.

Only in the morning the group of General Galanin reached the river. To the north of the Pogorely Orodish, the 6th Tank Corps (169 slippers) of Major General A.L. [egma na, yuzhnes - 8th (165 tanks) Major General M.D. From Lomatin, and to the left of him - the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (about 20 thousand people, 120 guns) of General Major V.V. Kryukov. Since the restoration of the crossings had not even begun yet, the group was forced to stop on the eastern shore. Fortunately, she had at her disposal weak means of transportation - two panton battalions, as well as three attached engineer battalions. The latter immediately got down to business, and at 12-13 o'clock they were able to ensure the crossing of two slipper brigades to the western bank of the river. By that time, General Galanin had specified the task for the day, ordering both tank corps with strong forward detachments to capture the Gnezdilovo-Khlspen border and the crossings on Vazuz by 18 o'clock. South carried, to Bkat, the cavalry corps was supposed to advance.

At that time it began to rain again. When the advanced detachments launched an offensive in the indicated direction, the roads, dried up by the sughra, again turned into a mess. To whom, they were completely defeated by the troops that had passed through. Moreover, the latter in a number of places were still able to pull some of their cars out of the mud. Now it has created, traffic jams. True, after the tankers themselves, only one name remained from the roads: "Tankers, as a rule, did not recognize any roadsides, weak bridges did not go around and often broke them. As a result, most of the roads after the passage of tanks became almost impassable for ar

tilleries and motor transport".

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In a word, the forward detachments advanced extremely slowly. Even the tanks had a hard time with every kilometer. Every now and then you had to drag wheeled zhs cars in your arms. By the end of August 5, a detachment of the 5th Panzer Corps was able to withdraw part of its forces only to the paradise of Pokrov, Rovnos. The advanced subdivisions of the 6th corps, moving somewhat quickly, reached Kostino, Brovtsino on the near approaches to Vazuzs on

section of the 251st Rifle Division of the 20th Army.

Ahead was the enemy's fortified line in advance, passing here and north to Zubtsov along the western bersgarsky, and further south-east from Ise to Karmapovo. In front of this line, on the afternoon of August 5, the advancing troops of the 31st and 20th armies met with sharply increased enemy resistance and were stopped along their entire zone. An attempt by units of the 251st Infantry Division of Colonel B.B. Gorodovikov to break through the enemy defenses in the direction of Bukontovo was not successful even with the approach of the advance detachment of the 6th tank corps, which consisted of the 100th tank, 6th motorized rifle brigades and two anti-tank artillery batars.

Zhukov's new directive instructed the 31st and 20th Armies to resume the operation from the Ugrian on August 6 and on August 8 to move in their lanes to the Rzhev-Vyazma railway. The front mobile group was ordered to continue the offensive in the direction of Sychevka.

6th Panzer Corps. who had advanced his main forces to the area of Zepovskoye, Zasukhino, Staros, should have, without delay, marched on the Kopylovo. From there, the Smu was to attack in the direction of the settlement of Maloe Kropotono and capture the area of Krivtsovo, Mostishchi, Berezovka, Kuzmino, located on the Rzhsva meridian. The corps of General Solomatin received the task of advancing from Kaskov, Pokrov, Rovnoye to Kozlovo, Khlepepy in the future

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go to Sychevka. It was up to the Cavalry Corps of General Kryukov to defeat the enemy southeast of this settlement, which pushed out more easily from the districts of Praslovo, Krasny Pakhar, Semenovskoye, Kondra covo.

These tasks could not be fully fulfilled, although they were assigned to the troops of the Western Front with minor changes until the end of 1942. Sometimes it seemed that the goal was close. But the Germans again and again managed to regain lost ground. In no case did Hitler want to give up a convenient foothold, hoping to repeat the attack on Moscow someday,

The formations of the mobile front group were still moving very slowly. The rain poured incessantly. Only in the second half of the day of August, the building of 1etman. joined the battle with the heavily depleted units of the 161st Infantry Division, which opposed the left flank of the 31st and the right flank of the 20th armies. One of the first to attack

enemy advance detachment of the 200th tank brigade. Acting together with the infantry, after a fierce battle, he broke into Bukontovo and went to the eastern bank of the Vazuza River. Following that, units of the 8th Tank Corps captured the settlement of Kozlovo. Even the southern heads of the forces of the 251st Infantry Division and the tankers Soloma Tina cleared Lukoviiki and Karamzino of the enemy and continued to advance in the direction of Pschora. The left-wing 88th division of the 31st army, with the support of the 200th tank brigade, liberated Koshelevo, which the Germans used as one of the isopor points.

The enemy's defense in this sector was thus broken through at the Koshelevo-Karamzino line. By 20 o'clock the main forces of the front mobile group reached Vazuza. On the same day, the 6th motorized rifle and 200th tank brigades of the Hetman's corps crossed to the western coast and launched an offensive in the direction of Gredyakino, Schskollino, Kortnievo. But barely advancing 2-3 km, they collided with

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The enemy's reserves were gone. With the onset of darkness, the battle ceased, the Soviet units managed to hold a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Vazuza.

The 31st tank brigade of the 8th corps also broke through to the river at night and captured the crossing in the Khlepeni area.

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The attack of the Western Front on Sychevka created a threat to cut off the entire northern part of the Rzhev ledge of the Navy with the troops of the 9th German Army stationed there. But the time difference of 5 days between the start of the offensive of the armies of Konev and the armies of Zhukov played into the hands of the enemy. By August 5, the reserves of the Army Group "Center" had already concentrated in the Sychevka area, and instead of fortifying the Rzhev direction, General Model instantly decided to use them to launch a counterattack on Pogorelos Yurodishche: from Osuga through Bukontovo - with the forces of the 5th Panzer and 253rd Infantry Divisions, from the side of Sychevka through Khlepen - the 1st tank and 6th infantry divisions, from the Karmanovo area - the 2nd tank, 36th motorized and 342nd infantry divisions. The advance of the German divisions began on the night of 6 August.

To show all the difficulty of the problems that suddenly arose before him, General of the Army Jotman fantasizes uncontrollably about how strong the enemy was:

"So, battles were coming with clearly superior enemy forces. Such a conclusion could be made on the basis of data known to us about the composition of German formations. Thus, enemy tank divisions usually numbered up to 200 or more tanks (there were no such divisions in 1942. - Aet.). Running a little ahead, I note that this time the balance of forces in the offensive zone of the right wing of the Western Front ... in general was approximately equal, but in some sectors, including ours, it was effective

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strongly inclined in favor of the Nazis. In most cases, the enemy's 5th division had up to 16,000 officer soldiers, that is, twice as many as our corps. She had 160 tanks, while we had 169, but at the same time, more than a third of the latter were T + 50 light tanks with weak armor and a 20-mm gun (and more than 24 KV, 46 T-34 and 30 T-70. - Auth) . The ratio of forces in infantry was also not in our favor: zu.

It was as if General @tmap carried out the entire Rzhev-Sychevsk operation alone. Two enemy tank divisions are a huge force, and fourteen Soviet tank brigades opposing them are nothing! Tochio, as well as the four Ismetsky infantry divisions operating in this zone, it was believed that pesoism was more powerful than our ten rifle and three cavalry Russian divisions.

Another thing is that the tank corps really turned out to be forced to operate in rather difficult conditions, through no fault of the enemy. Already at the time of their advance from the region of the Derzha River through the familiar terrain, their pigabs collided © with the fact that they could not receive any data from the rifle units either about the road or about the situation on the front line. When breaking through the enemy defenses in the Koshelevo-Bukoptovo sector, the commanders of the rifle regiments came out: they had been here for almost a day, they were not able to tell the tankers any information © of the opposing units, And besides: "... there were no tanks with infantry, there were no artillery savits. Tapkists did not have sufficient experience in using signalization, they were not able to maintain continuous communication and maintain a western course (!) On the offensive.

The torrential lodges began to pour in again. The supply of ammunition, food and fuel was carried out by only one kind of transport, and with great difficulty. Armap's group received fuel by air Motorized units were forced to move on foot.

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There was also a lack of communication between the regiments and the headquarters of the divisions, and the latter with the headquarters of the armies. This led to a lack of a clear idea of the terrain ahead and enemy forces. The front-line mobile group, which did not always know the situation in the offensive zone, could not boast of good communications either. 6th lane Galanin, who chose the command post of the 6th Tank Corps as his place of residence, had no control apparatus, no own means of communication, and actually did not control anything. For this reason, the commander of the front had to take charge of the corps of the mobile group immediately.

On August 7, on the outskirts of Valuzs, a battle broke out between the Soviet tank corps and the 1st and 5th tank divisions.

As a result of 2 days of fierce fighting, the 6th tank corps and the units of rifle divisions that interacted with it did not only repel all enemy attacks, but expanded the bridgehead. The enemy was driven out of Kortnsvo, located on the banks of the Osuga, and from the pastel points of Vasilki and Lair located in the interfluvium.

On August 8, Kiskhod also saw success in the sector from the 8th Panzer Corps. Together with the main forces of the 251st Rifle Division, its 93rd Tank and 8th Motorized Rifle Brigades approached the eastern bank of the Vazuza, pinning the enemy against the river, while their left-wing units began to cross over to the western bank. As always unexpectedly, it turned out that "it turns out that the Vazuza is a more solid tributary of the Volga, even though the Derzha, the width is more than 80 m in places, and the depth reaches two or more meters". The 31st and 25th tank brigades of the corps moved forward even more Solomatina. Interacting with units of the 331st Rifle Division, Colonel P.D. Berestov, the first of them crossed Vazuza in the Khlepen region, the second crossed Gzhat. As a result, advice

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Soviet troops in this area reached the line Khlepen, Klimovo, Popsuev, and a few others advanced to Burgovo.

Overcame Gzhat and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, advancing in the zone of the 354th Rifle Division of General Major D.F. Alexesva. Continuing to act together with her, in the course of fierce battles he entered the settlements of Romanovo, Podyablonki, Kolokolnya. When crossing the river, the cavalymen suffered significant losses, since the German



aviation intermittently stormed the coccyx from low altitudes. There was no video of Soviet aviation, although 9 air divisions were allocated only to support the 20th Army; anti-aircraft artillery lagged far behind the advanced units.

The left-flank formations of the 20th Army, while continuing stubborn resistance, advanced in the direction of Karmanovo.

Tavgusga, the troops of the 5th Army went on the offensive under the command of Lieutenant-General I.I. Fedyupinskogo - Zya guards motorized rifle, 42nd gparley rifle, 19th, 28th rifle divisions, 28th, 35th and 49th rifle, 120th, 161st, 154th tank brigades. The task of the army was to break through the enemy's defenses south of Karmapopo and develop success in the North-Western direction and towards Sychevka. , which in one del only in the 3rd motorized rifle division disabled 413 people. On August 10, Zhukov set a more modest task for Commander-5: to send the authorities to Karmanov. the 33rd Army of General Lieutenant M. Khozin, who began to advance south of August 13, was the smallest.

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In fact, the Soviet offensive was provided by two - 1st and 3rd - air armies, which included

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included 19 air divisions. Aviation commanders again tried to work out the organization of calling fighters to the battlefield at the request of ground troops. Special representatives, who were with their walkie-talkies in the combined arms armies, ensured the exit of aircraft to the battle area 3-10 minutes after the call was made. Directly over the battlefield, aviation operations were directed by representatives of the fighter air divisions located at the radio station of the Yaharmei radio company VNOS. They informed the pilots about the air situation, having two-to-one contact with them. However, such cases were rare - most aircraft still did not have radio facilities, especially transmitters. Therefore, to provide direct support to the advancing troops during the battle, aviation did not have the opportunity and delivered strikes mainly on deep targets.

But at least experience was accumulated, an organization was laid. Already in February 1943, as Colonel Koyander says with a throat, in the 1st Air Army

for the first time carried out radio control of the target of a large group of attack aircraft, however: "Such cases of radio control of ground attack aircraft located over the battlefield were extremely rare at that time ... all the attention of aircraft controllers was paid mainly to fighters."

There was another good reason that did not allow this time the "Stalin's falcons" to win air superiority in the Sychevsky and Rzhepsky directions. If earlier it was argued that most Soviet aircraft had an obsolete design and our pilots could not, because of this, fight with the Luftwaffe on an equal footing, then another misfortune befell: "... fighter pilots, only on the eve of the operation, having received aircraft of the latest systems, did not learn still fight on them ... ". As they say: not diarrhea, so scrofula.

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Even more intense fighting broke out on 9 August. Both sides committed all their forces to the battle. The Corps of the 1st Army, advancing together with units of the 88th Rifle Division of the 31st Army, dealt a heavy blow to the enemy in the morning. Only the left-flank units managed to break his resistance. Relying on success, the corps with infantry slowly moved forward throughout the whole day, mainly along Vazuza. By the end of the day, they reached the line of Kortnevo, Lagovoe, Trostipo, Pechora, expanding the bridgehead on the western bank of the river up to 8-9 km along the front and up to 5 km inland. The 8th Corps also advanced successfully that day. But its tankists suffered heavy losses from German aviation. Kryukov's cavalry corps defeated the 6th Infantry Division, but was stopped 8 km southeast of Sychevka by units of the 1st Panzer Division and detachments of the "labor service" thrown into battle. In the Karmanovo area, the 8th Rifle Corps of Major General F. D. Zakharov, all too lazy, successfully repulsed the attacks of the 46th tank corps of the enemy. Convinced of the futility of a counterattack on Pogorslos Gorodishche, Model ordered the troops of the 9th Army to go over to the defensive on August 10!

In general, the results of the oncoming battle turned out to be favorable for the troops of the right wing of the Western Front. They approached the Vazuza and Vkat rivers along the entire offensive zone and liberated the southern part of the city of Zubtsov. However, the balance of forces, which had changed in favor of the enemy, called into question the success of the further offensive on Sychevka: practically all available troops were brought into battle, mobile groups lost their strength. The factor of surprise lost its effect. At the same time, the appearance of the 2nd tank

nemisy divisions in the Karmanovo area threatened the left flank of the 20th Army. In addition, the troops of the Kalinin Front had not yet approached Rzhev, and it was not necessary to count on their help in the offensive in the Sychevsky direction.

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True, according to the testimony of General Sandalov, the commander of the 20th Army for some time nurtured the idea of breaking through the Yemets defenses from the plateau southeast of Gkati and breaking through directly to Vyazma, but General Kryukov, remembering the fate of the groups of Efremov and Belov, refused from this honor:

"On the instructions of Reuter, I went several times to talk on this issue with the corps commander Vladimir Viktorovich. Kryukov, my close comrade in joint service in the troops of the Belorussian Military District.

"If we send both tank corps and my bridgehead corps across the Tzhat River to the southwest, there is no doubt that we will break through the enemy defenses and successfully go to Vyazma," Kryukov reasoned coolly. "However, the weak troops of your army will not be able to maintain the breakthrough site. The enemy, after our passage, will close the front and will beat us surrounded by both tank divisions and aviation.

- And if only your corps, reinforced by a rifle division and all army tank brigades, is allowed into the breach? I asked.

"There are not many tanks left in the army tank brigades, and, as I know, you deliver fuel for them by air transport," Kryukov replied mockingly. "In a raid, your brigades will be a burden to me. No, let the glory and laurels in carrying out such an operation remain only with Moscow colleague General Pavel Alksesovich Belov. I don't believe in the possibility of such a raid today."

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On August 9, the command of the Western Front adopted a decision that provided for a number of measures to strengthen the troops advancing on the Karmanovsky

board, with the aim of defeating the enemy grouping opposed there. In particular, this is directed

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lenis was also transferred to the 8th tank corps, which was transferred to the subordination of the 20th army. He was ordered to concentrate on August 10 in the Podberezka area, together with units of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, to strike at the left flank of the enemy's Karmapov grouping and liberate the regional center of Karmanovo. Thus, the corps of General Solomatia was withdrawn from the mobile group. On the night of August 10, the op sent the 25th Infantry Division his sector of operations to the districts of Igiatovo, Flyakovo and began to advance towards the Karmapovskos direction.

The defeat of the Karmapov group, according to Zhukov, should have created conditions for expanding the offensive operation of the right wing of the Western Front by connecting the 5th and 33rd armies to the army.

As a result of this, the strike group advancing on Sychevka was even more weakened. In the EU, ONE tank corps remained, which, as before, had the task of expanding the bridgehead, paying for the Podyablonki, Chupyatino section. If the day before, all armored forces of the froig mobile group with the 251st, 331st rifle divisions and part of the forces of the 354th had struck at this pravlepion, then from August 10, one corps [tmapa from the 251st rifle division. The 331st and 354th were ordered to gain a foothold on the lines they had reached. Over the next three days, the troops did not succeed in fulfilling the 1st dacha they had set - the enemy moved to a tough defense at a distance of prepared lines.

On August 13, the Pemts delivered a viszap blow from the Vishiyakovo, Kholm side of the positions of the 88th Infantry Division. As a result, all parts were forced to leave Gardens and Vasilki. The division entrenched itself in the area of the east Plyushchevo, Pishchalino, Luchkopo, Lair. At the same time, the 6th corps was ordered to Pripyat from its section, which was pushing from the last settlement in the southeast to Vazuzs, and with a blow in the Western

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board to return the village of Sady, again captured by the enemy.

Now Hetman's tankers were advancing simultaneously both to the southwest and to the west, the Germans put up stubborn resistance, now and then turning into counterattacks. Fighting in the interfluve continued until [August 8. By the end of that day, the 6th Panzer Corps and units of the 251st Rifle Division had pressed the enemy in both directions, crossing Osuga in a number of sectors and in the battles along the Luchkovo-Sady-Zevalovka-Pechora line.

The enemy, however; continued to increase resistance. In the period from 19 to 22 August, they again launched counterattacks with large forces. The German 1st Panzer Division operated in the zones of the 331st and 354th Rifle Divisions, which "managed to push the Soviet units, the 5th Taiko Division tried to push back the 6th Panzer Corps and the 251st Rifle Division on the same days . But she had no success. Against. ours managed to move forward and expand the bridgehead west of Osuga to the line of Sady, Paltsevo, Kiselevo.

On the left flag, the troops of the 20th Army from three directions advanced on the regional center of Karmanovo. Against three German divisions - the 2nd tank, 36th motorized and 342nd infantry, united by the headquarters of the 46th tank corps, General Reiter threw the 8th slipper and 8th rifle corps, 415, 312, 82- th rifle divisions and the 40th rifle division, as well as three separate tank brigades. From the south, having crossed the Yauza, two divisions of the Fedyuninsky army advanced into this area. Nevertheless, the rate of gnaw through of the multi-tiered Islamic defense was 1-2 km per day, the operation lasted almost two weeks.

August 23 was marked by two significant events in the offensive zone of the right wing of the Western Front. On this day, the 31st Army liberated Zubtsov, and the 20th Army, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 5th Army, liberated the regional center of Karmanovo.

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Using the success of the Western Front, from August 21, the actions of the 30th and 23rd armies of the Kalipin Front were activated. In the same del was taken the village of Polunino. This event became possible as a result of the following confluence of circumstances.

The commander of the 14th Guards Rifle Division, with the support of the 35th Taik Brigade, which had been fighting for this fortified point for 8 days, fell ill and was sent to the rear. Colonel P.1, who replaced the commander; Shafkh Ranpov proposed an idea of genius and apparently accessible to the ralum of a higher komaiidapiya: to change the direction of the blow. The fact is that before that, all attacks by Polupino were methodically and monotonously carried out from the north. since by the fuse of 07. the reference on the headquarters map was a passable swamp. And so, pakopets, after eight days of bloody warfare, the Dinilio scouts walked into the swamp and found out that a long time ago

dried up.

After checking this information, Colonel Shafranov drew up his plan for a shigurm: a tank brigade and one

the mu rifle regiment was jokingly "depicting" an attack from the north, and two regiments of infantry were supposed to strike *viezai tu* around, through the swamp. At dawn on August 21, that part of the forces of the 16th Guards Division, together with the Taikists, started a battle on the northern outskirts of the village, and 2 rifle regiments quickly and secretly went out to the outskirts of Polunino. The Germans did not expect such sophistication from the "Ivans" - a large supporting navel fell within three hours. The funny thing is that when analyzing the operation at the front headquarters, Shafranov was reproached for not dragging tanks into the swamp (!), because according to the charter, "tanks are supposed to be launched with the main forces."

The armies of the Kalipin Front entered the approaches to Rzhev and the left bank of the Volga. However, by August 23, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet troops were exhausted and they were dying to defend. Rzhev remained behind the Germans,

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In the course of the operation, the Soviet troops advanced west another 40-45 km, liberated 3 regional centers, but they achieved their decisive goals. True, by their active actions they forced the German command to transfer [3 district Rzhev several formations from other sectors of the front. Assessing these events, General Tipples Kirch writes: "The only way to prevent a breakthrough was that three tank and several infantry divisions, which were preparing to be transferred to the southern front, were detained and introduced first to localize the breakthrough, and then to counterattack." This was subsequently announced as the achievement of the Red Army's operational-strategic significance and the main goal of the offensive.

However: firstly, Tippleskirch's book, to which Soviet sources like to refer, was published in 1951, published in Russian in 1956 - we learned all this from him; secondly, it is not clear what specific divisions the general is referring to, but it is known for certain that it was in August that von Klugs received tank divisions from the "southern froit" of the internal combustion forces, which they immediately put into action.

The Red Army also achieved educational goals:

"... it was clearly refuted by Hitler's assertion that the Soviet troops were allegedly incapable of successfully advancing against the Wehrmacht in the last period;

..the operation clarified a number of theoretical provisions

information about an offensive operation and showed a lot of new things for improving the organization of troops and their more advantageous deployment during an offensive;

... the operation had chain experience for subsequent operations on the organization and entry into the breakthrough army and front mobile groups.

And in general: "... the command and troops gained valuable combat experience ... In general, this operation was

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a definite step in the development of Soviet military art.

Is the liberation of one single district center the achievement of a "major offensive operation" on two fronts?

The study of Zhukov, Konev, Reiter, Fedyuninsky, Sapdalov and the clarification of "a number of theoretical propositions" cost their troops huge losses - officially 193,683 people were killed and wounded, i.e. 52% of all forces thrown into battle. This figure does not take into account the 5th and 33rd armies. The results achieved by Fedyuninsky and Khozin were scanty, therefore it is generally accepted that their troops in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation did not seem to participate at all and did not suffer any losses. In fact, the Zhukovskys operations against the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge are the bloodiest battles of 1942, surpassing even Stalingrad in this "indicator". The losses in them amounted to about 8,000 people - almost a division - per day. In terms of the speed of spending his own soldiers, Georgy Konstantinovich had no equal, for which he is honored in Rus' as a great commander.

In his memoirs; assessing the not entirely brilliant results of the offensive, Zhukov reproached the deceased Stalin for not allowing the matter to be brought to a victorious end: "If we had one or two armies at our disposal, it would be possible ... not only to defeat the Rzhev group, but the entire Rzhev -Vyazma group of German troops and significantly improve the operational situation in the entire Western strategic direction. Unfortunately, this real opportunity was missed by the Supreme Command."

Zhukov kept silent about the fact that he, as directly responsible for the situation on the Western Direction, was so carried away by the skirmish with Model that he missed the enemy's blow on his left flank. The Supreme Commander had to give Zhukov another 1,000 tanks to rectify the situation.

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In fact, the battle did not end on 23 August. as it is considered officially. It's just that the front command temporarily decided to suspend the offensive in the Sychevsky direction and concentrate efforts to strike at the German grouping in the Gzhati area, west of Karmanovo,

The 20th Army was to organize a strike in the Pzhatsk direction, help the 5th and 33rd armies break through the enemy defenses in front of them, and subsequently, together with these armies, launch an offensive to the west in order to eliminate the entire Rzhev ledge.

As early as August 18, General Reiter received the following task: after the active actions of part of the forces in the Sychevsky direction beyond the rivers Vazuza and Gzhat, after clearing the German troops of the Karmanovsky district, continue to tie down units of the 89th tank corps of the Model army; with three reinforced rifle divisions to prepare by September 1 from the bridgehead across the Gzhat River, southwest of Karmanovo, a breakthrough of the enemy defenses and the introduction of a mobile group into the breakthrough.

The mobile group under the command of General Lieutenant A.A. Tyurin, as part of the 8th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, reinforced by two tank brigades, artillery and engineering units, was ordered to prepare to enter the gap from the Prilepa, Karmanovo line to Gzhatsk to curtail the enemy's defense in front of the 5th Army and defeat in cooperation with it from the sgogzhatskaya group. On August 26, the 6th Tank and 8th Guards Rifle Corps were additionally included in the mobile group. It was planned that when approaching Gzhatsk, the group of General Tyurin would become directly subordinate to the front command.

During the last week of August, the troops of the 20th Army, in private battles, improved the outline of the starting line for the deployment of the operation in the South Direction.

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lepii. The group of General Tyurin was preparing to carry out the task of attacking Gzhatsk. On August 27, the 6th Tank Corps handed over its section on the bridgehead across the Vazuza River to the 251st Rifle Division and was located next to the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps in the area of Podsosonye, Korotovo, Vasyutpiki. The 8th Guards Rifle Corps concentrated the army re-



zerv in the forests north of Karmanovo. The troops of the mobile group were replenished with people and materiel.

On the morning of September 2, after a short artillery preparation, the troops of the 20th Army went on the attack. She got off to a good start. In 2-day battles, the tankers broke through the first and second defense positions. However, then the tank brigades broke away from the infantry and were unable to gain a foothold on the reached line. At the same time, the brigade was subjected to-. Were subjected to continuous attacks by enemy aircraft and suffered significant losses in personnel and materiel. Finding themselves unable to develop success and overcome the entire enemy defense (8-10 km), our commanders were forced on September 4 to withdraw units to their original positions.

In subsequent battles, the 6th Panzer Corps, by order of the front, was withdrawn from the hut and again transferred to another direction - near Zubtsov, in the zone of the 1st Army. This was due to the fact that to the west of the city in the area of Sokhatino, Martynovo, Mikhesvo, the enemy concentrated large reserves and began to persistently attack in the direction of Zubtsov. It was necessary not only to strengthen the defense of the Soviet troops on this front, but also to force the enemy to give up attempts to regain the lost positions by active actions.

By this time, the left-flank 29th Army of the Kalinin Front was transferred to the West. She, together with the 31st Army, was to carry out an offensive operation with the aim of defeating the entire enemy Rzhev grouping. The combat order of the front demanded that they encircle and destroy them with joint strikes.

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ve, while freeing Rzhev. The start of the operation was scheduled for 8 September.

The 6th Tank Corps was transferred to the operational subordination of the 31st Army. By the morning of September 8, the army concentrated in the forests of the southern settlements of Stary Berezui, Gpeelilovo, and on the night of September 9, it went to its original positions in the area southeast of Mihesvo, Pulnikovo, Lespicheno. The corps had the task of entering the breakthrough after reaching 164 th and 118th rifle divisions along the Belogurovo-Cherkasovo line, rapidly develop success in the North-Zapaliy direction and, not allowing the enemy to withdraw from Rzhev to the south-west, reach the area of Sboevo, Abramtsevo, Turbachevo by the end of the division.

The offensive was postponed to September 9th. It began at dawn after a half-hour artillery preparation. So how did the rifle divisions manage to completely break through the enemy

defense, then to complete it on the same morning, units of the 6th Panzer Corps were introduced into the battle.

The Taikists broke into the German positions near Belogurovo and Zubarevo with one throw, and by 10 o'clock captured all the villages. On the same day, the troops of the corps started fighting for Mihevo. Parts of two tank and motorized rifle brigades fought for this small, but tactically important settlement - in a month of continuous fighting, the corps lost more than half of its combat vehicles. Meanwhile, the Germans especially fiercely clung to Mihevo, the mastery of which opened up the possibility of an attack on Rzhev from the southeast. Tankers took the village of Mikhevo, and the offensive as a whole failed. On September 12, the Getmaia corps was withdrawn to reserves, due to large losses. Successes in all other areas were similar.

These battles were not awarded the title of "operation", as if they did not exist at all, although the troops of the five armies took part in them. Therefore, our losses are unknown.

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However, knowing the "Zhukov's law", it is not difficult to calculate: you need to multiply 8 thousand fighters by the number of days.

#### ON THE KOZEL DIRECTION

In mid-August, the Germans launched an offensive from the region of the west of Bolkhov to Kaluga, trying to weaken the Soviet search in the Rzhev region. The idea of Operation Smerch was to make a deep breakthrough in the defenses of the 16th and 61st Soviet armies and develop further success in the direction of Sukhinichi, in order to then go to the Yukhnov westward area and thereby endanger the entire left wing of the Western Front. 1 | divisions, including the 9th and 11th tank and 25th motorized divisions, which had up to 400 combat vehicles. Aviation was widely used.

On August 11, formations of the 2nd Panzer Army broke through the defenses at the junction of the 16th and 61st armies with a sudden blow and wedged in a narrow section of 35-40 km, reaching the Zhizdra River in the Vosta and Belokamen areas. Three rifle divisions of General Belov were cut off from the main forces. At the same time, another grouping of German troops struck at the sector of the left-flank 322nd infantry division of Bagramyan's 16th Army, defending the Rubsk along the Rosseta River. The Germans sought to reach the rex Zhilra and link up with their main strike group, which was operating against Belov's army.

Teneral Baghramyan brought the army reserves into action, but still the enemy managed to reach Zhizdra, learning tks Gretnya, Vosta. The 322nd division suffered heavy damage, but escaped encirclement by retreating beyond the rivers.

As soon as the scale and possible goals pursued by the German command were indicated, Bagramyan gave two orders:

- the 10th tank corps of General V.G. Burkova

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it was ordered to make a march from the Sukhini chey area and concentrate by the morning of August 12 on the northern bank of the Zhizdra with the left flank of the army in readiness to carry out a strike in the southern direction, to meet the enemy tank divisions that had broken through the defenses of the 61st Army.

- 5th Guards Rifle Corps, Major General RA Gl. Korotkov, after surrendering his sector of defense to his neighbors and the 31st Guards Rifle Division, which had previously been in the army reserve, had to make a night march and concentrate on the northern bank of the Zhizdra in the Alyoshkinka region. Behind the left wing of the army was located 1- 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Coming to Zhizdrs, the Germans for several days tried to force it and build on success in the direction of Sukhinichi. At the cost of heavy losses, they managed to cross the river in the area of the settlement of Glinnaya with large forces, with the support of the slippers, to penetrate the narrow section in the LSS, which is south of Aleshinka, and go to the nearest approaches to this settlement. But here the German motorized infantry was. was stopped by the powerful fire of large-caliber guns of the army artillery brigade, and the counterattacks of the 146th tank brigade and units of the 11th guards rifle division were driven back into the depths of the forest. When trying to resume the offensive on Alsshiika, the tank divisions of the opposite peak suffered a heavy defeat from a counterattack of Major General A.V. Kurkin.

At the same time, another German grouping tried to break through from the Gretnya region to the northwest in a general direction to Sukhinichi, but the ogism and koitra of our troops were thrown back to their original position. This became the climax. The troops of the 16th Army held out and forced the enemy to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

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By stubborn defense and counterattacks by the 3rd, 9th, and 10th tank corps and rifle formations, the enemy offensive was halted by August 18. The Germans lost up to 10 thousand people killed and over 200 tanks and abandoned further offensive plans,

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During the defensive battles, the command of the Zapadny Front, on the orders of the Stavka, prepared an offensive operation in order to defeat the enemy grouping, which had broken through into the depths of the Soviet defenses. The decisive role in the operation was assigned to the army group under the command of the generals P.L. Romanenko, who received an order to strike from the area south of Kozelsk in the direction of Veiko, Staritsa.

The army was formed in May-June 1942 in the Plavsk area as part of the 12th and 15th such corps and the 179th separate tank brigade, the 154th and 264th rifle divisions, the 62nd guards motorized regiment, fighter -anti-tank artillery regiment and anti-aircraft artillery regiment. In addition, before the beginning of the operation, the army included the 1st Guards Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division, 3 artillery regiments of the RGK, 2 guards mortar regiments, 2 anti-tank, 5 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 5 divisions of the RS, as well as the 3rd tank corps, which had by this time 78 tanks and 2 artillery regiments,

It's free for Zhukov to write: there are almost 1,400 tanks on his right flank, and another 1,000 on his left.

The idea of the operation was to attack the 16th Army from the north, and the 3rd Panzer and 61st Armies from the northeast to surround and destroy the enemy between Rossosha, Zhizdra and Vytebsk. The command of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front was entrusted to General Romanenko, whom on August 15 the Stavka of the Supreme High Command appointed concurrently as Deputy Commander of the Western Front.

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The offensive was planned for 19 August. But by this time, due to heavy rains and the unorganized work of the railway, Romanenko's troops did not have time to concentrate in the indicated area, so the start of the offensive was postponed several times. The transfer of people and equipment ended by the end of August 21, and cargo - only by the end of August 24. The slowness of the rearrangement of compounds and parts, as well as their

concentration was used by the enemy. His aviation began to carry out massive strikes against the advancing army echelons and areas of its concentration. The German command got the opportunity to "prepare for the meeting" properly.

Having received information about the concentration of the 3rd Panzer Army in the Kozelsk area, the German troops advancing on this board on the night of August 19 at the line of Krichina, Kumovo, Smetsky Vyselki, Ozerna, Leonovo switched to positional defense. Units of the 26th and 56th Infantry Divisions were defending directly in the zone of advance of the Panzer Army, reinforced by the panzer subunits of the 11th Panzer Division, the main forces of which were in relay. Using favorable terrain conditions - forests, copses, heights, ravines and swampy areas, the German infantry created a strong defense, covering it with minefields, and in some places with barbed wire.

Surprise was lost, and the Soviet troops had to break through the prepared defenses of the enemy. Upon arrival in the Kozelsk area, the 13th and 17th motorized rifle brigades of the tank corps took up positions on the southern front of the Kozelsk fortified area, covering the unloading and concentration of the main silarmies. 12th Panzer Corps, General Major S.I. Bogdanov concentrated in the Krasny Klin area, the 15th tank corps under the command of Major General V.A. Koptsova - in the Gorodok area, the 179th tank brigade - in the forest, 2 km east of Kozelsk.

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The plan of General Romanenko was to break through the enemy's defenses on an 8-kilometer sector, force the Vytebst River and seize a bridgehead in the north-west of the Bers with the help of rifle divisions; after that, enter the penetration of the tank corps and develop the penetration in depth.

Three groups of troops were created for the offensive: the right group consisting of the 3rd tank corps, the 324th rifle division and the 105th rifle brigade under the general command of General D.K. Mostovepko; the central one, under the command of General Koptop, as part of the 15th Tank Corps and the 154th Rifle Division, reinforced by two Guards mortar regiments, a fighter anti-tobacco regiment and a pontoon-bridge battalion; the left under the command of General Bogdanov in the composition of the 12th Tank Corps and the 264th Infantry Division, reinforced by the Guards Mortar Regiment and the Pontoino-Mosg Battalion. The 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division was in the second echelons, while the 179th Tank Brigade and reinforcement units were on the avszers.

Koptsov's group of troops received the task of advancing in the direction of Meshalkipo, Myzin, Maryino, Bely Verkh with the immediate task of defeating the opposing enemy. cross the Vytebst and seize a bridgehead along the western coast. Subsequently, the duty group was in cooperation with the northern group of the 61st Army and the strike group of the 16th Army to surround and destroy the enemy in the area of Trostyak, Perestryazh, Bely Verkh. Bogdanov's group of troops received. an order to advance in the direction of Ozerko, Yuskov, Sorokino, Obukhovo, Staritsa. The immediate task of the antivi is to force Vytebet, in the future, in cooperation with the Koptsov group, to surround and kill the Germans in the area of Medintsevo, Staritsa. In fact, only the 26th Infantry Division opposed the general strike groups in the zone of the upcoming strike. The 3rd Panzer Corps struck in cooperation with Bagramyan's troops on Kumanovo and Volosovo.

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The 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division was to advance behind Bogdanov's group of troops and, after the 264th Rifle Division took possession of Sorokino, engage in battle from behind its left flank and advance on Krasnogors, providing the main forces of the army from enemy attacks from the south.

In total, 60,852 men, 512 tanks and 168 armored vehicles, 861 guns and mortars, and 72 RS installations were concentrated in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army against two German infantry divisions.

On the morning of August 22, after artillery and aviation preparation, the 16th, 61st combined arms and 3rd tank armies went on the offensive. The rifle divisions advancing in the first echelon captured the first position relatively easily, but they met stubborn resistance in the second line, and the rate of advance slowed down sharply. It became clear that rifle divisions alone could not break through the defenses and create conditions for bringing tank troops into the breakthrough.

To build up their strike, on the orders of Zhukov, tank corps were thrown into the battle. Formations of the 12th Tank Corps overtook the combat formations of the 264th Rifle Division of Colonel N.M. Makovchuka and the attack on the move took possession of Goskova - a large node of enemy resistance. Here the corps was forced to stop in order to repel the counterattacks of the enemy, supported by active aviation operations, and there were so many "Nazi aircraft that they literally hunted for single vehicles, tanks and small groups of fighters." The fighting in this direction took on a protracted character.

At 12 o'clock a report was received that the 3rd tan-

The military corps took possession of Smetskiye Vyselki and was successfully advancing to the west. Considering that the advance in the main direction was suspended, the front commander ordered the transfer of the 15th tank corps here, as well as to bring the 1st guards motorized rifle division into battle "and build on success. Proletarian

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the division was commanded by Major General V.A. Revyakin is a man of great "military talents", a former commandant of Moscow, the same one who proposed in October 1941 to sprinkle the streets of the capital with explosives so that the Germans would explode.

The 15th Mutaik Corps was ordered to advance on Slobodka, Bely Verkh, and the infantry division on Smetskaya and Zhukovo. Regrouped. Koptsov's corps launched an offensive to the west, but was immediately stopped by the counterpeak. Tapkists got involved in protracted battles, slowly overcoming the woods' blockages and missions in the fields,

The 154th and 264th rifle divisions and the 12th tank corps, having captured Ozerensky. Lake and Oskova, fought stubborn battles south of these populated points. The southern group of the 61st Army had no success at all. During August 23-25, the Soviet troops advanced slowly, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the anti-Tivian forces.

Only by the end of August 25, the 15th Tank Corps, the 1st Motorized Rifle Corps, and one regiment of the 154th Rifle Division cleared the east of Vytebeti from the enemy and reached the river. However, it was not possible to force the EU. The 12th Pilot Corps, the 154th and 264th Rifle Divisions, which attacked on the left flank, had no significant success these days. Only in certain directions did they manage to advance to a depth of 1-1.5 km. The southern group of troops of the 61st Army, as on the first day of the offensive, also had no success. The main reason for the slow advance of our troops in these days was the dominance of enemy aircraft.

In order to break the resistance of the 26th Infantry Division, on the night of August 26, General Romanenko ordered the 15th Tank Corps to be withdrawn from the battlefield and regrouped from the Zhukovo area into the forests 3 km west of Myzin, and then, together with the 154th Infantry Division, to strike on Sorokino and in cooperation with the 12th Panzer Corps, capture this populated area.

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Having made a 15-kilometer march, Koptsov's corps

at dawn on August 26 he went on the offensive. Noi did not achieve success here, since there was a forest along the way, which did not allow him to turn around in a battle order and maneuver on the battlefield, the 12th tank corps and the 264th rifle division also had success, since the German command

abandoned the main forces of the 1st tank division, as well as the 20th tank division approaching from the depths. who strove to master the axis. To repel the blow, the 179th tank brigade commander S.Ya. Denisova,

By the end of August 27, all enemy counterattacks from the south were repelled by the 32nd Tank Corps, the 264th Rifles, the 179th Tank Brigade, and the Southern Army. Therefore, on the night of August 28, the 15th Panzer Corps was regrouped from the Myzin area to the Pakom area with the task, together with the 12th Guards Rifle Division, to break the enemy's resistance in the Lsonovo area, and then to improve success in the direction of the settlement of Ukolitsy and leave reared the enemy grouping that resisted the 154th and 264th rifle divisions and the 12th Mutank Corps in the Bogdapovka and Goskov area. The Bog Lapov corps was ordered to advance on Bogdanovka, Soro cinema, and the 264th Infantry Division on Markovka, Soro cinema.

On the afternoon of August 28, the 15th Panzer Corps, having ace brigades in the first e1lonon, after 30-th way artillery preparation and ground attack aviation strikes, without reconnaissance of the area and the enemy, went on the offensive. But he immediately stumbled upon a solid anti-tank ditch, covered with minefields and a huge amount of artillery, and was forced to stop. On the night of August 29, sappers and motorized men made passages in the anti-tank ditch, and at dawn the corps offensive resumed. But after 200-300 m, the soldiers came across a second similar anti-tank ditch.

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During the day, the tankers were engaged in a firefight with the enemy, but could not cross the ditch.

On the night of August 30, the 15th Panzer Corps was withdrawn from the battle and the kutru concentrated in the forest | km south of Meshalkino, in readiness, together with the 12th Tank Corps and the 264th Rifle Division, on the morning of August 30th, to strike in the South-Western direction and capture the settlement of Sorokino.

However, by this time the 12th Panzer Corps had suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks and had practically lost its combat effectiveness. The 3rd and 10th such corps were in even worse condition. The 264th Rifle Division also suffered significant losses.



vision. It took time to put the 15th Panzer Corps in order. For these reasons, the offensive on August 30 did not take place. By this time, the troops had lost 34.5 thousand killed and wounded, as well as about 500 tanks,

On August 30, only the 195th tank brigade of Colonel S.V. advanced. Leks from the body of Koptsop. She was given the task of striking in the South-Western direction and helping two battalions of the 156th Infantry Division of the 61st Army break out of the encirclement. By the end of the day, the brigade successfully completed the assigned task.

While the main forces of the 3rd Panzer Army were trying to break through to Sorokino, a group of troops under General Mostovskko crossed the Vytebet River and started fighting for Volosovo.

In connection with the unsuccessful offensive of the tank army in the main direction and the emerging success on the right flank, at the end of August 30, the front commander ordered on the left flank to go on the defensive, the main forces of Romansiko to regroup on the right flank, force Vytebst, capture the Volosovo, Perestryazh, Bely Verkh and, in cooperation with the shock group of the 16th Army, advancing from the north, destroy the enemy in the area of Kolosovo, Glinnaya, Bely Verkh. Based on this order, I command

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The leader of the tank army decided to regroup to Kumo into the 15th tank corps and the 264th rifle division, and the 12th tank corps, which had suffered heavy losses, was transferred to the reserve.

The army troops were assigned the following missions: the 3rd Mutank Corps and the 342nd Division to capture the settlement of Volosovo and advance on Trostyanka; The 264th Rifle and 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions will force the Vytebet, capture the villages of Ozhigovo, Zhukovo, Slobodka and advance on Pers Stryazh and Bely Verkh; 15th Panzer Corps enter the gap and capture Perestryazh; The 154th Infantry Division to hold the occupied line, covering the left flank of the army. The attack was scheduled for the morning of September 2. By this time the army had 181 tanks in service.

Day 2 September turned out to be sunny. Having discovered the regrouping of the main siltank army, the German aviation began to launch continuous massive strikes. Therefore, the Soviet troops went on the offensive only at 1 pm. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, the 3rd Tank Corps, together with the 842nd Rifle Division, captured Volosovo by the end of September 3, and the 1st Guards Power Regiment Division

crossed Vytebet and freed Zhukovo.

The most fierce battles unfolded in the direction of the main attack in the Ozhigovo area. The 264th Rifle Division was not replaced in time by the rifle units of the 6th Army in the Sayazi stsm chgo, only one SS regiment took part in the offensive on September 2, which could not break the enemy's resistance, force the river, capture Ozhigovo and create conditions for the 15th Tank Corps to breakthrough input. Therefore, in the middle of the diya, the commander brought in the 170th motorized rifle brigade and 2 motorized battalions of machine gunners. After a short artillery preparation, they crossed the rivers and captured Ozhigovo by the end of the day.

On September 3, the 195th tank brigade made it through Vytebet and rushed to Perestryazh. One

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ko could not take it, as she came across a large ravine, which was covered by the fire of German anti-tank artillery, and soon the enemy attacked with slippers from the left flank. Although the counterattack was repulsed, the offensive of the 195th Sneaker Brigade stopped. The remaining troops of the 3rd Panzer Army, as well as the shock group of the 16th Army, advancing from the north, could not develop success to the west.

On the evening of September 3, due to the lack of tanks, the 3rd Tank Corps was withdrawn to the Stavka reserve. Therefore, under: the passage to the Ozhigovo region of the main forces of the 254th Infantry Division, the 113th Tank Brigade of Colonel A.S. Svirilova and the 17th motorized rifle brigade of the 15th tank corps on September 4 were regrouped in the Volosovo area, having received the task, together with the 342nd rifle division, to march on Trostyanka.

Over the next five days, the Soviet troops tried several times to resume the offensive, but due to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the lack of forces and means, and the shortage of ammunition, they were not successful. In principle, our troops these days were not so much advancing as repulsing counterattacks on the enemy's 9th and 17th tank divisions that had reached.

On September 10, the Soviet troops went on the defensive, and the 3rd Panzer Army, having transferred the 1st motorized rifle division and reinforcement units to Belov and Bagramyan, was withdrawn to the reserve.

As a result, having lost practically all tanks and about 60,000 men killed and wounded, the Soviet troops advanced 8-10 km. They failed to encircle and defeat anyone. German losses were estimated at 5 thousand killed and 12 thousand wounded, more than 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, 150 guns.

The offensive was carried out under conditions of German air supremacy and in exceptionally difficult terrain. Soviet military leaders did not have not only intelligence data, but, apparently, topographic maps as well. Or maybe they didn't know how or didn't consider

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necessary to use them. In any case, the tank brigades were again sent out to fight in the unfavorable conditions of a wooded swampy area. The concentration of troops before the operation dragged on for a long time, but the blows were delivered practically without preparation.

The headquarters of the armies and corps, instead of directing the troops through brief bossy orders by telephone or radio, were carried away by the development of written combat orders and thereby absorbed the time that the troops needed to prepare for hostilities. There was no interaction between tank and rifle units. Attacks on the enemy were delivered, as a rule, in the forehead, instead of bypassing and enveloping the nodes of resistance. All this allowed the Germans to freely maneuver their forces and successfully repel attacks.

The 15th Sneaker Corps found itself in a particularly difficult situation, which had to regroup 4 times from one area to another in the course of the operation in search of a weak point in the enemy's defense. And, as a rule, each time he was required to go on the offensive immediately. For these reasons, the brigades went on the attack in a disorganized manner, without reconnaissance of the enemy on the ground. The results of the battles showed that the troops lacked the ability to conduct high-level military operations.

(The overall low level of crew training also had an effect. For example, Soviet tanks could either move or shoot, but so far few tankers have been able to combine these two processes. Therefore, to Stalin's question: "Do tankers shoot on the move?", - the first guards tankman of the country, General Katukov answered ingenuously, no, they say, they don't shoot: "Accuracy is bad right away, and we regret the shells," That is, they shoot from a place, and then they shoot at the enemy's defense without firing,

Numerous episodes of Stalin's "lessons" with his generals are simply touching: "Stalin stopped, looked at me point-blank and spoke clearly, separating every word with pauses:

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- Tell me, comrade Katukov, please, did it fall on the German batteries during the attack? Nalo. And koun

first of all? Of course, the tankers, who are prevented by the Prague guns from moving forward. Even if your projectiles do not hit the enemy's guns directly. but they are rushing not far away. How will the Germans shoot in such a situation?

"Of course, the opponent's ogy's accuracy is going down.

"That's the shit," Stalin picked up. "Shoot those at once, we'll give shells, now you have bulug shells."

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Marshal Baghramai spoke highly of the results of the operation; The active combat operations of the Soviet troops on the Western Front, in which a large number of tanks took part, had a significant impact on the course of the defensive battles of our troops near Stalipgrad and in the North Caucasus. In spite of the enormous need for reserves for pastures in the south, the German command was forced to keep significant forces in the central sector of the front.

But the conduct of offensive operations requires much more manpower and means than the organization of defense. The Soviet counterattack on Kozelskoye was repelled by two armored, three infantry and one motorized divisions. The Western front deployed troops of three army troops for its nansepia - eighteen tank brigades, one motorized rifle and ten rifle divisions, FIVE MOTOST rifle divisions and one rifle brigade, parts of the RGC and rocket artillery.

It was not for nothing that General Halder made the following entry on the course of the operation to straighten the lipia of the 2nd Panzer Army on August 22: Already popimakig (command of the Center group. - Ant.) that they will succeed in achieving anything, but they think that it is impossible to refuse to pin down large enemy forces here.

So who was shackling who?

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Only in September 1942, which is typical, did the new commander of the Western Front, General Colonel Konev, allow his troops to dig trenches, "approved and gave them practical guidance." But just recommending was enough. In the second year of the war it became clear that many dirs of infantry units, brought up at the very forefront

howling military science, they could, shouting "For the Motherland, for Stalin," go ahead of the advancing chains, but "they did not know how to properly tie the trenches to the terrain, so that they would provide good observation and shelling in front of the lying areas, they could not correctly use natural obstacles to strengthen the anti-tank defense. Not everything went smoothly with the location and binding to the location of the main firing points, it did not go well with camouflage. Everything had to be re-learned. At the same time, for the first time, instructions were drawn up for engineered equipment for trench defense. Koisv approved the SS on October 13, 1942.

On October 10, a directive was received to continue the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation.

## BATTLE FOR OIL

No encirclement, no flight, no misfortunes and setbacks so demoralize a soldier as mediocre leadership.

General P.V. Sevastyanov

At the beginning of July 1942, German troops reached the Don along its entire length, from Voronezh to the mouth, with the exception of a large bend west of Stalingrad. The course of the operation "Blau" initially justified the expectations placed on it. Hitler has come again

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to the opinion that the Russians were at the limit of their strength and had already committed the last reserves into battle. This contradicted the estimates of the Department of Foreign Armies of the East, which, on the contrary, came to the conclusion that: "The human potential of the Red Army in 1942, presumably, will not be so weakened that its military defeat is probable."

Nofiusr, from the very beginning, aiming at the oil fields of the Caucasus, showed nterpezion. The desire to get to the coveted oil as soon as possible pushed Hitler to a reckless step. He decided to change the plan of the entire campaign, which ultimately "required even more precious fuel and led to the loss of no less precious time."

The fundamental point of Operation Blau was the rapid advance of Army Groups A and B on Stalingrad and the encirclement of the retreating Timo-

shenko. Following this, an attack on Rostov was to begin with a general direction to the Caucasus. However, Hitler was in such a hurry to seize Groziskiy and Baku oil that he decided to carry out both operations simultaneously. Naturally, this did not allow for a sufficient concentration of troops. Contrary to Halder's advice, the Führer redirected the tank armies to the southern direction and selected the 40th tank corps from Paulus, which, in turn, could not affect the pace of advancement of the 6th army to Stalingrad. Of the mobile formations, only one motorized division remained in it. Hitler feared that by throwing his main forces at Stalingrad, he would strike at an empty place and waste precious summer time.

Disagreements with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, who were annoyed by the transformation of a staged operation into two simultaneous strikes, became completely unbearable when the Führer began to reject any advice and repeatedly, at his own will, replace the grouping of troops with their transfer.

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Scheme of the German pastupletium in the summer of 1942  
(4 stages of the operation)

Colonel General Halder wrote in his diary on July 23: "... the still existing underestimation of enemy capabilities takes on grotesque forms and becomes dangerous ... Serious work is out of the question. Painful reaction to instant impressions and highlighting only the shortcomings in the assessment of the governing apparatus and its capabilities - this is what determines the nature of this so-called leadership.

Tippelskirch described the new style of work of the high command as follows:

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"Hitler since 1933 didn't know the crazy ones. The idea that such a state of affairs could someday come to an end, that someone else's will would turn out to be stronger than it, was incomprehensible and incomprehensible for this person, who gradually became accustomed to the myth of mastering and defamation, "sompambularly" followed his intuition and who horny flattering propaganda lifted up to the "greatest commander of all changes" ... Any voluntary concession was for him tantamount to the loss of power and prestige, submission to someone else's power, therefore, there could be no peak concessions ... It would not be a mistake to look in this painfully egocentric pastrospy Pitle-

ra key to raising his leadership of operations in subsequent years.

The inevitable consequence of such a conduct of the war was such a use of manpower and tihtsiki, which exceeded their capabilities (*italics pash. - Auth*) ”,

In Directive No. 45, signed on the same day, “On the continuation of Operation Braunschweig,” the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Commander of the Ground Forces, Adolf Hitler, approved the decision of the Supreme Commander: instead of the originally envisaged echelon operations, he ordered 2 simultaneous offensives in diverging directions - to the Volga and the Caucasus. @peral Plulu was ordered to take Sgalingrad, then turn south and develop bluntness along the Volga to Astrakhan and beyond, right up to the Caspian Sea. Army Group "A" under the command of Field Marshal List was to occupy the eastern coast of the Cherio Sea and capture the Caucasus.

The troops received new tasks, new deadlines and peak reinforcements. Moreover, considering that the available forces were quite sufficient for the final defeat of the Russians in the southern wing, the Fuhrer sent Manstein's 1st 1st Army to Leningrad with the task of establishing contact with the Finns, capturing the city "and destroying it to the ground." Two SS motorized divisions

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stav army group "A" transferred to France ("Adolf Hitler") and to the army group "Center" ("Vslī Kaya Germany"), internal combustion engine tank divisions from group "B" (9th and 11th) - to the army group "Center". In total, by the end of July, 11 German divisions were removed from the main direction, including 2 tank and 2 motorized.

If on June 28, 68 German divisions and 26 Allied divisions were concentrated in the composition of Army Group South on a front of 800 km, then to | In August, 57 German and 36 Allied divisions were available to carry out new tasks. The front line at that moment was already about 1200 km. The nominal total number of formations remained unchanged, however, the PSM themselves quite reasonably considered the overall strength of an Italian, Romanian or Hungarian division to be about 1/2 compared to a Wehrmacht division. These forces now had to capture and hold a strip of 4100 km. To say nothing of the difficulties of transport and supply, which must have arisen as a result of this, the strategic goal no longer corresponded in any way to the available means.

“July 23,” complains Gsperal Dörr, “apparently can be considered the day when the main command of the German

The Manxian army clearly showed that it did not follow the classical laws of warfare and entered the papal path, which was more dictated by Hitler's self-will and illogicality than by the rational, realistic way of thinking of a soldier ... only interruptions in the supply of fuel (length German communications with access to the Don reached 2500 km. - Auth.) would be enough to disrupt the plans of the main command.

The very idea of the operation according to the directive of July 23 became fatal for the Wehrmacht,

and\*\*

As already mentioned, for us to invade the Caucasus, the German command allocated Army Group A. Ts

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Now it included the 1st Panzer Army of General Colonel Ewald von Kleist, the 4th Panzer Army of General Herman Hoth, the 17th Army of General Richard Ruoff, the 3rd Romanian Army of General Petre Dumitrascu. By the beginning of the new offensive, there were 40 divisions in the group: 18 infantry, 4 7: motorized, 3 motorized, 6 mountain rifle, light infantry, 4 cavalry and 2 security, Romanian DIVISIONS were part of the German associations: 4 divisions - the main army of Gotha, 3 - subordinate to Ruoff. All in all, at the disposal of General-Field Marshal List, according to Soviet data, there were 167 thousand soldiers and officers. 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars. up to 1000 aircraft of the 4th airborne fleet.

These figures are rather controversial. In reality, only 8 tank divisions took part in the hostilities in the Caucasus - the 3rd, 13th and 23rd. As for aviation, here there is a place for complex manipulation. If we take descriptions of the battles in the Stalingrad direction. then we will see all 100 aircraft of the 4th air fleet. Well, General-Colonel von Richthofen 2000 aircraft? No, just throughout the entire length of the Soviet-German corrugated front from the Baltic to the Black Seas in 1942, up to five German air fleets operated - the 1st and 4th. The latter included 2 air corps and provided combat operations in the southern wing from Orel to Rostov.

The historian of the Samsopov school compares the number of aircraft of the entire 4th air fleet with the aviation of one of the Soviet fronts, after which he authoritatively declares that the enemy outnumbered the aircraft near Stalingrad by more than 2 times, and in the Caucasus by almost 8 times. Whereas in reality



In the summer and autumn of 1942, pilots of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 15th, 16th and 17th air armies fought in the southern direction from the Soviet side, not counting the air defense, long-range and Black Sea Fleet aviation. Who is to blame that Richthofel's "experts" managed to beat their essh.

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As regards, in particular, the Caucasus, here by the end of the battle in the 4th Air Army of General Vershinin there were 130 serviceable aircraft, in the 5th Air Army of General Oryunov - 135, in the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet there were 216 of them, in the Air Force of the Transcaucasian front - 409 combat aircraft. In addition, the reserve aviation regiments and aviation schools had about 800 more aircraft, including 125 fighters, 107 bombers and 568 training aircraft. About 700 Soviet aircraft were operating in the Stalingrad direction at the same time. Here you can add 8 air divisions of the Voronezh Front. Now you can compare.

There are also production indicators. According to Soviet data, in 1942 the opposing sides on the Soviet-German front had an approximately equal number of aircraft - 3,400. [The German military industry produced 15,409 aircraft in that year, of which less than half were sent to the Eastern Front. Soviet aircraft factories produced 25,436 aircraft in 1942. The official "History of the Great Patriotic War" proudly reports (there is something to be proud of) that "the Soviet Air Force received an average of 2260 aircraft per month (one and a half to two German air fleets per month. - Auth.) ... In terms of their qualities, the new Soviet aircraft were not inferior to the German ones.

So what's the deal? And the thing is, you still need to know how to use a weapon. If you don't sum it up, then you have to make up stories that the enemy has very powerful equipment, while we have little and outdated construction, that their pilots, tankers, artillerymen, and pshotins are experienced, the amas have not yet learned and, in general, there were grenades " no caliber." Finally, an arithmetic problem: in May, the Red Army had 3855 aircraft, factories produced 2260 aircraft per month, by the end of 1942 the remainder was 4544 aircraft. What would that mean?

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Scheme of the plank "Edelweiss"

In addition, German forces in the Caucasus are steadily

shortened due to the transfer of more and more new units to the Stalingrad direction. General Kleist, who replaced Lisg as commander of Army Group A, waited later: "We could have reached our goal if my army had not been pulled apart in parts to support the troops advancing on Stalingrad. In addition to some motorized units, I had to send the anti-aircraft artillery corps and its military-cradle forces, with the exception of reconnaissance squadrons (*italics pash.* - Auth).

The immediate task of Army Group A was the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet troops that had retreated beyond the Don, south and southeast of Rostov. To gogo, the Germans intended to use strike groups of tank and motorized troops, which were to advance from bridgeheads in the areas of Konstantipovskaya and Tsimlyanskaya in the general direction of Tikhoretsk, as well as infantry divisions from Rostov.

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After the capture of the North Caucasus, according to the Edelweiss plan, it was planned to bypass the Main Caucasian Range from the west and east. The 17th Army was to reach the coast of the Black Sea, to capture Novorossiysk and Tuapse. In addition, in the Crimea, the 3rd Romanian mountain infantry division of General Filchinescu was preparing to force the Kerch Strait, in order to then carry out a blow along the road running along the Black Sea coast to the southeast: Voenio-Osstiiskaya and Vosno-Georgian roads. Baku was the ultimate goal on this parapravlepii. Simultaneously with a roundabout maneuver, it was planned to overcome the Caucasus Range in its central part along the persvals and reach the areas of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi.

With access to Transcaucasia, the Germans seized the last days of the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, established direct contact with the Turkish army. In the future, Hitler decided to involve Turkey in the war against the Third Reich, and also to create conditions for the invasion of the Near and Middle East (in a different scenario, there was a plan for the occupation of Turkey - a convenient bridgehead for the transfer of troops to Syria and Iraq). The German command also planned in September, after breaking through the Terek line, to launch naval operations in the Caspian Sea with the aim of disrupting enemy communications,

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By July 25, 1942, the Soviet troops, covering the Caucasian direction, occupied a blind fire: on the left bank of the Don from Verkhps-Kurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river, the troops of the Southern Front were defending under

mandirovanie gsperal-leitenite RY. Malinovsky. The total width of the defense line was 320 km. In co

the front line had 6 armies, but they were defeated ar  
missions.

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The 37th Army of Major General P.M. Kozlova held the defense along the southern coast from Kopsgantipovka lo Bogaevskaya, there were 17 thousand fighters in it. During the retreat, the army lost. all your artillery.

12th Army Major General A.A. Grechko, consisting of three infantry divisions (1,600 infantry in each), defended on a front 40 km wide, from Belyanin to Kiziteriyka.

18th Army of Lieutenant General F.V. Kamkov, consisting of three infantry divisions and one brigade (about 20 thousand people), fought defensive battles on a front 50 km wide, from Kiziterinka to the mouth of the Don.

The 56th Army, commanded by Major General A.I. Ryzhov, had 5 rifle divisions and \$ rifle brigades, with a total strength of about 18 thousand people. This army, after the battles near Rostov, was withdrawn to the second echelon. The 24th and 9th armies, which united the remnants of 11 divisions, were incapable and were withdrawn in the Salsk area across the Yegorlyk River for resupply.

On the right wing from Verkhns-Kurmoyarskaya lo Konstantinovskaya, in a strip of 171 km, the 51st Army of the North Caucasian front was defending, which was commanded by Major General T.K. Kolomiets. It numbered 40,000 men in four rifle and two cavalry divisions and fought with enemy groups that captured small bridgeheads on the left bank of the Don in the area of Tsimlyanskaya and Nikolayevskaya.

The reserve of the front consisted of rifle and cavalry divisions concentrated in the 87th Army zone.

In total, under the command of General Malinovsky there were 112 thousand people, 2160 guns and mortars,

121 tanks. The correlation of forces for the defending side is not the most hopeless (new reserves are already moving forward), if it knew how to organize a defense. The armies were again drawn to a string without second echelons and reserves. In addition, the above figures

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They are taken from the "History of the Second World War" filtered by the Institute of Marxism Malepiism, in which it is proved in this way that "the enemy achieved a significant superiority over the troops of the Southern Front: in personnel - 1.5 times ...". Od pako in the Russian collection "Secrecy Removed" indicates that by the beginning of the operation, Malinovsky had 300 thousand people.

The Southern Front was faced with the task of liquidating the enemy who had broken through to the left bank of the Dots and, having restored the position, firmly hold the occupied lines. The hasty retreat required the urgent evacuation of valuables from the threatened areas. The railway tracks were clogged with echelons. A huge number of automobile and horse-drawn vehicles, stolen cattle, and refugees moved along dirt roads from the Don to the Kuban. This to a large extent complicated the normal supply of the army in the field, in which there was an acute shortage of ammunition and fuel.

The North Caucasian Front, for some time, occupied the defense from the mouth of the Don along the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait and along the coast of the Black Sea to Lazarevskaya. It included, in addition to the 51st, the 47th army of Major General GP. Kotov, 1st Delta Rifle Corps, 17th Kuban Cavalry Corps. The latter was a voluntary formation, the basis of which was the Cossacks of non-military age, i.e., over 60 years old. The troops of the front, numbering 2,16,000 fighters and commanders, were ordered to cover the coast and prevent the enemy from forcing the Kerch Strait.

It was up to the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla to support their ground troops and prevent the landings of the enemy's naval landings.

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The fleet allocated 87,000 soldiers of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard for ground operations, the Troops of the Caucasian Froit under the command of General of the Army I.V. Tyuleneva defended the Black Sea along the Berszhye from Lazarevskaya to Batumi and further along the Soviet-Turkish border. Part of the forces of the front was in Svernoy Irais,

The defense of the Caucasus from the north was poorly prepared. The fact that no one thought about this until the summer of 1942 is understandable - picto and could not imagine the German

divisions on the banks of the Don and Volga. But even after the apparent threat, much was done. Prapla, the Military Council of the North Caucasus Military District, as early as June 16, decided to create defensive lines between the Don and Kuban, along the Tersk, on the Taman Peninsula, along the coast of the Black and Azov Seas, but less than a third were able to complete this work. It was possible to do it, in terms of the quality of execution it was impossible to call it half-full defensive lines - they were not covered by engineered barriers, there was no camouflage at all. There were discussions of grave plans for the creation of several obstacle courses to a depth of 100 km along the most probable directions of enemy action, and the discussions of the All-Union Council ended.

According to the testimony of the former commander-12 marshal Grechko: "The commanders of the armies and the commanders of the separate rifle and 17th cavalry corps were ordered to prepare for the explosion of all structures on Lorogi, many sections of the roadbed, to set up minefields, to prepare areas for flooding and swamping, to destruction - primary objects and railway junctions; front front line of the main defensive line and rear defensive lines: create continuous lines of all types of barriers 6-8 km deep, leaving passages prepared for the barrier for their troops in them. However, for the most part, all these plans were not fulfilled "(italics pash. -Aat.)".

A month later, having realized that the Germans were quite seriously rushing to the south, the Soviet Sgavka also took care of the defense of the North Caucasus. On July 19, [the general headquarters recaptured a telegram to Marshal Budyonny: "According to the data of the General Staff, defensive structures and the organization of work to strengthen the Azov. Black Sea coast and southern Bersga river. Doi have a number of significant shortcomings, and the command of some units and formations of the front is criminally negligent in organizing the defense of the sectors they occupy. So, for example, the defense section of the 113th brigade was checked by nine commissions in two months and all noted the same shortcomings. Such a situation is also evidence of the lack of proper leadership of the defensive work on the part of the front headquarters.

The result of the vigorous activity of the headquarters, defense construction departments, and the sapper army, consisting of eight sapper brigades and 19 construction battalions, was zero - no lines, no main rear lines, no barriers, no mining of military objects. Nothing was done on the Don River either. More than Menes dug in the 51st Army of Major General T.K. Kolomiets,

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He who has the advantage is obliged to attack: Eld-

Marshal List was not going to slow down. On July 25, German troops launched an offensive from bridgeheads in the lower reaches of the Don. The 1st Panzer Army and the 40th Panzer Corps of the Army of Hoth dealt the main blow to Salsk and Voroshilovsk, and the 17th Army to Krasnodar. In one day, the defense of the Southern Front was breached along the entire belt, and a couple of days later the German mobile formations advanced to a depth of up to 80 km. The breakthrough to the Salsk area made it possible for the Kleist tank grouping to go behind the rear of the main forces of Malinovsky, located south of Rostov,

On July 27, the head of the operations department, General

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General Heusinger pointed out to the chief of staff of Army Group A, General Greiffenberg, from the fortification of Rostov, it is not necessary to push too far to the south from the bridgehead fortification of Rostov, so as not to force the enemy to retreat before he is surrounded by the advancing left flank of the group army."

In order to improve the operational situation, the Komandovanis of the Southern Front decided to withdraw the troops of the left wing of the line, which ran along the southern bank of the Kagalnik River to the Mapych Canal, early on July 28. However, a flat-scale retreat failed, the divisions managed to break away from the enemy and retreat in an organized manner to the indicated lines. The enemy finally disorganized the command and control of the troops, communication was paralyzed, handguards were again rushing across the steppe.

On July 28, the front was already gone, large gaps formed between the Soviet armies, the troops were unable to hold back the onslaught of the enemy and continued to roll back to the south. In a number of areas, the retreat turned into a flight, the settlements were left to the enemy without resistance. The divisions of the 12th, 18th and 37th armies each had 500-800 bayonets. In the 56th, 9th and 24th armies - only headquarters and special units.

The entry of German tank and motorized formations into the Zadoisk and Salsk steppes and the pasture expanses of the Krasnodar Territory created a direct threat to their breakthrough into the depths of the Caucasus. In order to unite the efforts of the All-Union Army in this direction, Sykta, by the decision of July 38, formed a single front of the troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts - the North Caucasian under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny, subordinating to him the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov infantry flotilla.

Semsi Mikhailovich was also heavy on his hands), but,

We accept old-fashioned habits, the officers are not in the face

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beat. True, the 59-year-old participant in the Russian-Japanese war and the "glorified hero" of the civil war, having graduated from the Frunze Vosniy Academy in 1932 "on the job" about the "war of engines" had a samos smugios idea. Khrushchev left memories of the visit of the marshal to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front:

"...op listened to the situation, listened to the commander of the troops and the head of the operative officer Baghramyán. His conversation with Baghramyán made a heavy impression on the mission. I remembered it in a hurry and still can forget it. Dlobylo after lunch. Budyonny heard Bagramyap, who reported on the situation. Bigramyai is a very distinct person, he reported everything, as it were, about all the troops that we had at that time; their location, environment, Lug Budyonny passl pas Bagramyaia. Why, I don't know, but ... I only remember that the analysis of the situation ended with the following words: "What is this tacos with you? You don't know your troops," "I don't know, I told you, comrade marshal," Bagramyai said, "So I listen to you, look at you and think - you need to be shot, It's such a thing to shoot," - a sort of squeaky Smei Mikhailovich, Bagramyan says in a voice: "Why, Semyon Mikhailovich, shoot me? If I'm not fit to be the head of operations, you give the miss a division. I am a colonel, I can command a division. And what is the use of being shot?" Budyonny, in a rude manner, persuaded Bagramyan to agree to the discussion. Well, of course, Bagramyan couldn't possibly agree. I was even surprised why Semyon Mikhailovich so insistently sought Bagramyan's "consent" for SA ... Semsy Mikhailovich withered away, and we remained in the same difficult situation, which after that time did not improve and worsened.

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In the newly created front, there were 23 kovys arrows, 5 cavalry divisions and 9 rifle brigades. They were tasked with defeating (1!) And driving back the enemy,

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by all means return Bataysk and restore the situation along the southern bank of the Don. In order to improve the command and control of the troops, the commander of the Froit, by order of July 28, divided the troops into two opposing groups: the Don on the right wing and the Primorskaya on the left wing of the front.

The Don Operational Group, headed by Malinovsky, consisting of the 51st, 37th and 12th armies covered the Stavropol direction. Primorsky group of General Ya.T. Cherevichenko, as part of the 18th, 56th and 47th armies of the 1st rifle and 17th cavalry corps, covered the Krasnodar government and the Taman Peninsula.

However, the issuance of orders could not in an instant transform the defeated troops into combat-ready divisions. In the Don Operational Group, as before, there was an acute shortage of ammunition. Most of the military artillery and artillery were reinforced on the move, and there was practically no interaction between the general-arms commanders and artillery commanders due to communication failures. This is not so lavish, there were almost 500 tanks, now there are 15 military vehicles;

The combat operations of the troops of the Don Group were supported by the 4th Air Army under the command of Lieutenant General K.A. Vershinin, which at that time had 130 serviceable samolegs. Aviation was given the task of covering the withdrawal of ground troops by bombarding and ziturm strikes to delay the enemy's attack to the maximum and reduce the rate of his advance. Vershinin's headquarters did not have a stable connection with the headquarters of the front and the headquarters of the general military armies. Therefore, aviation acted independently, according to its own understanding, "taking into account ensuring the fulfillment of the common task."

The defense of the troops of the Don group was poorly organized and not prepared in engineering terms,

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what the 8th sapper army did at Budyonny is not known. In a number of areas, the infantry would have been glad to equip trenches and other defensive structures for themselves, but could not do this due to the lack of entrenching tools. The anti-tac mines did not fire. The rear units, samys "mobile" during the retreat, broke away from their armies and lost contact with them, leaving the troops almost without ammunition, fuel and food. The command and control of the divisions also did not improve, as before, stable communications were not organized, as well as interaction, ground and air reconnaissance.

Under such conditions, it would seem that it would be appropriate for the troops to set a simple and concrete task. And Marshal Budenny es ordered: on July 29, the armies of the Don Group should stop the retreat, persit to the defense, from the morning of July 30, by the forces of the left-flank units of the 51st



of the army and two reserve tank brigades that had barely reached the deadline to launch a counterattack (!) in the direction of Nikolaevskaya, Konstantinovskaya. In general, there is some logic in this - the shovels were brought all the same. The leadership of a group of troops that panned the contra labor was entrusted to Gsieral Major B.A. Burial. By the end of July 29, the 115th Cavalry Division and the 135th Tank Brigade had taken up a starting position for an offensive in the area of Bolshaya and Malaya Martynovka.

The Germans knew that in two days our troops had undergone such a powerful reorganization, and, as if nothing had happened, they continued to develop the Edel Weiss operation. On July 30, a few minutes before the Soviet offensive, tanks of the 40th Corps broke into Bolshaya Martynovka. They scattered the units that General Pogrebov had and his headquarters, decapitating the command and control of the group, which never managed to go on the offensive. By evening, the troops of the 51st Soviet Army were cut off from the main forces of the Froit, since

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the rupture was about 65 km. Communication between the army headquarters and the headquarters of the group and the front was broken. In this situation, on July 31, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transferred the 51st Army to the Stalingrad Froit. Just as easily, the enemy cut through the froit at the junction of the 37th and 12th armies.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht in Kavkala developed so successfully that it was in these days that Hitler decided to transfer the 4th Panzer Army (without the 40th Corps) to the Stalingrad direction, where Plaulus still failed to capture the city. This inconsistency would cost the Germans dearly in the future. According to Dörr: "If in the plan of operation of July 23, which contradicted the actual situation, it is still possible to detect the main grouping (Army Group A, consisting of three armies and Army Group B, consisting of only one German army), then in Hitler's new order of July 30, the last remnants of the operational concept were thrown overboard. mastery of the Caucasus, it was not necessary to strive to capture Stalipgrad, if the task was to master Stalingrad, then it was not necessary to carry out a travesty to the Caucasus. ^

"It was one of the most successful ideas that dawned on Hitler," wrote A. Werth, who, by the way, was also a colonel in the British army.

Field Marshal Liszt had 8 divisions and a name on the left, shock flank. Until it's his

worried.

On the morning of August 2, the Isms continued their offensive against Salsk, and by the end of the day they reached the line of Proletarskaya, Salsk, Belaya Clay. From this point, the 1st Panzer Army began to rapidly advance with two tactical corps: the 57th Corps made a strong attack on Kropotkin, and the 40th Corps on Voroshilovsk. In order to avoid the encirclement of the troops of the Don group, the Zavgusta Military Council of the front gave the order to withdraw.

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The 37th Army, hiding behind rearguards, retreated in a southeasterly direction to Voroshilovsk, which was surrendered on August 5th. The 12th Army fought back across the Kuban River towards Armavir, and by the end of August 5, it had crossed to the left bersg. By this time, the army had lost contact with the headquarters of the Don Group and, by order of the front commander, was included in the Primorsky Group of Forces,

After the capture of Voroshilovsk, the tank corps of von Schwelpeburg developed active operations at the line of Nevinnomyssk-Minsralnye Vody-Georgisvsk. This ended the defensive operation of the Don Operational Group, of which only scattered and demoralized units of General Kozlov remained.

Valentip Pikul writes: "... it was, perhaps, a spontaneous flight of a mass of people dressed in military uniforms, and this whole crowd (you can't say otherwise) draped ia. Caucasus, and in Essentuki, detachments even had to repulse "attacks" on wine warehouses, on an elevator and a server factory.

In Esssituki, in one of the hospitals, political instructor Plotnikov, who survived the Crimean epic, was recovering from the Crimean epic, who managed to once again be on the front lines and get another portion of iron: any minute can be edss. Party documents were returned to us, we were given the isgoria of illnesses, directions for further treatment in the deep Soviet rear.

The sick patients went on their own (on foot) to the foothills of Nalchik - right in hospital pajamas. Thousands of people and wagons blocked the highway.

I joined Ivan Kravchenko (he walked on crutches) and Vasily Vanin (his right arm was in a cast). I have a bandaged head and a hand on a kosynx. About six kilometers later, his eyesight deteriorated, so he held on to Vasily's hand. Dobrel

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to Nalchik, the gamblers were advised to go further. The people of Makhachkala went to the tambu. |

It is hard to imagine that our hero thus independently (!) in his pajamas (!) across the Caspian Sea Krasiovodsk, Alma-Ata, Tashksit, Orsnburg and Chelyabinsk reached the "deep Soviet rear" - Sverdlovsk, where he finally received medical assistance.

life

Not long ago, a difficult situation developed for the Soviet troops on the left wing of the North Caucasian Front. Here, the main blow of Ruoff's army was taken up by the weakened 18th and 56th armies. The most bossy, fresh, fully equipped troops of the Cherevichenko group were deployed in secondary sectors. Thus, the 47th Army was on the Taman Peninsula in anticipation of an enemy amphibious assault, and parts of the 1st separate rifle corps - the 417th division and 4 rifle brigades - were redeployed to occupy the Kraspodar defensive bypass. From the tank units there was the Maikop tank brigade, attached to the 17th cavalry corps, and the 126th separate tank battalion as part of the 47th army. The combat operations of the troops of the group were provided by the 5th Air Army of General Lieutenant S.K. - ryupova. By this time, the army had 135 serviceable aircraft of various types.

The general state of affairs in the Primorskaya group did not differ much from the situation in the Dopa group: the defensive lines were not prepared, the work of the rear was disorganized. Great efforts were made to equip strongholds, fortifications and centers of resistance on the coast of the Azov and Black Seas. In the areas of Azov, Yeisk, Novorossiysk, on the Tamai Peninsula, almost one and a half thousand firing points were erected. but all this splendor was oriented towards the sea. Approaches to the foothills

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The main Caucasian ridge from the north was strengthened in engineering terms, the cities of Armavir, Maikop and Drugis, the rivers Kuban, Laba, Belaya were not prepared for defense.

At the time of the liquidation of the South Froit, deprived of command of the 18th army of Kamkov randomly

retreated without offering any serious resistance to the enemy.

"During the retreat from Rostov, the control of the troops was very often paralyzed," recalls General Provalov. - The headquarters of some of our formations lost contact with subordinate divisions and did not have a complete picture of the situation. This happened and we passed in the 18th Army. From time to time, the commanders of communications appeared from the headquarters and only delayed orders to close one or another line of defense. Where is the anti-terrorist, how many are there, how are the neighbors doing? You ask the park attendant, and the op knows almost nothing either. There was plenty of disorganization, for which one had to pay with blood.

On July 29, the enemy with advanced units crossed the Kagalnik River in the Novobataysk region and continued to develop pasture in the South and South-East directions, trying to reach the deep rear of our units operating in the Kushchevo direction and the Taman Peninsula.

Under these conditions, the gallant commander of the North Caucasian Front ordered precisely the troops of the 18th July 30th to launch a counterattack and in interaction. The 12th Army and the 17th Cossack Corps, which was supposed to advance on Bataysk, restore the situation on the Don, the Headquarters of the 56th Army were ordered to withdraw beyond the Kuban and organize defense along the southern bank of the river and on the Krasnodar bypass.

However, the command of the 18th army was unable to control its troops, and the 17th cavalry corps received an order from the front headquarters very late: the counterattack did not take place. The Kamkov army continued

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walk away randomly. The position of the troops of the Primorsky Group was rapidly deteriorating.

ARMAVIR AND MAYKOP

Having failed to encircle the armies of the North Caucasian Front between Don and Kuban and having established their withdrawal beyond Kubli, the command of Army Group A decided to change the direction of the main attack. The main forces of the 1st Panzer Army - two-wheeled, three motorized and one light infantry divisions - turned to the south-west towards Armavir and Maykop with the task, in cooperation with the 17th Army, advancing on Krasnodar, to break through to the Black Sea coast in the area Tuapse, surround and destroy the Soviet troops. Only one pkovy was left on the ncsis

Corps Schweppenburg.

On August 5, General Kleist introduced the 13th Taik division and the SS Viking division into the gap between the 12th and 37th Soviet armies. The German divisions were opposed by formations of the 12th Army and the 1st Special Rifle Corps. Marshal Grechko claimed that he put up "brutal resistance" to the enemy, however, the German source Melaicholicio notes that the 13th Tapko Division "advancing to Maikop almost without fighting", while it should be noted that the tankers of Major General Gerrap had to force water barriers three times along the way .

At the same time, Ruohra's army attacked Krasnodar. The 56th Army, which was defending on the Krasnodar bypass, by this time had 93 guns and 203 mortars. Warmia shells were 0.2-0.4 boskomplekska. Not

which artillery units turned out to be without ammunition at all.

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On August 9, Krasnodar fell, and a day later, Kleist troops captured Maykop, and this was already the first oil that Hitler was so eager for. The chief of the general staff of the Italian army, Marshal Cavaliero, these days wrote in his diary: "10 thousand specialists and qualified specialists follow the armies of List, who, after the capture of Maykop, must restore oil wells. According to estimates, it will take 4 to 5 months to put them back into operation."

In fact, it took much less time. Although the Russians removed the oil and gasoline reserves in advance, the boreholes were clogged, the dismantled equipment was only partially evacuated, and the amination of such strategically important objects as the oil fields was not carried out at all. So the Fuhrer received all this in good condition, and a month later he began to pump Maikop "black gold".

On August 10, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicated to Marshal Budyonny: "In connection with the situation that has arisen, the most important and dangerous moment for the North Caucasian front and the Black Sea coast is the direction from Maykop to Tuapse. You move the enemy to the Tuapse region, the 47th Army and all the Kafront troops located in the Krasnodar region, will be cut off and captured ... in no case, under your personal responsibility, let the opponents pass

like Tuapse. Thus, the Stavka categorically demanded that the enemy's way out to the sea be covered.

For this purpose, it was supposed to use the forces of the 18th Army and the 17th Kuban Corps. At the same time, the 12th Army was given the task of ensuring the junction of the 18th and 56th armies. The 47th Army moved to the Novorossiysk region, leaving the Taman Peninsula to the marines. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet from Transcaucasia transferred the 236th and 32nd Guards Divisions, with the task of taking the road from Maykop to Tuapse.

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Meanwhile, the enemy continued the offensive with two strike groups: by the forces of the 16th motorized and 101st light infantry divisions on Alshersky, Nef-tegorsk and by the forces of the 13th Tapkova, 97th light infantry divisions and the Viking SS division on Kabardinskaya, Khadyzhenskaya, trying encircle the troops of the 18th army.

On August 12, the Germans captured Belorechenskaya. Here the 383rd rifle division of General Provalov fought hard, the 31st rifle and 9th divisions of the NKVD defended on the right of it, on the left the 17th cavalry cor "pus" - 12, 13.15 and 116th divisions. units crossed Laba east of Belorechenskaya in the Kuban sector and broke into the Khadyzhenskaya area.

noted in his decision:

"1. The enemy breakthrough in the Khadyzhenskaya area occurred solely due to the type of command of the 17th Cavalry Corps, Major General Kirichenko ... Regimental Commissar Ochkin ...

2. During August 12-16, 1942, the command of the 17th cavalry corps did not fulfill a number of tasks: a) allowed the enemy to break through the Khanskoye-Velikos section; b) did not destroy the enemy in the area of Guriyskos, Kabardinskaya, despite the received instructions from the dvadzi; c) for two days, the 17th cavalry corps was empty-footed and took decisive action to destroy the enemy in the area of Tverskaya, Khady Zhenskaya; d) the corps commander repeatedly changed the location of his headquarters without the permission of the front headquarters, breaking away from the troops up to 50 km, which led to the loss of command and control of troops and communication with the front headquarters,

3. The command of the 18th Army, Lieutenant-General Kamkov, a member of the Vosniy Council, Brigadier Commissar Kuzmin, did not take decisive measures to strengthen the defense of Khadyzhenskaya and for two days there was no decisive blow against the enemy who occupied Khadyzhenskaya.

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The resistance of the Soviet troops, regularly replenished with reserves, paralyzed. According to the headquarters of Army Group A, since the start of Operation Edelweiss, the losses in personnel have amounted to about 54 thousand soldiers and officers, of which more than 10 thousand in the last 10 days. By mid-August, the offensive of the Ismet troops stalled at the Samuraiskaya-Khadyzheiskaya-Klyuchevaya-Smolenskaya line,

At this time, the Germans had their first supply difficulties, which then "became chronic and gradually turned into a real disaster ... Communications became so long that the convoys carrying fuel themselves used up most of their cargo on the way", as "fuel trucks » camels had to be used. The troops of Generals Kleist and Ruoff advanced 100-120 km, but did not reach the set goals. Almost all the forces of Field Marshal List turned out to be shackled in the zone of the Marine Group, and in fact it was still necessary to take Baku,

During this time, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front took up defensive positions along the Terek, Baksan rivers and in the passes [of the main Caucasian ridge, covering the directions {rozny, Bakui Orzhonikidze, Tbilisi.

#### BEFORE THE STORM OF THE CAUCASUS

The Transcaucasian Eastern District, which since January 1942 was commanded by General of the Army I.V. Tyulepsv, May 1 was reorganized into a front.

In June, Front had a total of 44th, 45th and 46th divisions, 17 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 3 kovys arrows and tank brigades, 12 artillery and 5 artillery regiments, 12 artillery regiments and 12 armored trains. There were 746 mortars (82 and 12 () mm), 926 guns,

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220 slippers. With the approach of danger to the Caucasus from the west, from the side of Doibass and the Don, the Soviet Headquarters. part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front was deployed in the direction of this new threat.

On July 16, Tyulenev's headquarters sent the "Plan for the Defense of Transcaucasia from the North" to the Eperal Headquarters, which provided for the creation of several lines of defense. The first and main frontier was to pass

along the Terskot River of the Caspian Sea coast to Maysky, then south along the Uruk River to the Main Caucasian Range and further along the ridge to the Black Sea coast in the Lazarevskaya area. At the mouth of the Tersk, work was carried out to prepare for the flooding of this area,

From August 1 to August 12, the Headquarters regrouped the troops of the Transcaucasian Front. At the same time, 2 guards rifle corps (10th and 11th) and 11 more rifle brigades were detached from the Stavka reserve. The transportation of these troops was carried out through the Asgarkhan, and then along the Caspian Sea to Makhachkala and further by rail. Five rifle divisions, three rifle and one sneaker brigade, tri-artillery horseshoes, armored trains and several other units

From the Terek river to Chervlennaya oborets, the 44th army was entrusted with the command of Gepsral-Major A-A. Khryashchev (from August 2 - Major General Petrov), whose troops advanced to the indicated lines from the Makhachkala, Baku, Army of Imsl in their own composition of rifle divisions. From Chervlennaya to Maisky and further along the Uruk district, the defense was entrusted to the troops of the army troupe under the command of Lieutenant General V.N. Kur Dyumov, consisting of four rifle divisions and the 11th Guards Corps (soon these troops were taken over by the administration of the 9th Army). Particular attention was paid to the cover of the subgroups to Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, the Truzinskaya and Vosino-Ossetian roads.

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The defense [of the main Caucasian ridge from the Mamison Pass to the Black Sea coast was entrusted to the troops of the 46th Army, commanded by Major General V.F. Sergatskov.

The second defensive line was created along the Sulak River. It was occupied by the 1st 16th Rifle Division. In addition, a defensive line was created in the depths from Makhachkala to Buypaksk and rear lines along the Samur River near the Derbent Gates. For the defense of large administrative and industrial centers, defensive areas were formed, the axis of the troops in them were divisions of the NKVD,

45th Army General Lieutenant F.N. Remezov and the 15th Cavalry Corps covered the state border with Turkey and communications in Iran.

The isolation of the troops defending Grozny and Baku from the headquarters of the front, which was located in Tbilisi, made it necessary to create - for more efficient command and control of the troops - its own leadership headquarters, which was done.



Iano. On August 8, by order of the Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was created, which was appointed to command the Berisva nominee, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, literally for. dvs psdel before this left without an army,

The group included the 44th and 9th armies - a total of 9 rifle divisions and 3 guards rifle brigades. The reserve of the commander of the group consisted of the ICE rifle divisions, the 52nd tank brigade, the 36th and 42nd armored divisions, the guards rocket artillery regiment, the mortar regiment. After 3 days, the 37th army.

So, in the first half of August 1942, the troops of the Caucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. Particular attention was paid to the reliable cover of the Baku directions and approaches to Grozny, as the most probable and accessible to the enemy troops.

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Revenge contributed to the fulfillment of defensive tasks. In order to delay the Germans in front of the main defensive line, advanced detachments were advanced, which, without meeting the enemy, went out significantly north of the lines indicated by them and, by the end of August 9, took up defenses on the eastern bank of the Kuma.

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After the German troops reached the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasian Range, the command of Army Group A believed that the Soviet troops would no longer be able to offer serious resistance, which List reported to the Fuhrer: "It seems that the enemy along the entire front has put everything I have on the front lines forces at your disposal and that after breaking through this line, the enemy's resistance will be broken

lazy."

In this situation, the plan of the Ismet command was reduced to someone, so that after regrouping, they would begin a direct assault on the Caucasus simultaneously in three directions.

Ruoff's 17th Army was given the task of capturing the Black Sea coast from Anapa to Poti and then advancing on Batumi and Tbilisi. To secure the entire right flank, the 5th Army Corps under the command of Tensral Lieutenant Wetzell, with the forces of the 73rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, was to capture Anapa and Novorossiysk to take over the protection of the Black Sea

cutting.

The 57th Panzer Corps, commanded by General Kirchner, the forces of the SS motorized division "Viking" of Major General Steiner and the 1st Slovak motorized division under the command of Major General Turanetz, after the capture of the Maikop oil region, was to advance on Tuapse and further along Poberzhya on Sukhumi, Batumi and part of the forces, together with the 44th Army Corps, commanded by General of Artillery DeAngelis, on Adler. In the next 44th

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the corps had to advance behind the 57th tank corps at Gbilisi.

General Kopral's 49th Rifle Corps operated in the center of Army Group L. He was tasked with advancing through the Main Caucasian Range to Sukhumi and Kugaisi.

Kleist's 1st Sneaker Army, advancing to a low angle in the Tuapse direction, should have turned sharply to the southeast and, with the forces of the 3rd and 40th Sneaker Corps, struck from the Pyatigorsk, Prokhladny area on Ordzhonikidze, Grozny, Makhachkala, Baku. The left flank army was provided by the 52nd Army Corps, commanded by General Ott.

In mid-August, the battle was supposed to flare up with renewed vigor along the entire length of the Kavkazsky ridge.

ON THE MOZDOK DIRECTION.

So, the 1st Panzer Army of General Kleist acted against the Northern Group of Forces of General Mas Lappikov. The latter transferred two divisions of the 44th Panzer Corps to Mozdok: from the Armavir area, the 13th Panzer Division of Major General Jerra, from the Nalchik area — the 3rd Panzer Division of Major General Bright. The 11th infantry division of Major General Ryuknagel and the 370th infantry division under the command of Major General Klepp, which were part of the 52nd Army Corps, were also advanced to the Mozdok papravlepis. The 23rd Panzer General von Makkai of the 2nd Romanian Mountain Rifle Division remained on Nalchik's com. Ilog: the Germans were going to conquer the oil-bearing regions [of Rostov and Baku, having only 6 divisions and 340 tanks (in the future, tank and motorized units were expected to approach from Stalingrad, which should have been captured according to the Grarik).

14 Goa 1942 > training 385

On August 18, Soviet forward detachments entered into battle with units of the 52nd Army Corps. These formations, due to their small numbers, could not stop the approaching strike force of the enemy, and on August 21 they withdrew to Mozdok, to their main forces. All the same, the actions of the forward detachments played a positive role: they forced the 1st Panzer Army to launch once again on the line of the Kuma River, helped the command of the Northern Group to clarify the direction of the strike and prepare the troops to repel attacks.

On August 23, the Germans, with the forces of the 3rd and 13th tank and 11th infantry divisions, launched an offensive immediately on Mozdok. Here they were met by a detachment of Major Korieev and the cadets of the Rostov Artillery were taught together with units of the 26th reserve rifle brigade. The three days fought fierce battles, but under the pressure of superior enemy forces, they were forced to leave Mozdok. This time, the NKVD special group did not have time to competently mine oil wells and drilling rigs and blew them up at that moment: when German motorcyclists approached them.

After the capture of Mozdok, the Germans first of all tried to take possession of the passes across the Terek and secure for themselves an initial bridgehead for a further offensive in the direction of Ordzhonikidz.

On August 25, the chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army, Lo, sent word to the general headquarters "about the new planning of the army for the further conduct of the offensive: due to the desert steppe area near the Caspian Sea between the Terek and Manych, it is impossible to advance strong units. Also, the issue of water supply is facing colossal difficulties, since there will be a struggle for individual wells, which the enemy has left in an unfit condition. Therefore, the offensive should be carried out from the line of Baksan, Mozdok, here the direction of the main attack.

The opportunity to cross the Terek under Moelok is the most advantageous, since the width of the river here is not

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exceeds 100 m. Thus, under the command of the commander of the 3rd Panzer Corps, a group consisting of a Romanian mountain division, German mountain units attached to this division, and reinforced by a regimental group of the 23rd Panzer Division, whose task will be to advance the western and south of the Terek to Ordzhonikidz and cut off military roads.

40th Panzer Corps with the 3rd Panzer Division and happy

The strength of the forces of the 23rd Panzer Division, as well as the newly subordinate 13th Panzer Division, was preparing an attack in the area of Mozdok Chersl River. Terek, forms a bridgehead bridgehead and, after building the bridge, will advance to Grozny

The 52nd Army Corps follows the 40th Tank Corps through Mozdok in order to advance on Ordzhonikidze.

After forcing the Tersk, first of all, it is necessary to destroy the enemy located in the bend of the Terek, and for this to put into operation a sufficient number of tanks to strike at Ordzhonikidze.

Simultaneously with the attack on Mozdok, the private 23rd armored division attacked Prokhladny from the north and east. Having captured it, the Germans on August 95 launched an offensive from this ranon to the south along the Prokhladpy-Orlzhonikidz railway. However, all attempts to break through the defenses in this area were not successful. Thus, by the end of August, the Germans, having captured Mozdok and Prokhladny, went to the left bersg of the Tersk and Baksai rivers and proceeded to prepare a strike from Mozlok to Malgobek.

This time, Stalin took with all sincerity the threat of an enemy breakthrough to the Russian and Baku oil regions and, unlike Hitler, in such cases he did not believe that there could be too many forces. In the Makhachkala region, the 58th army was formed under command of General Major V.A. Khom Chepko, who made up the second echelon of the Northern Group of Forces. This army included 317th, 328th, 337th rifle

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divisions, the 3rd rifle brigade and the Makhachkala rifle division of the NKVD, the 136th artillery and 1147th howitzer artillery regiments. In the first echelon of the group were 3 armies.

On the northern flank along the Baksan River, the 37th Army of Gesral Kozlov was defending. The army consisted of the 2nd Guards, 275th, 392nd (Georgian), 296th Rifle Divisions and the 1st NKVD Division. The task was to hold Nalchik and prevent the enemy from entering Baksan.

In the Isitra, on the right bank of the Plersk, the 9th Army took up the defense under the command of the gsisral-major K.A. Korotsvi. The army included the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, 61st, 151st, 176th, 389th and 417th Rifle Divisions, and the 62nd Naval Rifle Brigade. The army had to prevent the forcing of the Tersk progivpik.

The 44th army, commanded by General Pegrov, consisting of the 223rd, 416th Azerbaijani and 114th Georgian rifle, 30th and 110th (Kalmyk) cavalry with kikhiviziy, 9, 10, 60, 84 and 256 The th heating brigade turned around on the right flank of the group. Obs cavalry divisions were intended for the defense of the Kizlyar-Astrakhan railway. In addition, for this purpose, 3 divisions of armored vehicles were also allocated, reinforced by infantry landings and mobile detachments.

The 10th Guards Rifle Corps, the 89th (Armenian) and 347th Rifle Divisions, the 52nd Sneaker Brigada, the 249th and 258th Separate Tank Battalions, 8, 44 , 49th and 50th Guards Mipomst Regiments and the 259th Department "Guards Mivomstny Division. For operations in the rear of the enemy from the Tuapse direction, the right wing of the front, the Stavka transferred the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Gsial Kirichenko (the former 17th).

Let me remind you that all this is against five German and one Rumanian divisions. The overall balance of power was in favor of the Soviet troops.

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However, the command of the Northern Group of Forces, despite the clearly revealed direction of the enemy's main blow, distributed forces, and especially artillery, evenly along the entire front. As a result, only a small part of the rifle troops of the 9th Army participated in the battles in the Malgobek direction of the Soviet side, EU commander , General Korotev, was from the same cohort of Soviet military leaders, worked out on the same block: he had a proletarian braid origin, he did not study anything, he received an officer's education at gunnery and machine gun courses and was a "hot" person. As General of the Army E.E. Maltsev, who closely observed the work of the commander: "The cool style of leadership became a strong habit of the gsisral ... the commander was very emotional for a century, not moderately hot. Having received the order "Stand to the death! Not a step back!", op, used to call the division commanders for hours: "Look mis, stand to the death! Otherwise, a tribunal. Clear?" "It's much clearer," the division commander usually answered with noticeable doom in his voice,

Of the 2,356 guns and mortars available in the Northern Group of Forces in the Malgobsk direction, only 237 were used in the first period of the operation. in the direction of the main attack, they had 6-fold superiority in artillery and 4-fold superiority in slippers. The purpose of the offensive was to break through the defenses

Soviet troops on the Tersk River and capture Malgobsk. Then the Germans expected to break through with tank formations between the Tersky and Sunzhsi ridges and, advancing along the valley along the Alkhan-Churt kapal, reach Grozny;

On August 31, Hitler or his headquarters once again reminded Field Marshal List: "The main task of the 1st Panzer Army is to destroy the enemy in the Terek bend ...

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By all means, and above all mobile ones, continue the offensive against Grozny in order to lay a hand on the region of the oil fields.

On the morning of September 2, the Germans began to force the Terek, they managed to capture a small bridgehead, on the right of the main forces was disrupted by a flank attack of the 11th Guards Corps. On the night of September 4, Kleist's troops made a strong blow from the areas of Predmostny and Kizlyar to Voznesenskoye. The steps were carried out by groups of tanks (about 100 vehicles of the 3rd division) with a landing on the ground, supported by two divisions of assault guns. In the zone of the 9th army, they managed to advance 12 km south of Predmostnoy. In the afternoon, General Korogsev brought into battle the 62nd naval rifle brigade with the 249th tank battalion, the 47th guards fighter and anti-tank division and stopped the opponents at the foot of the Tersky Range.

Great help", which is quite rare in the memoirs of 1942, the Soviet ground troops were provided at that time by the aviation of the 4th Air Army, working on enemy bridgeheads, crossings and directly over the battlefield.

The main role in the success of the defensive operation of the Northern Group of Forces was played by 2 circumstances. Firstly, this was facilitated by the conditions of the terrain: the enemy tank groupings could advance only along the valleys, fenced off, albeit from high, but steep mountains, cut by gorges, ravines and covered with dense forest; tank-dangerous directions were easily calculated. Secondly, having repeatedly experienced the bitterness of defeats from a small, but highly professional enemy, Soviet commanders learned how to build a solid layered defense and organize interaction between military branches. An example of such a competent organization of the battle is given in his memoirs by Marshal Grechko:

"Among the tank battles in the Mozdokl region, special

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the battle in the valley was fierce, lasting ten and a half hours ...

The entrance to the valley was defended by the 52nd tank brigade of Major V.I. Filippov, artillerymen of Major F. Dolinsky and one motorized rifle battalion, tanks were assigned the main role in this defense (for a long time the very concept of "tank in defense" was considered one of the items in the Soviet military lexicon. - Auth.). Before adjusting the pace, Filippov and Dolinsky agreed on interaction (also a novelty, but majors learn faster than generals. - Auth.). In view of the fact that the entrance to the valley in the narrowest place did not exceed 77 km, it was decided to create a number of anti-tank strongholds capable of most of the defense. These points were located along the valley to a sufficient depth (and the commander Maslennikov draws his troops to the point. - Auth.). Each of them consisted of a tank ambush, reinforced on the flanks by anti-tank guns and machine guns.

kami.

The first line of PTOPs was supposed to cut past) - the fallen echelons of enemy tanks into separate groups and really heavy damage to them. Therefore, the position was more durable. This line consisted of two tank companies, joined in three ambushes, moving in constant communication with each other. The tanks were dug into the ground and stood at an angle of 45 degrees to the enemy's position line. Such a position allowed them to fire simultaneously with equal force in several directions.

The second line of VETs was located two kilometers from the first. It included as many such KV and anti-tank guns.

The third position was formed by separate tanks and anti-tank guns. On this position it was necessary to finish off the Yemetsky slippers. The CI of the commander of the tank brigade was in the center of the anti-tank missions. Major Filippov personally looked through the entire area. This helped him in the future to clearly control the actions of the tanks. Since

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Since the quarter artillery battalion and separate guns were stationed near the tank silos, Major Dolinsky decided to stay with the commander of the tank brigade. This made it easier for him to lead the army of artillerymen in accordance with the rapidly changing situation (here they are - real Russian commanders, majors Filippov and Dolzikh; the only drawback of their position, judging by the description, is the absence of mine barriers, so there were no missions. - Auth.).

At dawn, after a long artillery and mortar fire on our battle formations, the Nazis threw a battalion of 120 tanks, hundreds of machine guns, paratroopers and more than a regiment of infantry on foot. The tanks moved at top speed in two groups of 50 and 70 vehicles, falling on the move to break into the valley along the slopes that form the se. In a bipocular it was clearly visible that 5-7 km from the front edge of our defenses, a large number of artillery on tractors and motor vehicles with German infantry had accumulated on the roads. This was the second shock train, half-prepared by the enemy to develop success in depth.

As soon as the enemy's tanks approached our defenses at 700-800 meters, the artillery of the army opened heavy fire on us. The first bursts of our machine gunners from the fascist tanks swept away machine gunners. Immediately, the artillery shifted its fire to the infantry, following 300 meters behind the slippers. At the same time, the guards mipomegas fired several accurate volleys. Their shells exploded in the midst of the Nazi infantry. Having lost up to half of their strength, the fascists began to retreat, the Mezhlutsm slippers continued to stubbornly move forward, apparently believing that the infantry would soon overtake them. With any physical tension, they could not break into our first line of defense together. Thus, a favorable situation was created for the defeat of Prague in parts.

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When the German tanks came close in the first line of anti-tank guns, all the fire fell on them. A minute later, six German tanks were on fire on the battlefield and about ten stopped, lined with shells.

Since the left group of German tanks (50 vehicles) turned out to be closer to our positions, the main blow was first carried out against us. It was so powerful that the surviving Ismetian vehicles turned back. Then the ambushes of the first line concentrated their fire on the right, stronger group (70 vehicles) of fascist tanks. Our tanks and the guns of the rear strongholds were silent for the time being, not revealing themselves. `

The German tankers of the first group, who watched the defeat of the left group of tanks, apparently decided that as soon as they broke through our front line, they would go out into the Takgich expanse, where there were no fire weapons,

At high speed they rushed forward, it was impossible that their path was littered with flaming and wrecked cars. About 18 tanks broke through our first line of defense. However, after a minute they hit



whether under the fire of a new line of VETs. Since only a group of advancing tanks broke through, the intensity of the attack on each of them turned out to be even higher here than on the front front. Soon seven more enemy vehicles burst into flames and turned back a few. Chstyrstanka tried to slip further along the pu. Two of them, having stumbled on the back of our GAIKOVs, were hit, the rest turned back.

Thanks to the coordinated actions of the Taikists, artillerymen and infantrymen, the courage and heroism of the soldiers, 53 enemy cubs remained on the battlefield by night. 10 guns of various calibers were also shot down, over 800 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. Our tankers lost ten vehicles, five of which soon returned to service.

Classic! It was in such battles that the Pobsda was forged, and in the hasty counterattacks, which

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it was necessary to "destroy" and "liquidate" SSSH 10 "slowly" with a lach in one day.

Ilugzhe, two ostapopii of the enemy, the commander of the Spernaya Group of Forces ordered to liquidate the Prague bridgehead and clear the right bank of the Tersk. © Ugra On September 14, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, with the support of the specially created 'sin gruppa ss artillery strike on Mozdok from the next day from the west and south: given the Bridgehead, units of the 11th Corps and the shock group of the 37th army de sectors went on the offensive

Sovial counterattacks with attacks from the Pemecks and all the fierce oncoming bop. 1peral Kleis, skillfully maneuvering his forces, managed to keep the cape of the territory and even advanced somewhat to the foothills of the western Koli. standing 'bout, hoarse

However, to achieve

yak

parts of the Suizhensky ridge. hmesge, the most heperal already knew how to organize this organization quickly

before

And Guy's tank army was not able to achieve any success. After ten days of bleeding

the Germans were forced to stop by the Germans. The stubborn resistance and continuous counterattacks of the Soviet troops greatly weakened the Ismetsky units. Oeo benio, the 5th and 370th Infantry of the AIB suffered heavy losses. September was ending, the army of Kleisg had succeeded in a line, and had advanced south of Mozlok. at the same time, more than 6,000 soldiers and officers and 180 gawks were lost,

For the efforts of the Mozdok grouping, an SS division was transferred from the Tudpsiya direction; "Wee kig", which Kleist introduced into the first line on 24 September. This time he aimed the main strike at the gate - a valley 4-5 km wide, which is about. there were roads pa fozny and Ordzhonikilae. The Soviet troops and this momsit were preoccupied with other problems - the implementation of the next directive (S: ki about the destruction of the enemy south of the Terek. for

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chsgo should "immediately proceed to the liquidation" um, p. Therefore, General Korotesv. a comma with the building of their y; a number of groupings of science on the boards, missed the concentration of the enemy grouping.

The Ismet strike on September 25 was strong and imaginative. On the same day, advanced battalions 1] and. kovy division started fighting for Elkhotoovo. On the 27th of September, the Isms managed to take the village. In this situation, the commander of the Northern Group of Forces, quite reasonably, proposed to abandon the offensive and temporarily go on the defensive along the lines occupied. The rate of hardpla is the decision

Having advanced only a few kilometers. Kleist's troops were forced to refrain from long-range attacks, tiki did not break through to the coveted PSF thermal fires of Grozny.

BATTLE FOR NOVOROSIYSK

Almost simultaneously with fierce battles Xie

the troops of the North Caucasian Front carried out the Novorossiysk defensive

operation. Opa began on August 19 in the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasian Range.

After the retreat to the foothills of the troops of Marshal Buden-

By August 17, the forces of the 18th, 13th and 56th armies entrenched themselves on the line of Khamiiki, Samurskaya, Cheftegorsk, Kabardinskaya, Dubinin, Stanropolskaya, Azovskaya.

The 47th Army withdrew to Novorossiysk along the line Shap-Sugskaya, Krymskaya, Troitskaya, Slavyaiskaya, Petrovskaya. Between the 47th and neighboring 56th Army, by this time, a gap had formed from the Abiyskaya to the Azovskaya, about 40 km long, which was covered by the military.

Regarding the withdrawal of General Kotov's units to some of these lines, the Stavka pointed out to Budyonny:

"Sanctions on the withdrawal of front troops to the Rezhets line, Art. Navagia, Thamakha, Shapsugskaya, Verkhis-Bakapsky will not be required, since without the consent of the Headquarters you have already sent troops to this rubble, which is wrong.

It must be borne in mind that the lines of withdrawal are themselves cleared of obstacles and give nothing if they are not defended. The defense of mountain lines must be built on stubborn counterattacks ahead of the main positions on all approaches to these positions, so that create the greatest difficulties for the enemy in advancing, exhausting him with small and large battles for extermination.

From everything it is clear that you have not yet been able to create a proper turning point in the actions of the troops and that where the command staff is not seized with panic, the troops fight well and counterattacks bark their results, as can be seen from the actions of the 17th Cavalry Corps.

You need to take the troops into your own hands, force them to fight and properly build a defense in the foothills, achieving constant persistence in the actions of all individual detachments ahead of the main positions and the main forces on the main lines.

The island covered by the Taman Peninsula had the weakest effect. Insignificant units of the marines and rear units of naval bases defended themselves there. These troops took up defense on a broad front along the coast of the Taman Peninsula with a front to the west and along the rivers Kuban and Protoka with a front to the northeast.

The 17th German Army was concentrated against the troops of the North Caucasian Front. She had the task of capturing the Taman Peninsula, capturing Novorossiysk and further advancing along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi.

In an effort to unite the efforts of the troops and the fleet for the defense of Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, which

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on August 17, the commander of the front created the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR), into which the troops of the 47th army (two rifle divisions and two brigades), the 216th rifle division from the 56th army, the Azov military flotilla, Temryukskaya, Kerch, Novorossiysk naval bases and the combined aviation group, the command of the NOR was entrusted to Major General G.P. Kotov. His deputy for the naval unit was the appointed commander of the Azov Flotilla Captain; Admiral G. Orshkov. They were given the task of preventing the breakthrough of the trough to Novorossiysk both from land and from the sea.

Defense from land was to be carried out by the 47th army mission, together with the marines.

The defense of the base from the sea was entrusted to coastal artillery, ships of the naval base, and naval aviation. Coastal artillery consisted of 87 barrels of 45-152 mm caliber. The ship's forces consisted of two caponier boats, 26 boats for the protection of the water area, and 17 torpedo boats. The Naval Air Group had 112 aircraft. From the air, Novorossiysk defended the air defense base area, which included the 62nd Rare Aviation Regiment and zepigi artillery - 84 guns and 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.

According to the plan for the defense of Novorossiysk, developed back in October 1941, it was envisaged to create forward, main and rear lines, as well as lines of cover and an anti-amphibious line. It was planned to strengthen the front edge with anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. However, after the landing of Soviet troops in the Crimea, all work was curtailed. In July 1942, the construction of defensive structures in the city itself and the anti-amphibious defense of its coast began. Thus, in spite of the already existing experience in defending Odessa and Sevastopol, where defense from land had not been created in advance, by the beginning of the battle for Novorossiysk, work on creating land defense around the city had

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measure could not be fulfilled. By August 18, the defensive structures were mainly equipped and only on the inner bypass.

By the end of August 19, the troops of the 47th Army occupied the following position: the 216th Rifle Division concentrated in the 1st Sector, in the Shapsugskaya area, and separate SS units occupied a defensive line in the Erivansky, Semntsovsky sector; The 103rd Rifle Brigade held Abinskaya with part of its forces, and with two battalions

it defended itself with talons in the area of Krymskaya, with one company it held Troitskaya, and one battalion defended itself in the area of Kievskoye and Varenikovskaya; a consolidated brigade of the 14th, 142nd and 322nd marine battalions defended in the Neberdzhayevsky direction - the 2nd sector; The 77th (Azerbaijani) Rifle Libya with its main forces concentrated in the 8th sector, the area of Verkhis-Bakansky, the Wolf Gate Pass, Gaiduk, and part of the forces covered the Kabardian and Neberzhayevsky Persians; The 144th and 35th Marine Battalions and the 40th Artillery Division of the Azov Flotilla took up defensive positions in the 4th Sector - along the Kurka River, the section Red October, Klabatka; The 83rd Naval Rifle Brigade moved out to defend the 5th a - Krymskaya, Kisvskos; The 126th separate kovy battalion, which included 36 T-26 guns, was concentrated in the Yurno-Vesely area. The defense of the coastal region from Elendzhik to Anapa was assigned to the Novorossiysk naval base; The Taman Peninsula was supposed to be protected by the Kerch Naval Base,

According to Grechko, the forces allocated by the German command for the capture of Novorossiysk exceeded the forces of the defenders by 4 times in terms of people, 7 times in guns and mortars, and 2 times in tanks and aircraft. True, Grechko does not indicate what kind of forces they were. But it is clearly seen on the map that two German infantry and three Romanian cavalry divisions were operating in the Novorossiysk direction.

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On August 19, the 9th and 73rd German infantry divisions launched an offensive against Severskaya and Abinskaya. By the end of the day, they managed to capture the villages of Severskaya, Ilskaya, Kholmanskaya, Akhtyrskaya and started fighting for Abipskaya. Attempts to seize the latter on the move were repulsed by units of the 103rd Rifle Brigade. On the same day, against the rifle company of the 103rd brigade and subdivisions of the 144th battalion of marines, defending in the district of Troitskaya and Anastasisskaya, the Romanian cavalry corps - 5th, 6th and 9th divisions began to attack. The Romanian cavalry captured these villages, but was stopped at the large railway station Krymskaya. After that, the main forces of the cavalry corps - the ICE division - launched an offensive on Temryuk. Supported by artillery and aircraft, the Romanians broke through the front near Temryuk and moved to the village of Kurchanskaya.

To strengthen the units that defended Temryuzhk. The iggab of the Azov flotilla formed a battalion of marines from the personnel of patrol ships and boats in 500 hours under the command of Major Ts. Kupiikov. This battalion was immediately sent out to the village of Kurchanskaya. Having received a little under-

krspenis, the marines, with fire support from the guns of the 40th artillery division, the gunboats Bug, Don, Disstr, No. 4, the Zheleznyakov monitor and two river gunboats, held this flank position of the Persian line until the evening of the next day, and then, under cover of naval artillery fire, regrouped to the second line of defense.

Termaiskos command, having replaced the 5th Romanian cavalry division, which had suffered a lot of losses, with a fresh 9th Cavalry Division, at dawn on August 22 resumed the offensive against Temryuk. In the evening of the next day, by order of the command, the defenders of the Temryuk Naval Base left the city and retreated to the Taman Peninsula.

On the Novorossiysk direction on August 2] the Germans continued to advance on the Crimean with the forces of the 5th

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May Corps from the Abiyskaya area and part of the forces of the Romanian Cavalry Corps from Troitskaya. On the same day, the commanding 47th Army transferred the 83rd Naval Rifle Brigade to the Krymskaya district, having previously guarded the coast. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, Soviet troops left Abinskaya and Crimean.

There was a threat of the enemy breaking through the passes. In this regard, by the decision of Admiral Rshkov, detachments of marines with a total number of about one thousand people were formed from the personnel of the rear units, crew, ships of the flotilla and the Novorossiysk Naval Base and sent to the Babich passes. Kabardian, Wolf Gates and on the Abrau-Dyurso road, where there were units of the 47th Army that day. The units of the NOR managed to halt the further advance of the enemy,

On August 22 and 23, the 103rd Rifle Brigade conducted defensive battles along the line Nsberdzhaskaya, Nizhns Bakansky, Yurno-Vesely. The Germans managed to capture Neberdzhaskaya, and zatsm and Nizhne-Bakapsky. However, attempts to develop an offensive along the Verkhis Bakapsky-Novorossiysk highway were repulsed.

On August 25, there was an opsrtive pause. At the same time, Gsieral Kotov decided to launch a counterattack by the forces of the 77th Infantry Division on Neberdzhaskaya. In the course of 8-day battles, the division captured the heights south of Peberdzhaskaya, where it settled down, causing serious losses.

Having received a short-term advance, the troops of the 47th Army accelerated the equipment of the positions taken, replenished the combat units at the expense of the personnel of the rear units and units of the marines. Komai dovanis of the Azov flotilla strengthened the defense of Tamap-

peninsula. On August 26, the Opo created 8 combat sectors there, defended by the 305th, 388th and 144th Marine Battalions.

In this way, the enemy may have regrouped his troops. Having transferred from the Tudpsinsky direction

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the 125th infantry division of the 57th tank corps in the Crimean region, the Ismets troops again went on the offensive on August 29. This time, abandoning frontal attacks, they broke through to Novorossiysk, bypassing the northwest, through Natukhaevskaya with the forces of the 125th infantry division of General Fribs and through Verkhie-Bakapsky, where the 73rd infantry division operated. The second blow was made by the 9th division of Geisral Shlsinits panosil from the north - from Neberdzhaevsky to Methodius. The movement of the Ismetsky units was very slow. On the other hand, units of the 5th and 9th cavalry divisions of the Romanian Corps, with two regiments of motorized infantry and one cavalry regiment, reached the Black Sea coast on August 31, captured Anapa and isolated the marine units defending the Tamai Peninsula from the main forces of the 47th Army. The sailors had to allocate part of the forces to cover the Eastern Directorate, weakening the defenses of the coast of the Kerch Strait. Initially, the German command of the plapiro was to transport the 11th army from the Crimea to the Taman Peninsula, but then it was decided that the Persians would throw the main forces near Leningrad, and the landing operation would be under the conditional name "Blucher-I" to carry out with the forces of two Romanian divisions - the 19th infantry and 3rd mountain. Later, it was decided to include the 46th German Infantry Division in the operation, which had orders to land on the Taman Peninsula. ensure the landing of the Romanian divisions, and then return to the Crimea. The operation was planned to be carried out on 10 August. However, this period had to persia sleep on August 15, and then on | September. The isolation of the Soviet units on the Taman Peninsula forced the withdrawal of the ships of the Azov Flotilla to Cherpoe Mors. The breakthrough of ships through the Kerch Strait proceeded in very difficult conditions. The strait was heavily pierced, shot through by Ismet artillery and exposed to aviation. NW to 29 August out of 217 ships sent to Chernos

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sea, when breaking through the strait, 107 boats and armed seipers were killed. In addition, 14 ships were blown up in Alov bases due to the possibility of taking them to the sea.

On the night of September 2, the troops of the 46th German Infantry Division and the 3rd Romanian Mountain Division were plowing the crossing of the Kerch Strait. The landing was counteracted by coastal artillery, marine units and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet. The torpedo boats that left Novorossiysk for the southern part of the Kerch Strait did not pass the ships, since the enemy was operating in the northern part of the strait.

By September 5, Soviet units in boxers and seiners left the Taman Peninsula, about 6,000 people were taken to Novorossiysk and Gelendzhik, who joined the battle formations of the defenders of Novorossiysk.

rach, gravel

The actions of the Black Sea Fleet during the war, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, are generally assessed as ineffective. A painful role, of course, was played by the defeat of the Soviet troops on land. The fleet lost its main bases and was forced to use the Caucasian ports of Tuapse, Nogi and Batumi, which were not equipped for the supply of warships. A negative role was also played by the circumstance that, having a numerical superiority, Soviet aviation ceded air supremacy to the enemy, and the naval leadership was not ready to solve the tasks of a defensive war. For example, they knew how to set up mine obstacles, they knew how to overcome them and competently maneuver; they were preparing to smash the koivoi prague, but they worked out the protection of their own. Unsatisfactory was the organization of air defense, command and control, reconnaissance, and the interaction of aviation

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In addition, throughout the entire Soviet history, the attitude towards the navy on the part of the leaders of the state was dilettantish. on the other hand

s of the highest military leadership - neglect the flame. Before the war, they did not spare money for the fleet, but they had little idea of what to do. As N.G. Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, recalls, "the misunderstanding of maritime affairs occurred on the basis of good remembrance for the fleet as a whole." At the same time, "there was no one of one naval representative at the [operational headquarters] who could competently advise something on naval conflicts, amiss (1 local commissar of the USSR Navy! - Auth.) it gave no one a spin ...



„If in steel all the main questions

If the

issues were resolved only on his instructions, then the navy somehow closed up against him, and there was not a single leader who would take up their decision. The reasons were that the flog is very expensive and the issues are complex. It was necessary to understand them in detail in order to consciously make a decision, but there was no desire and no time for this. Stalip's decisions on the fleet). sometimes it was impossible to foresee how difficult it is to burn out the correct solution, and therefore the acceptance often turned out... after listening to my report, in which I convincingly argued the great importance of anti-aircraft weapons for modern ships, Stalin declared that "we are not going to fight near America" and rejected my proposals. Realizing that airplanes can drown and 1000 km from their shores, and some 50 km, and in bases, I could not call the reasoning of the "great leader DYA" correct ... I came to the conclusion with chagrin that Stalin does not want to talk about naval issues and therefore make the right decisions.

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Analyzing all this while working in Moscow for a long time, I came to the deep conviction that Stalin, who was a supporter of the fleet, counted on him to rely on him in solving political problems, but in practice he approached the solution of the problems of creating a fleet incorrectly and not always correctly. ".

As a result, "we prepared the fleets for war in every possible way, but these preparations were not aimed at specific tasks, and without this, this is still not preparation. To teach ships to fight regardless of the enemy ("the Reds" start and win. - Auth.) - this is important, but far from everything yet, "and when planning operations, even landing (!)," Naval issues were not given much importance and sailors not only were they not consulted, but they were not even properly informed."

In 1941, the Soviet fleet had no real opponents in the Black Sea theater of military operations, and Romanian ships did not appear off our coasts. In May-June 1942, the Germans and Italians transferred a dozen torpedo boats and six dwarf coastal submarines to the Crimea. In the autumn of 1948, 6 German sumbarins of the second series appeared, delivered from the Kiel Bay. The main combat means of the German fleet in the Black Sea were high-speed landing barges and

self-propelled ferries armed with gun mounts, bomb-droppers and performing various combat missions. There were about a hundred of them.

The quantitative superiority of the Black Sea Fleet over the naval forces of the enemy was absolute. It entered the war with 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 leaders, 13 destroyers (in addition, in January 1942, the destroyer Svobodny entered service), 47 submarines, 84 torpedo boats, 802 aircraft. With the outbreak of hostilities, dozens of ships were mobilized, equipped as patrol ships, gunboats and minesweepers.

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The fleet performed the following main tasks:

1. Raiding operations with the aim of shelling the enemy's coast and assisting its ground forces.

As a rule, such actions resulted in losses and damage to ships with their minimum effectiveness. For example, during the attack on Constanta on June 26, 1941, the leader of the Moskva was killed in the Romanian minefield, and the leader of the Kharkov was seriously injured by the fire of the coastal batteries. On September 2, 1942, during the shelling of the port of Feodosia, the Molotov cruiser received a torpedo on board; the explosion tore off 20 meters of the stern along with the rudder, the ship was under repair until June 1943.

On November 29, 1942, during a naval operation on the coast of Romania, the Voroshilov cruiser was blown up on mines. At the behest of Admiral Basisty, "... once again our underestimation of the mine danger was manifested ... The cruiser Voroshilov and the destroyer Soobrazitelny, being in the minefield, in essence, they repeated the mistake of the ships that operated here in the first month of the war. A mine was cut by the destroyer's paravap, This is a signal of serious danger. It was necessary to immediately leave the area of the minefield, and to go out in reverse, in no case deviating to the side of the line of initial movement. This is the requirement of the instruction. But the cruiser and destroyer did not fulfill this requirement. "Smart", who started a U-turn on the opposite course (!), Of course, was subjected to a serious danger of being blown up by a mine. Of course, the Voroshilov was also subjected to it, continuing to move forward (!).. And here is the result - the mines that exploded in the right and left paravanes caused considerable damage to the cruiser.

The shelling of the coast and ports was often carried out from long distances, the fire was fired at the squares

\* Paravane - an underwater vehicle towed by a ship to protect the ship's anchor contact missions.

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and without adjustment, therefore, the results simply could not be high. The battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna in these shelling finally "worn out the main caliber main caliber channels (during the firing of the Navy, crumbled pieces of metal flew out) in February 1942, it stood in Poti, did not take part in hostilities.

Finally, on October 6, 1943, a detachment of ships consisting of the leader "Kharkov", the destroyers "Able" and "Merciless" that left Tuapse in order to strike at the port facilities of Yalta and Feodosia, was destroyed by German dive bombers,

## 2. Postgapovka minefields,

The most reliable result of this work was the undermining of squadron minesmen "Sovershsiny", "Able", "Smyshlyny" and "Dzerzhinsky" on their own mines.

## 3. Support for landing operations.

Of the thirteen amphibious landings landed during the war by the Black Sea Fleet, only the chegyrs had an op- sative value, and in the end, most of the operations - Feodosia, Kerch, Eppatoria, Alushtia, Sudak - ended in thunder and the death of the landed troops. .

Warships and submarines were also involved in the transfer of military coitingsites and cargo, which, in principle, did not correspond to their purpose, was dictated by the situation. At the same time, securing the blockaded Sevastopol cost the loss of the Chervona Ukraine cruiser, four destroyers, and two submarines. During the Feodosia de sait operation, the squadron mipon carriers Shaumyan, Zheleznyakov, Nezamozhnik, and the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz were seriously damaged. The last one spent 10 months in repairs.

## 4. Struggle in communications.

The Germans carried out active sea transportation, primarily to ensure their Crimean

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groupings. The presence of the Black Sea Fleet had no real influence on them. Soviet

surface ships did not have direct confrontations with an equivalent enemy, due to the lack of such. To my knowledge, not a single enemy ship or submarine has been destroyed. However, on the rubks of the Guards squadron destroyer "Savvy", a remarkable survivor of the five Black Sea improved "smerks", there was a number "2", indicating the sinking of two submarines, but ... one of them was the Soviet Shch-206, blowing up deep bombs in the district of Constanta, the other was simply "attributed" according to the results of the shelling of the Yalta port,

Submariners of the Black Sea Fleet recorded 63 flooded and 13 damaged enemy transport ships. During the war, according to Soviet data, the enemy lost 4065 combat and auxiliary ships and 324 vehicles in the theater of operations, but the figures 279 and 217, respectively, are considered reliable. Opovny losses, including 6 submarines, the Germans suffered from the impact of aviation in 1943-11, of which more than 50% - in the bases.

After the "rainy day" on October 6, 1943, the Supreme Commander ordered the transfer of all large ships of the Cherpomorsky Fleet to the Stazki reserve - Staliy had to leave at least something, a way to "carry the flag" after the war. They no longer took part in boss actions,

By this time, the fleet had lost 1 cruiser, 3 leaders, and! destroyers (the "Smart", "brisk" and? "Novik" of the 1917 model of the year - "Nelzamochnik" and "Zheleznyakov" remained in the ranks; the destroyer Bodry was in a major overhaul until the end of 1944), 18 submarines . Losses in small ships and vessels have not yet been calculated, many of them are missing, but the total number here is in the hundreds. German boat boats sank twenty and

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damaged one Soviet ship. The total losses of the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea relative to the losses of the enemy over the entire period of the war are estimated as | : 0.6 and in general disproportionately large in comparison with the damage inflicted on the enemy.

As has traditionally been the custom in the modern and recent history of Russia, sailors played the main role on land. Naval rifle high brigades and battalions participated in the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad, the Taman Peninsula, Tuapse and Novorossiysk. During the battle for the Caucasus, the Black Sea Fleet

allocated about 40,000 marines and coast guards, 150 coastal and 200 anti-aircraft guns, 250 aircraft, 250 ships and vessels to the Primorsky, then Black Sea groups. In total, on the scale of the Navy, more than 400 thousand ships went to the front,

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K | September, near Novorossiysk Paim, the approaches to the city from the west turned out to be more protected, this was explained by the fact that the insufficient number of troops in the 47th Army did not allow the prepared positions on the internal defensive bypass to be filled in advance. In addition, the lack of reserves made it impossible for the army command to carry out counterattacks, and the units with battles retreated to the mountainous region northeast of Novorossiysk. In connection with the exit of the German-Romanian troops to the outer bypass of the defensive area, the front commander ordered the main forces of the 47th Army to be concentrated in the direction of Neberdzhavskaya and Verkhns-Bakansky. The 318th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel V.A. was transferred from the front reserve to the army. Vrutsky.

This was the last decision taken with Marshal Budyonny. On September 1, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command transformed the SS Vero-Caucasian Front into the Black Sea Group of Forces

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Transcaucasian Front under the command of General Colonel Ya.T. Cherevichenko. The group included troops of the 12th, 18th, 47th and 5th armies, the 4th guards cavalry corps. Budeiny remained out of work. However, the zamsia was a chain-link: one cavalryman (in terms of the level of thinking) replaced another during the civil war.

If we turn to the official biography of Cherevichenko, it is clear that the man studied hard all his life to be a commander: he graduated from cavalry courses, a higher cavalry school, cavalry certification courses for command personnel, military-political courses for commanders of the commanders and, finally, the Military Academy of M.V. . Frunze in 1935. He seems to be a very competent general. However, in the self-written autobiography, everything looks much more prosaic: "General education: graduated from a rural school in 1910, in 1935 passed for ten years at the Frunze Military Academy (italics nat. - Auth)." At that time, our "Lomonosov" was forty years old and his education did not extend beyond the device of a horse. And nothing, for the time being he commanded armies and fronts.

From September 1 to September, 2 battalions were formed and sent to defend Novorossiysk, which merged into the 83rd Marine Brigade. skoy regiment, Of the arrived defenders of the Taman peninsula, they formed the 2nd brigade of the marine pshota of the 4th battalion composition. Coastal and anti-aircraft batteries of the Azov flotilla and the Kerchensk military naval base, advanced to the forefront, were included in the battle formations of the coastal artillery of the fleet. Artillery support group NOR was created from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet

Sugra On September 4, the Germans tried to break through to the city from the side of Neberdzhavskaya. In a counterattack, together with the 1st consolidated brigade, a sea regiment was thrown

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infantry. They were actively supported by coastal and naval artillery. The leader "Kharkov" and the destroyer "Reasonable" fired their fire at the concentrations of enemy troops. The effectiveness of this artillery nalst is evidenced by an entry in the battle log of Army Group A: "The enemy fired heavy artillery from warships and caused our units heavy losses."

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However, the efforts of individual units and subunits were not coordinated by the headquarters of the 47th Army. (Eperal Kotov and his headquarters failed to establish contact with the troops and mobilize all forces to repulse the enemy). Soon the Germans succeeded in capturing the Wolf Gate Pass, Abrau-Dyursoy and Yuzhnaya Ozerskaya, and at dawn on the 6th of September, reached the Nebsrdzhasvskaya-Mephodisv road; skies to break through the xecero-lapadian outskirts of Novorossiysk.

Having killed his grouping with units transferred from the Crimea, and with three battalions of tanks, the enemy continued to rush towards Novorassiyk). On September 7, the Germans rushed into the gaps between the strongholds of the 47th Army. On the same day, units of the 9th Infantry Division broke through to the northern outskirts of Novorossiysk, captured the railway station, then the elevator and the port. Street fighting ensued.

During this period, the Froit Council of Vos removed Kotov from his post and appointed General A.A. frechko. A new member of the Army Military Council, General E.E. Maltsev described the current situation as follows: "The picture turned out to be generally unsightly. The interaction of the infantry was weak,

artillery, aviation and navy. The firm hand of the commander, the Military Soviet Army, was not felt. The types of troops acted in essence themselves according to the SSBS. The headquarters had no contact with other units. Soldiers of each military unit, included in the 47th Army, heroic

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ki fought with the advancing enemy, but there was no relationship between them, there was no single and clear defense plan, therefore sometimes weak spots at the junctions and flanks of units and formations remained open, without fortifications, without troops. Rezer you were used up",

By the end of September 9, the enemy occupied most of the western district of the city. On the night of 10-< Novorossiysk was abandoned. The defenders of the city withdrew and entrenched themselves on the eastern bersg of the Tsemess Bay.

Until September 15, the troops of the left flank of the 47th Army beat off the attacks of the enemy, who was trying to break through along the coast to Tuapse.

All this time, with lectures, seminars and visual agitation, he inspired the fighters for the exploits of a host of political workers. With inspiration, he tells about the work of the political department of the army, his former chief, General M.Kh. Kalashnik: "With all the variety of forms and methods of party political work, we sought to strengthen the soldiers' conviction that we must, we can withstand ... At company and battalion rallies, in conversations and reports ... Frequent trips to the troops, conversations with commanders of formations and heads of political agencies, with commissars of units, with soldiers and officers took up a lot of time. There was almost no rest for him,

The number of these parasites in the Red Army is simply incalculable, all of them, puffing out their cheeks, tell how they forged victory, "educating people in the spirit of unshakable stamina."

Let us give an example of the advanced 81st Marine Rifle Brigade.

"There were more than a hundred agitators in the brigade. These were the most courageous, the most authoritative, politically the most literate people. The political department of the brigade, military commissars and leaders of party organizations regularly instructed them on various political and military issues, familiar

miles with the situation on the fronts, with the most important international events, helped the activists prepare the necessary visual aids, recommended topics for conversations, newspaper and magazine articles for colle

lecture readings.

In an atmosphere of almost unceasing bosses, this was not easy to do, but the party political apparatus of the brigade found a way to continuously maintain the activity of agitators. For example, she is political instructor N.A. Drepa met daily with the agitators directly in the departments, platoons and companies... he set them the practical tasks for the day, and in the evenings, when the fighting subsided somewhat, he made sure to check (1) how his tasks had been carried out. The experience of this political instructor was summarized by the political department in a special leaflet, which was of great benefit to other political workers ...

Agitators during the zatiya hours carried out loud readings of these materials right in the trenches, trenches, dugouts and dugouts, supplementing the judgments and conclusions of the authors with living, topical examples of life outside.

Not a war, but solid political information. Eat your eyes open and imagine how hundreds of agitators give lectures over the positions of the naval brigade "during calm hours" and supplement their judgments.

On the contrary, the 216th Rifle Division was clearly the advanced one: "Some company party and Komsomol organizations worked poorly, many of them actually disintegrated as a result of recent difficult battles and significant losses. The analysis of the applications of fighters and commanders for admission to the party and the Komsomol was sometimes delayed without any serious reasons. Educational work with soldiers of non-Russian nationality was far from always carried out with purposefulness.

And here are pearls from another similar source: "... Kazmin enters the office with an urgent matter. He is a cheerful, energetic person, loves a joke;

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These people are nice and easy to work with. However, this time there are no smiles on his face, he reports with restraint and dryness - it means that he is excited about something. So it is: in some divisions of the party organizations they drag fighters and commanders into the party (what passions, it takes your breath away! - Auth.). Conscio, haste must not be allowed here, painstaking individual work is required, however, it is unacceptable to postpone applications for admission to the party, referring to any reasons: better soldiers should go into battle, knowing that they are in the ranks of a glorious



Leninist party.

"In the 7th Guards Rifle Division," Kazmin reports, "the issuance of party cards and Kailidat cards is delayed, as if the handing over of party documents is a mere formality! But after all, Andrey Dmitrisvich, we all know from experience that a party fighter doubles the strength of a fighter in battle..."

It should be noted that under the conditions of Froit, handing out party cards and candidate cards is a simple matter (the fate of a political worker is hard! - Acht.). It is necessary to take a photograph, write down accounting data, hand the party building directly into the mouth of the battery, squadron.

Nothing can be learned about the war from these writings, filled with thoughtful problems, stories about their own importance and "mass heroism". For example, the 2-month defense of the famous "Pavlov's house" in the interpretation of the Kalashnikovs and hams looks like this: artistic, political and military literature. Political workers came here, held talks and read newspapers. The guardsmen of the garrison were always aware of events at the front and the life of the country. It was also here that the Communist Party and the Komsomol took place.

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Sergeant Pavlov himself, unfortunately, did not leave any memories, and immediately after the war he went to the monastery.

Soldier's memoirs are the most interesting and the rarest in our literature. They have no place for agitators and worries about a candidate card, but sweat, blood, fear, pain, hunger, cold and lice "Lice were poisoned ... I tried to poison with dust - it was useless. It happened when I got wet after a fight, x took out a bag of dust and fell asleep through the collar under a wet shirt to the voice of the body. Dugom powdered everything from head to toe. But the lice were tenacious, and the dust had an effect on them. " Or such details of soldier's labor: "My guardians are loaded with lafsts, trunks, and ilites. Just fall, stumble - and due to the inertia of the movement, the iron will flatten the back of your head. If there were no heavy packs, then the lightly wounded mipometchiki, falling, would not die. A heavy blizzard finished off the wounded.

f+\*

After breaking through attempts to break through the defenses of the East Ise of Novorossiysk, the German commando-papie organized

called for a new offensive from the northeast of the city. To this end, the Germans concentrated in the Abipskaya district, in addition to the 9th and 73rd German infantry divisions operating in this direction, the 3rd Romanian mountain infantry division, which arrived from the Crimea. Israel Ruofr hoped to break through the defenses of the Sonst troops at the turn of the village of Erivan and the village of Shapsugskaya by attacking the flank of the 47th Army, to cut off the troops of the army from the rest of the forces of the Cheriomor group; crush it and, advancing through the mountains in a southern direction, go to the sea in the Slenzhik area.

A kind of intelligence report about the enemy in the style of the Soviet political worker: "Despite the fact that these formations were pretty worn out in the last battles, and the arrogance inherent in the Nazis was shot down from the self-satisfied commanders, the divisions still remained strong. They were staffed by personnel

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well-armed and provided with sufficient ammunition, had tanks and assault guns.

About the Romanian mountain rifle: "It was commanded by the arrogant fascist general Filchinsku, close to government circles and the Romanian royal house. The formation included about 16 thousand trained and equipped soldiers and officers. Although Hiller's Romanian allies, especially the soldiers, were not such fanatics as the German soldiers drugged by the Nazi demagoguery, the 3rd Romanian Division of Mountain Rangers was a very dangerous adversary.

At the turn, where the offensive of the Romanian division was being prepared, units of the 216th Infantry Division of Major General A.M. Plamsnevsky, weakened in previous battles and somewhat forgotten by the command, which threw all its forces under Novorossiysk. A member of the Army Military Council recorded his impressions of visiting the forward positions of the 216th division:

"When we approached the trench, two borolachas, blackened from enoi, came up to meet them. One of them reported:

- The commander of the machine gun crew Kiselev.
- Mehdsda fighter from Odessa, - he introduced himself a second time!

It turns out that the last time the password was given to the pullers was a week ago and during this time no one looked at them.

- And what about food? I asked.

"We collected a lot of dried biscuits, and then created our own stock,"

Private Miheda replied not without pride. And then he led us to a kokopa, where they kept salted meat of a wild boar, a lot of nuts, wild apples and powiika. — 'So I show you every day the grievances of three courses. Even compote varimo. Good, the water is not far away (the fighter Miheda was lucky - a wild boar was blown up on an anti-tank mine, other soldiers of the division have the same "menu", only without wild boar. - Auth.) ...

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The commander thanked the machine gunner... On the way back, the op,  
as if talking to himself, said quietly:

- The fighters are excellent. With such Kav dim. But we are  
badly leading the troops

On September 19, the 3rd mountain infantry division of the "positive" and "fascist" Filchiissku went on the offensive and began to push the advanced units of Plumepevsky and parts of the 2nd Marine Brigade. After Z: Dievny Bosv, the Romanians captured a number of heights and joined the defense to a depth of 6 km. [General Reko, having cordoned off the situation, decided to carry out two converging blows on the flanks of the wedged group and, having surrounded it, destroy it. For this purpose, the 77th Infantry Division of Colonel E.E. Kabanova was concentrated in the Erivansky area, and the 255th Marine Brigade, Colonel D.V. Yurdseva and the 88th Naval Rifle Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Kraspikova - vrayope Shapsugskaya. On the night (') before the shepherd, ritual party and Komsomol meetings were held in all parts, and then rallies, and which "mpogis assumed specific obligations, for example, destroy an enemy machine-gun, blow up or smash a car, bropetraisporter, exterminate. so many invaders. the attack of the Soviet troops dwindled at dawn on 25 September. A fierce battle lasted for more than two years, the result of which was the defeat of the Romanian division. Opa lost up to 8,000 soldiers and officers killed, raps and plaits, and was sent from the Froita. On September 37, the German-Romanian searches on Novorossiysk, the populace of the lepii, went over to the defense and did not undertake any

at ne otla

here attempts to attack with large forces.

Ruoff did not manage to hit the Guapse Highway. Do not use mogon to supply  
your troops and But-

port of Vorossiysk, since it was under fire from the Soviet side with artillery and machine-gun fire  
ism.

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#### ON THE PASSES

The German command intended to march not only across open spaces, but also to inflict many blows through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. For this, the highly trained professional 49th Mountain Infantry Corps under the command of General Rudolph Konrad was included in Army Group A. The corps included the 1st Mountain Rifle Division "Edelweiss" of General Lanz - one of the best Wehrmacht affiliations, the 4th Mountain Infantry Division of General Egeldeer, as well as the 97th and 101st Light Infantry (Chasseurs) Divisions. Infantry formations were manned by mountaineers and inhabitants of the mountainous regions of Germany, the Bavarians and Grolmans, for whom the mountains were their native element. The corps had the task of advancing through the Main Caucasian ridge of the Tuapse road to the Mamison Pass.

All his formations were equipped with special mountain equipment and weapons: "The equipment of the personnel included comfortable strong mountain shoes and outerwear, tents, sleeping bags, hiking individual alcohol kitchens and stoves, dark glasses. The equipment consisted of ice axes, "cats", ropes, rock and ice hooks and carbines, mountain rescue equipment. The high-mountain parts were also provided with special high-calorie nutrition.

In addition, for actions on mountain passes, List had at his disposal the Romanian cavalry corps of Major General Popescu, consisting of the 5th, 6th and 9th cavalry divisions. In the Crimea, the 3rd Romanian mountain infantry division of General Filchinescu was preparing to force the Kerch Strait.

The presence in group "A" of a large number of special mountain troops testified that the German command attached great importance to a breakthrough in Transcaucasia through the passes and prepared in advance

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It led to the implementation of such operations with the particular features of the war in the mountains.

Many officers of the above-listed

had solid mountain training and had experience in combat, acquired during the period of operations in the mountains of Norway and the Balkans. The commander of the "edelsey sov" General Tubert Lanz was himself an experienced climber who had climbed the Alps, the Caucasus and the Himalayas. His division was an elite division of the Reich, before the war the fighters constantly lived and trained in the mountains of Switzerland and in the French Alps. In addition, back in the 1930s, Ismetsky "tourists" and "sportmen" climbed the peaks and passes of the Kavkalsky ridge and carried out a thorough reconnaissance of its various districts in order to study the terrain.

And before the war, this sloppy  
German parasite, took you, He fell down.  
but he was saved, Avot now, perhaps,  
oh He is preparing his machine gun  
for battle ...

Things were somewhat different with the mountain troops in the great, powerful and messy Soviet country.

Of course, mountain rifle units existed in the Red Army. There were mountain rifle divisions, corps and m dazhs of the army. In these troops, there were no battalions in the regiments, the regiments were divided into companies. Automobile transport was supplemented by new transport. for example, companies of donkeys. The fighters wore pan we instead of caps. Here, in fact, is the whole thing that distinguished the Soviet "gorpo shooters" from ordinary rifle formations. Like tank troops or aviation, quality was sacrificed in the creation of these troops for the sake of quantity.

To begin with, they had a climber in them, and the fighters did not even know how to ski. However, they didn't have any skis themselves. Before the war, climbers were registered according to a special registration certificate.

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alities, therefore, only some athletes, it was by chance, served in the mountains. Special share mountain training in these parts was not carried out. And they didn't have any special mountainous equipment, and uniforms. The fighters and commanders wore boots or boots with windings, ordinary trousers, shi yeli. These clothes and shoes were of little use for operations in high altitude conditions. What is it like to climb in boots and overcoats? Mountain rifle formations were armed with special guns for setting fire in the mountains, but small arms were conventional, with a sight designed to fire at a slight angle to the horizon.

Traditional for our army was the attitude

to combat and special training, which looked as simplistic as possible: "Although exercises were conducted in the mountain rifle troops before the war," wrote the famous climber, scientist and warrior A.M. Lusev. - the soldiers trained in simple foothill areas and only occasionally made trips through the mountains and to the peaks ... But mountain training for mountain rifle formations, in essence, is one of the elements of combat training. It is necessary for the successful conduct of the battle in the foothills, and on the passes, and on the peaks. Orientation. reconnaissance, the use of various types of weapons, the very rules of conducting fire - all this in the mountains has its own specifics. The recording of mountains makes it possible to reduce losses from natural hazards: frost, lapips, kamispads, closed trades. Operations in the mountains in winter conditions are especially difficult. To be successful, you need to know how to ski, be able to walk on snowshoes. There was neither one nor the other in the mountain settlements ... We. climbers, even before the war, more than once approached the mountain, ski and physical training department of the Red Army with a proposal to use their experience for mountain training of troops. But they often heard in response: "We will fight on Elbrus ..."

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In those days, they really were not going to fight in the conditions of the highlands, the Soviet mountain units were preparing in the summer of 1941 with one throw to overcome the Carpathians, and therefore they were concentrated before the war in Moldova and Ukraine, because they needed all the Allinistic subtleties.

Only in November 1941, after the Sozeta troops left the Crimea, a group of sportsmen-alpinis-'lor - A.M. Gusev, E.L. Bader, Yu.N. Lubanyow, N.P. Khromov, A.I. Sidorsiko, B.M. Berkovich, A.S. Uvarov, V.V. Molokapov - sent to Transcaucasia to organize special training of mountain rifle troops. They had to start by teaching the "gorpostlekov" how to walk on the ground (most of the fighters saw them for the first time) to shoot at a horizontal angle, which was not even considered by the instructions on rowing. Gradually, the troops entered. and commercial equipment: lumberjacks, ropes, sticks, sleeping bags, alpine skis and boots.

Urgent measures taken by the Soviet komailo vacism helped to improve the situation with the training of mountain rifle troops, but it soon turned out that the work done was mostly wasted. On the other hand, in the spring of 1942, Comrade Stalia set out to turn the tide of the war, which means that he was not going to "raise Elbrus" again. On the other hand, the gradual Soviet priitsia had an effect - pezams inmykh have no past. If the Germans, even in the most difficult moments, tried not to introduce elite

and in the battles of para rawieps, go \$ pas opi were used in any situation without regard to specialization: it was possible to throw in the attack nuts of air designers without heavy weapons, or to send mountain shooters to naval desaits. as a result of such a fire, even a few formations in which combat training of personal soldiers for combat operations in the mountains was seriously carried out were only partially used in the high-mountain sections of the front.

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Back in November 1941, the defense of the passes was entrusted to the 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, commanded by Major General V.F. Sergatskov. In June 1942, the same army received the task of preventing the enemy from reaching the Cherkass Sea and the Transcaucasus through the passes. The combat order of the front headquarters of June 23 stated: "The possibility of an enemy attack from the North Caucasian front through the Main Caucasian Range along the Vosno-Ossetian, Voyino-Sukhumi and other roads to Kutaisi and the Black Sea coast is not ruled out."

The army's line of defense was very long and varied in character: it started from the coast of the Black Sea and extended to high mountain regions. But the problem lay in this, and in the fact that we were at hand with the Black Sea Fleet with a slinker, cruisers and destroyers against a dozen enemy boats, the Soviet command was most afraid of naval forces. Therefore, the main attention of Generals Tyuleisva and Sergatskov was directed to organizing the defense of the coastal region. The Soviet command considered the high-mountain passes in themselves an insurmountable obstacle for the anti-air and attached special importance to preparing them for defense. In fact, there was no such defense.

At the passes, they took the trouble to bring explosives and materials for the construction of obstacles in advance, positions were equipped, and the mountain passes and paths were not mined. Finally, there were no troops on the passes. Basically, they were covered by small forces from a company to a battalion, which, however, had no connection with their headquarters. The personnel of such detachments were not prepared for actions in the mountains, therefore they could not create a reliable defense and foresee the possible actions of an experienced enemy. Northern slopes of the passes and defense

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lis, reconnaissance was carried out there. The commanders from the detachments and units rarely visited the passes and did not know well how the defense was organized. After the war, the commander of the 815th regiment, Major V.A. Smirnov told me that, while on the Marukh Persval, he never saw his divisional commander. Some passes were generally occupied by troops.

“There was some kind of carelessness, obviously giving rise to disbelief in the ability of German troops to infiltrate with any significant forces through the high mountain passes to Zakavkals,” Marshal Grechko wrote in his book. - The front completely surrendered to the army and let go of control over the state of affairs on the front lines. When, on August 10, the Stavka expressed some doubts about the reliability of the report of the headquarter of the front on the state of defense on the persvals and raised specific questions, the front headquarters was unable to answer them, since the dog had accurate information about which passes and what forces were covered, which of them were prepared for undermining );

.. In view of the fact that the majority of the commanding staff of the front troops did not have experience in combat operations in the mountains, the defense and its ogy system were organized, as a rule, only directly on the passes, instead of taking out ogy means to the near and far approaches to it (the most prepared At that time, the 9th Mountain Rifle Division defended the seacoast from the Turkish border to Poti for operations in the mountains; from here on, the lines of the 20th Mountain Division were assigned in the highland regions; but the 68th Cavalry Division went to the Elbrus region! - Auth ).

The defense was not circular. A number of directions that allowed approaching the passes from only individual groups, but not from entire enemy subunits, were discovered and were not defended by anyone. This was a consequence of the fact that a long-term reconciliation of the regions adjacent to the passes did not take place. (This is Y

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Generals Laitsa had detailed maps of the Caucasus, and for Generals Tyulenev and Leselidze, Soviet shift sports climbers drew sketches from memory: “Oddly enough, military operations in the mountains showed that we, as a result, knew the Main Caucasian Range. We had to study sgo from meager descriptions and obsolete notes, very basic maps. - Auth). Moreover, only observation remained on the positions, and the garrisons of the zone themselves were located on the southern slopes of the ridge, in populated points and nomad camps, sometimes 5-20 km away from the persvals.



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Meanwhile, already in the first days of August, the 49th Mountain Peasant Corps from the area of Nevinomyssk and Cherksska began to move towards the Persians. Well-trained, fully equipped units, provided with special climbing equipment, went to the mountains. The path to the passes from Sapcharo to Elbrus was, in fact, open.

Divided into 4 groups, the alpine riflemen of the 1st and 4th mountain infantry divisions rushed along the valley of the Bolshtsaya Laba river in the right side of the Sapcha roi Psashkha passes, along the valleys of the Marukh and Bolshoy Zslen chuk rivers - to the Naursky and Marukh persvals, and along the Tiberda river valley - to the Klukhorsky pass and Dombai. One group of "edelweiss", made up of experienced alpine climbers, was heading along the valley of the Kuban river to the ps revels Nakhar, Goidaray, Mordy on the Glavpom Caucasian ridge and dalss to Hotyu-Tau, This path led to Elbrus and the rear of the Soviet units retreating up the Baksai gorge. By the way, the Hotyu-Tau and Chipper-Azau ridges were not protected in this mountain junction of peaks. On Elbrus itself, there were only four peaks of the metso- rological station. Parts of the 97th light infantry division operated at the Belorechensk government,

It cannot be said that the advance of Konrad's corps was completely unhindered. Through the gorges of a hundred

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on the ridge, disparate Soviet units retreated, cut off from the main forces in the foothills. These units offered resistance to the attacking chasseurs in the most advantageous areas for defense. Retreating detachments moved without maps, and few knew the mountains, the Germans orientated quite freely on the ground.

As Gusev points out, many takis units "suffered a sad fate. Pursued by the enemy, the opi fell into the flanks of the skill, ending in sheer cliffs, steep snowy slopes and glacier patches. Only experienced climbers could pass the tug. And people died from avalanches, kamispads, perished in the bottomless cracks of the Ladyiks, perished from bullets from the Nazis who had killed them. Many years have passed since then, but even now the remains of fighters and commanders are still found in the mountains, trying to break through to their own through the harsh sky-high heights and perished eles...>.

Regarding all these events, the headquarters of the 46th Army was in a happy state of knowledge. 1% of August he donated

forces to the front: "The position of the units is unchanged." Meanwhile, on the 15th, the Germans captured the Klukhorsk pass, which was supposed to be defended by a battalion of the 815th regiment of the 394th rifle division. In fact, a line company, easily abandoned by Edslweiss, walked on the pass, two other companies were located on the southern slopes, and the nearest reinforcements were in Sukhumi, a mile from the pass (of which 80 km were mountain paths). The headquarters of General Sergatskov became aware of this only on August 17. A similar situation developed in other corrections, where the Germans either preempted the Soviet units in occupying the passes, or shot down the small units covering them. On the Klukhorsk and Sancharsky borders, taking advantage of full visibility, the opium in a short time moved 10-25 km along the southern slopes, creating a threat to Sukhumi and communications along the Black Sea coast.

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Even on August 20, the front headquarters, not being guided by the situation, reported to the Headquarters a new plan for the defense of the Black Sea coast from enemy landings. It must be admitted that Muscovites got worried earlier than Tbilisi and Kutaisi. On the same day, General Tyu Leiev was instructed to take care of the situation on the passes and hold the passes through the ridge:

"The enemy seeks to invade the borders of the Caucasus and, in order to achieve this goal, will not be limited to the actions of large forces in the main operational areas. .

The enemy, having specially trained mountain units, will use every road and path through the Caucasus Range to penetrate into the Transcaucasian Khazia, acting both in large forces and in separate groups ... Those commanders who think that the Caucasus Range itself in itself is an obstacle for the enemy. You must firmly remember that only that line is passable, which is skillfully prepared for defense and stubbornly defends itself. All other barriers, including the passes of the Caucasus Range, if they are not firmly defended, are easily passable, especially at this time of the year.

Proceeding from this, the Stavka demands, along with the creation of a solid defense along the main operational directions, to immediately strengthen the defense of the Main Caucasian Range, and especially the Truzinskaya, East Ossetian and Military Sukhumi roads, eliminating any possibility of enemy penetration along these directions. ".

Paper, in general, is correct and feels in ia

style of the Kremlin "highlander". But a little belatedly, the passes are already over.

On August 21, a detachment of climbers captain Grot climbed Elbrus and set up flags with the emblems of the 1st and 4th mountain infantry divisions on the top. The ascent itself is of the highest exponential significance.

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had, but the conquest of this mountain range opened the way to the Ipgurskaya and Voenio-Sukhumskaya roads to the deep rear of the Soviet troops. And what was the propaganda effect! "The subjugated Elbrus crowns the Korean of the fallen Caucasus!" Burlip newspapers wrote. Captain Grotto was awarded the Knight's Cross, his subordinates were awarded the Iron Crosses.

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The plan for Operation Edelweiss was nearing completion; more than two-thirds of the territory scheduled for capture were taken - almost the entire North Caucasus, the Kuban expanses and the Salskis steppe, the Maikop oil-bearing region, and across the Main Caucasian Range; Flags with swastikas fluttered on Elbrus. At this time, General Rommel beat the British in the deserts of North Africa, and on August 23, the tankers of General Hube reached the Volga.

Hitler still received pefti, but already deprived the ss of Stalipa. Practically all Caucasian oil went along the Volga. In the spring of 1942, huge quantities of oil were delivered to Moscow and Central Russia, almost equal to a year's supply. V. Karpov recalls, in particular, the many huge "oil pits" dug by the prisoners around Sverdlovsk; railroad junctions were brought to them and oil was poured directly from the tanks into these pits. However, with the beginning of the summer campaign, the bombing of the Volga puga by German aircraft made transportation along it more and more risky. In August, the export of oil from the Caucasus practically decreased, the Volga was cut.

Despite this, mining continued for some time. Due to the lack of storage tanks, the oil was poured into the hollows of the mountains.

"True, the main pefgen-bearing districts remained in our hands," Khrushchev recalled, "the noops were actually put out of action, the equipment was dismantled, mining and processing stopped.

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petty. Difficult conditions have developed for industry. In addition, we have lost the opportunity to economically use the territories (with the territories under the Germans there were more than 48 million people. - Auth.), which went to the enemy.

The loss of the Kuban, one of the richest agricultural regions of Russia, was very acutely felt.

To top it off, in August it became completely clear that in 1942 there would be a second frost in Europe. On August 13, Stalin handed the British Prime Minister a very harsh memorandum in which he accused the British government of inflicting a "moral blow on the Soviet public" and destroying the plans of the Soviet command, built on the basis of "creating in the West a serious base of resistance against the German Fascist forces and thus facilitating the position of the Soviet troops. It was further asserted that right now the most favorable conditions had arisen for the landing of the allies on the continent, since the Red Army had diverted all the best forces of the Wehrmacht to itself. The Supreme Commander directly admitted that the Soviet Union was on the verge of defeat, which would lead, first of all, to the worsening of the situation.

Stalin can be reversed: he found himself in an extremely difficult situation and even, if we are to believe individual testimonies, he set the stage for concluding a separate peace with Germany.

On August 14, Churchill responded with the well-known "Memorandum", in which he recalled his memorandum of June 10 and pointed out: "... the fall of six or eight Anglo-American divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula and on the Channel Islands would be a risky and fruitless operation. The Germans have a sufficient number of troops in the West ... The pomp of all the British forces in the sea, military and air forces, the operation could only end in disaster.

The premier can also be understood: in August 1942, the situation was clearly "not such as to carry out

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landing in Europe. Churchill was well aware that at this stage the entire burden of the operation of opening a second front would fall on England - the Americans made encouraging statements, but in practice they did nothing and did not even plan. Therefore, he preferred other ideas - the landing plan in French North Africa or the Jupiter radio ops - the liberation of North Norway

gee.

Who "for a number of months in 1942, Churchill considered the USSR an ally, which "will have to be written off", and at times extremely pessimistically assessed its chances of survival ... Even after the Russians repelled the first German onslaught on Moscow, Churchill believed that that a quick defeat of the Soviet Union is not excluded" (A. Werth). The same conclusions were reached in August by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which believed that "the Russians are not capable of inflicting a counterattack of such force on the enemy as to prevent the Germans from carrying out their plans." Hence, the threat of the appearance of German divisions in northern Iran or Iraq in the autumn of 1942 should have been taken into account.

The report of the Middle East Defense Committee stated:

"In the worst case for us, we should expect a threat to Northern Iran by October 15, and if the enemy changes his plans and starts moving through the province of Anatolia, then we should be ready to meet this danger in Northern Syria and Iraq by September 10.

If the campaign in Russia turns out badly for the Russians, and you cannot send us the required number of reinforcements in a timely manner (to repel the new threat, an additional four military, one such division and 95 air force squadrons were required. - Author), the volumes will face a dilemma:

a) either our troops or as many of our bases and installations as possible will have to be transferred from

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Egypt on the northern flank to cover the Iranian oil fields (and this would mean the loss of Egypt);

6) either we will have to continue our current policy and take the risk of losing the Iranian oil fields.

We do not have the strength to defend either one or the other, and if we try to perform both of these tasks, then we will not complete either.

What a googling in Europe!

"These were just those days when Churchill ... drank a lot more than you can drink in those years, and often called our ambassador Maisky to ask him with some sarcasm: "When did Uncle Joe turn to Hitler with a request about making peace?

It was the time of the peak of German weapons. But

this was the last "pass" taken by Hitler. Right, yes, while the picto and ps suspected this.

"From mid-August," Dörr writes, "it became clear that operations in southern Russia were not going according to plan; the army, instead of a "victorious march", was moving forward with difficulty. In this situation, it is customary to throw reserves into battle or change the plan of operation. /% - lerdots was not. Consequently, it was necessary to change the plan of the operation (italics ours. - Auth.) Op could, for example, consist in concentrating all forces on one goal and temporarily abandoning the rest. The decision of the high command could be twofold:

a) for the sake of achieving success in Kavkals, abandon Stalingrad and go over to defense here ...

6) take Stalingrad and abandon the Caucasus ...

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, however, did not want to give up anything and continued to expend forces and means in battles that had nothing in common with the operation.

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Rudolf Konra simply did not have enough strength to realize his ultimate goals. He believed that

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the Reds brought the last reserves into battle, and the 46th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze, only began to turn to the sea "backwards", and to the mountains "in front". Against two mountain infantry divisions of the enemy, Leselidze had the 9th and 20th mountain rifle divisions, 894, 242, 351, 267 rifle, 63 cavalry divisions and 51 rifle brigade. An additional 61st Rifle Division and several other units were transferred to the army. A group of climbers from a separate special-purpose motorized rifle brigade, formed in the NKVD troops from volunteer sportsmen of various profiles, was sent from the Headquarters Reserve to defend the passes. But this is a start.

On August 23, a member [of the Defense Committee of the Gift L.P. Beria, who replaced a number of responsible employees of the army and front-line apparatus of the Transcaucasian Front, including the commander of the 46th Army. To say a kind word about Lavrenty Pavlovich has long become indecent, Marshal Grechko called his style of work "rude administration", contrasting it with the "painstaking organizational work of headquarters

front and army. But who could stir up this sleepy kingdom under the palm trees of Sukhumi better? And what was the "hard work" expressed when the Germans hung flags over Elbrus? By the way, after the war, Army General Tieniev put it this way: "The Germans overslept." (Judging by the further actions of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Comrade Beria found the right words, managed to give meaning to "hard work".

The aviation of the front, finally, received the task of conducting daily reconnaissance from the air of all transit ships through the Main Caucasian Range and the roads leading to them from the north.

Measures were also taken to construct barriers on the most important pass routes leading to the Black Sea coast. On the Sancharsky direction

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electric barriers were erected on the military-Oshtinskaya and Vostpion-Greek roads, work began on the preparation of the collapse of rocks, the destruction of the logs and their flooding. All this was reinforced by the creation of minefields. In addition to the system of barriers, a system of defensive structures was built along these roads - defense centers, strongholds, pillboxes and bunkers, trenches and anti-tank ditches. On the main directions and roads, commandant's offices were created, which had reserves of sapper forces, means and were equipped with radio stations.

To counter enemy detours, special detachments were formed with the strength of a rota with a sapper squad, which moved forward in possible directions of a detour maneuver. < for the same purpose, paths were undermined, which were not covered by troops. Separate mountain rifle detachments were urgently created, each as part of a battalion company. These detachments, which included climbers and instructors (they were now looking for climbers in all fronts) were sent to the most hard-to-reach areas.

Beria took part in the liquidation of the bankrupt headquarters of the Spsro-Caucasian Front. Eyewitness of the events Sergo Beria pishst:

"The front headquarters completely lost control of the troops and was demoralized. In agreement with the Headquarters and the State Defense Committee, my father dismissed Semyon Budyonny, who was serving at the front, and Lazar Kaganovich, a member of the Military Provincial Council, and a number of other people responsible for the collapse of the defense. Stalin approved this decision, because he himself was convinced of the inability of the front leadership to organize a proper rebuff to the enemy.

I saw Budyonny, who seemed to me to be in a state of prostration. When his father came to him, he began to convince: "There is no need to protect these mapdarin groves, we must leave!" Father, although he knew that, as a fireman, he was Marshal Buds

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ny, was amazed. The front commander could not clearly explain where the units were located, who commanded them. When he reported to his father about the situation, he immediately realized that there was nothing more to talk about. Interrupting the conversation, the father began to call the commanders of all the rapgs to him and find out what was happening there in action.

validity.

In front of my eyes they made a map of military actions, and Marshal Budyonny sat on the sidelines with an absent gaze. It seemed to Mies that he did not really understand what was at stake.

In January 1943, the marshal came up with the position of commander of the country's cavalry, which he unrepentantly headed for the next 10 years. Already a pensioner, having stepped over the 70-year milestone, Semyon Mikhailovich managed to become a member of the Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Fate turned in such a way that in 1953 Beria was "unmasked", shot, accused at the same time of having "damaged our defense during the battle for the Caucasus",

In the "Soviet Eastern Encyclopedia" of the 1976 edition, a member of the State Defense Committee, Marshal Beria, was completely included. The article about the battle for the Caucasus is illustrated with a photo with the caption: "Brigade Commissar L.I. Brezhnev handed a party ticket to the Red Army soldier A. Malov. Brezhnev also disappeared from the 19900 edition. Oh, the windings of court historiography!

\*and..

So, the 46th Army moved into the mountains. This was the beginning of the molding of General Koprad, in fact, ended. On August 27, the Germans were stopped near Klukhor and on the Marukh Persval. Further fighting resulted in pushing them back from the southern slopes. Fierce battles unfolded from the Elbrus region to the very road to Tuapse. To the Soviet units that surrendered the northern slopes of the ridge without a fight, now come

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elk attacked from the back upwards, solving difficult questions of spabzhepiya on the ground, comprehending from scratch the tactics of mountain warfare.

"We often attacked frontally," writes Tyulenev, "but not sideways, which is especially detrimental in mountain warfare. Carelessness was allowed in the deployment of troops on the defensive. All this led to sad consequences. In addition, at first our troops occupied hollows or passes: and left the neighboring heights without cover. This made it possible for the enemy to occupy them without a fight, and then with flanking fire to knock out our units of advantageous positions ... Combat operations in the mountains taught us a lot, enriched our froit experience.

The "Edelweisses", having a much higher level of training, once again made sensitive co-workers, but they did not succeed in descending to the sea, which was hoarse on the horizon. However, they also did not give up the passes.

By the end of September, the situation in the mountains stabilized. Koprad had to send out a division of Alpine riflemen to Ruoff for a new offensive in the Tuapsip direction; as a replacement, he received units from the Italian Alpine Corps "White Lily",

During the same period, G. eral Leselidze's FORCES REPLENISHED, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 16 detachments were created, intended for operations in the highlands. They were to be attached to the units located there or act independently, remaining subordinate to the headquarters of the 46th Army. Each detachment consisted of two submachine gun companies of 100 men each of one machine gun and mortar company with platoons of sappers and anti-tank rifles attached to it. The total number of detachments was 300-320 people. They were equipped with Alpi

pistami,

"Getting acquainted with the detachment," recalls A. Gusev, "I was struck by his brilliant equipment. Every

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the fighter had everything necessary for fighting in the mountains: ice axes, ten-pronged "cats", storm suits, sleeping bags, fur vests, fur socks. woolen and leather gloves, lined felt boots, skis with hard bindings, snow boots, backpacks, ski boots, avalanche cords, goggles. Alpine ropes, mountain tents, alcohol high kitchens, rock and ice hooks, rock hammers and other necessary sleep were provided for each squad in the detachment.

disguise,

The personnel wore a special uniform: commanders - a double-breasted tunic, ski trousers, mountain boots; soldiers - ski jacket, ski pants, mountain boots. This form was convenient, versatile and met all the requirements of the technique of movement in the mountains.

These were the first first-class mountain rifle units in the Red Army, in no way inferior to the mining units that existed in the armies of other states, and in particular in the German army. ,

How can one not recall Nikulin's anecdote here: "The character is such! Until we get hit in the ass, we will do nothing." I

In October, the Soviet troops succeeded in throwing off the Belorechensky and the Saicharsky Persians against the peak. With the onset of winter, active military operations in the mountains ceased. Klukhorsky, Marukhsky, Umpyrsky Persvals, Hotyu-Tau, Elbrus peaks remained with the huntsmen. They left on their own in January 1943, when the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front, having gone into a decisive assault, liberated Mozdok and Mineralnye Vody, the successes in the Stalipgrad direction created a real threat to the encirclement of the German units in the Caucasus. Those of the "Edelweiss" who did not have time to retreat and were cut off from their forces were caught by the troops in the gorges.

NKVD.

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On February 17, 1943, by order of the front command, 3 groups of climbers under the general leadership of A.M. Ussva, with the participation of a representative of the political leadership and a cameraman, made a winter ascent of Elbrus, removed the black and red "fascist pennants" and installed the state flags of the USSR on the tops.

## TUAPSE OPERATION

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By the end of September the situation in the area of military operations became tense, which cannot be said about the situation in the German headquarters. After all the victorious fanfare, the outcome of the battle for the Caucasus turned out to be too unexpected for Hitler: the German troops were stopped in all directions. On the-

it was time to look for those responsible for the actual failure of the Edelweiss operation.

As early as August 29, General Gllder wrote in his diary his conversation with the Fuhrer: "Today there were very angry disputes about the leadership of operations in Army Group A. I had to talk on the phone with Liszt about the measures that should be taken in order to make our actions manoeuvrable again.

Chersz two days, | In September, Hitler declared at a meeting of the leadership of the Wehrmacht: "Everything will be recorded from perseverance! The enemy will use up his strength faster than we ... Someone must run out of breath, according to us. Nevertheless, the attacks of the German formations in the direction of Baku were clearly becoming weaker and weaker. On September 8, Halder wrote: "The advance of Army Group A is seriously disappointing to the Führer."

In order to establish the reasons for the failures, Hitler seconded General Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKW, to List in Stalino. Reporting to him the situation, Liszt bluntly said that the next

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to abandon attempts to reach the Black Sea through the Caucasus Range, the 2nd field marshal asked Jodl to report this to the Führer and advise him that he would allow parts of the mountain rifle corps to be withdrawn at least beyond the passes, since the 49th mountain infantry corps risked being isolated. List also announced that the offensive of the 1st Tapkov Army on Baku was close to its stop. When Jodl returned to Hitler's headquarters and reported on his negotiations with List, stating that the prospects for the bosses in the Caucasus were bleak, the Fuhrer became furious.

On September 10, Field Marshal List was removed from the post of commander of Army Group A, Hitler took over his duties and personally supervised the group's operations for a month, trying to achieve a turning point in the battle.

The troops of Army Group A, in mid-September, were already unable to advance to the entire front. Therefore, the German command made a decision to inflict successive strikes on Tuapse, and on Ordzhopikidze. In a conversation with Keitel on September 18, Hitler declared: "The decisive thing is the breakthrough on Tuapse, and then the blocking of the Vosipo-Georgian road and the rip to the Caspian Sea." O

The immediate task of the offensive on the Tulpsi administration was to reach the Black Sea coast in the shortest possible way, to cut off the Cherimor group of troops from the main forces of the Transcaucasus.

Kazakh Front, to deprive the Chirchik Fleet of all bases and ports. In case of success, the front was reduced by almost 200 km, which made it possible to release about 10 divisions, which could be transferred towards the desired oil fields in the Caspian. The operation was entrusted to the 17th Army of General Ruoff and parts of the infantry corps of General Kopral. One blow was clapped to the papists from Neftsgorsk, the second - from Yuryachiy Klyuch. Ticks were supposed to lock up near the village of Shau

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Myan, 30 km north of Tuapse, creating a "cauldron" for the 18th Army of General Kamkov.

Assessing the alignment of forces before this operation, Soviet historians, as usual, use their special arithmetic, specially developed for such cases:

"After the failure of plans to break through in the Tuapse direction in Transcaucasia in August-September 1942, the Yemets-Rashist command decided to use the forces of the 17th Army (over 162 thousand people, 147 tanks and assault guns, 1316 guns and 950 mortars) with the support of part forces of the 4th airborne fleet (350 aircraft) again attacked ... and surrounded the main forces of the 18th army (32 thousand people, 244 guns, 362 mortars) ... To deliver the main blow from the troops of the German 17th army, the Tuapse group was created.

From here, even a blind man should be able to see that again the overwhelming superiority of our troops has fallen into the enemy's hands. It is only incomprehensible why all the forces of Army Group A or Ruoff's army are compared with one fortunate army of Kamkov? Why, for example, not with Propalov's 383rd Infantry Division? It would be even scarier. Or a platoon of Lieutenant Ryabtsev? It is clear that these quantities are not measurable.

Let's try to compare differently. In total, by this time, Army Group A had 26 divisions, of which 3 were tank divisions. The troops of the Transcaucasian Front opposing them included more than 60 rifle and cavalry divisions, 31 rifle brigades, 1 () tank brigades, not counting armored trains, separate tank battalions and mountain rifle detachments. Let's agree that in this form the balance of power looks somewhat different. As of October 1, there were 165,423 communists in the units of the Transcaucasian Front (multiply by two, because "a party card makes you stronger") and 219,131 Komsomol members, and there were three non-party members per communist. By the way, Medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus"

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received about 870 thousand people - mostly survivors. This pagrad, established in 1944, was not awarded to the dead, missing, or captured.

Further: Ruoff's 17th army with 18 divisions was opposed by one general Kamkov, and four Soviet armies - 47, 56, 18, 46th.

And even in comparison with the Tuapse strike group, the forces of our 18th Army look so pale. From the German side, 7 divisions participated in the operation - 46, 125, 198th infantry, 97th and 101st jaegers, 1st Slovak motorized division and the consolidated mountain infantry division of Lanz. At Gsneral Kamkov and in the Tuapse defensive region - seven rifle (31, 383, 328, 408, 236, 395 and 32nd guards) and two cavalry (11th and 12th guards) divisions, four rifle and one motorized rifle brigade, Marine Regiment, plus support for two 130mm coastal batteries. one 180-mm railway batarsi, artillery of the Black Sea Fleet, plus continuous replenishment of new divisions, brigades, guns and aircraft,

Another thing is that Kamkov also turned out to be "ie Gipdenburg" - there was nothing but cavalry courses, and the defense was built according to the rules of the "most advanced" Soviet Eastern science. So, the divisions of the first echelon, despite the operational pause, did not have a continuous line of defense, but limited themselves to the creation of military strongholds, they did not set engineering barriers, minefields, and even did not reconcile their own defensive line.

births and fire points on the Black Sea coast: in places of possible landings, anti-infantry minefields were set up, in the vicinity of Kabardinkilo Tuapse, the construction of more than 500 pillboxes and Izogs was completed, more than 300 controlled landmines were installed. Tons of explosives were laid to withdraw from the Sukhumi highway, destroy bridges and back up steppes,

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The main forces of sapper and engineering units were involved in these works, these specialists were "not enough" directly for the front. And not only specialists: the country of the great construction projects of communism, even in the second year of the war, failed to provide its army with the simplest entrenching tool. An example from Tyulenev: "The rifle unit that defended the Gupai and @yman mountains got (!) Two dozen

like shovels, but she didn't have a single scrap. And try a zybolbi trench in the rock without a forehead! Some text message from a rocky agent helped out: he stopped the manufacture of crowbars from the axles of wagons. Interestingly, when there were wagons, crowbars were inserted instead of axles?

"When planning work," writes Marshal Grechko, "the headquarters of the engineering troops of the Black Sea Group made serious mistakes, especially in the distribution of the available engineering and sapper units. So, too many sappers were assigned to the maintenance of barriers installed on the roads, while there were not enough sappers in other areas. There was still an erroneous opinion among the commanding staff that the mountainous and wooded area in itself was a good cover and there was no need to carry out major defensive work (in the spring of 1940, the Germans pushed a whole tank group through the Ardennes, while in our country, two years later, there was still "an erroneous opinion". - Auth.).

All this led to the fact that, although time and terrain made it possible to make the defense insurmountable, it remained only slightly equipped. Even some of the key heights turned out to be unfortified and unoccupied by troops (our italics. - Auth.). The strongholds were not adapted to all-round defense, the fire system was not organized, and the forest blockages created only along the perimeter of defense were not mined.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command instructed the commanders of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Group of Forces:

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"According to 1enigtab, confirmed by the events of recent days. the defense of the troops of the Black Sea Group is weak, despite the fact that time and space made it possible to make the ss impassable.

The defense in the 18th Army's sector was especially weak. Despite the fact that, according to Mr. Provalov's confession: "We knew about the impending offensive of the Germans in the Tuapse direction." The trouble is that the enemy was expected in the valley of the Pinskha River, but these expectations were not justified.

On September 25, after 2 days of powerful air strikes against the communications and military formations of the 18th Army, the Germans, with the forces of the 97th and 101st light infantry divisions, "rushed into the attack with an avalanche" from the Khadyzhenskaya area to Shaumyan. A day later, the 198th Infantry Division began a breakthrough from Goryachiy Klyuch to Fanagoriyskos. Within three days, five Soviet divisions, having improved for almost a month before. this their defense, "heroically held back the onslaught"

'three German infantry divisions.

On September 27, General Ruoff introduced Lanz's Alpine Riflemen into the zone of the 383rd Rifle Division. They managed to break through the front, capture the mountains of Gunai, 1st man - here the "Edelweiss" were expected - and go to the pre-Linur Pupayka, creating a threat to the rear of the 18th Army. The Soviet units began to retreat to the west and southwest. General Provalov, justifying his failure, writes that he was attacked by almost the entire army group "A": "The Germans immediately brought down the Alpine riflemen of Lanz, the 97th infantry division, the 46th specially prepared for combat operations, on the 383rd rifle division in the mountains, the SS motorized division "Viking", the Belgian legion "Walloons". The General somehow forgets that the 236th Rifle and 32nd Guards Divisions fought on the left of him with the above formations of the enemy, on the right - the 31st Rifle and 11th Cavalry Divisions, the reserves of the 328th and 408th were deployed in the rear rifle divisions, 40th motorized rifle brigade. Well

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and the SS men from the Viking division simply imagined that at that time they were near Mozdok.

In the Lazarevsky direction, units of the German 46th Infantry Division went on the offensive on September 28 along the Samurskaya and Neftegorsk sectors and advanced almost to the valley of the Pshekha River.

On September 29, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command explained the situation to General Tyuls and Wu:

"Despite the sufficient number of forces on Khady in the female-Tuapsi direction and the long time for the troops to occupy defensive lines, the enemy managed to reach the flank and rear of the units of the 18th Army, defending the Khalyzhepskaya--Tuapse road, from the first offensive line,

]. Instead of a deeply echeloped strong defense, the units of the 18th Army were scattered and, despite the overall superiority in strength (*italics pashch. - Dan.*), in each individual direction turned out to be weaker than the advancing enemy ...

<...>

3. They did not try to restore the situation in the very first days, to concentrate the necessary forces and go on a decisive counterattack, they strengthened the defending units with small forces, which made it possible for the enemy to beat them in parts (crushing ours. - Auth).

The further intention of the enemy is to, acting from the side of the Kotlovin, the mountain [y-

Mount Gaiman and from the direction of Fanagoriyskoye along the valley of the river. Psekups, bypass the main forces of the pashgsy hada of the female group, isolate the ss and tsm, thereby creating a real threat to exit to the coast in the Tuapss region ...

I consider it necessary to immediately create strike groups, go over to active actions and completely restore the situation in the area south of Khadyzheiskoy and in the Oryachiy Klyuch area, bearing in mind that in no case should the enemy break through into the Tuapss area.

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A breakthrough in the center of the operational posting of the 18th Army was especially dangerous, so the command of the Black Sea Group decided to launch a strong counterattack here and destroy the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bSospovka - Mount Geiman and restore the situation. This blow was scheduled for 2 October. But the Germans were ahead of the curve and on October 1 they themselves struck in this sector, ov lalev and the bright points of Kotlovina and Kurinskaya.

On October 7, the troops of General Kamkov again tried to launch a counterattack in order to destroy the enemy's Gunai Isosi groupings. However, due to disorganization and poor preparation, this blow did not succeed. That same day, General Cherevichenko ordered the commander of the 18th Army to stop scattered actions and, without dispersing his forces, deliver successive strikes against the enemy grouping in the Tunaika and Kotlovina regions. By \$ October, Soviet troops with counterattacks stopped further enemy movement. There was an operational pause on the right wing of the Black Sea Group of Forces, both sides were preparing to continue the fight in the Tuapsip direction.

The Germans strengthened their grouping in the area [near the share, removing units from other sectors. In turn, the command of the Transcaucasian Front carried out a number of urgent measures to strengthen the troops of the Black Sea Group. The 353rd Rifle Division was transferred from the 56th Army to the 18th Army. The 83rd naval rifle brigade and a separate regiment of marines were transferred to the Tuapse region as a reserve. by planes. X

On October 11, the Headquarters relieved Colonel-General Ya.T. Cherevichenko and appointed a major general to his place. I.E. Petrova: (Cherevichenko then 4 months of compo-



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shaft of the 5th Army, for a short time he was deputy commander of the North-Western Front and for almost a year and a half was at the disposal of the Headquarters - he could not be used. In April 1945, Colonel General (!) was entrusted with a rifle corps).

Even before that, the Military Soviet of the Black Sea Group of Forces had developed a plan to defeat the enemy's Gunai and Khadyzhen groupings. For this purpose, two strike groups were created: in the Navagiis Koy area for an attack on Khadyzhenskaya and in the Tserkovny area for an attack on Neftyanaya. Such a plan had a number of serious shortcomings. Firstly, the real possibilities of concentrating troops were not taken into account. They had to regroup along only one road in each direction, and in the area of Tserkovnoye there was only one plowed path - for the big paulers, the map remained smooth paper on which you could draw whatever you wanted. Secondly, the transfer of troops to the flags weakened the center of the 18th ar

mission, apparently, it was believed that the enemy had already lost Ipiciagiva

While this complex regrouping was being carried out, on October 14, the Pemts launched two simultaneous strikes - from paradise it! Unayka, Mount 1eiman and from the area east of Fapagoriy on Shaumyai, Sadovoe in order to surround the main forces of the 18th Army and break through to Tuapss. By the end of October 15, the rangers reached the outskirts of Shaumyan; The 198th Infantry Division on the left flank also broke through the Soviet defenses and began to advance along the share of the river Khatyzh. The situation at the Tuapse Patrol was getting worse and worse.

The full-blooded 408th Rifle Division, which arrived from the Soviet-Turkish border, found itself isolated from the main forces of the 18th Army, which fought in the Shahumyan direction, and from its rear. The only road connecting the army with the army was the footpath through Semashkho. Parts of the division, holding the defense of evil in unfavorable positions, carried

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heavy losses, the supply of shells, mines and cartridges was running out.

On October 15, the Headquarters sent a directive to the commander of the Transcaucasian front, which stated: "From your most frequent visits to the troops of the Northern Group and from the fact that you sent a significantly larger part of the troops to this group, the Headquarters considered you underestimating the importance of the Cherpomorskaya

group: and the operational-strategic role of the Cherpomorsky coast.

The Headquarters explains that the significance of the Cherpomorsk direction is not less important than the direction to Makhachkala, since the enemy will cut off almost all the troops of the Black Sea group from the troops of the front, which, of course, will lead to captivity; the enemy's entry into the region of Poti, Batumi will deprive our Black Sea Fleet of the last bases and at the same time provide the enemy with the opportunity to further move black. Kugaisi and Tbilisi, as well as from Batumi through Akhaltsikhe, Lepinaikan, along the dolips, go behind all the other zois of the front and approach Baku.

The same directive ordered to immediately transfer to the 18th Army 3 Guards Rifle Brigades - 10,11,12-0 from the reserve of the Northern Group, the 63rd Cavalry Division from the 46th Army, the 83rd Marine Rifle Brigade from the 47th Army, and also send the 83rd Mountain Rifle Division, which arrived from Iran, to the Black Sea Group. After 5 days, these units were already in the combat area.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued to advance and on October 16 went to Navaginskaya, and the next day he captured Shaumyan and started fighting for the Glisavetpol Persian shaft. The Faiagori group captured by October 16. Styopki tract and began to spread lalyshs. On the 16th of Israel Ruoff was confident in the polyom success of the enterprise, the ring was almost already slammed shut. This dep in a magazine

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combat operations of Army Group A, a record appeared: "The enemy's resistance in the Tuapse region, which has become weaker in recent days, allows us to conclude that the Russian resistance forces are heavily supported by our continuous offensive, as well as effective support for aviation."

On October 17, the general Pstrov with a pggab went to Kamkov to sort out the situation. During the check, it turned out that "the commanding 18th army and the headquarters did not know the actual state of affairs on the front, Opie lost contact with the adhesions of the left flag of the army. The command of the army did not even know that the enemy had captured Shahumyan, Opo neglected the conditions of the terrain and sought to create a solid front, as a result of which the search, having entered the army from the reserve, was dispersed, instead of concentrating to inflict counterattacks in the most threatened places ".

Seeing such actions of the army leadership and considering

situation, the Vosipy Sovst of the Front decided to change the commander of the 18th Army, Gsial-Leutspant F.V. Kamkov and appoint Major General A.A. Grechko, who commanded the 47th army in the Novorossiysk administration. Kamkov was also offended - he was sent to Grechko's place to command the 47th Army. Castling took place on 19 October.

same

The new army commander-18 decided to concentrate the efforts of the army and the reserves allocated to his order to bring in a counterular to the anti-pike grouping that had entered the Shaumyapa district. It is obvious that while discussing the creation of a defense in depth, the picto did not even think of doing it in practice. As a result, on October 19, the German troops themselves went on the offensive and captured the Elisavet Polish Pass and Mount Kochkanova. [general fscso, avoiding

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encirclement, I had to withdraw my left flag. The enemy continued to develop the offensive on Toitkh, 1borgievskos.

On the morning of October 21, after strong artillery and nationalist preparation, the Germans launched a new blow from the Tupayka area, the Jaegers crushed the resistance of the 408th Rifle Division, which had become very red and left without ammunition, penetrated the northern outskirts of the Persvalny district and captured the Oitkh. The advanced German units reached the valley of the Luapsiika River, from which more than 34 km remained to Tuapse. But at this turn, by the end of October 23, the Germans were stopped, and then from October 31 they went over to the defenses. Thank God, our bravos geisrals were able to do at least this, True, considering that in October, after the enemy divisions were fired from the Soviet side, the action was called by dss rifle and three cavalry divisions, eight rifle and one motorized rifle brigade, counting individual detachments and regiments of marines , achieve good results

How could the pilots of the 5th Exalted Army and the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet help the Nazi troops? True, and in October 1942 they had to face the same difficulties: "The control of aviation by radio was still going through its sad period (!). Radios were used only by aircraft of new designs created during the war (is it possible that the presence of a radio station on board depends so much on the design of the aircraft?

station, in the summer of 1913. It was necessary to buy this airplane of the latest design from the British. - Auth.), and since they went on a mission with old ones who had walkie-talkies, they were controlled in the air, as before, with the help of missiles. By the way, many pilots whose planes had walkie-talkies, at first knew how to use them in a qualified manner. Out of habit

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they trusted more the rocket signals and the swaying of the wings of the leading planes (this is how they were shot down while they swayed their wings. - Ayat.). Spachala had to introduce radio communication in the main land between the headquarters of the formations and airfields (I wonder if the design of the airfield somehow influenced this? - Auth.) ". The same source about interaction with the infantry: "We also talked about air strikes on the front line of the enemy. At our headquarters we well understood the enormous significance of such strikes, but we planned them extremely rarely (bomb strikes were carried out in the enemy's main rear areas - 467+). For this, it was required that our troops mark their front line with white banners, fires and rockets, oh obik: - military commanders did not always agree to fulfill the five requests of the aviation command. And they can be understood: bonfires, banners, and even rockets almost always became targets not only for ours, but also for enemy aviation. Which", to whom, zhs, pas zempys, the commanders saw themselves much more often. The last attempt to break through to Tuapse through [- Orgievsky the Germans made in mid-November. By November 23, they had penetrated into the defenses of the 18th Army to a depth of 8 km and along a front of up to 10 km, but they were stopped here, and on November 26, flag counterattacks from the Russian troops were driven back to their original positions. . This ended the Tuapse operation: the German troops managed to break through to Cherio Mumor southeast of Novorossiysk.

## NALCHIK ORJONIKIDZE

In the course of the Malgobek operation, the troops of the Northern Group accumulated forces for the offensive. From its side, the German command was also preparing

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strike with the 1st tank army on Grozny and further on Makhachkala and Baku,

At the end of September, the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps, which was deployed here from the Tuapse direction, concentrated on the right flank of the group of troops of the Transcaucasian Front in the area of Staro-Shchedrinskaya.

During this period, there was a gap of more than 200 km between the flanks of the Transcaucasian and Stalingrad fronts. Here, from Budenovsk to the Caspian Sea, a waterless soloichak steppe stretched, covered with sandy breakers. In turn, there was also a large gap between the left flank of the 1st German Panzer Army and the troops operating in the Staligrad direction. The left flank of the 1st Panzer Army was, in essence, open: it was covered by tench by small motorized detachments and the cavalry regiment of fop Yuigulz. Weak garpisons were located in Levokumsky, Vlalimirovka and Achikulaks.

Considering these circumstances, the command of the Transcaucasian Front decided to move the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps to this command, strike them at the flag of the 1st Tank Army and go to its rear. Such actions were supposed to firmly cover the Kizlyar-Astrakhats railway and divert the attention of the enemy from Malgobsksko-M. Oksky direction, where at that time the Soviet troops were preparing for an offensive. The corps attack was supposed to serve as the end of the offensive for the 9th Army and the 10th Guards Rifle Corps. If this operation were successful, then the troops of the 1st Tank Army would be in danger of encirclement. Perhaps it would have succeeded if it had been planned taking into account accurate data on the enemy and options for his possible actions.

On October 2, the corps of General Kirichenko moved along the Prikumskaya steppe in the direction of Achikulak. Having not met the enemy anywhere, the cavalrymen passed in 12 days,

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more precisely, pochey, only 150 km. Suporovskis sollaty etudi station would have overcome the zadvostros with a few days. The Red Cossacks were in no hurry, trying to get too far away from the sprawling camel caravans with food, fodder and barrels of water. The slowness and inertia of the corps command contributed, firstly, to the loss of vigor, and secondly, they delayed the start of the offensive of the 9th Army and the 10th Rifle Corps.

In the tenth of October, the Cossack units came into contact with the Nempys in the areas of Abdul-Taza, Makhmut Msktsb and Berezkin. With a swift "blow at the saber" the cavalrymen took possession of these settlement points and continued their advance on Achikulak, where the enemy, according to intelligence, had a garrison in part of the battalion

infantry, 400 horsemen and 30 tanks.

However, these data were wrong. The Rmanskos command guarded the unhurried advance of the 4th cavalry corps and, having no other reserves, transferred from Doibass to cover the left wing and rear of the [th sneaker army, part of the corps of the special assignment "F".

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A special headquarters "F", headed by General of Aviation Telmut Felmi, who was considered an expert in the East in the Reich, was created back in 194 | of the year. The tasks of the headquarters included the management of sabotage activities, undercover intelligence, specially formed military patriotic units in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Caucasus. The camp at Cape Supioi in southern Greece was chosen as the place of the initial deployment of the headquarters, where the Arabs were trained, who in the future should form the core of the "Iraqi-Arab army".

In 1942, after the capture of Rostov, on the eve of the breakthrough of Army Group A into the Caucasus, the German command decided that favorable conditions had developed for the implementation of far-reaching plans.

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nyh with the invasion of Iran, Iraq and then India. In comparison with such brilliant prospects, taking a yew of some kind of Tbilisi seemed like an empty business,

On August 20, the OKW decided to deploy Special + "F" to the special purpose corps "F" and transfer it to the reserve staff of group "A" in Stalino. According to the plans, the Felmi Corps, after the entry of the lesmian troops in Tbilisi, was to be transferred by rail through Rostov to the Caucasus, and then was to advance along the Western Irani-Iraq direction with access to the Persian Gulf, to Basra. in the Middle East Corps; closing the "pain of the pincers". it was necessary to unite with the "Loterman" troops, which by that time were to take possession of the Suzsky Canal. By October 3, the corps was concentrated in the Stalin army and formally became part of the "A" group, in fact subordinate to the OKW.

In the case ""F" there were subsections. sepia and parts of all military branches. which allowed him to act on his own. The corps included 3 reinforced motorized battalions, each of which numbered up to 1000 people. The 1st and 2nd battalions were manned exclusively by soldiers and

officers of the permacht, the 3rd consisted entirely of pz arabs. Each motorized combat unit was equal in composition, armament, tactical and command capabilities to a regiment. In addition, the corps included: a separate tank battalion (25 tanks), an aviation detachment (25 aircraft), a communications company, a sapper and a mipomet company, a military detachment, a cavalry squadron, a platoon of the meteorological service, and an auto colony. The artillery consisted of a division of 4 batteries, batteries of 105-mm assault guns, heavy and light anti-aircraft divisions - a total of 120 guns and mortars ...

Corps "F" was completely mechanized and had the opportunity to arm a division of volunteer volunteers during an attack on Iraq. The number of the corps initially was about 6,000 people. pos

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In addition to military and political training, a cavalry regiment and an army battalion of the 20th]-gosaic regiment were attached to the transfer to the Caucasus. Sullats and officers spoke Turkish. Persian, Arabic and other oriental languages, in addition they analyzed French and English.

Initially, the special purpose corps was supposed to act as a strike-and-turmovo unit and the political center of the campaign of the German army in the Kavka and the countries of the East. The personnel were charged with the obligation to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage, propagandistic propaganda work. I was busy preparing anti-Soviet uprisings in the Caucasus.

The High Command gave General Felmy a double task: 1) to move in the strictest secrecy after the group! army "A" to Iran through Baku and along the Vosnio-Georgian road. depending on that. where usish will be faster; 3) to assist the 1st Panzer Army in overcoming the growing resistance of the enemy.

Since the success was not "marked" in any way, the second problem assumed ever greater importance. On October 6, Hitler ordered to throw parts of the Geperal \Felmi to the implementation of the operation - "as soon as possible, cut the railway leading from Kizlyar to the north." On October 15, the transfer of the corps to Budyonnovsk began, to the area of the upcoming hostilities, even on the 17th Corps "F" entered the enemy's bosvos soprikospovs PIS "With STRONG cavalry" of the enemy ...

On October 17, the troops of the 30th Cavalry Division of the 4th Guards Kuban Corps, instead of an unexpected night attack on Achikulak, unsuccessfully attacked from the enemy's Persian detachment in Andrsy-Kurgan. As a result, the division itself came under attack from the main forces of the core.

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Pusa "F" and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated. The Germans went on the offensive against the 9th and 10th Guards Cavalry Divisions and, after 2 days of battle, captured Urozhayny and Vladimirskaia. At this line, Felmi organized a solid defense, well prepared in engineering terms, behind which motorized units were located. As a result, the corps of the Kirichsman did not fulfill the assigned task, and the strike of the German divisions in the direction of Nalchik completely buried the plan of the Soviet offensive.

The commander of the front ordered the commander of the corps on the morning of October 30, bypassing the strongholds of the opposition, to advance on Stepnoe, Solomseiskos and, in cooperation with the 63rd Cavalry Division, which arrived from the Black Sea Group of Forces, and the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, defeat the enemy's Mozdok grouping. But Kirichenko decided on the night of November 1 to attack again and capture Achikulak. By this time, the Germans had managed to concentrate additional units of the 360th and 375th grappler regiments here. For two days the Cossacks waged unsuccessful heavy battles with enemy infantry and tanks, but they were not able to capture Achikulak. Having suffered heavy and true losses in frontal attacks on enemy strongholds, the corps retreated, and on November 7, without the permission of the front and group command, General Kirichenko began to withdraw his divisions to the east in the direction of the Black Market.

Upon learning of this, General Tyulens telegraphed to the corps commander: "The task of battalion operations against the flank and rear of the enemy, which is disgraceful to you, provides the best cover for the Kizlyar-Astrakhan railway ... and is completely incompatible with your withdrawal to the east. Immediately take measures to prevent contact with the enemy with your advanced units and secure behind you the wound of the occupied zone ... and intensify the actions of reconnaissance groups with the capture of prisoners and disruption of enemy control.

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However, by this time the Cossacks, having had their fill, had retreated 100 km to the east. The moment was lost, the beautifully conceived maneuver did not materialize. [2]



According to our official history, "the raid ended with a brilliant success for the Kubantzels."

Corps "F" remained on their positions. From a row shabby, he was unable to conduct offensive actions. In addition, his activity was restrained by an acute shortage of fuel and the absence of air cover - Kleist threw all his resources into the Gozno direction. In the end, the elite special unit of the general Flm was used as an ordinary army corps (in January 1943, it was again transformed into the Special Headquarters "F", avfsvrle - psrebrosche in Tunisia, where after another 3 months it capitulated at Cape Bon in the composition of the 250- you are a strong Italian-Islamic group).

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After the failure of the attempt to break through the Elkhotovskis Gate, the German command decided to capture Ordzhonikidze first. At the same time, it was planned to close the Vosino-Gruzinskaya road, separate the Soviet units, and then develop the pasture to Grozny, Baku and along the Vosino-Truzinskaya road to Tbilisi. On 14 October, an entry appeared in Army Group A's war diary; "The offensive from the mountain range of Malgobek-Voznseeskoe on Ordzhonikidze is carried out with the aim of crossing military roads. The offensive with the task of capturing the Grozisi oil region and forcing the Argun and Supzha rivers has a lucrative goal, pursuing the enemy, to reach the sea.

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The city of Ordzhonikidze was of great strategic importance, which, for some reason, was not noticed at Tyulepev's headquarters. From here, a passage opened into the Transcaucasus along the Military Fusia Road and through the Daryalskos Gorge. However, from the north, the approaches to the city were covered

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yutsya rski and mountain ranges. But the terrain in the direction of Nalchik and Orzhopikidze to the east is passable for all military branches.

The command of the Northern Group of Forces, knowing that the German taik army was operating against them, did not expect the advance of the German troops in the Nalchik direction. Which is very strange for a professional military: did they really think that Kleist's tanks would trample over Elbrus? Most likely, why did they think about this, the command of the Northern Group of Forces at that time was enthusiastically preparing their campaign, aimed at defeating the Mozdok grouping against the peak. Despite the fact that

the commander of the Transcaucasian Front ordered Geisral Masleipikov, at the same time as preparing an offensive in the Malgobek-Mozlok direction, to strengthen the troops covering Nalchik, the latter was not up to it,

Meanwhile, back in the Soviet Union, the opposition began preparations for an offensive precisely on this sector of the front. On September 25, the Germans captured a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Terek in the Maisky district. The raid of the 87th Army and the Northern Group of Forces did not attach much importance to this and took measures to eliminate the bridgehead. And since the last time, the German troops were going to carry out the main blow in the Nalchik operation. On the Russian side, one regiment of the 151st Infantry Division operated in this sector.

The Germans were quite successful in using the Soviet command to deceive. However, this almost never required much effort. To disguise its intentions, the 1st Panzer Army commando continued active operations in small groups in the area of Malgobek and, having strengthened the defenses in the area of Illariopovka, El Khotovo, Planovo with engineering structures, withdrew the 13th and 23rd Panzer Divisions from there and concentrated them in Mayskos area, Kot lyarevskaya. In addition, the 2nd mountain rifle rumips

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Kai division was reinforced by two firearms battalions.

In total, in the Nalchik direction, General Kleist concentrated two tank and one mountain rifle divisions, ten battalions and special forces divisions. The number of troops here reached almost 34 thousand people, 460 guns and mortars, 178 tanks. The main part of these "enormous forces", which Zhukov or Rokossovsky would have only had enough for one or two attacks, concentrated on a bridgehead with a length of only about 20 km. The Germans were counting on an attack by the 2nd Romanian division on Nalchik from the north, and then by two tank divisions from the east,

Meanwhile, the troops of the Northern Group of Forces were completing the last preparations for the offensive, which was scheduled for November 3rd. By the beginning of hostilities, the group was reinforced with nine artillery regiments, ten anti-tank regiments, two local and two regiments of rocket artillery. The group had about 30 divisions, 8 tank brigades, 8 separate tank battalions and 6 armored trains. The 4th Air Army included 232 aircraft. The main forces of the Soviet troops were in the Grozny and Ordzhonikidze directions.

niyah, while in the Nalchik direction, the weak ("only" 5 divisions)  
37th Army of General Kozlov defended.

By the start of the operation, the army's forces were evenly spread out over a 120-kilometer front. The 37th Army had no reserves. The defense of the SS in terms of engineering was poorly equipped, no minefields were created, despite the fact that even in October the most fierce defensive battles were in full swing in the zone of the neighboring 9th Army. It seems that the illiteracy, stupidity and inertness of thinking of the Soviet voplochnikov has no boundaries. Are opi capable of learning at all?

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The problem of Masleinnikov and his army commanders was also the large number of paciopal formations - 7 rifle divisions. separate battalions, livisons and squadrons were recruited from the "On the oneness of the Caucasus and the Middle of Asia." The vast majority of their personnel and junior commanders did not know the Russian language, and some of them, moreover, were completely illiterate. equally "internationally" they showed their subordinates "formalism, and sometimes callousness and rude attitude" - the usual set, which means: they didn't feed, they beat them when they were drunk, they shot them extrajudicially. Barefoot and special training in these units was carried out at the same high level as in the entire Red Army, but to this was added another language barrier. as a result, the highlanders and the Asians deserted en masse, since the house was nearby, or they ran over to the Yemtsy,

The head of the political department of the Northern Group of Forces, Brigadier Commissar Nadorshin reported to the head of Glavpur Shcherbakov: -

"... As a result of the neglect of educational work with personnel, poor study and knowledge of people, as a result of the lack of elementary work to put together units and prepare them for participation in battles, the state of most national divisions until recently was poor (*italics auth.*) . In parts of these divisions, there were mass cases of desertion, mutilation and treason. Two national divisions - the 89th Armenian and the 223rd Azerbaijani - were recognized as unfit for combat in terms of their combat training and the political and moral state of the personnel and were assigned to the second

echelon.

The 223rd division, having not yet entered the battle and only

going on the march to occupy the defense sector, showed

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its combat capability. On this march, 168 people deserted from units of the division, singly and in groups, carrying weapons and ammunition with them.

From the very first days of the fighting, during an insignificant collision with the enemy, the 89th division faltered, lost many people, equipment and weapons, and also showed itself incapable of accomplishing any serious task. Despite the fact that the division had 10 months (!) for military training, this time was used irrationally. Instead of painstaking and stubborn work to improve the basic skills of the personnel and prepare them for the upcoming battles, they were washed down with fruitless hype and pomp ... (: they didn't work with people, they weren't educated, and they were worried about their everyday needs. There were cases when the battle The soldiers in the forward positions did not have drinking water for days and did not receive hot food, so it is not surprising that most of them fell under the influence of hostile Elements, who operated with impunity in the division.

In the first battle, many platoon, company and battalion commanders lost control of their subdivisions. Intelligence was organized, there were no interactions and relationships between units in the battle. As a result, the division suffered heavy losses. Many fighters fled, and more than 400 people went over to the side of the enemy ...

A similar situation has now been revealed in the 39th Georgian division. In this division, only for 4 days, from October 9 to 13, 117 Red Army soldiers and commanders betrayed the Motherland and went over to the enemy's hundred ... "

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The command of the army and the Northern Group of Forces was able to decipher the enemy's plan. This can be understood. The concept of carelessness in the construction of defense on the most tank-dangerous board. Although once the Yasdka reported on the regroupings of the enemy

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troops, the conclusions from her data were erroneous. The Soviet official, including the Eastern one, was brought up on the principle "The boss is always right" and, due to the wretchedness of his imagination, simply cannot imagine that

Kleist may have a different view of the situation and his own plans. Therefore, our staffs evaluated the regrouping of the enemy peak as a measure to strengthen their defenses.

On October 25, early in the morning, German aviation made a powerful raid on the troops and headquarters of the 37th Army, located in Dolinskoye. 1st Lt Kozlov still had time to eat tea, when he found himself without communication with the Northern Group of Forces and lost control of his troops.

At 10 o'clock in the morning the 2nd Rumanian Mountain Rifle Division, reinforced by German units, after a short but strong heavy raid, went over to the offensive. Tanks with submachine gunners under the cover of smoke screens struck at the junction of the 295th and 392nd rifle divisions, in the general direction of Nalchik. The 295th division of Colonel N.G. Safaryan was forced to retreat lazily 8 km in separate areas, the 392nd division, which was commanded by Colonel G.I. Kuparadya, was from Rezaia and pressed against the mountains. The subdivisions of this division, trapped in the Baksan Gorge, had to leave for the Transcaucasus through the passes of the Elbrus region. At the same time, the division was instructed to procure 12 tons of molybdenum from the Tyrnyauz combine and 25,000 heads of cattle that belonged to breeding farms. This transition, in fact, in winter conditions at an altitude of up to 3700m, was completed in 10 days, but the Kuparadze division dropped out of the battle for Nalchik.

In the afternoon of October 26, the German-Romanian troops approached Nalchik, which fell 2 days later. At the same time, the 13th and 23rd Panzer Divisions struck from the Maiskoye and Kotlyarevskaya regions. Having broken through the weak defenses, the German sneakers quickly spread in a southwestern direction and by the end of the day

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moved more than 20 km. The uncontrollable troops of the 37th Army scattered to the south-west.

The commander of the Northern Group of Forces assessed the actions of the enemy as a private action to eliminate the hanging position of Kozlov's army. Only in the evening did it become clear to General Maslennikov that the Isms were planning a large-scale operation to capture Ordzhonikidze from the west.

Inspired by the early successes, the command of Army Group A reported to Hitler's headquarters: "In the area of the 1st Panzer Army, the move to Nalchik, apparently, took the enemy by surprise. Panzer divisions advanced to Psygansu already on the first day. Some of their parts turned to the north and created the preconditions for the encirclement approximately

thousand enemy divisions. The destruction of this grouping should end in as many days as possible. The enemy has been pushed back into the mountains. It seems that the advance of the Taik forces in the southern and then in the eastern papravlepiya on Ordzhonikidze will open up broad prospects ... "

The commander of the Transcaucasian front needed to take urgent measures to cover the Ordzhonikidze direction. At that time, Tyulenev, the gist of the army, was in the Cheriomor group of troops on the Tuapse administration. Upon learning of the enemy's advance on Nalchik, he flew to the headquarters of the Northern Group and sent orders to the 155th Rifle Brigade from Sukhumi and the 317th and 319th Rifle Divisions from the 58th Army. In addition, the newly formed 10th Rifle Corps under the command of Major General P.E. Catching gin. On the night of October 27, he was supposed to take up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the Uruk River, from the Terek to Chikola. The right-flank 75th Rifle Division and the 52nd Tank Brigade were subordinate to the corps. 1st Guards Rifle Corps General Major I.P. Tall was ordered to take up defense along the vpet

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him bypassing the Ordzhonikidzevsky defensive area.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued to advance continuously, pushing back General Kozov's units to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. A gap formed between the divisions of the 37th Army, the section from Uruk to Chikola turned out to be completely open. There was an immediate threat of a breakthrough of German tanks to Ordzhonikidze.

On October 29 and 30, the German command regrouped the 13th and 23rd Panzer Divisions to the western bank of the Uruk River. On October 31, they struck in the Chikola area and went to the rear of the 10th Rifle Corps, spreading its headquarters with caterpillars. Having broken through the defenses of the corps, the enemy launched an offensive against Ardon. On November 1, the Yemtsy occupied Alagir and crossed the Ardon River. On this same day, their aviation inflicted a strong bombing strike on Ordzhonikidze, as a result of which the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, gsis ral-lieutenant P.I., Bodin, as well as a member of the Military Council of the front, A.N. Ossetian Republic Zadelava.

In these tense military operations, General Tyulenev decided to abandon the planned offensive in the Ishchersky direction and, within 2 days, transfer the 10th Guards Rifle Corps from the 44th Army to the Ordzhonikidzevsky direction.

The 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Brigades also went here. In addition, 5 fighter-anti-tank artillery regiments and 3 rocket artillery regiments were concentrated in the Ordzhonikidze area. Thanks to the measures taken, the enemy offensive was slowed down, but the situation remained extremely dangerous.

On the morning of November 2, German tank units broke through the outer contour of the Ordzhonikidzevsky fortified area and advanced units reached the suburbs. By the end of the day they captured Gisel. They did not succeed in advancing further: with all the Aryan contempt for

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The enemy divisions were still not enough to capture Grozny and Baku. November 5 was the turning point of the entire Nalchik operation. The Germans were thoroughly stopped. Moreover, having stalled on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, the German group itself found itself in a sack. There was a real possibility of encirclement and destruction in the area of Teessley.

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Taking into account the current situation, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front decided to inflict a kop-groudar on the Gisel group at the same time with all the forces located in the Ordzhonikidzevsky direction. But the commander of the Northern Group of Forces, in turn, took a half-hearted decision. According to his plan, 3 rifle and 4 taiko high brigades went on the offensive; the main forces - 5 rifle divisions and 6 rifle brigades - occupied a passive position and actually had the enemy in front of them. at

Teneral Tyulenev corrected this decision by ordering the use of the entire 10th Guards Rifle Corps, as well as the 276th and 35th 1st Divisions and the 155th Rifle Brigade, for the counterattack. However, the offensive began, nevertheless, not with all forces, but according to the well-marked plan of General Maslupikov. Appropriate formations were introduced into battle piecemeal. True, even the so-called Gisel grouping represented one single 13th such division from the SS.

On November 6, the 10th Guards and 57th Rifle Brigades, the 5th Guards and 63rd Taik Brigades attacked Dzu Arikau along the eastern bank of the Fiag-Dop River. At noon, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, with the forces of the 4th Guards Rifle Brigade, compatible with the 52nd and 2nd Tank Brigades, attacked Gisel, counterattacked with tanks against the peak and retreated to the starting line. And yet, thanks to the successful pro-

movement of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, about

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tivpi was almost completely surrounded. It had only a narrow passage in the Dzuarikalu region, no more than 5 km wide. Parts of the German 13th Panzer Division did everything to expand this corridor and break out of the trap. Especially strong battles flared up = Suar gorge, 12 km from Ordzhonikidze.

This area of military operations played a large role throughout the entire Nalchik operation. Firstly, through the Suarskos gorge, the path to the Vosnya-Truzinskaya road opened, along which the Soviet troops were saved, groupings in raions Geesely. In an effort to assist the 13th Panzer Division, the German Command on November 9 threw into battle the 2nd Romanian mountain division and the German Brandsburg Regiment, supported by 60 tanks. However, they were not able to break through either to Sudrskos ushels or to the Gisel district.

The Soviet troops, in their turn, managed to dismantle the units surrounded by Pemsksys. The counterattacks were scattered and pseudo-temporal. As soon as the search began to move, their control was lost, there was no interaction between rifle units and tanks, and the tankers did not even have a signal connection with artillery. Firmly holding the corridor, the Muslims left the Gisel sack step by step. By 1] November, the Ryagermai divisions retreated to Alagir, where they firmly entrenched themselves,

Thus ended the Nalchik defensive operation. It was of great importance for the defense of the Caucasus. With the defeat of the German troops on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, their last attempt to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil regions, as well as in Transcaucasia, failed.

Unable to personally turn the tide in the Caucasus, on November 22, Tytler handed over command of Army Group A to Colonel General Kleist (the 1st Panzer Army was taken over by cavalry general Eberhard von Ma

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keysezn). This no longer mattered after the Steel City catastrophe broke out.

and\*



Simultaneously with the preparations for the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the troops of the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front the task of actively tying down the entire forces of the 1st German Panzer Army, and allowing the German command to carry out wide paratroops of troops from Army Group A near Stalingrad. The headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces developed a plan for the implementation of counterattacks in the Nalchik and Mozdok directions.

At the first counterattack, the troops of the 9th Army of Gesral K.A. were to be hit. Korotsva and the 37th Army Geisral Kozlov. They were given the following tasks: by November 15, reach the line of the Ardon river; by November 20, take possession of the Alagir district and, on November 29, reach the line of the Uruk River.

The enemy imsl in this direction is the 23rd and 13th tank divisions, in which there were 260 such.

Sugra On November 13, the troops of the left flank of Koroteev's army and Kozlov's division launched an offensive, for ten days and managed to break through the enemy defenses, but only clipped to a depth of 10 km, reaching the eastern bersg rsk Ardop and Fiag-Doi.

The main reason for the unsuccessful actions of the 9th and 37th armies was the poor preparation of the counterattack. The interaction of troops was not organized, especially between infantry, tanks and aircraft. The command did not concentrate the necessary forces and means on the main direction. So, for example, in the 9th Army, the 3rd Rifle Corps, operating in the direction of the main attack, had only one tank brigade and two reinforcement artillery regiments, while the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, which operated in a secondary direction, had tank brigade and tri artillery regiment. In addition, the counterattack was carried out by the same troops, tired of long

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battles and regroupings. Often they had to fight throughout the day, regroup at night; and in the morning of the next day to join the battle again.

The unsuccessful actions of the Northern Group of Forces could not satisfy the Headquarters. On November 15, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Army General I.V. Tyulenev and the commander of the Northern Group, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslseinnikov. The troops of the Northern Group of Forces were given the following tasks: to firmly cover the main directions to Rozny and Ordzhonikidze, strike on both flanks and defeat the Mozdok and Alagir groupings of the enemy,

In accordance with this plan, a new regrouping was carried out. By this time, the 11th and 12th Guards Cavalry Divisions had arrived from the Black Sea Group of Forces. Of these, the 63rd Cavalry Division was formed by the 5th Guards Doisky Cossack Cavalry Corps under the command of Gsieral-Major AA; Selivapova. Now on the right wing of the group there were 2 cavalry corps and the 110th cavalry division.

The Soviet counterattacks did not prevent the command of Army Group A from releasing the 23rd Panzer Division, which was being transferred to the Kotellikov area to the Manstein group, which was assigned to provide assistance to the Paulus encirclement. The 50th Infantry Division arrived from the Taman Peninsula to reinforce the 1st Panzer Army, replacing the Viking SS motorized division in the Malgobe region.

On November 27, the troops of the left flank of the 9th Army launched an offensive in the general direction of Digora. At the turn of the Ardon river, they were stopped by the Viking division. For three days, the Soviet units tried to break through the enemy's defenses, but were unsuccessful. On December 4, they launched new attacks, but this time they were forced to stop the offensive.

The failure of the operation was explained by the unsuccessful choice of the direction of the main attacks. Means of amplifying times

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were evenly distributed between the units, so there was no superiority in the enemy's forces. on the main directions. The poor work of reconnaissance also had a negative effect on the actions of our troops.

The interaction between infantry and tanks was disrupted, especially between the 140th Tank Brigade under Colonel N.T. Petrenko and parts of the 3rd mountain rifle corps of Colonel GN. Perskrstova. So, from November 26 to 27, parts of the corps were removed from the brigade's offensive site, about which the tankers were not even informed,

On December 1, the Headquarters pointed out to General Masleniekov: "The enemy has already transferred part of his forces from the area of \u200b\u200byour troops to the north and the FCM has weakened itself. Judging by the course of the operation near Stalingrad, the enemy will continue to transfer part of his forces to the north. Prel, the intentional retreat of the enemy on the northern coast of the Tersk cannot be considered an accident. Thus, a favorable situation was created for the offensive of all your troops. Your job is to seize the moment and act boldly."

The situation for the offensive of the troops of the Northern Group was indeed favorable. The situation of the German 6th Army near Stalingrad, which was surrounded, not only required the transfer of fresh forces there, but also undermined the morale of the German soldiers and their allies operating in the North Caucasus. On December 9, the commander of Army Group A telegraphed to General Makeyev: "It is necessary to explain to all commanders that the tank army must at all costs, despite strong pressure from the enemy, hold its positions ... Everything now consists in ... clench your teeth, hold on.

Almost simultaneously with the counterattacks of the left wing of the Northern Group, counterattacks of the Soviet

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troops on our right wing. On November 30, the 4th Guards Kuban Corps launched a strike in the rear of the enemy's Mozdok grouping and by the end of the day on December 1 reached the Achikulak-Mozdok road. But the larger corps reached the goal failed. Until December 4, the Cossacks fought fierce battles with the motorized units of the German Special Purpose Corps "F". The Don Cossack Corps also failed. Fearing a blow to his right flank, he was also forced to retreat

twist.

Troops of the 44th Army under the command of General Major V.A. Khomenko - 7 rifle divisions and the 9th rifle corps, reinforced by tank units - had the task, in cooperation with the Don Cossack Corps, on November 30, to strike in the direction of Shefatovo-Mozdok, to defeat the anti-pi kaik group on December 12 to free Mozdok,

The offensive developed at a mellen pace. By the end of December 3, Soviet formations reached the Titarov-Sborny line, 2 km east of Ishcherskaya. However, they had no further success. This came about for a number of reasons. Of course, "the enemy had great forces here."

Acrometogo, our troops were extremely poorly supplied with ammunition. In the first days, motor transport got stuck in the congestion, the Voditsly had to drive cars on sandy impassability. There were no directions for movement, there were no traffic controllers and signs on the supply routes. As a result, the evacuation of the wounded was not properly organized. The rear of divisions and regiments worked especially poorly. So, on the second day of the offensive, the 402nd Rifle Division was left completely without food. Interaction Stewis was absent. Artillery lagged behind infantry, tanks operated without reconnaissance of routes, often

broke away from the infantry. They were poorly supplied with Yuryuchy and bospripas. Before an offensive, thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's anti-tank defenses is not carried out.

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the tanks were not given enough support by artillery and infantry. As a result, the tanks often acted independently and suffered heavy losses.

Therefore, the army of General Khomenko did not fulfill its main task of capturing Mozdok. By December 25, the troops of the right flank of the 44th Army advanced only 10 km in the western direction.

Entering the battle from the second echelon, the 58th Army in the zone between the 44th and 9th Armies also had no success in offensive operations and fought fruitless battles until the end of the month.

Kozlov's 37th Army, together with the 3rd Army, was to encircle and destroy the enemy's Ardon-Digor grouping. The commander decided with two detachments of the 295th rifle division and a regiment of the 11th rifle division of the NKVD to cover the left flank of the army at the turn of the Cherek, Cherek-Balkarsky rivers, and the main forces of the 295th, 2nd guards rifle divisions and the cavalry regiment to attack in three directions with the overall task of cutting off the enemy's withdrawal routes from the Ardon, Alagir, Chikola region and promoting the success of the 9th Army's offensive.

Based on the order of the commander of the Northern Group, the 37th Army was to go on the offensive on November 29th. But then the start of the operation was repeatedly postponed. This made it possible for the enemy to reveal the preparation of our offensive and strengthen their defenses,

On December 4, the troops of the army went on the offensive, but it did not begin at the same time. So, the 295th rifle division attacked with a delay of 2 hours. During the operation, the regiments lost their bearings and mixed up their battle formations. Met by strong fire against the nickname, parts of the 295th division were not successful,

On the same day in the morning, units of the 2nd Guards Rifle Division, Major General F.V. Zakharov dealt a sudden blow to Khaznidon, Uruk. As a result,

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The deytsy quickly took possession of these settlements, capturing prisoners and trophies. Army troops

were already close to completing the task, but the unsuccessful actions of the 9th Army allowed the enemy to throw additional forces from the Ardon direction and stop the advance of the 37th Army.

On December 23, the Germans, in order to release the SS Viking division for its transfer to Stalingrad, began to withdraw their units from the area of Ardon, Alagir, Digora. Having anticipated the enemy's retreat, the troops of the 37th Army went into pursuit. However, the regiments and divisions received military orders for the offensive with a great delay, and there was no daylight left for preparation. The units did not have time to conduct reconnaissance of the area, organize interaction and prepare equipment for battle. The unit commanders did not receive specific tasks and therefore failed to carry them out to the fighters.

By the time the combat order was received, the 2nd Guards Rifle Division had already begun the offensive and managed to advance 15-20 km. The division commander had to hastily change direction. By two o'clock in the afternoon on December 24, the division occupied a new starting area and, having absolutely not prepared the offensive, launched it at 15.00 instead of five o'clock in the morning, as was planned. The attacks were frontal. Due to the lack of reconnaissance data and a strong fog on artillery fire, it was carried out in areas and was ineffective: As a result, the division did not fulfill its tasks, except for the 351st Rifle Major General, V.F. Sergatskov, before whom the enemy withdrew, leaving Alagir and Zrau,

Thus, the active operations of the Northern Group of Forces ceased by the end of December 1942. By reducing the front of defense, the German command on December 23 began to withdraw its troops from the areas of Ardon, Alagir and Digora to the prepared defensive line of Elkhoto, Chikola.

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The command of the Northern Group of Forces was not able to use this favorable situation for the offensive. Counterattacks in the Nalchik direction did not give the desired results. The task of defeating the Ardon and Alagir groupings of the enemy was not completed, although the available forces and means completely allowed this to be done. The Germans succeeded in withdrawing the 23rd Panzer Division and the Viking SS motorized division from the battle and throwing them into the Kotelnikovo area to the group of General Manstein to help their Stalingrad group.

Marshal Zhukov explained that "when preparing counterattacks, the headquarters did not always pay due attention to the camouflage of the troops, the enemy often revealed our intentions

and took appropriate action

Due to poor reconnaissance, our troops often did not even know the outline of the enemy's front line of defense. Therefore, artillery and mortar fire was not always effective. Thus, on December 4-5, under the koi grudara of the 11th Rifle Corps, artillery and mortar fire during the period of artillery preparation was aimed at destroying the enemy outposts, and when our troops approached the true front line of his defense, they were not supported by artillery. due to the fact that the ammunition was already used up.

Troop control by the headquarters of the Northern Group and some divisional headquarters was sometimes carried out at a great distance from the troops. Therefore, the headquarters of the advancing armies sometimes did not have detailed information about the situation at the front for several days. Often the commanders of divisions had to find out about the nature of the defense and the forces of the enemy already in the course of battles ... -'

In the first days of the offensive in all our regiments there were many losses not only from enemy tank attacks, but also from his minefields. While retreating, the enemy mined roads, separate trenches, paths, bridges and passages.

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It is characteristic that counterattacks, the number of which increased with our advance into the depth of the enemy's defenses, were most often carried out by tank subunits. Infantry subunits were used, as a rule, for firefighting and equipping positions at the next lines of defense.

The battle usually went like this. When our advancing units, having overcome the minefields and artillery-mortar fire of the enemy, approached his next defensive line, the enemy counterattacked with tanks our most advanced unit, forcing it to slow down or even stop further advance. With the onset of darkness, he withdrew the main part of his forces to the next line of defense. For the night, a cover was left consisting of small silartilleries, mortars and tanks, with sapper and infantry divisions, which illuminated the line of the froit all the way and, as soon as they noticed movement from our footsteps anywhere, they concentrated fire there. From the morning of the next day, pulling out their artillery and mortars in the evening and night, our troops created a counterweight over the enemy's cover forces and forced him to return to Dalss, everything was repeated from the beginning. The enemy led a mobile defense, did our troops methodically destroy it, while they did not kill the enemy on the spot, but drove out

nodded him to the next frontier.

All these and many other reasons led to serious costs in the combat operations of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front. With better leadership of the troops, these actions could give more effective results.

The main achievements of the poorly prepared offensive boiled down to the fact that "by this time (December 1942! - Auth.), the command of the group, armies, as well as the commanders of formations and headquarters, gained extensive experience in combat in difficult conditions, learned to control troops more firmly".

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The most densely populated, the most fertile, the most economically developed regions of their own country were turned by the Soviet generals into a massive training ground and they studied, studied, studied. Near Moscow - to fight in difficult winter conditions, near Kharkov - in difficult spring conditions, near Rzhev - to march in the summer, in the Caucasus - in the mountains ...

'lj

The defense of the Caucasus was carried out in conjunction with the Battle of Stalingrad, which had a huge impact on the further development of events in this theater of military operations. more concentrated in the Stalingrad direction to the detriment of actions to seize the Caucasian oil sources, the 1st Panzer Army, operating in the Caucasus, was gradually weakened due to the transfer of troops to Stalingrad. The collapse of Paulus' army completely buried the Edelweiss plan and all Hitler's hopes.

During their summer and autumn offensive in the Caucasus, the troops of Army Group A, according to Soviet estimates, lost more than 10 thousand people.

The losses of the Red Army in the battle for the Caucasus on December 31, 1942 are estimated at 37391 people, 990 tanks, 5049 guns and mortars, 644 combat aircraft.

In the current situation, the German troops had no choice but to hastily leave the Caucasus. The "optimum" of the defeated German generals on this occasion amusingly echoes the arguments of Bagramyan and Moskalenko about the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad lost by the Soviet troops.

which operation: "Assessing today the events of that time, we can come to the conclusion that the impossibility of continuing the offensive of the troops of Army Group A"

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was, probably, both for her and for her command simply happiness ... There is no doubt that if her troops had overcome the mountain range and even reached the southern border of the Soviet Union, then after the catastrophe in the upper reaches of the Don and under With Stalingrad, they simply would not have been able to break through from the Transcaucasus to the back and connect with the main forces of the Germans.

Forced to order the withdrawal of Army Group A from the Caucasus, Hitler thereby recognized the futility of further struggle to achieve his goals.

#### STALINGRAD UNIVERSITIES

... To be honest, in 1942 we still didn't know how to eat and command troops the way we learned later.

Mitail N.I. Krylov

The beginning of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad can be counted from July 17, 1942, when the advanced units of the 6th German Army of General Paulus came into contact with the troops of the 62nd Army of Major General V.Ya. Kolpakchi at the turn of the Chir River.

By mid-July, it became clear to the Soviet command that the enemy was not going to turn his forces to the north and northeast, but was striving to break through to the Volga in the Stalingrad region, capture this important strategic point and the largest industrial region and cut communications linking the center of the country with the Caucasus. The defeated and retreating troops of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts were unable to stop the enemy.

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The Stavka put forward the direction to Stalingradskos. from his reserve of the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies. They entered the Stalingrad Front, created on July 12 on the basis of the South-Western Front. The front also included the 21st



combined arms and 8th air armies. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the front, Khrushchev was appointed a member of the Military Council, and Bodin was appointed chief of staff. Units of the 28th and 38th armies that had left the encirclement also joined here.

In total, by July 20, the Stalingrad Front had 38 rifle and three cavalry divisions, eight rifle brigades. Of these, 18 divisions were fresh and fully staffed with personnel and artillery (the three new armies had 3,710 guns and mortars), six divisions numbered from 2,500 to 4,000 people, and 14, which had come from the Donets and Oskol, from 300 to 1,000 people and were completely incompetent.

The 13th, 22nd, 23rd and 28th tank corps, the 3rd cavalry corps, 14 separate tank brigades and 9 separate tank battalions operated as part of the Stalingrad Front.

The 8th Air Army had 454 aircraft. In addition, 210 long-range bombers and 60 fighters of the 102nd air defense air division operated here. From July 20 to August 17, another 23 air regiments with a total strength of about 450 aircraft arrived.

Thus, by the beginning of the defensive operation, Timoshenko had at his disposal 540,000 men, over 1,000 tanks, and 734 aircraft. In addition, at the same time, 8 more rifle divisions transferred from the Far East, and the newly formed 57th Army under the command of Major General D.N. Nizhnev is left. On July 22, a decision was made to create, as part of the front, the 13th and 4th tank armies of a mixed composition on the basis of the directorates and rear of the 38th and 28th army

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missions, four tank corps and arrived rifle formations.

It can be concluded that in this case the advancing side did not have any quantitative superiority, and most importantly, as A. Samsonov pointed out in a brochure dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad; "The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, Comrade Stalin, with the foresight of a great commander, promptly unraveled the plans of the German-fascist camouflage. I.V. Stalin countered the adventurist plans of the enemy with his strategic plan for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad, worked out taking into account the existing possibilities and the specific conditions of the situation. This ingenious plan was based on the idea of active

defense followed by a counteroffensive. For the practical implementation of the Stalinist plan, it was necessary to bleed the enemy in protracted defensive battles and to keep Stalingrad at any cost in order to create favorable conditions for a desperate and a heinous assault.

In 1941, Stalin lured the Wehrmacht near Moscow and "destroyed" his best troops there, in 1942 the Supreme Commander lured the Germans to the Volga just as brilliantly. So everything is going according to plan - to be an academician for Comrade Samsonov,

The task of the Stalingrad Front was, defending in a strip 520 km wide - from Pavlovsk along the left bank of the Don to Kleitskaya and along the south through Surov and Viki of Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya - to stop the further advance of the enemy. On the outskirts of Stalingrad, the construction of defensive lines, begun in the autumn of 1941 and abandoned after the winter victories of the Red Army, was resumed. The hands of 225 thousand Stalingraders built 4 defensive bypasses: external, middle, internal and urban. People's militia detachments, fighter battalions and air defense groups were formed.

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The 62nd and 64th Armies took up the defense directly in the large bend, having ten rifle divisions, two naval rifle and three tank brigades, eight Kurat regiments, six separate tank battalions - 160 thousand people, 2200 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks. The advanced detachments were thrown out to the border of the Chir and Tsyma rivers, the main forces were deployed on the right bank of the Don along the line of Kleitskaya, Surovikino, Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya.

As for the enemy's assessment, in an effort to simultaneously demonstrate both Soviet power and the "powerfulness" of the enemy, our historical chroniclers, Zhilins and Samsons, completely got confused. The fundamental work "History of the Second World War" on p. The German fascist commando was so confident in the quick and easy capture of Stalingrad that it even found it possible to take several formations from the 6th Army advancing in the Stalingrad direction and transfer them to the armies operating in other directions and put them in reserve. As a result, the composition of this army on July 7 was reduced from 20 to 13 divisions in comparison with the beginning of the month. Of the mobile units, only one motorized division remained in it (our italics. - Auth.).

Exactly 3 pages later, the team of authors was stunned by completely different data: "To 17 in the

In the direction of Stalingrad, 14 (?) divisions of the 64th German army were advancing, in which there were about 270 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars (caliber 75 mm and larger) and about 500 tanks (our italics. - Auth) ". I don't understand 110, IS IT IN "ONLY ONE MOTOR DIVISION" - 500 tanks? Well, of course, the entire 4th Air Fleet is here - "up to 1200 aircraft in total", and again "fascist German troops outnumbered the Soviet ones ..." so many times.

So, to be absolutely precise, by July 17, 3 infantry divisions were advancing in the Stalingrad direction.

zii of the 8th Army Corps of General 1eytz.

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On July 19, the German troops crushed the Soviet barriers and began to be drawn into the large bend of the Don, Paulus expected to reach Stalingrad and capture the city on the move by July 25,

"For the Germans, the question of occupying Stalingrad and reaching the Volgs seemed to be decisive. The term was determined simply: it was only necessary to divide the length of the remaining path by the average daily advance. Having made this simple calculation, Hitler announced to the world the day of the occupation of Stalingrad.

#### BETWEEN DON AND VOLGA

The Deputy Commander of the 64th Army, General V.I. Chuikov. Until 1942, he was in KITAS as an accomplice of Chich Kaishi, in the Stalinist expression, "pulling the tail of the Japanese tiger with the hands of the Chinese comrades." In this new war for him, the general was a novice and therefore diligently recalled what he was taught at the Military Academy: their forces in the most advantageous position. For the defender, the terrain must always be an ally, it must give him tactical advantages for counterattacks, for the use of all firepower, for camouflage.

At the same time, the terrain should, if possible, hinder the movement and movement of the attacker, and with engineering support, make the ss inaccessible to tanks so that the attacker does not have hidden approaches and, as far as possible, is under fire from the defender.

In general, in the theory of Chuikov, everything is very correctly stated

etc. Noto Li got his education in some other academy than

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his bosses, if he found out about all these subtleties after the war. however, "the defensive line for the 62nd Army was chosen without taking these requirements into account. We did not have time to use natural barriers - rivers, streams and ravines. which could be easily reinforced with engineering structures and made difficult for the attacker; positions were placed in the bare steppe, open to observation and viewing them both from the ground and from the air. There were many gaps between the defending subunits and units, especially on the right flank, which made it possible for the enemy to cover the defense positions and go to the rear.

All the time the same rake: how to defend - failed to prepare, how to attack - failed to concentrate. Marshal Timoshenko "academician baked", ran his fingernail over the map - here tsbe and "stand to death", but where are the rivers, where are the ravines, what's the difference? (In fact, all this was done in accordance with the Field Manual of the Red Army, which assigned the commanders of rifle regiments and battalions to work on the ground. For higher commanders and headquarters (?), work on the ground was not provided for when organizing defense.) engineering barriers, there was an acute shortage of mines and explosives. Instead of trenches and communication passages, separate rifle trenches were torn off, which, in open terrain, made maneuvering with manpower and firepower during a battle a deadly number. The anti-tank weapons of the 62nd and 64th armies - 944 guns and 3,660 anti-tank rifles - were evenly distributed along this front, instead of concentrating them in dangerous directions; The provision of anti-aircraft artillery was very weak.

It was not Menes who arranged the troops in the positions indicated to him in an interesting way, and General Gordov, who took command of the 64th Army. Almost a whole division from the first echelon was assigned to the Persian detachments.

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dy pas remote from the main forces of 10-50 km, not having either artillery or air support. The smallpox defense line on the western bank of the Don from Suro Vikino to Verkhie-Kurmoyarskaya was occupied by 4 rifle divisions, the 154th naval rifle and 121st tank brigade. Yurdov left the rest of his forces on the eastern bank of the Don and the Myshonka River, depriving the army of the second echelon and reserves.

As a result of this, the enemy continuously recorded the entire movement of the Soviet troops, the reconnaissance aircraft circled for a long time under the YMI, A ". "We couldn't fight them, because the army didn't have anti-aircraft artillery, and the fighters of the front's evil army were busy on another section of the front," there were still important sections on the Stalingrad front, so strong were you air fighters! bale?

And the nab of the front, just the opposite, did not have the slightest idea about the opposition - reconnaissance aircraft, apparently, also operated "in a different sector." Evidence of this is the order received by Yurlov and Chuikov on July 22 to send along the right bank of the Dopa to the village of Tsimlya! the 66th Naval and 137th Sneaker Brigades and strike at the "enemy group of troops" crossing there. heavy and medium tanks. As a result, a brigade of sailors and a motorized rifle battalion, accompanied by 15 T-60 Taiks, left for the night with the task of "hitting the flank and destroying the rear" and nothing less ... Gotha's 4th Panzer Army.

On the same day, there was a change in the commanders of the Lipgrad Front. In place of the one who ruined everything

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armies of Geisral G.T. Oink

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Timoshenko, Stalin appointed Lieutenant General Gordov. The quality of command and control of combat operations did not gain anything from this. According to Gordov, Op "did not have the experience of a major military leader at that time. Unfortunately, this idea was confirmed later ... Yurdov, of course, tried to do everything he could. But the task was daringly within our power", the General was also distinguished by an extremely annoying character and, like many other Soviet generals, was also a "hot man". N.S. Khrushchev described the new commander as follows: "...his drawback was rudeness. He fought people. He himself is a very frail little man, but he beats his officers. However, in the eyes of Stalin, slapping was just not a shortcoming, and evidence of the "firmness of leadership" was encouraged by the Supreme.

LJ"

Marshal Timoshenko served for a long time and fruitfully for the good of the Fatherland. Tsova ranks were no longer supposed to be, but he received his share of military orders. However, Stalin did not give him the First Star for the Patriotic War, he did not consider it necessary.

According to the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of April 16, 1934, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union was the highest degree of distinction and was awarded "for personal and collective services to the state associated with the accomplishment of a heroic deed." The pilots were awarded this award by 7 pilots who participated in the rescue of the Chelyuskinites. Soon they were joined by famous throughout the country test pilots and participants in long-range psrelegs - M.M. Gromov, V.P. Chkalov, G.F. Baidukov, A.V. Belyakov; the first female pilots - V.S. rizodubova, P.D. Osipenko, M.M. Raskov. These were the exploits of peaceful days. Then there were Khasan, Spain, Khalkhin Yul and the Winter War, for which Timoshenko also received his Star. The basis of the first stream of heroes of the Soviet country was, as a rule,

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pilots, tankers, infantrymen, junior and middle-level officers, in a word - the people of the battlefield. In the post-left era in the USSR, the main characters were cosmologists and generalists.

On February 18, 1965, Marshal Timoshenko received his second Gold Star. What "heroic feat" did the 70-year-old inspector of the Ministry of Defense accomplish? Yes, it's just his anniversary, he survived, unlike millions of his subordinates, and therefore a worthy award with the wording "for services to the Motherland and the Armed Forces of the USSR."

The idea of receiving the Star of the First Hero "for merit" pleased our commanders. Over time, it became

literary" in a set of awards of Soviet marshals, the waist of the mind Former Stalinist "falcons", "gods of war", "kings of the fields" were reforged into faithful Khrushchevites and announced to the whole world that the Supreme, it turns out, praised the globe, How could he cordon off to the dignity of their strategic talents and immeasurable merits? And in general, one Gold Star on the whole marshal - somehow it even looks unsalted. And so, having claimed the highest positions in the state and the army, they rushed to paper what they had lost, not realizing by their bosses that they looked ridiculous and ashamed. s

The second Star "for services to the Motherland" was received by

whether Marshal Malinovsky and Marshal Moskalenko.

During the war, Teperal Grechko was not awarded the heroic title "by mistake". But in 1955 he became a marshal - and pity: in 1958 the award found a hero, and in 1973 - the second. And how beautiful it sounds: "Soviet party, state and military leader, commander, Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Fechko Apdrey Antopovich."

Geisral Rotmistrov did not have the Golden Star among his numerous orsdeps, and it was worth it to become the chief marshal of the armored forces - and it's a hat.

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Stalin did not show justice in relation to the very first, most "people's marshals" of the 1935 model. I had to, burying the Great Godfather. catch up on lost time: Voroshilov became twice a Hero of the Soviet Union, and Budyonny three times. Semyon Mikhailovich accomplished his last "heroic feat" at the age of 85.

Marshals Konsv, Krylov, Rokossovsky, Katukov, Yakubovsky, Chuikov, Koshevoy earned their ICE Stars during the war. They didn't have more "in the state"

supposed to. ,

At the very beginning of this wonderful period, the most prominent of the marshals, the Civil Code, was still in power. Zhukov. He and the race was supposed to be more than the rest. In 1956 Orgy Konstantinovich, three times a hero, became the swarm of the Soviet Union for the fourth time - "for outstanding services to the CPSU and the Soviet people." However, there were indeed merit. Not everyone dares to drop an atomic bomb on their own army.

The apotheosis of this comedy of self-awarding was the presentation of four heroic Stars (the highest degree of distinction), the Order of Victory (the highest military award, due to the lack of availability, I had to borrow the Order of the late Vasilevsky), personalized Golden Weapons (the highest award of civil war) to Marshal L .AND. Brezhnev - this is the greatest commander of the twentieth century! R

In total, 35 Soviet marshals, not counting the marshals of the zoisk clans and generals of the armies, became the 1st swarms of the Soviet Union 56 times, of which "for the war" - 30 times, the rest - "for merit",

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On July 22, 1942, the command of the Sta-

Leningrad Front. The next day,  
the offensive of the 6th German

Coy army, which, due to the increased resistance of the Soviet troops,  
was significantly strengthened. July 19 at

17 Year 1942 - toothed "481

the 14th Panzer Corps under the command of General von Wietersheim was included, and on July 20 the 51st Army Corps of General von Seydlitz was returned; on July 22, one security division was transferred from the reserve to the 6th Army, which operated on the left flank, the 75th Infantry Division was transferred to the 2nd Hungarian Army. After all the regroupings in the army, there were eighteen divisions, including one tank and two motorized divisions - according to the Oveg military, about 250 thousand chelonsk, 7500 guns and mortars, 740 tanks. God knows where so many tanks came from? Directly in the Sgalingrad direction against the Soviet 62nd and 64th armies, 9 divisions initially operated, and on July 25 - 12, plus more than 150 tanks. Almost 60 years after the events described, it was officially recognized that from July 23 to July 31, 270 thousand German soldiers, with 3400 guns and mortars and 400 tanks, attacked 540 thousand with 5000 guns and 1000 tanks. Prior to this, it had been invariably asserted that the enemy had a formidable superiority.

There is no doubt that if, immediately after the defeat of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, the German command, as planned by Directive No. 41, had moved at least the 4th Panzer Army to Stalingrad, the city would have fallen by the end of July. In fact, in the middle of July, the divisions Gota and Klst were oriented by the Fuhrer to organize a "Rostov pocket", and the 6th field army was to conduct a frontal offensive in the Sgalingrad direction with a much less favorable operational situation.

Paulyu formed two shock groups: sverd puyu - the 14th tapkovy and 8th army corps (later the entire composition included the 17th army corps, which was commanded by General 1yullidg); the southern one - the 51st Army and 24th Panzer General Fop Knobelsdorf (after a few days it was "requisitioned" from Goth, transferred from the region of the lower reaches of the Donets and resubordinated to the army on July 24).

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Both of these groupings had as their task to advance along the bank of the Don inside its large bend to Kalach and, having surrounded the main enemy forces in



this area, connect to force the Don and advance on Sgalingrad.

On July 23, a large group of Wietersheim's four divisions attacked the right flank of the 62nd Army, which was defended by the 33rd Guards, 192nd and 184th Rifle Divisions, and advancing by failures to a depth of 20 km. In order to prevent the enemy grouping from breaking through, General Gordov decided to temporarily transfer the 13th Tank Corps to General Kolpakchi. The latter, at 5 o'clock in the morning on July 24, ordered the tank corps and the 33rd Guards Division with a battalion of tanks to launch a counterattack in order to restore the situation on its right flank. 5 hours were allotted for the preparation of the strike. However, on the morning of July 24, the German "pincers" gathered in the area of Verkhne-Buzinovka, where they defeated the headquarters of the 184th and 192nd divisions; at the same time, the division commander-192 Colonel A.F. Zakharchenko and the BSZ Vssti Kom Div-184 Colonel T.S. Koid.

The 13th tank corps, which led the regiments nikT.N. Tanaschishin, was re-equipped, had three tank, one motorized rifle brigades and 123 tanks. In the composition of the brigades, there were anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, the combat capabilities of the corps were greatly reduced by the low training of the subdivisions. At 10 o'clock the corps went on the offensive in the direction of Manoilin, but this hastily organized maneuver, not supported by the infantry, which did not have time to reach the deployment line, did not give a tangible result and was repulsed. Tankers lost only 2 strikes from enemy aircraft | car. . \*

By the end of the day, the 3rd and 60th German motorized divisions broke through to the Don near the villages of Golubinskaya and Kamenskaya, completing the encirclement of three Soviet rifle divisions, the 40th tank brigade, and the 644th tank battalion.

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talopa and the sin of the artillery regiments of the RGK, the Yermainsky units went to the right bersg of the Don in the Kamensky region, the right flank of the 62nd Army was deeply engulfed from the north.

On July 25, the southern group of Paulus moved from the Oblivskaya area to the pasture. The main blow to the right flank of the 64th Army, which Chuikov took temporary command of, was inflicted by one tap and two infantry divisions of Knobelsdorff's 24th Panzer Corps. Exactly one day later, even here the defense was broken through and the German mobile formations rushed to the Chir river, going into the junction of the Soviet armies. By the grace of the Ordov, Chuikov did not have any reserves on the right side. In addition, a rumor spread in the rear of the army that the Iems taiks were two or three kilometers from the crossings, and panic began. Many

rushed to the crossing. To stop people and carts, Chuikov sent staff officers there. But it was in vain. The enemy aircraft, having occupied a large concentration of people and vehicles, began to bombard them. During this air attack, the head of the artillery peak of the army, the head of the operational department, the head of the engineering service and other commanders were killed. Only by the evening of July 27, the troops of the 64th Army managed to gain a foothold on the eastern bank of the Chir Don rivers and stop the enemy.

However, the position on the right flank remained unstable. Severius Kalacha, the Ismians broke through to the crossings over the Doi with a deep encirclement and threatened to reach the rear of all Soviet troops located in a large bend. Urgent measures had to be taken to eliminate the identified danger. Stalin demanded not only to stop the enemy's movement, but also to throw him back beyond the Chir. The 125th, 204th, 205th, 321st, 399th, 422nd rifle divisions and other formations began to arrive from the Stavka reserve. Arriving at the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front, Mr. Peral Vasilevsky ordered counterattacks by the srami of the 1st and 4th tank and part of the forces of 64 th and 62nd

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of the combined arms armies, At the same time, from the Serafimovich region in the southern papravlepiy, to the rear of the enemy groupings of the enemy, the divisions of the 21st Army, Major General A.I. Danilova.

Two tank armies are a force: about 40,000 fighters, almost 1,000 guns and mortars, and more than 700 armored vehicles. It is true that Marshal Eremenko is whining about the fact that the OPI "almost were equipped with tanks," but he simply strikes at pity. As part of the 1st Panzer Army under the command of the "mpogo mupauchivshego" gesceral K.S. Moskalenko included the 13th and 28th tank corps, the 158th heavy tank brigade, the 79th regiment of guards mortars, the 131st rifle division, 2 air defense artillery regiments and 1 anti-tank artillery regiment. There were exactly 301 tanks in the corps 31 cars), including 162 "thirty-fours". The heavy brigade received a trainload of brand new KVs. The 4th Panzer Army of General V.D. Kryuchenkip included the 22nd and 23rd Tank High Corps, the 51st Regiment "Katyusch", the 133rd Tank Brigala, the 18th Rifle Division, the artillery regiments of the PTO and air defense. h

The snag lay in something else - in organization. The armies themselves, as a single combat organism, existed in practice. Thus, General Moskalenko received the order to form the 1st Tapkovoy on July 22;

to a panesepian counterattack on the morning of 25 July. In addition, formations and units of the new formation were scattered over a considerable area, and the 13th Panzer Corps was already preparing to enter the battle as part of the 62nd Army. All these corps, brigades, divisions did not have connections with each other, were not ready for coordinated military actions, the newly minted army commanders had enough time even to get to know their own troops, not to mention working out interaction and control.

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According to the plan of the operation, the 1st Panzer Army was ordered to cross through the Dop in the Kalach area and advance in the direction of the paved Mayorovsky point. The immediate task is to destroy the enemy that has broken through and by the end of the day to take control of the Verkhne-Buzinovskaya and Mapoilin lines. In the future, it was necessary to develop the offensive on Perelazovsky and there to join up with the 4th Panzer Army. The troops of Kryuchepkinai had time to concentrate on their starting positions for the specified period, so the descriptions were to start hostilities on July 27, moving from the Trekhostrovskaya area to Perelazovsky. The foregoing means that the counter-attack was delivered at the same time, and moreover by the forces of the armies that had not completed their formations and had not received all the prescribed means of reinforcement. One day was allotted for the preparation of a front-line offensive operation! Marshal Moskalenko assures that the readiness for a counterattack was well known to those who received retenis, and we will take it out. but, they say, there was simply no other way out - "the situation required a quick strike."

So, is it not, but on the night of July 25, the assigned troops mainly concentrated on the eastern bank of the Don. 28th Tank Corps (178 tanks) G.S. Rodina was ordered to launch a decisive offensive in the morning, crush the enemy, and then pursue him to Novo-Grigorsaskaya and Logovskoye. The 18th Tank Corps was to advance in the direction of Verkhns-Buzinovskaya, Kletskaya. In the second echeloi of the army, the 158th tank brigade and the 131st rifle division followed the Rodin corps;

At dawn, the 1st Panzer Army launched a counterattack against the enemy, who also resumed the offensive with the aim of capturing the crossings at Kalach. A counter battle ensued between the 14th tank corps of Wietersheim and the brigades of Moskalenko, Ne

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despite the superiority in forces, the Soviet troops from the very beginning found themselves in extremely unfavorable conditions. First of all, as a result of the decisive actions of the tank brigades, the lack of information about the enemy and the absolute German dominance of the air.

"Enemy aviation," the psominast marshal, "acted in groups of two to three dozen self-propelled guns, which appeared every 20-25 minutes by us. Unfortunately, nothing was opposed by our 8th Air Army, apparently engaged in other (2?) branches ... The troops of the 28th Tank Corps threw back the enemy in fierce battles 6-8 km from Kalach. During the night we regrouped and replenished ammunition. On the morning of July 26, the 28th Panzer Corps resumed its advance. The attack began at dawn, at 3 o'clock, before the appearance of enemy aircraft (there is no hope for our own. - Author), We expected that the strike would be not only swift, but also sudden.

However, it turned out (1) that the enemy troops were preparing to repulse him that night. They yawned advantageous lines, buried tanks in the ground, pulled up anti-tank artillery. They used 88-mm anti-aircraft guns against our tanks (since none of the German anti-tank artillery used our middle and heavy tanks. - An.).

The attack, carried out at dawn by units of the 28th tank corps, was not successful. The second attack, made at 3 pm, was also repulsed by the enemy. We have suffered sensitive losses. For example, in the 1st battalion of the 55th tank brigade, 9 tanks remained on the move ... Our attack did not reach the territorial goal. However, the enemy was stopped, he felt the force of our blow...

Here is the difference in the organization of boss management and, ultimately, professionalism. The Germans, having entered the battle on the move, in some six hours of normal time managed to dig into the ground, and create strongholds, and "strain all forces to hold dos

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tygiuta border". In a word, in the shortest possible time to create a defense that is insurmountable for our strike forces, which, by the way, thoughtlessly try to break through with frontal attacks in the same direction. And the German defenses of the German tanks are easily broken through on the same day they receive fuel for their fuel tanks.

These battles only confirmed the Germans in mpepia that "the weakest point of the Red Army was still its miserable tactics, Russian tankers were completely

they deliberately did not use the advantages of the relief of the places of the post and, it seems, the ps knew the principles of shooting and magic. According to Moskalsiko, in the course of hostilities, "gaps in the training of the troops all the time made themselves felt," therefore, after fierce diev battles, which lasted 17-18 hours, it was necessary to conduct full gatherings of the surviving mshaniks-tank drivers in order to abandon them at dawn to a new attack.

If everyone knew that they were ready for a co-workout, then perhaps it was not worth conspiring? Perhaps pado was to take advantageous lines, use a water barrier, dig into the ground, create strongholds and so on? And if the counterattack was so necessary, as Marshal Vasilevsky assures, then maybe it was worth at least managing the available heavy forces in a businesslike way? One gets the impression that all the real preparation consisted of the writing of combat orders. For example, it will be striking that the fate of the front is at stake near Kalach, and the picto does not know what the 8th Air Army is doing, or the opal itself knows what to do with it.

A private of the 289th Infantry Division, Geperal Magnusa, wrote home: "By God, we are completely safe, send pasha aces to heaven. By the way, I didn't see Russian planes at all. " (True, our aviators claim that they "destroyed the slippers and motorized troops of the enemy with all the available forces and by whom.")

On the same days, the leves was advancing by the 13th Panzer Corps. But, being in double subordination, he continued to perform the same task: he struck at Manoi lin instead of turning to Verkhne-Buzinov kui Kletska. General Moskalenko had no connection with Colonel Tanaschishin. As a result, the shock groupings of the 1st Panzer Army hit in divergent directions. I had to specially send General E.1 to the 13th Corps; Pushkin, who only on July 28 set him a new task and turned the brigades from the north-western and western directions to the north.

Taking advantage of the fact that the 1st Panzer Army fought essentially alone during the first days of the offensive, the enemy concentrated most of his artillery and large air forces against it. General Moskalenko's staff waited patiently for the time when Kryuchenkon's 4th Gun Army would be able to join the operation in order to break the enemy's resistance by joint actions with it. But the expectations were not justified. By 4 p.m. on July 27, only 17 tanks from the 4th Tank Corps had crossed to the western bank of the Don, one of the 22nd Corps.

The 4th Panzer Army was late with the start of the offensive, and the 13th Panzer Corps was still fighting in the Mapoilin area. Therefore, a blow to Verkhie-Buzinov-

ku 1st tank army inflicted only by the forces of the 28th tank corps. The 131st Rifle Division was advancing along the right bank of the Don, and the 158th Heavy Pebble Brigade was ordered to clear the heights of the western bank of the Don from the enemy. The army "skhala" in different directions and could not break through the German defenses in any direction.

By July 28, only the 18th Tank Corps managed to "unite in the Mayorovsky area with units of the 184th and 192nd Rifle Divisions and the 40th Tank Brigade, united under the general command of Colonel K.A. Zhuravlev. However, this was a rout for the partisans. The Germans simply missed the slippers and again the deputy

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kicked the encirclement ring. The tank brigades were cut off from the headquarters of the corps and from their rear without sufficient supplies of fuel and ammunition, they could not fight for a long time. The corps commander, who was plowing along with the brigades, was deprived of the opportunity to contact the headquarters and had no means of control.

The German command hastened to take measures to parry the blow. Another infantry division of the 8th army corps appeared on the right flank near Moskalenko. On the left, one tank and two infantry divisions of the 24th Panzer Corps crossed the Chir River, tore apart the adjacent flanks of the 62nd and 64th armies and created a threat of an attack on Kalach from the southwest, cutting off the 1st Panzer Army from Pershchinsk. To eliminate this danger, Moskalenko had to send the reserve 163rd tank brigade from the 13th corps and the newly arrived 204th and 321st rifle divisions to the Surovikino area. The 23rd Panzer Corps rushed to the Persians. Combat was introduced at the junction of the 62nd and 64th armies, these formations played a decisive role in repelling the enemy's attack on Kalach. The German divisions were defeated and driven back beyond the Chir.

In the last days of July, the 1st Panzer Army thus operated on two opposite directions - northwestern and southwestern, and the postdisorder required appropriate attention from the command and headquarters of the army. The commander of the army had to acquire two observation posts and dangle from one to the other in order to direct the actions of the troops in both directions. Having sent all the reinforcements to the southwest, Moskalenko was unable to build up efforts in the direction of the main attack.

The 4th Panzer Army crossed to the right bank of the Don only yesterday, July 28, and therefore went on the offensive only in the morning of the next day with the forces of only two tank brigades of the 22nd Corps. 3 days of

advanced to the Verkhne-Golubinsky, Evlam line

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Pievsky, Malopabatovsky, where they were stopped by the enemy. On July 31, Zhuravlev's group left the encirclement and entered the location of the 4th Panzer Army with a blow through Verkhie-Buzinovka. Together with units of the 13th Gothic Corps, the latter had less than 5,000 men and 66 tanks.

On July 30-31, military operations against the northern grouping of Paulusad reached the highest tension. At 4 o'clock in the morning, having pinned down the Germans from the front, the right-flank formations of the 1st Panzer Army were the 28th Panzer Corps. The 131st Rifle Division and the 158th Heavy Tank Brigade went on the offensive again. In an effort to bypass the enemy from the west, they slowly moved forward. This time, the Soviet command also succeeded in building up the forces of the armies operating from the south. As soon as the 23rd Panzer Corps had completed the task of defeating the enemy in the area around the mouth of the Chir River, it was reassigned for operations in the northern direction. At the same time, the 13th Panzer Corps, assigned to the 4th Panzer Army, together with units of the 22nd Panzer Corps, launched an attack on Osinovsky, rearing the German group. The threat of encirclement loomed over the German 3rd and 60th motorized divisions. However, the Russians failed to realize the ss.

The German infantry created a system of dense anti-tank fire, General Paulus clearly maneuvered his forces, calculating the maneuvers of the enemy, the German aviation dominated the air, continuously attacking the Soviet units and inflicting sensitive damage on them. For example, there were 27 tanks left in Tanaschishin's corps, and he, according to Sugi, lost his combat capability. Until August 5, bloody battles continued in this area. For twelve days, the Soviet troops attacked continuously until they finally ran out of steam, after which they themselves went over to the defensive.

Moreover, the reinforcements to them did not come down much: the center of gravity of the fighting in early August moved to the Kotelnikovskoye direction.

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As we remember, simultaneously with the "rout" of the enemy's northern grouping, the 64th Army, led by General M.S. Shumilov, and the 62nd Army, which was received by Lieutenant General A.I. Lopatin, were supposed to strike at the southern grouping of Paulus, which broke through to Surovikipo and Nizhne-Chirskaya. Marshal Chuikov left a detailed description of the performance

this part of the Soviet plan, to which there is simply nothing to add:

"At the same time, a frontaz directive was received signed by the chief of staff, General Major D.N. Not kishev. The directive ordered the simultaneous strike of two armies (62nd and 64th) to destroy both enemy groupings in the area of Verkhle-Buzipovka and on the river Chir. The 64th Army was reinforced by the 204th Rifle Division and the 23rd Tank Corps.

The order was received at 2 pm on July 28, and the start of the operation was scheduled for 2 am on the 29th, i.e. hrsz 12 hours.

We were supposed to with M.S. Shumilov investigated to find (2) the 204th division and the 23rd tank corps. We knew nothing about their whereabouts. The front headquarters was requested by telephone. They answered to us:

- Look for these parts between the Don and the Liska River.

All night long we traveled across the steppe in search of units attached to the 64th Army (the most suitable occupation for the commander and his deputy. - Det.). Did the intrigue all morning and only by noon on July 29 at the Zhirkov district did they find one tank brigade of the 28th corps. The brigade commander did not know anything and was not preparing for the offensive (and at the front headquarters they have been drawing arrows for ten hours already! - Auth.).

Looking for the headquarters of the 23rd Corps at the Pobeda Oktyabrya state farm, on the way we stopped at the Volodiisky khugor, where the command post of the 62nd Army was located.

Full, blond and outwardly very calm General A.I. Lopatin met us at the command post with a good dinner and announced to us that the 62nd Army was not

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can carry out the order of the chief of staff of the front, since the units are not ready, the ammunition is not under delivery, and the Vosiny Soviet of the front confirmed this order.

A.I. Lopatin expressed his assumptions as to why the Military Council of the front did not approve the directives of the front headquarters. Our 1st and 4th tank armies under the command of Generals K.S. Moskalenko and V.D. Kryuchseikin undertook counterattacks on the advancing protipnik. The counterattack of our own 62nd and 64th armies was to be launched in development of the strikes of the tank armies.

But the 1st and 4th tank armies were able to stop the enemy's incursions and break up his units ... It did not work out at the same time.



I stopped searching for the 204th Division and the 23rd Tank Corps. Nalo had to return to the army headquarters, "

As for the 21st Army, which was supposed to strike with the forces of four divisions from the north in the direction of Kletskaya and cut off the escape routes for the Germans, General A.I. Dapilov managed to allocate only one regiment (?) to solve the problem. Corresponding were the results of this "offensive",

Poorly organized strikes by five Soviet armies stopped the advance of the enemy for a while, did not allow the Smu to force the Don, but did not achieve their declared goals. A simultaneous, concentric counter-offensive with all forces did not succeed either on the scale of the front, or on the scale of the armies. Tank corps operated in isolation from each other, without the support of infantry and aviation, and after significant losses.

Assessing the results achieved, our commanders took it to their credit that in this battle they "threw the enemy's plans to break through to the Volga on the move", delayed the advance of the 6th Army and to a large extent cooled its offensive ardor. They could think of no other way to "delay progress."

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Soviet military leaders, telling us about this, are full of optimism. well, they did not defeat the enemy, as they promised, but they stopped; if they didn't stop them, they "bled them dry", in extreme cases they "threw the enemy's plan". At what cost - it does not matter, but "the enemy felt the force of our blows."

Rokossovsky, who had relations with these strikes, assessed them more critically: "The Headquarters interfered unnecessarily in the activities of the front command on operational and even tactical issues. She justifiably hurried the command of the front with the preparation and delivery of counterattacks, the use of military or other directions of units and formations, despite the fact that in specific conditions of the situation the command of the front could more timely resolve such issues ... The open nature of the terrain gave the defending troops great advantages in the rise of vengeance aimed fire, Therefore, the Supreme High Command had to show restraint and great foresight. It should not have pushed the command of the front and the armies to a premature transition to the offensive, since the Soviet troops at that time were not prepared for the Ism and studied unjustified losses in fruitless counterattacks ... As a result, this

all the prepared counter-attacks on the pedal had positive results and led to heavy losses in people and technicians.

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Nevertheless, the Germans failed to enter Stalingrad with a parade march.

The unexpected appearance of large forces of the Red Army in the Stalingrad direction, which drew the troops of Paulus into protracted fighters on the right bank of the Don, forced Hitler to urgently reinforce the German grouping acting here. The Fuhrer ordered the 4th Panzer Army, which was aiming for the Caucasus, to turn

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and strike at Stalingrad from the south. Thus, the German command again returned to the idea of two-sided coverage of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, albeit with much smaller forces than envisaged by Directive No. this group of armies did not have enough forces to encircle the troops of the Southern Front south and southeast of Rostov.

The new plan of action for the army group "Be was simple: both armies - the 4th tank army to the south, and the 6th army north of Stalingrad - carried out a blow in the direction of the Volga, the ureks turned left and right, respectively, and took the entire area of \u200b\u200bStalingrad in pincers with the troops defending it,

At the end of July, the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth crossed the Don in the lower reaches and occupied a bridgehead south of Tsimlyanskaya. The power was significantly reduced after 2 tank corps and the division "Grossdeutschland" were withdrawn from its composition. The 48th tank and 4th army corps, which had the 14th tank, 29th motorized, German ICE and two Romanian infantry divisions, remained at the disposal of the PII of General Hoth. On the way was the 6th Romanian Corps of four infantry divisions. The troops of Thot were to strike the main blow with the tank corps east of the Salsk-Stalingrad railway to the northeast and go to the Volga in the Krasnoarmeiska area, the 4th Muarmey Corps was to provide the eastern flankarmie, and the 6th Romanian Corps - the western flank in the area between the railway and the Don,

1] August 4th Panzer Army went on the offensive. It is characteristic that the Germans stood by this

bridgehead for 10 days and, having barely begun to move, they easily broke through the defenses of the 51st Soviet army (literally the day before transferred to the Stalingrad Front), cutting it into pieces. The army that you find

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had been following Dop since mid-June, had a month and a half of time and the only task was to create a solid defense on this line, ceased to exist in one day.

According to the "Soviet Vosina Encyclopedia", she seemed to be with someone in August, no one was in command, the Army Headquarters lost contact with the connection and did not have reliable information about the situation southeast of Tsimlyaiskaya. The last order received, for example, by the 138th Rifle Division: the distance from the situation, the scattered remnants of the Soviet divisions partly retreated. It read: "To act independently depending on to the east, to Stalingrad, partly to Elista.

On August 2, the Terman 14th Panzer Division was already in control of Kotelnikovo, defeating four echelons with the arriving troops of the 208th Infantry Division at the station (a few more echelons of the same division were defeated by German aviation strikes due to the fact that the front headquarters did not bother to cover the area from the air unloading arriving reserves), on the evening of August 3, she went to the Aksai River, and on the morning of the 4th she continued to move towards Plodovitoe. To protect this direction, a task force was hastily created from the left-flank formations of the 64th Army under the command of General Chuikov from the 29% (1] thousand people) and the 208th (10 thousand people) rifle divisions, the 154th brigade of marines and 6th Guards Tank Brigade, two regiments of rocket artillery. In addition, the 138th (4200 people) and 157th (1500 people) rifle divisions of the defeated 51st Army were transferred to the group. Chuikov was categorically ordered to hold positions on the Aksai River by any means. Additional forces, including 7 guards mortar regiments, were transferred to the district of the Abganerovo and Tinguta stations.

On August 6, the main forces of the 48th tank corps of the general [sim - 14th slipper and 29th motorized di

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visions - concentrated near the Aksai River and, having made a breakthrough on the left flank of the 64th Army, reached the outer defensive bypass in the Abganerovo, Plodovity sector. On August 7-8, the Germans advanced to the station

Tinguta. There was a direct threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.

The command of the front transferred here all the forces and means at hand. The two Geim divisions, which broke away from their infantry, were opposed by the 29th, 126th, 204th, 426th, 38th rifle divisions, the 133rd tank brigade with 43 heavy KV. The command of the 13th tank brigade of Tanaschishin also arrived here, taking under its command the 6th guards, 13th, 254th tank, 38th motorized rifle brigades, in which there were 132 tanks, including 114 "fifty fours" . And even less so, "in the area of the breakthrough against the peak, he had forces four times greater than the Soviet troops (?!!) ".

On August, Chuikov's group, with the support of the 13th Panzer Corps, attached to the goy, tried to inflict a coup on the flank of the Geim corps, but was repulsed by two Romanian infantry divisions. But for a short time, the situation in this direction stabilized, the troops of the 64th Army again reached the outer defensive line by the end of August 11, the Tanaschishila Corps lost 96 tanks during this time, received 40 replenishment vehicles and took up defense in the battle formations of combined arms formations. Tanks were used at the front line as fixed firing points - they were dug into the ground up to the towers and camouflaged.

Subsequently, due to the deterioration of the situation in the Kalach region, the 64th Army was forced to withdraw across the Myshkova River.

The fact is that Paulus, too, did not sit idly by on the right bank of the Don. The troops of the 6th Army, having regrouped their forces, on the morning of August 7 resumed the offensive in the zone of the 62nd Soviet Army, which was defending a ledge in a small bend. The connection of the army headquarters with the majority

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connections that day was lost. On the evening of August 8, the 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions, which broke through from the north and south, closed the "pincers" in the west of Kalach, surrounding 6 divisions and reinforcement units of the 62nd Army. The remnants of General Lopatin's troops rolled back to the east. Their retreat was covered by the 23rd Panzer Corps, which left 20 tanks, 30 guns and mortars and about 200 riflemen. crossing the remnants of the defeated 62nd Army. Small groups and singly made their way to their circle. So, the commander of the 33rd Guards Rifle Division, Colonel A.I. Utvenko led 120 people out of the encirclement. Almost all the artillery of the army went to the Germans.

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It was during this period that Stalin, irritated by the reports from the Staligrad Front, ordered the Persians to give General Gorlov: "I am struck by your short-sightedness and confusion. elimination of the alarming situation on your front."

There was nothing General Gorlov could do to please the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. By August 10, Soviet troops withdrew to the left bank of the Don and took up defensive positions along the front line of Staligrad. The long career of the 1st and 4th tank armies and the first thousand tanks of the front has ended. That is, the 4th Panzer Army still figured for some time, but there was nothing "tank" left in it, now it was a purely general military formation, which received the nickname "four-tank", the directorates of the tank corps were withdrawn to the rear for reorganization and understaffing.

According to Marshal Vasilevsky: "The Headquarters and the General Headquarters became more and more convinced that the command

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the management of this front will clearly cope with the leadership and organization of combat operations of such a number of troops (the fact that Gordov could not cope even with one army was evident during the Kharkov and Voronezh operations, why was he given a front, and even so Responsible? - Auth.), forced by whom to fight in two disparate directions. It could not cope with the steps that, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee and the requirements of the military situation, were to be carried out to strengthen the defense of the city.

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The total length of the front reached 810 km,

The headquarters adopted a decision to divide the Staligrad front into two. On August 5, a new, South-Eastern Front was formed from the sgo, which was assigned the task of defending the south-western approaches to the city. The front included the troops of the left wing - the 64th, 57.51 and 8th air armies, the 13th tank corps, parts of the 118th fortified area. For him, the 1st Guards Army was thrown out of the reserve. Geisral Colonel A.I. was appointed commander. Eremsenko. 63, 2], 62nd combined arms, 4th tank,

the newly formed 16th airborne army, 28th tank corps. The 1st Panzer Army was disbanded.

At Stalin's whim, the dividing line between the two fronts passed through the center of the city, dividing accordingly the responsibility for keeping the city between the two "hot" commanders. However, this situation did not last long. It quickly became clear that the division of the fronts made it even more difficult to resolve the most important issues, for example, the massive use of aviation (which was constantly solving problems in some "other areas"), the management of air defense or the evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population from the city. One can easily imagine how two commanders each save "their own" half of Stalingrad.

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Already on August 9, the Headquarters, at the suggestion of Vasilevsky, adopted a new decision, according to which the Stalingrad Front was subordinate to the commander of the South Eastern Front. As a result, all this bureaucratic creativity turned into a banal change of commanders, General Gordov became Eremenko's deputy. But at the same time - a unique case - two front-line departments were preserved,

As Yeremysiko himself recalls, "... it was necessary to lead through two parallel headquarters, not to mention anything else, even for the technical implementation of the functions of commanding troops, it took much more time. Orders, directives, orders, as a rule, were issued in two versions, being prepared by two different iggabs. I had to hear from two chiefs of staff, two heads of intelligence departments. two artillerymen, two taikists, two air force commanders, two deputies for logistics. There were up to twelve deputies alone on two fronts. But we needed not only to listen to everyone, but also to give instructions, to control their enforcement." Representatives of the Headquarters, the General Staff, the State Defense Committee, government officials and errands were constantly swarming here ...

What borscht, when takis is doing kuhi.

General Chuikov generalized his first fronte experience. Reflecting on the results of the defensive battles, he came to the conclusion that there was nothing new in the tactics of the Germans: "If at that time we had a deeper defense structure, and even anti-tank reserves, it would be possible not only to hold back the offensive, but also to deliver great damage to the enemy.

Indeed, nothing new for the red companies

dirs in German aktika could not have been. It's just that the Ismians thoroughly studied tactics and competently applied them, while Russians learn pedos, they comprehended everything by experience, long and bloody. One and a half years study:

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lied to build this deepest defense; use radio communication, as well as other tricks. For two years they accumulated experience in the correct use of aviation, but they did not succeed in mastering the art of maneuver - the war ended.

"... German tanks did not go on the attack without infantry and without air support. On the battlefield, the valor of the German tankers, their courage and speed of action, which were written about by foreign gas workers, were not noticeable. According to Chuiko Wussli, German tankers do not get involved in a hopeless battle without the support of personnel and aircraft, this is a sign of cowardice. If the front loses a thousand tanks in a week, this is "valor". And what "speed of action"! By the way, what foreign newspapers were read by Comrade Chuikov, who graduated from the 2nd grade of the Soviet school?

"The German infantry was strong with its automatic weapons; I saw a rapid advance on the battlefield. When advancing, the German infantrymen did not spare their cartridges, but they often fired in vain ... The front line of the Nazis, in particular, was perfectly visible, it was marked by tracer bullets and rockets of all colors. It seemed they were either afraid of the dark or bored with gunfire. Moreover, let us note that the German infantry was strong due to its excellent training, the ability to instantly master any captured line, the ability to maneuver in the offensive and steadfastness in defense.

".. The enemy aircraft worked most accurately in the battle. Communication and interaction of aviation with the ground forces of the enemy were worked out. It was felt that the fascist pilots were familiar with the tactics of their own and our ground troops. Well, at least something appreciated!

\*...Today, all day long, the German aviation did not give any peace, - a Soviet infantryman wrote home, - even burrow 100-1000 meters, but it will. Our planes were not visible all day, and not only today, but it was yesterday and will be tomorrow. There is no resistance, what they want, they do with the Nazis

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my troops ... Well, it's come to that the pilot from the Naga on the bst on pshots, how much they are afraid and how low they are. How ps disguise the trench - all vi-

dit... Oh, how many planes were on our route today, it's terrible, and! the main thing is that one party leaves and another comes. Well, where are our planes, why don't they help us? .. "

The main losses of the Germans during this time were not due to the actions of the enemy, and from our hasty counters, but from illnesses, heat strokes and physical exhaustion of the personnel.

Nevertheless, the battles near Kalach showed that "the Russians are not ready to give up the territory without a fight."

To continue the offensive, Army Group B had to regroup its forces once again. The 64th and fresh 57th armies opposed the Ota troops, it became clear. that without additional forces the 4th Panzer Army would not be able to advance further. Therefore, Paulus had to return the 24th Panzer and 297th Infantry Divisions to the dog. The 4th Panzer Army, huddled in this way, was ordered to reach the banks of the Volga near Krasnoarmeysk.

The main forces of the 6th Army - 8 divisions - were transferred to the northern flank and concentrated to force the river in the easternmost part of the Don bend at Vertyachey. The task of the army was to capture the bridgehead and break through the enemy defenses with an exit by mobile forces to the Volga svernes of Stalingrad. on the right flank of the army, the 34th Panzer Corps was to occupy the planlarm on both sides of Kalach and with the forces of one of the 71st Infantry Dipyliia advance in the east direction,

The 8th air corps of the general Phoebipg - 126 aircraft, including 30 fighters and 59 bombers - the main forces were to first support

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the actions of Zsidlitsa to seize the crossings, and zatsm - the breakthrough of Wietersheim's tank corps.

The strength of the 6th Army from the OKH reserve was transferred to the 1st Army Corps of Hepsral Strsksr. In order to cover the gap between Army Groups "B" and "A", which reached 300 km, the main command of the ground forces allocated the direction of the 52nd Army Corps of General Ogt to Astrakhanskos. which was supposed to, using a network of strong points, control the Sadovoye section. Elista, Manych river.

According to General Mies Dörr, these constant movements were explained by the fact that the Pemians had



reserves, Hitler sought to be in time for everything: "The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not understand what role the opi [rs reserves] were called upon to play; he could not allow any sodinsnie is to have a combat mission ... This is juggling with the forces of the front. masterfully mastered by all the installations, was invented by the main command and turned into a healthy system designed to compensate for the lack of reserves.

In August, the 8th Italian Army advanced to the Don under the command of General [aribolli, consisting of six infantry and one cavalry divisions. The Italians occupied the area from Pavlovsky to the mouth of the river Khoper. However, this led to the bite of the Paulus group, because, not believing too much in the combat capability of its allies, the German command shone the divisions of the 29th army corps occupying this line, and included them in the Italian and located upstream of the river 2- J vepperskoy armies.

But Stalip was a good judge of reserves. He knew how to create them, accumulate them, and at the right moment he always had divisions, corps and the army at hand. The Headquarters of the Supreme Command systematically reinforced the troops in the Stalingrad direction. From 1 to 20 August, 15 rifle divisions were deployed here, the 2nd, 4th, 7th, 16th tank corps were raised, the 22nd, 23rd and 28th

50%

The weapons made it possible to daily form an anti-tank artillery regiment with 20 guns and a tank company of 10 vehicles. In August, according to the decision to double production, the STZ hatched 390 "three-fours", until the last day, the representative of the GKO, V.A., Malyshsv, was at the plant with a tank industry park. Yurod gave the front mortars, machine guns, armored trains, armor-piercing and large-caliber shells, mines, tractors, armored boats, armor, rocket launchers, footwear, military uniforms, and much more.) By August 25, the troops had 19 regiments and 17 individual RS divisions, including 16 heavy M-30s.

The 1st Guards Army became part of the Stalingrad Front; This is another 16 divisions and 5 tank brigades.

So gisral Eremenko received his thousand tanks. At the same time, the defense was strengthened on the floor of the mortars to the city, the artillery was regrouped, part of the troops occupied the middle contour. Supporting the living ground forces, the 8th and 16th air armies and the 102nd air defense fighter division had 738 aircraft. In addition, on the Stalingrad direction

lepii, 150-200 ADD bombers were systematically used.

To assist the command of the Front, the Headquarters sent Tseisral Vasilevsky to this area in the first half of August. and at the end of the month - General Zhukov,

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In mid-August, German troops systematically loosened the Soviet defenses.

On August 13, two infantry divisions of the 6th Army (Shirsker's corps) launched an offensive on the right flank of Kryuchenko's 4th Gun Army, which now consisted of six rifle divisions (243, 192. 205, 18, 321. 184th), in ia

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rule over Perekopka. The 321st Rifle Division, which was defending here, could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy and began to retreat to the northeast. To strengthen the defense in this sector, General Kryuchenkon on the same day transferred from the central sector of the army strip an exterminating brigade and an anti-tank artillery regiment, the Commander of the Front, in turn, transferred the 193rd tank brigade, 2 separate tank battalions , 2240 exterminating anti-tank artillery brigade, 2 artillery regiments and a guards mortar regiment. During the 2-day battles, the Germans were stopped, but a considerable part of the reserves of the army and the front were drawn into the fighting in the zone of the 321st division.

On August 15, after a 2-hour artillery and aviation preparation, Paulus delivered half a blow at Kryuchenko's troops at the same time: the main one on Sirotkinskaya, the auxiliary one on Trekhostrovskaya. During the first day, the Isms managed to advance 12-20 km. The Ikhtaiks broke through to the command post of the 4th Taik Army; from that moment on, the headquarters of the Kruchsikipaugs did not manage anything. The 192nd, 205th and 184th Rifle Divisions were completely encircled. In the other three, 700-800 fighters remained. Having defeated the Soviet troops in a small bend, the Germans crossed the Don and seized a bridgehead on the pale coast in the area of Peskovatka, Vertyachey.

Having assessed the situation, the front commander decided to bring into battle the troops of the arriving 1st Guards Army, commanded by General Moskalenko. And not just to introduce, but of course to deliver a counterattack, chupich to live and restore the situation" - the standard tasks assigned to any fresh unit, as soon as it arrives on any of the Soviet fronts.

Imsl's new army consisting of 5 guards

rifle divisions, which were formed on the basis of airborne corps left without work in their specialty. Their personnel were selected from real fighters who had been well trained, so they were given the title of "guards" avant

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catfish However, firstly, the former paratroopers for the most part had no combat experience and, due to the specifics of their profession, did not know well the material part of heavy infantry weapons - mortars and easel machine guns. Secondly, the army itself had only just unloaded, had not finished concentrating, and, due to the inefficient work of the logistics institutions, could not beg from the front headquarters, which itself was going to throw the EU directly from the wheels into the counteroffensive, ammunition and other supplies .

It was traditionally necessary to "hit" the enemy very urgently, one night was also traditionally allotted for preparation, because "the harsh, formidable situation on the outskirts of Sgalingrad forced the front commander to use all available forces." Another question is how skillfully they were used. And it is quite understandable why the commander is chronically lacking in reserves: all the incoming connections "due to the tense situation" entered the battle hastily, without orientation, white preparation for battle, and sometimes, as we see, without ammunition.

Already on August 16, the 1st Guards Army entered the battle with three of its divisions. For some time the front here was stabilized. The 4th Panzer Army, having received two fresh guard divisions, took up defensive positions along the eastern berm of the Don from the Vertyachey mouth of the Ilovlya River.

At this time, to the south, after the regrouping of forces, on August 17, General 01 continued the offensive, Oi shifted the direction of the eye strike to the right and struck at the junction of the 64th and 57th Soviet armies. Three days later, Knobelsdorff's 48th Panzer Corps reached the heights near the Tunlutovo station; the Volga was only 20 km away. To strengthen his left flank, General Eremenko shone from the front of defense of the 62nd and 4th tank armies 4 anti-tank artillery regiments, 4 regiments of guards mortars, a separate tank brigade and transferred to the threatened sector of the 57th army south of Sgalingrad. These parts helped to stop the advance of ota, for all rezerv

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the fronts turned out to be scattered along the flanks, while the defense in the center was weakened.

Then came your main blow to Paulus. On August 21, the 6th Army crossed the Don along the left side of Vertyachy and on August 23 broke through the defenses of the 62nd Army, clearing the way for the 14th tank corps. One tank, two motorized and two infantry divisions rushed into the gap that had formed.

Lopatin's headquarters, having lost contact with the troops, had no idea that a large group of German tanks and motorized infantry had already reached the middle defensive line by the middle of the day. Froit's headquarters was the first to know about this from an aerial reconnaissance report, but the pilot's report, based on visual observations, was initially not believed: such a deep penetration of the enemy seemed incredible,

By 4 p.m., having "crossed" the column of the 87th Rifle Division, which was advancing to the front from the reserve, the forward battalions of the 16th Panzer Division of General Kube crossed the interfluvium and reached the Volga in the area of the villages of Rynok, Latoshynka, northern Stalingrad. The front was divided into two parts. The railroad lines that approached the city of the north and northwest were cut, sailing and the waterway along the Volga. "We were looking at the stretching across the Volga, the German captain wrote in his diary. "The way to Asia lay from here, and I was shocked."

On that day, Richthofen's aviation—the entire 4th Air Force—repeatedly bombed the city from the air, making up to 2,000 air raids in a day, dropping 1,000 incendiary bombs. Stalingrad burned like a gigantic bonfire. Industrial enterprises and residential areas were destroyed. A hail of incendiary bombs hit the wooden houses of the southwestern outskirts; The city water supply was destroyed. Massive bombardment and stopped after dark.

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On the outskirts of the northern part of the city, the 10th Rifle Division of the NKVD, Colonel A. A., took the blow of the German "panzer" that had broken through. Saraev, supported by the fire of the batteries of the 1077th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel V.E. Etman. Tank brigades of the 23rd Corps of General Khasip took up the defense on the Lipia Gorodische-Gum Rak-Sadovaya. Kurusites of the military-political school, air defense units, an anti-tank artillery regiment, a combined detachment of sailors of the Volga flotilla were thrown to the Stalipsky Tractor Zavole (STZ). The Judicial Defense Committee sent detachments to the native militia, raking battalions and the 99th tank brigade (50 tanks), formed from two training battalions of the STZ, from all these forces, the northern combat sector was formed from all these forces, the Sgo troops repelled strikes

advanced parts of the 14-tank corps.

The 10th division was also attached to the 1st company of the 28th separate detachment of tank destroyer dogs under the command of senior lieutenant P.G.; Bragoreiko. For the first time, dogs in the "anti-tank" version were used in the fall of 1941 near Moscow, allegedly in connection with the desperate situation on the outskirts of the capital. But then they are mentioned in descriptions of the defense of Oskol and Stalingrad in 1942 and during the offensive of the Don Front in 1943. Surely, and later these "big detachments" did not remain without work.

The dogs were trained for 3 months. The secret of training is the simplest: they were fed only under a moving slipper. Vitogs of animals developed a reflex: at the sight of a slipper, rush under its bottom. This is where the pin mine, mounted on the back of the dog, worked. According to Saraev, it was the Kamikalae dogs that "were the first to open the account of the destroyed enemy tanks" in the battles for Stalingrad, "and this did not go unnoticed by the Nazis. Subsequently, in the frontline zone, the Pemtsy shot down all dogs and cats.

Soon, 3 more riflemen arrived in the district of the tractor plant from other sections of the Stalingrad Front.

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you brigades. On the morning of August 29, the troops of the northern section went on the offensive. The enemy was driven out of the Rynok settlement and pushed back 8 km to the north.

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The fact that the gun crews of the anti-aircraft guns deployed for direct flooding consisted of raisin ds vushsk (and in total more than 8,000 women served in the 9th Stalingrad Air Defense Corps) caused considerable amazement among the German tankers. No one taught them to shoot at ground targets, they fought with amazing fearlessness: "Russian women are real soldiers in skirts. They are ready to fight for real and in military affairs can plug many men into the belt.

This was understandable and wild for the Germans, since the Ver "Macht participated in the world war for two and a half years without the help of women, with the exception of mobile brothels. Only in January 1942, due to a severe shortage of human resources, the organization of "staff assistants "in order to release the male soldiers in headquarters in Srmatia and in the occupied territories. And that's all that can be said about German women in this war. Not a single one of them served in the army. Nobody saw the photo-

images depicting a German nurse pulling a wounded man out of the fire, all the more so, what kind of Gretchen, repelling the onslaught of the Bolshevik hordes, crouching with a girlish chest to a machine gun. Hitler did not even think of such a simple idea as using the labor of the mothers and wives of his soldiers in military enterprises, while in the USSR tens of thousands of "hard workers, home fronts" cooked steel, stood at lathes or assembled tanks. The vile pacist regime did not allow a woman to fully express herself.

On the other hand, in the freest Soviet country, "war in the full sense of the word has ceased to be the lot of men," and "women, as equal members of the socialist state, have become equal defenders of it."

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kami (''). As you can see, although everything was bad with human resources, here it's a matter of principles.

So that Soviet women could sleep peacefully, they enshrined the law on the right to freedom of movement, moreover, by adopting] from September 1939 the Law "On Universal Compulsory Commitment". Since that Momsita, military service in the USSR has become an honorable duty for every citizen, regardless of gender. Article 13 of the Law stated that the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy were given the right to register and recruit women in the army and navy, as well as to attract their training fees. On behalf of all Soviet women, at the historic TU session of the Supreme Soviet, she thanked her beloved Communist Party and the Soviet government, Deputy E.M. Kozhushina: "We, young patriots, are ready to set foot on the defense of the shores of the beautiful Motherland. We women. we are proud that we have been given the right to squeak our paravia with men."

Very soon, the war made it possible to fully realize this right - "to seek paravne".

"We had a lot of women in the division," recalls etgeieral Provalov, "saniisgruktors, telephones, doctors, nurses, laundresses, bakers. Either we have simply become accustomed to the fact that women did the hard work all the same, or it wasn't before; I don't notice how sad it is for them on the front, on the women's front in the war, I personally knew how to raise questions.

Personally, I have questions. The first and simplest of them: how many were there?

This means that in one 883rd rifle division "there were quite a few" - about a hundred. The number of such divisions in 19942 went to the fifth sogia. Were her

some special

rifle, air defense, naval brigades, artillery, sapper, intelligence battalions, communications and air defense divisions, medical services, corps administrations. fronts, gyls, etc. Women served in the Vsada, hundreds

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thousand women. Officially - more than 800 thousand. But the sweat and exhausted researcher of this topic, V. Muromts, shared with you: "During the Great Patriotic War, about a million Soviet women defended the Motherland with weapons in their hands (our italics. - Avt}.) Without weapons - with a scalpel, a wrench, a telephone receiver, adjusting flags or solar trousers?

ZO June 1941, "taking into account the great desire of Soviet women to directly take part in the armed struggle against fascism," the State Defense Committee adopted a number of resolutions on the mobilization of women and girls to serve in the air defense forces, communications, internal security, on military roads, etc.

There were also several special Komsomol mobilizations of girls for the Red Army. In 1942, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League decided to mobilize Komsomol women for service in the Navy.

1,406,000 women were sent to the Air Defense Forces to mobilize the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League. The largest Komsomol mobilization of "female youth" into the air defense forces was carried out according to the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, adopted on March 28, 1942, which obliged the regional committees and regional committees to use two weeks - up to 10 an. relay - together with the voskokomats to call up 100 thousand Komsomol girls aged 19 to 25 years. In the autumn of 1942, a new mobilization of women for service in the air defense forces took place, the presence of a Komsomol ticket and "aspiration" no longer played a role. There were more than 9000 women in the troops of the Leningrad Air Defense Army. More than 17 thousand women were counted in the units of the Leningrad Air Defense Forces. 20,000 women and girls and 40,000 MPVO fighters served in the Special Moscow Army. By the end of the war, women accounted for 24% of the contingent of air defense troops - about 300 thousand. In individual regiments and divisions, they numbered up to 80-100%,

According to Komsomol mobilization alone, about 550 thousand girls got into the service, and 70% served in the active armin. From the end of 1942 each

the seventh Komsomol member in the Red Army was a female! There were also many "non-union female youth." Let's add 186 thousand members of KISS.

Among front-line doctors, women made up 41%, among ox surgeons - 43%, paramedics - 43%, nurses - 100%, medical instructors and nurses - 40%. During the war years, 300,000 nurses and over 900,000 sanitary instructors were trained.

Up to 3,000 girls and women served in each army of the 1st Belorussian Front (barmy), and at the beginning of 1945, over 20,000 women served in the 2nd Belorussian Front. In addition, a large number of them were in special and rear units of front-line subordination. On the same front, 9,656 women worked as freelancers,

Women were only laundresses, cooks, telephonists and medical instructors. And also - drivers, mechanics, artillerymen, machine gunners, machine gunners, snipers, sailors, tankmen, pilots, marines, scouts, political officers and commanders of battalions.

In the general education system of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, 222,000 women "specialist fighters" were trained: mortars, easel and light machine gunners (did any of you try to carry an easel pulse met or a mipomega plate?) submachine gunners, snipers, signalmen, road specialists operational parts. In 1943 alone, the Ryazan Infantry School trained 1,388 female commanders, who then commanded platoons, companies, battalions, machine-gun and mortar units. So in the 383rd rifle division - the commander of a machine-gun platoon Oktyabrina Borisenko; Levina Anna - Commander of the Ogiev Platoon of the 4th Batarsi of the 169th Mortar Regiment of the 3rd Breakthrough Artillery Division.

In accordance with the decree of the State Defense Committee, in November 1942, under the Moscow Military District, a

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rovan 1st separate women's reserve rifle regiment. In the first year of its existence alone, it trained 5,175 soldiers and sergeants for the front, including 489 riflemen, 217 mortars, and 266 machine gunners.

2484 female snipers were trained in sniper schools and courses included in the general education. The Central Women's School of Sniper Training provided the front with 1,061 snipers and 407 instructors. You are the last women "shot" almost a division



enemy - 11280 men. Sniper Leah Moldagulo destroyed 91 soldiers and officers, Tamara Kostyri - 120, Lyudmila Pavlyuchenko - 309111

In the autumn of 1941, at the initiative of M.M. Raskova, the formation of three women's air regiments began - a fighter, a bomber and a full bomber.

The 586th Fighter Regiment, equipped with the Yak-1, began combat work in April 1942 in the air defense system of Saratov. Female fighters protected the industrial centers and railway junctions of Saratov, Voronezh, and Kastornaya from German bombers. In the period from September to November, the 1st Squadron of the regiment took part in the Battle of Stalingrad. The regiment marched from the Volga to Vienna, the pilots conducted 125 air battles, shot down 38 enemy aircraft, and Yekaterina Zelepko made the only "female" air ramming in history.

The famous 588th regiment of "heavenly sluggish" - 20 crews - under the command of E.D. Bershanskaya arrived on the Southern Front in May 1942 as part of the 218th night short-range bomber air division of the 4th Air Army. He was armed with a U-2 aircraft, "converted for bombing." The re-equipment at first consisted in the presence of two baskets along the sides, in which mipo-metal mines and hand-dropped grenades were placed. "Night witches" participated in the battles for the Donbass, the Caucasus, Sevastopol, Mogilev, Warsaw, Danzig, committed

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23672 sorties. The regiment became known as the 46th Taman Order of the Red Banner and Suvorov Guards Women's Aviation Regiment.

Combat activity of the 587th bomber regiment began in December 1942 near Stalingrad as part of the 270th air division of the 8th air army. At first, the pilots studied on the Su-2 aircraft, but then they switched to the Pe-2. With the increased staff of the crew and technical staff, there were already not enough women specialists, and the regiment turned out to be of mixed composition. He reached the shores of the Baltic Sea and received the title of the 125th Guards Borisov Order of Suvorov and Kuguzov Air Regiment of Day Bombers named after M. Raskova, his pilots made 4419 sorties.

By the way, in the summer of 1942, the Americans also adopted a program for the training of female military pilots. However, the first 25 young women who passed the selection (health, higher education, American citizenship, age 21-25) were called up for service in the Air Force only in August 1943. As part of the ex-

of the perimental women's squadron, they mastered, and quite successfully, B-17 fighters and bombers. Even the unofficial nickname of the unit sounded very similar - "flying witches". However, they were not allowed to participate in hostilities, it was decided that America had enough men for such cases. In December 1944, the program was closed.

The British approach to the issue was even more conservative. "Full of amazement," writes M. Moore, "I looked at how quite a few women here do work that in England is not even considered suitable for women; in England, no one would even have an idea in their heads) that a woman is generally able to take on tacos.

What something unique was told in his time by the writer S.S. Smirnov the story of Maria Lagunova, a tank mechanic. In fact, it was not at all an isolated

happening. Former commander of the 91st Tank Brigade Marshal

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Yakubovsky recalls Ekaterina Petlyuk and her T-70 tank named "Baby". One can recall Maria Oktyabrskaya and her "Fighting Girlfriend", as well as Irina Levchenko, who graduated from not only a tank school, at the Military Academy of Armored and Mechanized Forces. The list can be continued: Valentina Barkhatova, Vera Bezrukova, Valentina Bogdanova, Alexandra Burlakova, Valentina Gribalsva, Zinaida Klimentieva, Olga Porshopok, Vera Smirnova, Tamara Okhrimenko served as drivers; tank commanders were A. Boyko, V. Orlova, Taisiya Ibtanina, A. Kalinyuk; aE. Kostrikova, Irina Levchenko and A. Samusenko commanded tank units.

There were also quite exotic girls. In the 38th Army, the 18-year-old Dusya Sytnik, the commander of a saber squadron (!) of the 18th Guards Cavalry Regiment, was praised, in the 4th Cavalry Corps - a sniper platoon (45 people) of the Kuban Cossacks. Kolesova Elena commanded a sabotage group of a special forces detachment, and Ekaterina Mikhailova went through the most brutal battles as part of an assault battalion of marines.

Only 150 thousand Soviet citizens were awarded orders and medals for military merits, and 86 of them were awarded the title of Groy of the Soviet Union,

They contributed to the Victory - and low bow to them,

"There is hardly a single military specialty," marshal Eremenko marvels, "with which

our brave women would not have done as well as their brothers, husbands and fathers."

But another question arises: men, brothers, husbands and fathers, did you really need this?

But what about this;

..- Pilot Milyutina, seriously wounded in the stomach, lost consciousness 4 times during the flight. Straining her last strength and will, she brought the plane to her territory and landed it safely ...

..Squadron commander of the 125th Guards Regiment

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K.Ya. Fomicheva, in battles with the enemy, burned twice in the air, received a wound in her right leg, a fracture of six ribs, and twice - burns of the second degree ...

.. Radio operator of the 2nd battalion of the 216th regiment of the 76th heating division Elena Stempkovskaya "... lay down behind a machine gun and opened fire on the Nazis. But the forces were too unequal. The Nazis captured the girl, subjected her to inhuman torture and torture. Lena before her martyrdom, but did not give out military secrets to the enemy. Then she was not even twenty-one years old ... "

... Members of the reconnaissance group of the front Anya Morozova. "During the execution of the next task, a group of our scouts was surrounded by SS men. Anya, wounded in the arm, hid in the swamp, but was tracked down with the help of dogs. Not wanting to surrender, she threw a grenade under her ... "

... 19-year-old Valeria [Giarovskaya, medical officer of the 907th rifle regiment of the 244th division, protecting the wounded, destroyed more than twenty soldiers and officers of the enemy, with a bunch of grenades rushed to the subtank and blew it up.

How many of them - sisters, wives and mothers - were killed, wounded, maimed, passed through captivity - no one knows. But out of 86 female Groys of the Soviet Union, 47 received this title posthumously.

Finally, there is one more side of the problem, carefully forgotten. From the materials of the check of ash hired persons, in the units and bodies of the rear of the 5th Army of the Western Front of December 4, 194] of the year:

"... Z., a Pole by nationality, worked as a machinist at an armvoentorg. 13/ŷ!-41 was brought from Moscow without any documents characterizing it. Sexually corrupted, she grouped around herself the commanding staff ...

..P., born in 1922. During the last 2 years she worked as a hairdresser in Moscow. 20 / X1-4] was brought from Moscow and appointed to the position of a typist. P., with her sexual promiscuity, created "la gathering with the participation of the chief of staff ...

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..K., born in 1915, worked as a waitress in canteen No. 2. She was sexually depraved and by her behavior introduced elements of domestic decay into the environment ...

... Cohabitation is flourishing in hospitals, and hospital chiefs and commissars (470, 105 and other hospitals) take an active part in this cohabitation ... b

... In the 105th hospital, early. AKHO Ya., a non-party member, a month and a half ago got along with nurse V., a member of the Komsomol. After some time, Y. stopped communicating with V. and got in touch with nurse I. On the basis of this, V. committed suicide ...

The head of the 105th hospital, military doctor @ rank K., and the commissar of the same hospital, battalion commissar S., in addition to the main apartment, had a second illegal apartment in which they had fun with the female doctors of their own hospital.

From the memorandum of the head of the NKVD OO of the Volkhov Front "On the Moral Decay of the Command of the Units and Formations of the 59th Army" dated March 10, 1942:

"Recently, in parts of the 59th Army, from the side cases of moral and domestic decay have become more frequent among individual servicemen. Often, using their official position, commanders incline female personnel to sexual debauchery, but here, in the presence of strangers, they solve combat missions. Separate commanders and commissars of units, being carried away by women, systematically get drunk. In the course of combat operations, instead of leading the battle, they lie down in dugouts ...

The head of the medical service of the 942nd artillery regiment of the 374th rifle division, military doctor of the 3rd rank Beloglazov, in a state of intoxication, went into the operating tent, summoned the medical instructor Ulanova, where he tried to use her. When Ulanova pushed him away from her, the latter indignantly drew his pistol and fired several shots into the ground...

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The commander of the 378th rifle division, Colonel Dorofesv, and the commissar of the division, Kornyshev, systematically drink and cohabit with women,

On January 8, Dorofeev and Kornyshev invited a dentist and medical assistant Levanova to their place. The indicated women drank and spent the night with them for two years. Being drunk, Dorofeev declared the commander! "... The women here are prostitutes, they need to be used, avy, commanders, don't waste this opportunity..."

On February 5, during the offensive of the division, the head of the Iggab and the commissar of the division left for the command post. Dorofes, on the other hand, summoned a young military officer to the dugout and drank with her for four days. Boleanyu motivated his non-departure to the command post.

The command staff in conversations among themselves says: "... Well, how is our drunken bosses, what did they decide? .." drunk, ns leaving the dugout.

Such facts of the moral and everyday decomposition of the command staff in parts of the 59th Army are not isolated. According to our information, the commanders and commissars of units and formations do not take measures to eliminate such phenomena, since they themselves cherish the perpetrators of this (our italics. -Av.)  
".

Fathers-commanders have fun in their dugouts, while the Red Army soldiers "show heroism" and storm something there! I can't even believe that all this is happening right on the front line during the hostilities. One can imagine how these pictures boosted the morale of subordinates. By the way, the 59th Army (can it be called an army?) is one of the two that dealt the main blow in the Luban operation of 1942. What happened is known: Meat forest.

Camping field wives, and sometimes more than one, were wound up commanders and political officers, army commanders and heads of political departments, members of the Military Councils and military

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The chiefs of the highest ranks are Generals Vlasov, Chernyakhovsky, Markian Popov, Eremenko, Katukov, the unforgettable Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and the iron Zhukov. Their "moral character" had to be supervised personally by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In a word: "The war showed what infinite strength a free and equal woman in the Country of the Soviets has, how her abilities have grown over the years of Soviet power, talent has flourished, how many-sided this activity has become." Different, frankly speaking, revealing

"Boundaries" were drawn in conditions when life was worthless, destinies were breaking and moral principles were collapsing under the slogan "War of All Life". There was, of course, love, and weddings, and children, family machine-gun crews, and even a matrimonial crew of a self-propelled gun, but here's the question; to: how much did the ego increase the Red Army's combat capability? Maybe if there were fewer women (and vodka) at the front, the men would rather be drawn home, the commanders would not be so much "distracted". Here, for example, is Zhukov's note dated February 1, 1945: "I have reports ... that Comrade Katukov is showing complete inactivity, is not leading the army, is sitting at home with a woman, and that a girl cohabiting with him interferes with his work . (The "camping wife", of course, does not interfere with Zhukov himself - Auth) I demand: immediately send a woman from Katukov ... Katukov to get down to business ... "Look, would the war have ended earlier?

and\*\*

The Soviet command was again forced to take "fire" measures to destroy the group that had broken through to the Volga. While waiting for the full concentration of reserves, an attack group was created in the Kotluban region. It included the 28th Tank Corps, the 169th Tank Brigade, the 35th, 27th Guards and 298th Rifle Divisions. On the way were the 4th and 16th tank corps and rifle formations from the Stavka reserve. This group, led by Deputy

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the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Major General K.A. Kovalenko, was supposed to strike to the southwest, close the breakthrough at Kotluban and Bolshaya Rossoshka and restore the situation with access to the Don. Another group consisting of the fresh 2nd and 23rd tank corps under the general command of the head of the armored forces of the front troops, Lieutenant General A.D. Shtevneva was aiming from the Orlovka area in the general direction of Yerzovka. The corps of General Khasin by this time was replenished with equipment, people and had 195 T-34 tanks.

At the same time, the 62nd Army received the task of attacking Vertyachy with its right flank in a northern direction and linking up with the left flank of the 4th Panzer Army, which was striking in a southern direction,

Thus, having thrown 650 tanks into battle, it was planned to chop up the enemy strike force drawn into a narrow corridor and restore the front on the left bank of the Don.

Withersheim's tank corps included

16th tank, 3rd and 60th motorized divisions. The infantry units of the 8th Corps following him stretched out in the resulting 60-kilometer corridor from Vertyache to the Volga. The flanks of the breakthrough were held by the barriers of the 384th and 295th infantry divisions,

The troupe of General Kovalenko, without waiting for the approach of the tank corps, went on the offensive at 18:00 on August 23, 5 hours after receiving the order. Two of its divisions, having met stubborn Ogian opposition, could not advance. The third division, together with the 169th tank brigade, commanded by Colonel A.P. Kodensts, defeated the enemy standing against them and united with the troops of the 62nd Army, cutting off the German tank corps from the main forces. However, it was not possible to build on the success, the Germans soon restored communication along the corridor. General Shtevnev's group went on the offensive on 24 August. She advanced 6 km and got stuck in the German defense north of Orlovka.

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On August 26, Kovalenko brought the 4th and 6th tank corps, fresh 24th, 84th, 315th rifle divisions into battle, but their offensive was carried out on a wide front, without a pronounced direction of the main attack, and was unsuccessful.

In the following days, the 2nd, 4th, 16th, 23rd and 28th tank corps, together with rifle divisions, almost continuously stormed enemy positions, but they could not completely isolate and defeat the breaking through grouping, although the width of the corridor in the Kotluban region was reduced to 4 km. The Germans, having taken up an all-round defense, stood to the death, having organized an effective system of fire and using their aircraft to the fullest extent, German aircraft methodically bombed and fired on the Soviet troops while still on the march, making it impossible for daylight hours to prepare in an organized manner and engage in combat.

Until the beginning of September, 3 divisions of the 14th Panzer Corps were in a critical situation along the banks of the Volga, repelling Soviet attacks, receiving air supplies and from small groups that made their way to it at night. General Wietersheim even wanted to leave his positions, but Paulus forbade the retreat. The discussion ended with the dismissal of Wietersheim, who had doubts about his success; the corps was led by the one-armed "Papa Hube".

The counterattacks of the left-flank forces of the army of Kryuchenko and the right-flank units of the army of Lopatin in order to reach the left bank of the Don in the Peskovatka, Vertyachy section were also unsuccessful. Only the troops of the 63rd and 21st armies, which carried out an auxiliary strike on the right wing of the Staligrad Front, as a result of stubborn battles, managed to capture southwest of Serafimo-

vicha bridgehead 50 km along the front and up to 25 km in depth.

The memorandum of the special department tells about the organization of hostilities of the 4th Panzer Army:

"In the course of operations carried out by the 4th tank army to destroy the enemy who broke through to the eastern bank of the Don River, there are serious shortcomings

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in the management of operations by the command of units and formations of the army.

Headquarters units and formations lead inefficiently; there have been repeated cases when orders given by the army headquarters are canceled several times and replaced by new ones within one day ...

Poorly organized interaction between units and branches of the armed forces ... There are facts of bombardment of parts of their aviation

The army headquarters and the active units are not engaged in constant reconnaissance of the enemy forces, as a result of which they do not know which units are opposed to them, the number of units, they do not know what the enemy's task is, they have no information about the enemy at all.

The statement on this occasion by the commander of the 4th tank army, Major General Kryuchenkon, is characteristic: "The devil knows what the enemy is doing there, absolutely nothing is known: what is the position in the "sleeve" of the breakthrough, what will the 62nd army do, where are our units in contact with the enemy ..."

Parts do not pay attention to intelligence at all. For example, August 24 g., before the offensive, the command of the 114th Guards, SL sent reconnaissance to 100 mot of its front line. s

In 780 SL - a platoon of foot reconnaissance, during the period from 30.8-42 to 5.9-42, he completed one combat mission in reconnaissance kene, they are not preparing for the ralvedka in the regiment, the reconnaissance task is not brought to the scouts, the routes of movement are not being studied scouts, as a result, reconnaissance does not know the routes and returns without completing the task.

There have been cases of loss of communication between the army headquarters and the detachments. Yes, August 24. The city of the army was subordinate to the 85th Guards Rifle Division, with which the army headquarters had no contact for 24 hours and did not know anything about its military operations.

During the hostilities, a number of facts of manifestation of cowardice on the part of the commanding officers, as well as the rank and file, were noted.



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For example:

1) August 23 The enemy, under air cover, broke through the defense lines of 4th and 166th SPs, which began to retreat in disarray.

The commander of the 4th regiment, Major Yarov, and the military commissar of the battalion commissar Sergeev, instead of organizing a plasma retreat, abandoned the regiment and fled from the battlefield.

The commander of the 116th joint venture, Major Kozin, the military commissar of the battalion commissar Belikov and head. Regimental headquarters Captain Tishchenko fled from the battlefield, and owls were left at the regimental CI. secret documents and the cash desk of the regiment.

2) August 15 with. The firing positions of the artillery regiment of the 22nd Fighter Brigade were bombed by enemy aircraft.

The regiment commander, Major Chirkov, and the military commissar Pstrov, having shown cowardice, fled from the battlefield. No one led the regiment

A Red Army soldier [of the AP 78 SD division Shcherbinin, in a conversation with the soldiers, said:

“... The German army is stronger than the Red Army. The Germans will soon surround us and beat us up. Our commanders don't care about the soldiers, they feed them badly. Our commanders should be shot down, and we ourselves should be taken prisoner by the Germans.”

The main reason for the failure of the Soviet troops was still the same - poor organization and unsatisfactory training. Troops, without finishing their concentration, rushed into battle without reconnaissance of the terrain and the enemy, with weak artillery and aviation support, and the aviators bombed indiscriminately both strangers and their own, and the tankers often fired at their own infantry. There was “not enough” time to prepare counterattacks, to work out interaction, to organize control.

Hastily formed from various formations, groups of ns did not include special command and control agencies and communications services, which means the absence of both the first and second during the battle. According to Chuikov: “Communication was poor even in the second year of the war. place. The Nazis at all levels used

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whether the walkie-talkie. We have a wired connection. She was constantly out of order. I had to send

officers, which made it extremely difficult to lead the troops scattered across the steppe. Therefore, information about the change in the situation and the decisions made were delayed.

As before, the headquarters "drawn arrows", not having reliable information not only about the enemy, but also about their own troops: "Orders with the word "immediately" often came to the unit when the settlements named in the orders had already been abandoned, and sometimes ceased to exist as a combat unit, and that part, which was supposed to fulfill the order.

."

Moreover, on August 25, the German 71st Division, reinforced by tanks, began to advance quite successfully from the Kalach region. And on the 29th, the Goth army delivered another blow - from the Abganerovo region. This time she broke into the defenses of the 64th Army and by the end of the day went to Gavri lovka, t.s. reared the troops of Shumilov and Lopatin. The 62nd and 64th armies were deeply engulfed by the enemy from the north and south, Commanders Lopatin and Shumilov asked the front command to withdraw troops from the ops sack on the prepared line of defense, but Eremenko did not give permission for this. He planned another counterattack. However, there was nothing to apply it with, and the enemy constantly "corrected" the Soviet plans.

On August 29, Gotha's army, having crushed the 26th Rifle Division and defeated its headquarters, broke through the defenses in the center of the 64th Army. On August 30, the Soviet command was forced to make a belated decision to withdraw both of the army to the middle defensive bypass. But even there they could not gain a foothold, and by the end of September 2, they retreated to the inner contour.

The 62nd Army took up defense in the Rynok, Orlovka, Gumrak, Peschanka sector, and the 64th Army took up defense in the sector from Peschaya

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kidolvanovka. On the left flank was the 57th Army, commanded by General Tolbukhin.

German aircraft day and night bombed Stalingrad and crossings. The glow of the fires did not fade. Hali floors of oil storage facilities and oil tankers. Oil and kerosene flowed in streams into the Volga and burned on the surface. There was not enough water in the city, there was no electricity. The population hid in ravines and cellars. By the end of August, there were over 4 thousand inhabitants in the city. But since it was crowded with refugees from the western regions, the picto did not know the exact number. According to some

Rimdata, it reached 600 thousand people. Until August 20, 100 thousand were evacuated, of which no more than 35-40 thousand people were from Stalingrad. The officers of the General Staff, who were studying the situation in Stalingrad on instructions from the Headquarters, reported;

"The city is overpopulated. It even got to the point that people live under fences, in gardens, on the banks of the river. Volga, in boats, etc. e. The evacuation of the city is taking too long due to the lack of sufficient means of transportation and the poor work of the evacuation bureau ... All schools and clubs are overflowing with the wounded. The hospitals continue to remain in the city. Lighting is bad..."

The evacuation of the civilian population, in order to avoid the spread of panic, was prohibited until August 23, when the corresponding decree was finally adopted.

From August 24 to September 14, about 300 thousand people were taken across the Volga. If we take into account that this number includes wounded soldiers, hospital staff, logistics institutions, refugees from other regions and about 60 thousand Stalingrad conscripts under the age of 50 who will return very soon, it becomes clear that almost half of the inhabitants remained in Stalingrad - women, children, old people, workers of defense enterprises. According to incomplete data, almost 4,000 civilians died from bombing and shelling from August to October, and tens of thousands were injured.

The male population of the city was mostly already at the front.

"Soldiers are sitting in the trenches, soldiers are reading letters":

"Gor. Stalingrad, Voroshilov settlement, Zhilstroy No. 22, FZO school No. 14, Perelman ML. : "... I don't know if you have to write a letter or not. The situation is terrible. We are dying. You can't get out of here, the scares are cut off. Pems dropped a mine on the Volga and 2 passenger steamers were sunk, and a barge with oil burned down today. In general, it's hard to say goodbye to life, It's a pity for the kids, they are cheerful and careless and completely unprepared to accept death, We don't die from bombs, then we die from the dead hands of the local population, They are nonhumans, but animals ... "

..Rostov region, Dubovsky district, Ilyinsky s / s, Len.Put farm, Lapko N.R:  
"... Darling, it seems that the end of my life is coming, I live in such a place, that you can't run away from the enemy, no matter what. and from the pass he is not 'so far away. If I can't die and the arrival of a bloody or executioner, then I won't stay in another insult, free the children and go to Russia. Everything that depended on the mission, I did. Rai onnys, the chiefs sent their cars to their lives. So it was with us, when we already thought, then the authorities, t. tops, sent their zhep hastily, providing food and good transport

volume, and we were persuaded not to panic, and when the enemy stepped on their heels, they all pushed us out. There is a crowd of people on the right side, atam bastard is bombing. So it was exactly in the Bolshe-Kamensky district, the authorities sent their families by car, and we - as we had to, So here the district workers, that is, the tops, have already sent their wives by car, and they will send us on bulls, daito, if possible. We "logon" them..."

"Left side of the Don, Stepnoe Pole, Nelga Klavdiya Vasilevna: "... On 11.7.42, our population was evacuated, everyone left, the authorities, the military commissar of the Mikulsky district military commissariat, left 2 days before the evacuation. We were not told anything, and the remaining deputy. - quartermaster comrade. Pavlov, a Cossack, loaded the car - and break loose. Yak

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she turned to him, so he answered - go to the crossing, there are boats there and you will be brought back. My mother and I began to cry - how can I live without anything. He shouted - "I will not drag you back to my hump," and they loaded the valuables of the military comat: lamps, buckets, balalaikas, guitars, and left the child and the commander's ass to be eaten by the Jews.

And what is the highbrow bosses concerned about? On August 25, at a meeting of the Froita Military Council, the head of the [amp; neral headquarters (!) Vasilevsky and the representative of the State Defense Committee Malsikov interrogated the secretary of the regional party committee A.S. Chuyapova, why the Persian newspaper Stalingradskaya Pravda began to appear in the city. In response to the report that the building of the editorial office and the printing house had been abandoned before the founding of German aviation, an order was issued to restore the printing base within 24 hours, because: "There is a newspaper – there is a party leadership in the city, there is Soviet power."

On the same day General Major Leining arrived at Paulus's headquarters; appointed commissar of Stalingrad.

On September 1, the right flank of the 6th German Army was connected by the left flank of the 4th Taik Army in the Stariy Rogachik area. From that time on, the main forces of Paulus and Hoth were aimed mainly at the central part of the city, along the Kalach-Staligrad and Stalingrad-Kotelnikovo railways. On the morning of September 3, the Germans launched an offensive throughout the froit. By noon, on the left flank of the 64th Army, they managed to cross the Chervlenaya River and break through the defenses of the villages of Tsybino and Nariman. In the sector of the 62nd Army, having overcome the Soviet positions on the Rossoshka River, the enemy entered the Basargino siding line. Sovstskis troops with heavy fighting retreated to their last positions, to Stalingrad. The armies suffered heavy losses, in some divisions there were 500-1000 people left, in ten tank brigades operating in the zone of the 62nd and 64th armies, there were

a total of 146 tanks.

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On September 3-4, the leadership of the front and numerous Moscow controllers quietly and imperceptibly crossed to the eastern bank of the Volga, without even informing the city defense committee about this. The commandant of the garrison, Colonel A.A. Saraev.

As Chuyanov recalls: "On the morning of September 5, N.S. Khrushchev called. In a dull, insinuating voice, he said that the Eastern Council and the headquarters of the front had been relocated beyond the Volga to the area of the Yama farm in the Krasnoslobodsky district.

When did the ego happen? I asked, perplexed.

"You can become good prey for the Nazis if you delay," Khrushchev said, leaving my question unanswered. - Do not delay, go to your alternate command post.

Is this an order or a wish? I asked again.

- Recommendation, but please don't think that we leave you in the city and ourselves "leave" over the Volga), ..

And it became clear to me that he made this call for insurance, putting me in front of a fait accompli, they say, look, I warned you.

...

"In order to weaken the pressure of the enemy" on Stalingrad, the Headquarters hastily prepared a new counterattack. To organize it, Army General Zhukov, who was appointed on August 26 to the post of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, arrived from Moscow. This counterattack, according to Marshal Moskalenko, "was a vital necessity in those days. Therefore, it was necessary to inflict it at least with the forces that were at hand.

Zhukov and Eremenko had something at hand.

At the time, three armies were concentrated north of the city: the 24th Army of Major General D.L. Kozlon, consisting of five rifle divisions and one tank brigade; 66th Army under the command of Lieutenant General

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that RY. Malinovsky - six rifle divisions and four tank brigades; the regrouping and staffing of the guards army was ending, now there were eight rifle divisions. The Stalingrad Front included the newly created 16th Air Army, Major General S.I. Rudenko. In addition to the forces mentioned, the left-flank units of the 4th Panzer Army were involved in the operation. All aviation - more than 900 aircraft - was instructed to cover the groupings of front troops and strike at enemy manpower and military equipment to ensure the offensive of the troops,

Since Stalin was in a hurry, and the troops of Kozlov and Malinovsky could take the starting line no earlier than September 5, a strong-willed decision was made to launch an offensive with the forces of the 1st Guards Army. The preparations for this operation suffered from the same shortcomings that had become chronic. Thus, the decision to attack the right flank of the Stalingrad Front, according to Zhukov, was taken later on August 27, and General Moskalenko received the order to relocate to the Loznoye region only on August 30. The combat mission was personally brought to him by Zhukov on September 1, and it was prescribed to start "destroying" the enemy in the morning of the next day. The lack of time, the lack of intelligence information, reinforcements, anti-aircraft guns, and interaction with aviation did not bother anyone. Only the lack of fuel delayed the start of the operation for a day.

]: subordination to Moskalenko fairly shabby troops were transferred from the disbanded group of GS neral Kovalenko, including the 4th and 16th tank corps. Of the latter, only two half-cover tank brigades were completed. In addition, the 7th tank corps of General Rotmistrov, with 191 tanks, entered the army. The corps made a 200-kilometer march from the Serebryakovo station and concentrated northwest of Stalingrad on September 2, i.e. actually entered into battle on the move, not even knowing where the front line was, not to mention the location

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In general, the army was not ready for the offensive, but "cruel reality dictated, as it had not done before (emphasis ours. - Auth.), the inevitable need to go to the enemy with the forces that were available at the moment",

On September 1st, the 1st Guards went on the offensive. She started it without sufficient artillery and aviation training and support, having failed to pull up the path to the starting positions of all her forces. Paulus, unlike Zhukov and Gordov, had full information and strengthened his left flank in advance, creating a powerful fire system and eshe-

The German command monitored the concentration of Soviet troops, knew not only the direction of the planned strikes, but also the time of their start.

Just before the start of the Soviet attack, the Germans launched an artillery strike on the divisions concentrated on the lines of attack, inflicting heavy damage on them, and with the Russians going on the offensive, they threw aircraft against them. As a result, advancing 5-6 km, Moskalenko's army was stopped by the enemy. The next day, the Soviet troops, having introduced a second echelon into battle, continued to attack in the same directions with the same result. Again, at the moment the attack began, German artillery spoke up and guarded the lines of concentration for an hour and a half, and again German aviation dominated the air.

By a directive of September 3, the Headquarters demanded decisive action from Zhukov: "The situation with Stalingrad has worsened. The enemy is three versts from Stalingrad. Stalingrad can be taken today or tomorrow if the Northern Group of Forces does not provide immediate assistance. Demand from the commanders of the troops, standing to the north and north-west of Stalingrad, to immediately strike at the enemy and come to the aid of the people of Stalingrad ... Procrastination is now equal to the feasible crime.

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On September 5, Zhukov led the 24th and B6Zuarmii to the right and left of the 1st Guards. Purpose: to defeat the enemy group advancing towards the Volga with a powerful flank attack, to unite with the troops of the 62nd Army and restore the common line of defense with the South-Eastern Front. These tasks could not be completed. The troops entered the battle directly from a 50-kilometer march, intelligence did not reveal the enemy's grouping and fire system, the artillery was unable to suppress it, so it was not possible to bring down the Germans <positions. For example, the commander of the 221st Rifle Division not only had no information about the location and forces of the enemy, but did not even know to which army the division belonged.

During the battle, the Soviet units advanced only 2-4 km, the 24th Army returned to its original police stations. Rman aviation dominated the air, the Soviet one worked mainly at night. For another ten or four Soviet armies were marking time, richly wetting the land with the blood of their soldiers. The losses were enormous, the results were miserable. So, in the 7th tank corps of the Rotmistrovsky, 15 combat vehicles remained in the ranks; the hull had to be withdrawn from the rear of the understaffing.

The cunning German generals used yet another "cunning" - they continuously conducted reconnaissance, as if

predicted the direction and strength of Zhukovsky's strikes, took adequate measures: "Since the fascist German command ... became aware of the forces of the attackers and the places of strikes, it created strongholds in advance in the corresponding directions (our italics. - Auth.) The actions of all enemy aviation were also aimed there, the reserves of infantry, tanks, artillery, mortars were brought up, "So, General Moskalenko was given only 3 days to regroup the army and prepare for the offensive, and the enemy had already "created strongholds in advance."

As Marshal Rokossovsky noted: "In the following days, in the advancing armies, the battle formations of the divisions of the first echelon were compacted, the offensive lanes were narrowed.

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surveys, orientation on the terrain was carried out with the help of topographers, and interaction and management were organized. However, the commander of the front and the commander of the armies, modifying the tasks, directions of strikes and

gov formations, offensive operations were carried out according to the previous scheme. As a result, the troops for 12 days 'stubbornly, straightforwardly and skillfully directed to strike in the forehead, led the brie in an unchanged grouping' (emphasis added. - Auth.). barriers and wrecked tanks as armored firing points

On September 12, the "invincible" Zhukov reported to Stalin that nothing had worked out for him:

"Moscow, 'gov. Stalin.

...2. We do not stop the offensive launched by the 1st, 24th and 66th armies and carry it out persistently. In the ongoing campaign, as we informed you about it, all the forces and means of the club participate,

We failed to connect with the Stalingraders because we turned out to be weaker than the enemy in artillery and aviation fire. Our 1st Guards the army that launched the offensive first did not have a single reinforcement artillery regiment, not a single anti-tank regiment, or air defense.

The situation near Stalingrad forced us to bring the 24th and 66th armies into action on 5.9, not expecting their complete reinforcement from the center and the approach of artillery ...

Takos, the entry into the battle of the armies in parts and without means of reinforcement gave us the opportunity to break through the enemy defenses and connect with the Stalingraders, but on the other hand, our quick blow forced the enemy to turn away from



Stalingrad, his main forces are against our grouping. which eased the situation of Stalingrad, which without this blow would have been taken by the enemy "

A special anger of the Staliyugrad Front on this day sent his report to the capital. It s00b happened in it

"In the past 3 days, despite the issuance by the front headquarters of a number of orders to advance, break through the enemy's defenses and connect both groups, the leading staff of the headquarters do not believe in the reality of their own orders and believe that the troops, in their current state, will not be able to break through the enemy's defenses .

Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Kramar, deputy chief of the operational department of the front headquarters, said: "I do not believe in the reality of the order."

In the divisions of the 1st Guards Army, there are heavy losses,  
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"Having eased the situation," Zhukov drove off back to Moscow. Between tcm, Paulus ns only successfully repulsed the onslaught of four Soviet armies on his left flank, but the next day after Zhukovsky's report he began the assault on Stalingrad.

Heavy fighting in the Samofalovka and Yertzovka sectors continued until the end of October. Our troops attacked incessantly, but the only thing they managed to achieve was to force Paulus to turn part of his forces on the front.

Our commanders explained their failure, as usual, by the numerical superiority of the enemy. The chief marshal of the armored forces, Rotmistrov, reports that "the German-Faiist command withdrew some tank and motorized divisions from the Stalingrad direction and threw them towards us." It's hard to argue with the marshal and doctor of military spiders, only Paulus had only one tank and two motorized divisions here, and all of them were part of the corps of General Hube, who kept a semicircular defense on the northern flank of the 6th Army.

According to the memoirs of Marshal Moskalenko, already for the first time during the battle, he found out that the enemy had "...a huge superiority in forces and means, especially artillery, tanks and aviation." And how, with such a correlation of forces, was he going to "cut off" and "destroy" it?

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You can also ask the following question: how are three Germans:

did the divisions, which did not leave the battle for a month and a half, with 200 tanks, manage to have a "tremendous superiority" over twenty fresh Soviet divisions supported by 500 tanks? Without thinking about this paradox, Marshal Moskalenko announced that the Soviet offensive was not only successful, but was "one of the most brilliant pages (!!!) of the epic of the city on the Volga."

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Summing up the results of the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, one can say with sovereignty that the Soviet military leadership mediocly lost. For two months, Paulus and Goebbels carried out a successful offensive, having at their disposal 18 German and 4 Romanian divisions, including 3 tank and 3 motorized. [generals Gerd von Eremenko, Vasilevsky and Zhukov for the same 2 months, with the care of Comrade Stalin, were able to bring into battle in the Stalingrad region more than 60 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 12 separate tank brigades, several separate tank battalions, about 2500 tanks The 13th Panzer Corps alone was completed four times in three months up to its regular strength, received during this time and again lost 550 combat vehicles.

And now the enemy stands on the banks of the Volga, adorned with big stars and kilograms of orders, the commanders tell the memory of tales about the fourfold and sixfold superiority of the enemy and that "the fierce battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad ... Soviet military commanders learned a lot in the chest school from modern warfare ".

On the one hand, one can sympathize with Comrade Stalin, on the other hand, he raised these cadres himself.

\*TIME IS BLOOD"

On September 1, Paulus and Weichs arrived at Hitler's headquarters near Vinnitsa. At the meeting, the Fuhrer demanded

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< the quickest capture of Stalingrad and at the end said: "The Russians are on the verge of exhaustion of their forces. The resistance near Stalingrad should be assessed only as a local matter. They are no longer capable of retaliatory actions of a strategic nature, which could be dangerous for us. In addition, the northern flank on the Don will receive significant reinforcements from the Allies. Under these circumstances, I do not see a serious danger for the stern flank. As for the rest, you need to take care of it in order to quickly take the city into your own hands, and to prevent it from turning into everything devouring

focus for a long time (emphasis ours. - Auth). The commander of the 6th Army asked for an additional three divisions and promised to manage in ten days.

There was no need for a personal point of view in this, since the main strategic goal - securing the northeastern flank during an attack on the Caucasus - was achieved. German troops reached the Volga, and it could no longer be used as a waterway, and Stalingrad ceased to be a communications hub. Its industrial enterprises were partly evacuated, partly destroyed. Taking possession of the city itself changed nothing.

The task assigned to Paulus was thus of a tactical nature, but had enormous propaganda significance: "As long as the Russians were fighting west of the Volga, Stalin could assert the heroic defense of his city. Hitler did not want to rest until his troops captured the last piece of land called Stalingrad. Politics, propaganda and sentiments prevailed over the sober assessment of the commander. True, the German high command believed that the operation would not take much time. b

On September 12, German troops were at Kiskhod near the wall of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and 3-4 km from the city center. Paulus decided to start the assault on Stalingrad by capturing its northern and central regions. For this, it was planned to apply simultaneously

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but 2 powerful blows and break through to the Volga. For this purpose, two groups were concentrated: one - consisting of the 295th, 71st, 94th infantry and 34th tank divisions - in the area east of the village of Gumrak, the other - silt of the 14th tank, 29th motorized and 20th infantry Romanian divisions - in the Upper Elshanka area. The task seemed simple: to pass 5-10 km by failure and throw the Russians into the river.

At this point, German troops reached the Volga in the Kuporosnoye area and completely isolated the 62nd Army. The EU defense front with a length of 95 km passed from the right bank of the Volga near the village of Rynok, through Orlovka, east of Gorodishche and Razgulyaevka, Sadovaya, Kuporosnaya. The maximum distance from the bank of the Volga near Orlovka was 10 km. The entire burden of the task of defending the central part of Stalingrad and the factory districts fell on the army. On September 5, General Lopatin was dismissed from his post, proposing to withdraw the troops beyond the Volga.

General Chuikov was appointed the new commander of the 62nd Army. In the troops subordinate to him, there were 12 rifle divisions (33rd and 35th guards,

87, 98, 112, 131, 196, 229, 244, 315, 399 and 10th rifle division of the NKVD), 7 rifle (10, 38, 42, 115, 124, 129. 145th) and 5 tank brigades, 20th fighter brigade, 12 artillery and mortar regiments. However, many divisions were smaller in number than a battalion - 250-1000 bayonets, the total number of the 85th guards, together with attached units, was 664 people, the 23rd tank corps had 40-50 tanks, of which 30% were used as fixed objective points. The 10th division of the NKVD (7,500 men) and separate rifle brigades were more or less complete. In total, the 62nd Army had about 54,000 men, 900 guns and mortars, and 110 tanks in mid-September. There was no elbow connection with the neighbors, the flanks of the army rested on the Volga. The Germans firmly held air supremacy.

5%

The forces of Paulus' 6th Army in this zone are estimated by Soviet sources at 100,000 soldiers and officers, about 2,000 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and assault guns. According to former generals of the Wehrmacht: "The German armies began this struggle so weakened that, under normal conditions, one could say about them that they were "exhausted by battles." Companies rarely numbered more than 60 men, tank divisions only 60-80 serviceable tanks. But the forces of the Russian 62nd Army were so exhausted at the beginning of September that there were no reserves in the entire area of the city.

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On September 13, the Germans launched an assault. They delivered the main blow in the direction of Mamaev Kurgan with the forces of the 295th Infantry Division and the railway station - the 76th and 71st divisions. On the first day, they only succeeded in pushing the Soviet units a little. In the evening, the front commander ordered Chuikov to drive the enemy out of the occupied sectors and restore the situation. On September 14, at 3.30, units of the 62nd Army went over to a counterattack, which did not bring success. By 12 o'clock the Germans concentrated 5 divisions on a narrow section of the front and delivered a strong blow. Hundreds of planes supported them from the air. Fighting flared up in the streets of the city. This day became one of the most difficult for the defenders of Stalingrad. In Chuikov's description, which repeats the invariable clichés of our memoirists, the Wehrmacht soldiers looked like a bunch of blunt villains:

"Despite the enormous losses, the invaders went ahead. Columns of infantry in cars and tanks broke into the city. Apparently, the Nazis believed that his fate had been decided, and each of them sought to

but rather reach the Volga, the center of the city, and profit from trophies there. Our fighters ... saw drunken Nazis jumping off cars, playing harmonicas and dancing on the sidewalks. Fascists perished

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or hundreds, but fresh waves of reserves flooded the streets more and more.

On the left bank of the Volga, the defenders were supported by 250 guns and heavy mortars of the front-line artillery group - 6 artillery and mortar regiments, artillery of the 2nd tank corps, anti-aircraft artillery of the Stalingrad air defense corps area, 4 rocket artillery regiments, according to enemy troops that broke into the city from their own fifty guns fired the ships of the Volga military flotilla.

By the end of the day, the "drunk Nazis" had seized the railway station, knocking out the sober Stalinists from there, and hung up Mamaev Kurgan, which dominated all of Stalingrad and the left bank of the Volga. The battle took place 800 meters from the command post of the 62nd Army, located in the gully of the Tsaritsa River at its mouth. There was a threat of the enemy's exit to the central crossing. There were almost no troops in the center near Chuikov - in the area of the station, the defense kept blocking the 62nd Army. Fierce fighting also unfolded on the left flank, in the area of the suburb of Minin, which was attacked by the Libyans of Goth.

The situation was saved by the 13th Guards Rifle Division, Major General A.I. Rodimtsev, who had 10 thousand fighters. She immediately entered the battle and knocked out the enemy from the city center. By noon on September 16, with a blow from the 39th Guards Regiment, the Germans were thrown off Mamaev Kurgan, Ataka, according to the description of the commander of the 1st battalion, I.I. Isakov, was, one might say, mental: "Let's go in chains. Our attack from the side did not look real. It was not preceded by either artillery preparation or air strikes. Slippers did not support us either. No one ran across, did not lie down - the fighters walked and walked ... The enemy opened machine-gun fire. You could see people falling in chains. Some of them got up and moved forward again... The mound passed into our hands... True, in a relatively short time of attack - and it lasted an hour and a half

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two - we suffered very tangible losses. There could have been much fewer killed and wounded if we had been supported by artillery. We were armed only with rifles, submachine guns, machine guns and mortars."

Until the evening, the guards beat off 12 counterattacks. The 295th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht also suffered heavy losses.

The first days of the defense were especially difficult for Chuikov, not only because of the superiority of the enemy, but also because of the lack of any organization. While the chiefs of all levels, including the commanders of individual formations, hastily departed to the left bank of the Volga, Chuikov, the day before the enemy assault, was thrown on the right bank to receive a defeated, scattered, unfamiliar army in an unfamiliar position and together with this army follow the leader's order: "Don't surrender Stalingrad!",

Although there was little doubt in the Kremlin, as well as in Berlin, that the days of Stalingrad were numbered, for Chuikov and all the troops remaining in the city, Stalin's order 03- began that there was no place for them beyond the Volga. All that was left was to fight to the last man, gaining valuable time, and "time is different," as Vasily Ivanovich himself later put it. In this spirit, explanatory work was carried out with subordinates.

At the same time, the city was not prepared for defense in advance: there were no fortifications, barriers, firing points, the barricades hastily built on the streets looked frivolous, the city ruins became a real obstacle to the advancing Germans. And the more ruins became in Stalingrad through the efforts of the German artillery and aviation, the more shelters the defenders found. .

Warehouses of ammunition, medicines, foodstuffs were taken out of the city (!?). For this reason, after a day of battle, Rodimtsev's division, which had lost 30% of its personnel, found itself without cartridges. Ammunition and food now had to be brought back through the only working ferry and

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only at night. There was no time and no one to take care of the wounded, vehicles for their transfer to the left bank were not allocated. The lightly wounded fighters made rafts, loaded the seriously wounded on them and independently swam across the Volga. The current carried the rafts down the river, where the wounded dispersed through the villages in search of help.

"Combat losses, waste, lack of ammunition and food, difficulties in replenishing people and equipment - all this negatively affected the morale of the troops. Some had a desire to leave the Volga as soon as possible, to escape from hell," recalls Chuikov.

Therefore, the NKVD detachments inspected all the departing ships and patrolled the city, detaining

So, from September 13 to September 15, 1218 servicemen were detained near the special department of the army. There were quite numerous cases of going over to the side of the enemy.

On two fronts of the Stalingrad government, 41 detachment operated, which from August 1 to October 15 detained 51,758 servicemen who had fled from the front line.

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The bitterness of both sides steadily grew, the battle took on an almost apocalyptic character never seen before. Survivors unanimously called it "Stalingrad hell": "Thunder of shooting, howling of mines, spas of ranks and bombs, the whistle of bullets from revolutionary engines became so common near Stalingrad and in the city itself that it seemed that it could not be otherwise. Etogadsky thunder constantly pressed on your ears and bent you to the ground. But at night, however, everything was quiet. Respite was needed, and we, and the enemy, to prepare under the cover of those notes for new, even more cruel battles. At night, on our side and on the enemy side, they fed personnel, brought ammunition, assisted the wounded, and, if possible, evacuated damaged equipment.

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The Nazis were very close, because the no man's land is negligibly narrow. The groans of the wounded could be heard here and there. The shovels of the funeral komaidu nihiu us clinked.

But soon there will be no quiet nights, no funeral teams - only a round-the-clock merciless fight.

On the southern outskirts of Stalingrad, from September 17 to September 20, there were battles for the tallest elevator building in this part of the city, which was defended by a battalion of guards of the 35th division. Not only the elevator as a whole, but also its individual floors and storage facilities changed hands several times. Colonel Dubyansky reported by telephone to General Chuikov; "The situation has changed. Previously, we were at the top of the elevator, and the Yemsians were at the bottom. Now we drove the Germans out from below, but they got to the top, and there, in the upper part of the elevator, there is a fight.

There were dozens and hundreds of such stubbornly defending objects in the city; inside them, with varying success, a struggle was waged for weeks for every room, for every ledge, for every flight of stairs. Until September 27, a fierce battle went on for the station. Thirteen times passed from hand to hand, each assault cost hundreds of lives to both sides, the Germans, who suffered significant losses in the first dashing attacks, began

change tactics. Attacks were now carried out in small areas, within one or two quarters, by the forces of a regiment or battalion, supported by 3-5 tanks. The streets and squares became the scene of bloody battles, which did not subside until the end of the battle.

"It was truly a titanic struggle of man against man," writes General von Butlar, "in which the German grenadiers and sappers, who had all the modern weapons at their disposal, slowly made their way through the city by street fighting. Such large factories as the factory to them. Dzerzhinsky, "Red Barricades" and "Red October". I had to storm separately and for several days. The city turned into a sea of fire and smoke. dust and debris. He absorbed the streams of German and Russian

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blood, gradually turning into the Verdun of the Second World War ... the Russians fought with fanatical tenacity ... The losses on both sides were enormous.

On the night of September 18, Chuikov's command post was relocated to the banks of the Volga near the central Persian right. To do this, they had to cross over to the eastern bank, rise above the current of the river and surmount to the western bank. During this move, the NKVD managed to sack the deputy chief of artillery of the army, Colonel Belyakov, "for anti-Soviet agitation" and "espionage" (?).

In the area of the central crossing, as elsewhere in Stalingrad, hell was going on. Machine tools, motors and other factory equipment that had not been evacuated were piled up on the sandbanks. At the edge of the shore stood half-broken barges. In the morning, after dark, enemy aircraft circled over the Volga, and at night artillery opened fire. The berths and approaches to them were under fire from cannons and 6-barreled mortars all day long. The delivery of troops and cargo for the 62nd Army was complicated to the limit. The units that managed to cross over during the night had to be immediately disengaged and put in position, and the cargoes were distributed to the troops, otherwise they were destroyed by bombing the next morning. During the day, the wounded crawled down the bank and waited for the evening; there were doctors, and hundreds of people died without medical care. The corpses were not removed, they were hit by cars.

Here, as a warning to the newly arrived policemen, they shot spies, cowards, crossbowmen, deserters, regardless of their titles, up to regimental commanders and commissars. On September 19-20, a detachment of the special department of the army detained 184 people, of which 21 were shot, 40 were arrested, and the rest were sent to the front line. In total, in September, on the orders of special departments in the 62nd Army,



but 195 servicemen, and in addition, "in some cases, correctly instructed agents themselves dealt with cowards and alarmists on the spot."

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These days, the 95th and 284th rifle divisions, the 137th tank and 92nd marine brigade joined the army. The headquarters of the completely "used up" regiments were taken in turn behind the Volga, received replenishment and returned to their positions again.

According to Marshal F.I. Golikova: "In September, new reserves of the Stavka began to arrive intensively. Brigade by brigade, division by division. In September, the 62nd Army received seven fresh full-blooded divisions and five separate rifle brigades ... during September, nine bloodless divisions were withdrawn from the 62nd Army for restoration ... The army's equipment of weapons has grown dramatically.

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The first week of fighting showed the Soviet commanders that in the city the defending troops could inflict much greater losses on the enemy than the counterattacks of troops advancing across open steppe terrain. Nevertheless, in order to provide assistance to the Gralians, the Headquarters decided to launch a new counterattack from the north and restore the front line from the 62nd Army. To organize this, General Zhukov again arrived to help Gorodov. The Nopos offensive was planned to be carried out by the forces of the] th Guards and 24th armies, but in a different sector - south of the Kotluban station. The 1st Guards was actually re-formed: having transferred its zone to its neighbors, Moskalenko's headquarters was redeployed to the junction of the 4th Panzer and 24th Armies, where it received 8 new divisions, concentrated on a 12-kilometer front. The army was reinforced by the RGK artillery: 4th, 7th and 16th tank corps, which replenished their materiel; three separate tank brigades and had the task of striking from the Kotluban region in the general direction of Gumrak, destroying the opposing enemy and linking up with Chuikov's troops.

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In the first echelon, the 3rd, 12th and 148th tank brigades, as well as formations of Rotmistrov's 7th tank corps, advanced with the task of direct infantry support. The 4th and 16th tank corps constituted a mobile group

puarmy, we are tasked to develop the success of the first echelon. At the same time, the 16th Corps of General A.G. Maslova was supposed to be introduced after the 4th corps, commanded by General A.G. Kravchenko.

The enemy to the south of Kotluban had positions convenient for defense and who managed to strengthen them strongly. The front line of defense passed along the ridges of the dominating heights, they covered the firing positions of artillery and all movements in the depth of the defense. The surrounding area from these heights was visible for many kilometers. The defense here was held by the German 60th, 3rd motorized and 79th infantry divisions, the Soviet troops were again facing a frontal attack on the bare steppe.

The offensive began on the 18th of September. But early in the morning, as in the beginning of September, the German artillery was the first to speak, opening fire on the places of concentration of Soviet troops - the Germans were ready to meet. Then Moskalenko's army conducted an hour and a half artillery preparation, and the Soviet tank brigades attacked the front line of the defense of the progivnik. Overcoming stubborn resistance, they advanced 1-1.5 km and managed to climb the ridges of the heights. But it was not possible to crack the defense to its entire depth.

In order to increase the force of the blow, at 14 o'clock the commander brought into battle the 4th tank corps and two divisions of the second echelon. However, they were late with access to the "Big Ridge", At 18 o'clock the German infantry, reinforced by 50 tanks, launched a counterattack and dropped the heights of the hardened and not entrenched units of the 308th and 316th rifle divisions. By this time, the Soviets of the Chinese tanks had been knocked out, the escort artillery had fallen behind in the morning, and the headquarters had lost control.

Diary of Captain Loringofen: "Russian attack

whether from kolm, our units were on the slope. For two days they followed the same route. Great goals! Then we burned at least a hundred tanks."

Over the next four days, the Soviet divisions were constantly rushing to storm the heights, but again they failed to capture the ridge. On September 23, the 16th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. However, his formations could not reach the goal either, attacking the enemy head-on in the same sectors and directions, where for several days they tried to break through the defenses of the 4th and 7th corps.

These days, Rokossovsky was at the command post next to Tordov, observing the work of the front commander, and "convinced that he was very ardent and tried to instill more fear in his subordinates. This was evident from the telephone conversations that Gorlov had with the army commanders ... It is no coincidence that the command staff of the front, which the junior officers later heard about,

schat, christened his management "obscene."

By the end of the month, the offensive fizzled out. The troops suffered heavy losses, but they could not break through the defense against the nickname. The indefatigable Moskalenko reports that this time, too, he "fettered" someone and "bled" them by force.

The 1st Guards Army was disbanded, and what was left of it was transferred to the 24th Army. Having lost 3 sets of military equipment in 3 months, General Rotmistrov "thought deeply" about the fact that "it's time for us, first of all senior commanders, to learn to fight grimacingly, with knowledge of the matter ... Poorly successful conduct ... counterattack in the presence of a large mass of tanks "detailed by a slight ability to use large tank formations (our italics. - Auth.) ...

..even having data on the enemy, the main losses were incurred not during the breakthrough of the front line of the enemy defense, but during the battle in this depth, when the interaction of slippers with artillery and infantry was disrupted and there was no air support. The trouble here was primarily that our gunners from

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Amid the flames and smoke, under the continuous fire of machine guns, artillery and tanks, under the bombing attacks of enemy aircraft, the guards fought to the death, defending every street. every house. Violent hand-to-hand fights broke out every now and then. It truly was hell. I have not been in one battle, but in such a fight I happened to participate for the first time.

In order to restore the situation, the next day, Chuikov threw the newly arrived 284th division, Lieutenant Colonel N.F., into a counterattack. Batyuka (10 thousand people). At the entrance of the 2nd fierce fighting, the enemy offensive from the area of the central pier to the north was halted. But they failed to connect with the 42nd and 92nd rifle brigades operating across the Tsaritsa River. Their remnants retreated across the Volga, and the headquarters were the first to abandon their troops and flee from the battlefield. Subsequently, the commanders and commissars of both brigades were sentenced to capital punishment.

Having untied their hands on the southern flank, the Germans began

decorate from there parts to Mamaepu kurganui to the north,

To restore the supply of the Chuikovites, new piers and water communications were urgently organized: the first in the Verkhnyaya Akhtuba region, the second in the Skurdi region, and the third in the Tumak region. From here, on the ships and vessels of the Volga flotilla and on boats,

PS were transported to the piers near the Krasny Oktyabr plant and the village of Spartanovka. A pedestrian bridge on iron barrels was built from the Barry Kady plant to Zaitsevsky Island, and a boat crossing operated between the island and the left bank of the Volga. Rifle brigades operating along the Tsaritsa River were supplied independently through Golodny Island. In total, during the defense, about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, 11429 tons of cargo, 1975 boxes of mines, 404 vehicles, etc. were transported to the right bank.

On the evening of September 24, the fighting in the center of the city began to subside, the first crisis was overcome by the 62nd Army.

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"The period of the battle for the Stalingrad industrial region that began in mid-September," writes [ns Doerr, "can be called a positional or "fortified" war. The time for carrying out large-scale operations has passed, the war has moved from the expanses of the steppes to the heights of the Volga region, cut by ravines with copses and beams, to the factory district of Stalingrad, located on uneven, pitted, persecuted terrain, overgrown with buildings made of iron, stone and stone. The kilometer, as a measure of length, was replaced by the meter, the map of the general staff by the plan of the city,

For every house, workshop, water tower, railway embankment, wall, burned down and, finally, for every heap of ruins, a fierce struggle was waged, which had no equal even during the First World War with its gigantic consumption of ammunition. The distance between our troops and the enemy was extremely small. Despite the massive actions of aviation and artillery, it was impossible to leave the close combat area. The Russians were superior to the Germans in the use of terrain and camouflage, and were more experienced in barricade fighting for individual houses; they occupied other defenses ... The positional war came unexpectedly for the German troops, the losses in people and equipment were incommensurable with the successes, which were calculated in square meters of the occupied area (our italics, - Avt.) ".

At the expense of experience, the German general turned down, where did the Red Army get the experience of barricade battles from? We didn't even know how to dig trenches, and cities had never been defended until that moment.

City buildings crushed the battle formations of the advancing German divisions and directed their forces along the streets. Soviet units held especially strong buildings, created strongholds in them.

with numerous garrisons capable of conducting an all-round defense in the event of encirclement. During ar

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During the Tillerian aviation training of the enemy, the "Chuikovites" closely approached any positions, deliberately going to the closest battle. The defenders of the city were the first in the Red Army to master the methods of defensive actions: they learned to let German tanks pass over them - under the fire of anti-tank artillery and armor-piercers, to cut off infantry with fire, to strengthen lines, to use engineering barriers, to use snipers en masse, to disguise themselves, to maneuver covertly and suddenly counterattack. According to Isakov's observation: "Here, for the first time in the war, the soldiers began to put on helmets: during the shelling, the bricks, falling from the upper floors, inflicted severe injuries, and even killed them."

The situation in Stalingrad developed in such a way that the Red Army soldiers received the kind of freedom they had seen before, left without "prominent commanders" who drove off across the Volga. The biggest boss was the battalion commander, who fought and died nearby. There were also real front-line commanders who had to risk their lives every minute and make their own decisions. The soldiers understood the situation and led their commanders - this is very important!

General Eremenko in the defense of Stalingrad, by and large, played the role of chief of logistics, providing supplies for the 62nd Army, and did it well. Chuikov and the Chuikovites, the Commander, however, like the Bolsheviks of Stalin's nominees, according to the memoirs of Gsisral Laskip, was cool, appreciated the "real warriors" and did not like the Chiggabs, "he was unfair with his officers." This diplomatic language is translated simply: Chuikov could easily knock out the teeth of the chief of staff of any division for a report he did not like. And of course, "he was merciless with panixras and cowards."

Severns of the city of Zhukov. Gorlov, Moskalenko, Malinovskaya were driven by a senseless untrained herd (new recruits underwent 12 days of training!)

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massacre tens of thousands of soldiers and did not advance a single magician. In Stalingrad, in the conditions of street fights, daily fights of small groups, individual fighters, the individual qualities of each fighter, his desire to survive and win, acquired importance. And even in these incredibly difficult conditions

Aisov to survive and it made more sense than in Zhukovsky attacks. It was then that the pastoral natural qualities of the Russian soldier manifested themselves, and not only endless patience and the ability to "endure all the hardships and deprivations of the military service."

"It was necessary to constantly come up with something new," Krylov recalls. "And that's what the Warmia Uplechenio did. even with sazar, a lot of people - from senior commanders and staff officers to ordinary soldiers, Ulyudei aggravated a sense of personal responsibility for the result of the battle, developed initiative, the ability to dare, the soldiers learned to think like a commander (our italics. - Auth.) ". Colonel Isakov writes about the same: "Each attack required its own decision and was not much like the previous ones. Naturally, in such a variety of conditions, the role of section commanders, commanders of airborne divisions and companies increased immeasurably. Often they had to act independently, sometimes even in isolation from other units. Therefore, initiative, ingenuity and resourcefulness acquired more and more importance. The sniper movement became widespread. Such "noble shooters" as Zaitsev, Chekhov, Ilyin, Passar became "cult figures" in (Stalingrad).

It seems that Sergeant Ya.F. Pavlov, Senior Lieutenant I.I. Naumov or commander of the 3rd battalion of the 42nd garr "deysky rifle regiment, captain A.E. Zhukov, pansli to the troops of Paulus much more than the dignitary of the same name of the latter, at much lower "costs",

Victor Nekrasov also recalls the literally transformation of the fighters in the conditions of Stalingrad: "... the reinforcements were sometimes simply miserable. Across the river

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redirected - with great difficulty - say, twenty new soldiers. They were either elderly people aged 50-55, or 18- or 19-year-old youths. They stood on the shore, shivering with cold and fear. They were given warm clothes and sent to the front line. By the time the newcomers got there, the German shells had managed to destroy five or ten out of twenty - after all, German flares were constantly hanging over the Volga and over our positions, so that there was never complete darkness. But what is amazing is that those of the recruits who nevertheless made it to PS Relova very quickly became extremely hardened soldiers - real front-line soldiers! ., the battle for Stalingrad was a triumph and the greatest glory of the Russian infantry.

The tactics of conducting modern street combat were born: along with platoons and squads, new tactical units appeared - small in number,

mobile and powerful assault groups, armed with automatic weapons, knives, grenades, tolovye charges, ogismets and ampulomsts. They were followed by reinforcement groups with heavy machine guns, light mortars, mines and anti-tank rifles. "We did not create any iggat assault units. The question was put like this: everyone should be able to storm!" (To be fair, let's clarify: the Ismians were the first to start acting: they acted in small assault groups, and the aedyons invented them back in 1918.)

No wonder two and a half years later, during the storming of Berlin, Chuikov's guardsmen were at the forefront of the main attack of the 1st White Russian Front.

Unfortunately, forty years later, in 1996, this experience was forgotten. The generals of the new generation again preferred to study "by the method of poking", paying for education with the blood of a Russian soldier. And nsky was, planning the capture of Grozny, to force Marshal Grachev to at least read a book.

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On September 16, by order of Army Group B, Paulus became responsible for the entire course of operations in Stalipgrad. The 48th Panzer Corps, which was part of the Goth Panzer Army, was reassigned to the 6th Army. In the area west of Orlovka, the 24th infantry division of the heperal fop Lensky and the shining ' of the northern sector of the 389th infantry division of Magnus were transferred. The 295th infantry division of Mr. Neral Kortes was sent to the center from the district north of Gorodishche. The regrouping of troops was carried out in such a way as to concentrate their main efforts against the center and the northern part of the city,

From September 27 to October 4, active hostilities were conducted in the northern outskirts of the settlements of the Kraspy Oktyabr and Barrikady barricades, and on October 4, behind these factories themselves. At the same time, the Germans were pasturing in the center on Mamaev Kurgan and on the extreme right flag of the 62nd Army in the Orlovka area.

By the evening of September 27, Mamaev Kurgan fell. An extremely difficult situation developed in the district of the mouth of the Tsaritsa River, where the 42nd, 95th rifle high brigades and the regiment of the 10th division were defending. Having suffered heavy losses, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition and food, losing control, they withstood the onslaught of the enemy and began to cross over to the left bank of the Volga in scattered groups.

By September 30, Paulus managed to

eliminate the Oryol ledge.

The 62nd Army responded with counterattacks by the newly arrived 39th Guards, 193rd and 308th Rifle Divisions. Reinforcements were regularly brought in to Chuikov, but they were melting away with a thud. 193rd division of General F.N. Ridiculously, the vase lost 4/5 of its composition for six days of fighting, from the 13th and 35th guards, the 10th division of the NKVD, which fought in the city for two weeks, only the headquarters remained. The strength of most German divisions fell to the level of the regiment.

On September 28, the Headquarters formed a new front - Dopskoy. It included almost all the armies of Stalingrals

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of which front, except for the 62nd, the Front occupied a line along the Don River from Pavlovsk to Kachalinskaya and further to Yerzovka on the Volga. General K.K. was appointed commander. Rokos sovskiy; General Yurodov went to receive the 33rd Army, he no longer commanded the fronts. At the same time, from the composition of the South-Eastern Front, whose troops fought in the city and the south, the Stalingrad Front was formed under the command of General A.I. Eremenko. Each front was directly subordinated to the Stavka.

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In the first days of October, Chuikov's army defended itself along a front 25 km long and 200 m to 2.5 km deep. On this narrow coastal strip, completely shot through by the enemy, the movement of units and subunits could only be carried out at night. The maneuver from the depths was practically impossible due to the lack of permanent crossings across the Volga. When the Germans occupied the city areas south of the Tsaritsa River to Kuporosnoye, to the north they reached the top of Mamaev Kurgan, they began to view and shoot through the entire territory held by the defenders of Stalingrad, as well as the front across the Volga, In the "devil's domes" - water tanks at the top of the mound - German observers and spotters of artillery fire settled for a long time.

From that moment on, the area of the tractor plant became the direction of the main blow. From the north and north-west, the group of Colonel S.F. defended it. Yurokhov as part of the 124th, 149th rifle brigades and a regiment of the 10th division. From the west, the approaches to the plant were defended by the 12th Rifle Division. In the area of the village of Barrikada, the 308th rifle division of Colonel L.N. Gurtiev. The 193rd Rifle fought for the village of Krasny Oktyabr. 33rd Guards Division under the command of Major General S.S. Guryeva continued to repulse enemy attacks on the Krasny Oktyabr plant. The fierceness of the struggle grew. Paulus



built up forces in the area. Chuikov quit on October 5

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to the tractor fresh reinforcements - the 37th Guards Division of Major General V.G. Zheludev and the 84th Tank Brigade (49 tanks) of Colonel D.N. Belov. The left bank was continuously fired by the front-line artillery group, in separate areas of defense 62- The density of artillery was brought to the 1st Army by 110 barrels per kilometer of the front.

Chuikov's troops continued to hold the line: the market of the settlement and tractor plant - the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr plants - the northeastern slopes of Mamaeva Kurgapa - the railway station. The losses of the 6th Army assumed catastrophic proportions: 535 people remained in the 94th Infantry Division, the 76th Division was almost completely knocked out. The Germans were bogged down in heavy fighting on the streets of Stalingrad and its surrounding areas. By the end of the first decade of October, the attacks began to weaken.

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More than 200 thousand inhabitants remained in the city turned into ruins. In the occupied areas, the Germans organized two commandant's offices and began the mass eviction of civilians from Stalingrad to Kalach, Gumrak and the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. About 60,000, according to Soviet data, were taken out for forced labor in the Russian Empire and Ukraine, more than 3,000. shot and executed. Approximately 12-15 thousand people remained in the occupied territory to serve the needs of the German army.

In addition, thousands of women and children hid in the ruins of houses, basements, in the sewerage system, in caves dug out on the Volga slopes (about 35 local residents lived in the basements of the famous "Pavlov's house", who helped the garrison "dig communication channels, and sometimes they picked up a submachine gun or a rifle"). Getting food and drinking water was almost impossible. At night, the children who became the main breadwinners made their way to the river for water or to the burnt granaries, where they could make their living.

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with burnt grain. Many of them became victims of German sentries or Soviet snipers. "The main food of the population robbed to the limit during this period was the meat and skin of killed and fallen animals," says a memorandum addressed to L. Beria, "that

led to mass deaths, diseases and swelling due to starvation and exhaustion.

People, of course, perished and died in the hundreds. Strikingly different - about 8 thousand survived after five months of the Battle of Stalingrad.

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On October 14, 1942, Hitler ordered his troops to switch to strategic defense on the entire Soviet-German front, except for the Sgalingrad direction, as well as in the areas of Nalchik and Tuapse. Thus, the Fuhrer recognized the collapse of all his strategic plans. The war was already lost, and from a military point of view it did not matter who got the ruins of the city on the Volga. But it was a city named after Stalin, and the capture of it became the paramount task of the Wehrmacht.

In mid-October, Paulus was preparing for the final assault. He concentrated three infantry and two tank divisions in the area of the factories on a 5-kilometer stretch, here he decided to strike again. Reinforcements, engineer and anti-tank units were drawn in from all ends of the front, from the flanks. 5 sapper battalions arrived from Germany by air. Before the front of the 62nd Army, 8 German divisions, numbering 90 thousand soldiers and officers, with 2300 guns and 300 tanks, were replenished and prepared for battle. The 14th Panzer and 29th Motorized Divisions were put into reserve. The assault was supposed to support the 8th Air Corps in full force.

Chuikov at that time had 55,000 men, 1,400 guns and mortars, and 80 tanks. The 8th Air Army did not count 188 serviceable combat aircraft.

There were coming days unprecedented even for Stalingrad in terms of the cruelty of the battles.

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On the morning of October 14, after powerful German air raids and artillery preparation, which lasted two and a half hours, ground troops went on the offensive, their main forces - three infantry and two tank divisions - rushed to the Volga in a 4-kilometer section between the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and "Barricade mi", seeking to dismember the 62nd Army and destroy it. There was not a single Soviet aircraft in the air. Chuikov managed to get through to the commander of the 8th Air Army and "asked to calm down the fascist vultures a little. General Khryukin said frankly that there was nothing to help now. The enemy tightly blocked the airfields of the army. It is still impossible for our Asiapia to break through to Stalin's tradition ... On that day, we did not see the sun

tsa". Literally everyone writes about the helplessness of Soviet aviation, while 3b aviation divisions were involved in the Stalingrad direction!

The main blow fell on the 112th, 308th rifle and 37th guards divisions. By 4 p.m., these formations, dismembered and outflanked by enemy tanks, were fighting in encirclement.

"Information from the troops was contradictory," recalls Chuikov. It became more and more difficult to clarify them. Command and observation posts of regiments and divisions were destroyed by shells and bombs. Many commanders have died. At the command post of the army, 80 people died. The guards of the army headquarters did not have time to dig people out of the broken dugouts ... "

The chief of staff of the army, General Krylov, believed that "the situation of the army had never been so difficult", it was very close to complete destruction.

On October 15, the Germans managed to seize the tractor plant and break through to the Volga, cutting the 62nd Army in half. Soviet formations operating north of the plant were cut off from the main forces. They united in a group of about 7,000 fighters, under the command of Colonel S.F. Gorokhov. Having taken all-round defense in the Rynok area,

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Spartanovka, a group supplied with ammunition by air, fought off enemy attacks until the end of the battle.

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About himself, Chuikov repeatedly and modestly repeats that he never, even in the most difficult situation, had the thought of crossing to the left bank of the Volga: "I personally did not think about moving to the opposite bank, I considered it impossible even to move to one of the islands ... Once K.A. Gurov told me that he had several boats in reserve for the Military Council of the Army. I answered him that this does not concern me, I will not get to the left bank if I am fully conscious.

Krylov also adheres to this version: "... the question of moving the command post that night did not arise ... The question of moving the command post was still not raised ... One thing remained clear: it was impossible to move away and nowhere."

But the laurels of the Stalingrad heroes haunted many. And our commanders are jealous of glory, like women. Therefore, Marshal Moskalenko with sympathy

(here, they say, how difficult it was for Chuikov), referring to the archi of the USSR Ministry of Defense, he cited in his memoirs the "correspondence" of the commander-62 with the front headquarters:

"To the Eastern Council of the Front. 10/14/42 9:40 pm.

The army is cut in two. The army headquarters is located 800 meters from the enemy. Management is only by radio through the radio center on the left bank of the river. Phone breaks all the time. I ask you to allow the perkiti of the main checkpoint on the left bank of the sk. at night, otherwise it is impossible to take (our italics. - Auth). Chuikov, Gurov, Lebedev, Krylov. Resolution of the chief of staff of the front: "Oper. otd. Com. front ordered KP 62A to remain on the western (right) bank of the river. Volga. Zakharov.

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"Tl. Eremenko, Khrushchev.

10/15/1942.

The enemy, having introduced new forces of infantry and tanks, is advancing on the northern group of Gorokhov. At the same time, it develops a blow to the south, Minusinsk approached.

37th and 95th Rifle Divisions, 200 men in total, cannot stop the enemy moving to the south of the 308th Rifle Division, which enters the CI.

The situation has become more complicated, It is impossible to stay further on the CP. Permit the passage of the checkpoint to the left bank, there is no other place (our italics. - Author),

Chuikov, Gurov, Krylov.

Front commander's resolution:

"T. Chuikov.

Remain the CP in Stalingrad. Take measures to cross the night from 15 to 16 of the 138th rifle division to the right bank of the river. Volga.

Eremenko.

So there were, there were moments when the desire to "escape from the hell" sometimes arose even for a knotted-toothed commander in white gloves. Interestingly, Krylov's entry "it's impossible to leave and there's nowhere to go" refers to October 16

rya and coincide with the resolution of the commander of the front.

On that day General Yeremysiko visited the command post of the 62nd Army. In this regard, Marshal Vasilevsky told Simonov the following story:

"According to my interlocutor, Eremenko, in particular, in the difficult days for Stalingrad, when everything hung in the air for Chuikov and when Stalin demanded through Vasilevsky that Eremenko go there, to the right bank of the Volga, to Chuikov and help, - just such the expression was used by Vasilevsky and, obviously, it was Stalin's expression - Yeremenko got away with it for two days and only the third day went down ... He knew how to get out and at the same time had a great ability to flatter. He did not like to get out of the dugout or the dungeon.

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An indirect confirmation is Krylov's story about this historic visit to the front commander: "I haven't seen Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko since I introduced myself to him two months ago, having flown to Stalingrad from the Caucasus. The front commander now behaved without much formality, but was gloomy. It is understandable: he arrived in the army, which in recent days has been in the most difficult, unequal battles, but still lost positions important for the front ... However, Eremenko did not ask the tractor.

= I came to see how you are alive here, - he said, entering the adit. And he added with a frankness and frankness that surprised me a little: "Comrade Stalin ordered you to visit yourself and report on what is going on here."

It must be said that in a short time, commanding the Bryansk Front and the 4th Shock Army, General Eremenko received two severe, painful wounds, he took over the leadership of the defense of Stalingrad while still on crutches - you will inevitably appreciate the convenience of the dugout. For all that, Stalin highly appreciated the actions of Yeremenko on the outskirts of Stalingrad, calling him "general of defense."

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After the capture of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Germans set the goal of defeating the main forces of the 62nd Army. On October 16, the Opi moved their shock fist to the south and launched an offensive along the Volga bersg. By this time, Chuikov's connections were very weak. In some divisions, for example, in the 37th Guards, 95th and others, there were only a few dozen

fighters, from the working detachment defending the Barricades plant - 5 people, the 112th rifle division numbered 598 people. The army used up its own reserves, it needed to be strengthened. On October 17, the 138th division of Colonel I.I. arrived in the army. Lyudnikov. She was transferred to the right bank

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ships of the Volga flotilla, Parts of the division immediately went into battle. From October 18, Paulus' ram began to noticeably lose its strength.

These battles were described by the historiographer of the 14th Panzer Division R Grams: "It was a terrible, exhausting struggle on the ground and under the ground, in ruins and cellars, in the ditches of a big city, in industrial districts ... Tanks clambered over mountains of garbage and debris, skrs zhezcha, making his way through the monstrously destroyed factory shops, shooting from short distances along the fallen streets and cramped factory yards. Another armored colossus suddenly shook and fell apart under the roar of a detonating enemy mine. But it was all possible to drink.

Further on, there was a gorge as deep as a bottomless gorge, steeply plunging off the Volga River, here the most fierce battles flared up ... On the opposite low wooded bank of the river it was impossible to see the enemy, but he was there, he led artillery fire from there, and every night hundreds of his boats brought reinforcements through the wide stream of the ruins of Stalipgrad, and everything started all over again: hurricane fire, diving bombers, smoke and fumes that obscured the sun for hours, but the situation almost did not change, and the combat capability of our troops melted like butter in the sun.

The fierce resistance of the 62nd Army exhausted the enemy physically and morally, fettering the maneuver of his reserves and thereby facilitating the conditions for the actions of the Soviet troops northwest and south of Stalingrad.

and\*\*

To alleviate the situation of the 62nd Army, on October 19, from the area north of the city, the troops of the Donskoy Froit went on the offensive. True, at first, General Rokossovsky was assigned much more decisive tasks: to break through the enemy's defenses, to unite with the troops of the Stalingrad Front, "to destroy the enemy group

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a ravine that breaks through to the Volga River. The main blow of the nano force is the 66th Army of General Zhalov. To ensure the fulfillment of the combat mission of the army, in addition to the 5 rifle divisions that were part of it, 4 divisions from the 24th Army and 4 fully equipped rifle divisions from the Stavka reserve, as well as 23 artillery regiments of the RGC, 12 regiments of rocket artillery, several tank brigades were attached. For every kilometer of the front line, Zhadov had 74 guns, not counting mortars and rocket launchers. The aviation of the front worked in the sector of the army, carrying out the tasks of attacking the enemy and covering their units from the air.

During the period from October 20 to October 26, the 66th Army, continuously attacking, advanced only 3 km and did not complete the task. Losses in this case amounted to about 18 thousand people.

Reporting on the reasons for the failure, Rokossovsky and Zhadov stated that the infantry, especially the newly arrived divisions, were poorly trained and offered to stop offensive operations.

"...People are not trained and completely unprepared, many do not know how to use a rifle at all. Before fighting, a new division must be trained and prepared for at least a month (1). The commanders, both middle and senior, are tactically illiterate, cannot navigate the terrain and lose control of subunits in battle ... In the presence of large artillery fire and massive nalsts of our aviation, the units advance very slowly ... The enemy aviation did not show any activity. The forces of the enemy in front of the front of the 66th Army are insignificant, the enemy has gathered soldiers from the rear ... "

In order to give his infantry "cheerfulness", Rokossovsky insisted that the detachments follow the infantry units and "force the fighters to raise the vataka by force of arms."

The special department of the Don Front in the report to his superiors noted, first of all, mediocre and not

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skillful leadership on the part of the commanders of regiments, divisions and General Zhadov himself. Artillery opened fire either long before the infantry units reached the initial line for an attack, or hit their own, since the artillery commanders "did not organize observations of the results of the firing, their observation posts were far away in the rear (?). Separate artillery regiments did not receive ammunition and did not fire at all. Aviation "supported" artillery in this matter, periodically attacking the front

edge of their own troops. The pinnacle of the wonderful organization was the fact that "the commanders of the units were not warned when to start the attack"!

Noiseto not vss. In the 66th army, the soldiers were dying of starvation: "Due to poor nutrition and exhaustion of the soldiers, 23 deaths were registered in 587 and 692 SP, 212 SD, 9 deaths were noted in 62 SD. Medical commissions established that death was due to exhaustion and persomnia of the body. (And Rokossovsky wanted these "heftlings" to cheerfully run to machine guns? Did he try to feed them? - Auth.) Despite the presence of signals, neither the army command nor the front command took the necessary measures normal supply. Zhadov's army was no exception. So, M. Abdulin, who fought in the neighboring army, shares in the "Soldier's Diary" a recipe for making jelly from compound feed.

After the war, Marshal M.I. Kazakov told briefly about this operation: "There are many reasons for this failure (indeed. - Aat.). In my opinion, the main thing was that there were not enough funds to carry out the operation.

And the saddest thing was that from the German side, without the support of tanks and aircraft, the exhausted units of the one and only 3rd motorized division of General Schlemer, in which there were 27 fighters per company, held the defense.

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South of Stalingrad On October 22, the shock group of the 64th Army - the 422nd and 126th rifle divisions, the 93rd, 96th and 97th rifle brigades of the 7th corps, the 13th, 50th, 90th and 155th tank brigades - attacked in the area of Kuporosnos, Zelenaya Polyana, at the junction with the 62nd army, the Soviet units advanced to the northwest by 3 km, but the next day they were thrown back to their original positions. On October 25, Shumilov's army again launched an offensive in the same direction. Stubborn fighting continued until 1 November. The troops advanced 3-4 km and captured the southern part of Kuporosnoe.

These days, a fighter of the 422nd Infantry Division V.I. Kovalenko wrote in a letter to his mother: "I am alive, and in a second, maybe they will kill me, because here life is a second. Although you write not to think about death, I don't think that he survived, because there are very strong battles, there are a lot of people, the corpses lie on the ground, it's terrifying to look: both Germans and pashas are lying, poor people, rotting and no one are not needed, even if they are buried, then they are lying around like sheaves. Tanks drive over people like firewood. The tank is covered in blood, it's creepy to watch. With me there are such comrades who have been wounded from the first battle,



those who do not have time to see the German, how he will be killed or wounded. I consider a person who was wounded in the arm or leg to be happy, otherwise most people kill ... "

The territorial success of the flag counterattacks was insignificant, but they delayed (chirsm - blood) the regrouping undertaken by Paulus.

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By October 30, the offensive of the 6th Army slowed down, although in the area between the Barikady and Krasny Oktyabr factories, no more than 400 m remained to go to the Volga. In the first days of November, the tension of the fighting subsided somewhat, the Germans acted only in small groups and secured captured positions.

However, Hitler certainly wanted to win "for

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to conduct the battle for Stalingrad, "and Paulus had to prepare a new assault.

Of course, military considerations no longer dominated in November, according to which the German troops would have had the idea to continue the assault on Stalingrad. They were completely replaced by considerations of a political nature.

"This battle has become truly a symbol of the struggle between two hostile worlds," Tippelskirch squeaks. - The German troops strained their last strength, believing that in order to achieve a decisive outcome of the war, they must fulfill the task set by the front at any cost. over all sane considerations as to whether it was even worth starting such a battle for the benefits that could bring

militarily or politically, the capture of this

cities. At this time, Hitler, of course, had deep doubts about the correctness of his strategic plans. Therefore, he tried more and more to convince himself and others by the successful and systematic course of the radio operation during the two years of the war, as well as in future successes ... Hitler's assertion that it would remain to take Stalingrad in order to cut the last and largest transport artery of the enemy - the Volga, was unconvincing - after all, the German troops were already standing by the very Volga ... What benefit could now bring the capture of the city, if its capture within the framework of the general situation lost interest, and its retention became dangerous?

Nevertheless, in November 1942, the party congress

de Hitler announced to the "tried fighters": "I wanted to reach the Volga at one specific point ... By chance, this city bears the name of Stalin himself. But I didn't want to go there for this reason... I'm going there because it's the whole important belly button. Thirty million tons of cargo was transported through it, of which almost nine million tons of oil. Wheat flocked there from Ukraine and Kuban to be sent to the north. delivery there

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Lasmanganese ore... It was I who wanted to take it, and—you know, we don't need much—we took it! Only a few points remained unoccupied. Some ask: why don't you take them quickly? Because I don't want a second Verdun there. I'll get it done with small strike teams."

Stalin, in turn, hinted the day before: "The day is not far off when the enemy will know the strength of the new blows of the Red Army. Every dog has his day!"

and\*\*

On November 11, the Germans made another attempt to take over the city. Five infantry (389, 79, 305, 100 and 295th) and two tank (24th and 14th) divisions, reinforced by four fresh engineer battalions, took part in the operation. The new offensive coincided with the beginning of a powerful ice drift on the Volga, which greatly worsened the situation of the Chuikovites, who were deprived of supplies. The ships of the Volga flotilla could not break through to the right bank.

In a narrow section of 500-600 m near the Barikady plant, German soldiers managed to overcome the defenses of the 95th Infantry Division and reach the Volga. "Drunken or both mad fascists climbed ahead," recalled Chuikov. And in another hemisphere, the New York Herald Tribune wrote: "Such battles are not amenable to strategic calculation. They are fought with burning hatred, with passion ..."

The 62nd Army was cut for the third time, and the 138th Rifle Division was cut off from the main forces. The fighters of the division continued to hold only a large section of about 700 meters along the front and 400 meters in depth. Divisional Commander 138 cites a letter from a German officer who was killed in the battles for the "Lyudnikov Island":

"We need to get to the Volga. We can see it - it's less than a kilometer away. We are constantly supported by aviation and artillery. We fight like man possessed, but we cannot break through the river. The entire war in France lasted less than one plant in the Volga region. We took large cities and lost less

people than on this God-damned piece of land, Suicide bombers are probably fighting against us. They are not receiving reinforcements as we control the crossing. They simply decided to fight to the last soldier. And how many of them are left there - the last ones? And when will this hell end?

This was the last success of the 6th Army. On the remaining sectors of the front, Chuikov's troops did not surrender their positions. Even the Berlin newspapers admitted: "For the first time in history, a modern city is held by troops until the destruction of the last wall ... this enemy does not spare his own city. Our offensive, despite the numerical superiority, does not lead to success.

The battle, as if by inertia, continued in separate sectors until November 20. By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the Barikady plant, and the northeastern quarters of the city center. The 64th Army defended the approaches to its southern part. At the cost of blood, Chuikov bought time. The total losses of the Red Army in the Stalingrad defensive operation amounted to 643,842 men, 1,426 tanks, 12,137 guns and mortars, and 2,063 planes.

The offensive of the German troops on Staligradsky on the board was finally stopped. A large grouping of the Wehrmacht was drawn into protracted and exhausting battles and was deprived of the opportunity to maneuver. Stalingrad, as Hitler feared, turned into "an all-devouring focus." In the battle between the Volga and the Don, the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet data, lost in July - but in November up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1000 tanks, over 2000 guns and mortars, more than 1400 aircraft. If you divide these figures by about three, you can get a result close to the true one.

LJ"

Thus, although both offensive wings p: In y r! group "South" in the summer campaign of 1942

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Successfully, in October they were already at the limit of their capabilities, who also did not have enough fuel for mobile connections. Instead of sacrificing either the Caucasus or Stalingrad in order to survive the winter, with a shortened front line, Hitler continued to insist on capturing and holding both positions, although he himself considered the far advanced arc of the German front on the Don and Volga dangerous. TO

also by its own propaganda, announcing the 8th of November; "Stalingrad is in the hands," the Fuhrer deprived himself of any operational freedom and freedom of decision-making. Leaving the city now meant admitting defeat.

Troops of the 8th Italian, 3rd Romanian, 6th and 4th German tank armies operated in the Stalingrad direction in the 860-kilometer strip from Pavlovsk to Khalkhug. The administration of the 4th Romanian army was also moving here. On October 1, under this rule, the Germans and their allies had 53.5 calculated divisions, including 9 tank and motorized. Moreover, the main forces and means were concentrated directly in the area of Stalingrad, where they continued to conduct active combat operations instead of moving on to strategic defense.

The troops of this grouping were located in unfavorable conditions on a huge arc with a peak at Stalingrad in the interfluvium of the Volga and Don. Its flanks to the northwest and south of Stalingrad were covered by the less efficient Romanian and Italian formations. In the Stalingrad direction, the Wehrmacht did not have large operational reserves.

On | In October, there were only three divisions in the reserve of the commando of Army Group B: the 298th infantry and two tank divisions - the 22nd German, counting about 45 vehicles, and the 1st Romanian, which was armed with 40 light tanks of Czech production. The operational aftermath of the German groups advancing on Stalingrad and the Caucasus was extended. Translational possibilities

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were exhausted, they were forced to go over to the defense with the weakly covered flanks of the Stalingrad group, not having sufficient reserves. Communications turned out to be stretched for thousands of kilometers and were vulnerable over vast expanses. All this created favorable conditions for a decisive counteroffensive of the Soviet troops in the southern direction,

To the memory of Marshal Rokossovsky: "With an objective assessment of the situation that had arisen and in anticipation of the impending winter, the enemy had only one way out - an immediate withdrawal to the greatest possible distance. (Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, clearly saw the danger and proposed the same solution - withdraw the troops from Stalingrad and, at the expense of the released divisions, create a solid front of the Don line. Hitler chose to replace the Chief of the General Staff. - Auth.) But, underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided to hold on to the space he had captured, and in the current situation, this was timely used by our Supreme Command

nie. The long-awaited moment has come for us." At the end of September, the Soviet command began to develop a plan and direct preparations for a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad direction,

After the war, the Stalingrad offensive operation, like any victory, had many fathers. So, Zhukov talked about the "acute hearing" of the leader and how, on September 13, together with Vasilevsky, they proposed to Stalin a plan for a large counterattack aimed at the flanks of Paulus, covered by the Romanian troops. Khrushchev claimed that, together with Yeremsiko, he had presented to the Headquarters by the end of September a plan for a future counteroffensive. Eremenko himself said in his memoirs that he put forward the idea of Stalingrad counterattacks right on the day of his appointment as commander of the front.

It can be said that in the second half of September the idea of a counteroffensive was in the air. However, even Napoleon put it in the sense that the regimental

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The child is not the one who came up with the battle plan, but the one who took responsibility for its implementation.

From this point of view, Fleet Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov is absolutely right, the only one who remembered the real "author" of all: "It must be said frankly that with the enormous and sometimes decisive The headquarters and the will of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief determined the success of the battle.

This time, Stalin did not hurry his commanders, the operation was prepared carefully, competently, in the strictest secrecy. In the course of it, first of all, it was planned to encircle the 6th army of Paulus; then, having struck at the Middle Don, to develop success towards Rostov, to defeat the German troops in the North Caucasus, to deploy an offensive in the Donbass, in the Kursk, Bryansk, Kharkov directions. The main blow was supposed to be delivered in the South-Eastern direction from the bridgeheads in the area of Sera Fimovich and Kletskaya in the zone of the 3rd Romanian army with the exit of the 1st army corps of Strecker. This region of the steppe was so remote from Stalingrad that the German armored and mechanized units concentrated around the city were still unable to save the situation in the event of a breakthrough. Another grouping was to advance south of Stalingrad from the Sarpinsky Lakes region in the zone of the 4th Romanian Army, closing the encirclement in the Kalach region,

The Soviet command, which widely applied the methods of camouflage and misinformation, this time managed to mislead the enemy about the place, time, and strike forces that were supposed to attack him.

sti (only in order to deceive German air traffic in various places across the Don, 17 bridges were built, but only 5 of them were supposed to be actually used). The headquarters of the OKH, for example, considered the most probable Russian offensive against the northern flank of Army Group B with access to Rostov and the Sea of Azov. The possibility of a winter offensive against

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Rzhev ledge. Hitler believed that the main blow of the Russian offensives on the positions occupied by the Italians. The command of the 6th Army and Army Group "B" was monitoring the concentration of Soviet forces on the bridgehead of Kltskaya and Serafimovich, predicted an imminent enemy offensive in their lane, but underestimated its scale. Most of the staff generals agreed that the Russians did not have the strength to inflict powerful enough blows, and in this they were very much mistaken. As a result, "the high command of the Wehrmacht was unable at the decisive moment to concentrate its efforts precisely where the fate of the entire struggle was determined."

The stubbornness of Hitler, who sought to keep Stalingrad at any cost, of course, aggravated the situation, but in fact the problem was deeper. Even if the encirclement of Paulus's army had not happened, the Germans would have had to give up everything they had won in the summer campaign, they simply did not have the strength to hold a huge front. By the autumn of 1942, the Soviet Union had fully restored military production, and the Red Army significantly outnumbered the exhausted Wehrmacht in material and human resources. And if we are told that at the peak of military efforts, more than 80 divisions of Germany and satellites acted as part of Army Group B advancing on Stalingrad, then from the Soviet side the following took part in the battle: 105 rifle, 9 cavalry, 36 aviation, 7 heavy artillery, 6 anti-aircraft artillery and 2 guards mortar divisions, 22 separate rifle, 3 motorized rifle, 8 fighter, 39 taiko brigades, 23 detached tank regiments, 14 tank and 5 mechanized corps and much more.

On November 19, 1942, the "Stalip 'holiday'" operation "Uranus" began, the Soviet troops made a breakthrough on both flanks - on the Don and south of Staligrad - and began to envelop the German armies,

"All attempts by the enemy to interfere with the encirclement turned out to be belated," writes Rokossovsky. - Connections

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Nazis, tank and motorized, transferring

ejected from the region of Stalingrad to the place of the breakthrough, they were introduced into battle in parts and, falling under blows on their superior forces, were defeated. Take it off, you got it, the same cartima as the happiness of the Red Army in bays in pain. along the bend of the Don (our italics. - Auth). Having failed to make a cardinal decision to withdraw in time, the fascist German command, like ours in its time, tried to put small "patches" on the ever-widening huge gap in the Stalingrad direction.

On November 23, the mobile formations of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts linked up east of Kalach. In the ring were twenty German and two Romanian divisions, as well as numerous reinforcement units, in which there were a total of about 270 thousand soldiers and officers. Despite all the efforts of Erich von Manstein to release the encircled grouping, on February 2, 1943, everything was over - Paulus capitulated. The six-month epic Stalingrad ended in a catastrophe for the Wehrmacht, which became a symbol of a turning point in the course of the war.

After Stalingrad, the war turned to the West.

## OPERATION MARS

It should be said that Zhukovsky's operational art is a superiority in strength by 5-6 times, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight with quantity and other blood builds his career.

Mirshal A.I. Yeremetsko

Simultaneously with the operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad, an ops was unfolding in the Moscow direction.

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walkie-talkie "Mars". Soviet historians simply missed this offensive in their numerous studies, works and multi-volume "stories".

Meanwhile, already on October 10, the Soviet troops received a directive to continue the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, which was again to be carried out by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts with the same goal; encirclement and destruction of the "malignant tumor" - the 9th German army in the area of the Rzhev salient. The start of the offensive was scheduled for 23 October. Zatsm terms were shifted by a month, which allowed

to involve in the preparation and leadership of the operation of the General of the Army of the Civil Code. Zhukov.

The main grouping of Soviet troops was still concentrated in the Moscow direction in the area from Kholmado Bolkhov. In total, the forces of the two fronts and the Moscow defense zone with the reserves of the Stavka totaled 1890 thousand people, more than 24 thousand guns and mortars, 3375 tanks and 1100 aircraft.

They were opposed by 72 divisions of Army Group Center, which, together with reserves, had about 1680 thousand people, up to 3500 tanks.

Comparing the forces of the parties, it must be remembered that the numerical strength of the Red Army was also expressed in the fact that a complete change of troops in it took place much faster than that of the enemy. At the end of 1942, the personnel in the rifle companies were renewed within a week or two. M. Abdulin reports that "during two months of fighting, the entire personnel in the companies was completely replaced for us how many times"! Therefore, often the losses of the Soviet armies of the fronts during offensive operations exceeded 100% of the initial number of troops.

Isodipnadiaty of the armies of the Western Front of General Konev in the offensive should have participated in the 20th, 31st and 29th. The main blow was delivered by the 20th Army under the command of Major General N.I. Kiryukhin consisting of six rifle divisions and four tank brigades. After breaking through the enemy defenses in its lane

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it was supposed to introduce a mobile group into battle under the overall command of Major General V.V. Kryukova as part of the 6th Tank, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 1st Scooter-Motorcycle Brigade. "We again had to cross Vaza...", writes General Getman, "and then attack that same Sychevka, to which the troops of the front could not break through in August."

From the Kalinin Front, Colonel General M.A. Purkaev also had 3 armies. 41st Army under the command of Major General F.G. Tarasov and the 22nd Army, Major General V.A. Yushkevich was struck to the east, towards parts of the Western Front, and the 39th Army of Major General A.I. Zygina was supposed to fall south in the direction of Olenino. In zone 4 of the 1st Army, in order to develop success, it was planned to bring into battle the 1st mechanized corps of General Solomatin.

The formation of mechanized corps in the Red Army began again in September 1942. The experience of the war showed that it is necessary to have motorized infantry in the composition of the tank troops, which could



to support the actions of tanks and to secure the areas and lines captured by them. On the other hand, where the use of purely tank corps could be hampered by terrain conditions, it was planned to use mechanized formations, which were supposed to have more motorized infantry. one two-tank brigades, an anti-tank regiment, an air defense regiment, a division of guards mortars, an armored car division, an engineer, a mine company, support units. The Solomati corps consisted of 15,200 fighters and 224 tanks, of which 10 KV, 119T-34 and 95 T-70. In addition, the 47th and 48th tank brigades were in the reserve of the 4th 1st Army - another hundred tanks,

In the band of the 22nd Army, in addition to the 185th, 238th rifle divisions, the 3rd mechanized corps of the gene

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ral-major M.E. Katukov - three shapized and one tank brigade, 13,500 men, 175 tanks. The commander's reserve included the 114th rifle brigade and the 39th tank regiment.

A total of 545,000 men and 1,200 tanks were deployed to carry out the Mars operation.

Army Group "Center" has increased significantly over the past time. In October-November, a total of 16 divisions were transferred here. The 39th Panzer Corps, which consisted of the 5th Panzer, 78th and 102nd Infantry Divisions, occupied the defense of the 20th and 31st Sovsts Kiharmii directly in the Narzhev-Vyazma ledge. Behind them were reserves - the 9th Panzer and 95th Infantry Divisions. On the western front of the ledge in front of the 22nd and 41st armies was the German 41st tank corps, behind which there were also army reserves - the 1st tank division and the SS motorized division "Great [Germany]". Severnse was defended by the 23rd Army Corps - 110th and 206th Infantry, 14th Motorized Divisions.

The Germans prepared for the winter campaign. Unlike last winter, all the personnel were saved by warm uniforms. The defense was continuously improved in terms of engineering. Minefields were set up in all directions of probable strikes by the Soviet troops, powerful strongholds and a system of bunkers were created. In the zone of the Western Front, according to Getman: "The most fortified was the zone of the upcoming offensive of our mobile group, stretching from Kortnevo to the blind point Khlepsy."

The bases of the ledge were the reserves of Army Group Center - 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions.

In a critical situation, opi could be quickly transferred to the threatened direction.

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At the same time, on its right flank, the Kalinin Front was preparing to carry out another one operation -

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the offensive of the 3rd shock army, Major General K.N. Galitsky on Vslukie Luki and Nevel with the aim of cutting the Leningrad-Vitsbsk railway in the Novosokolniki region. In the future, the Soviet command hoped, having eliminated the Velikoluksky bridgehead of the enemy, to open the way to the Baltic. The 3rd shock army included the 5th guards air force corps of Major General A.P. Beloborodov, rifle divisions, 5 separate tank, 7 artillery regiments and 9 regiments of guards mipoms. The commander's reserve included the 2nd mechanized corps, the 184th taik brigade and the 31st rifle brigade.

The general idea boiled down to the following. A glorious blow to the south of Velikiye Luki, bypassing the city from the north-west, was carried by the 5th Rifle Corps - the 9th and 46th Guards, 357th Rifle Divisions. The 381st Infantry Division of Colonel B.S. was advancing towards Beloborodov from the area north of Velikiye Luki. Maslova. The 257th Rifle Division of Colonel A.A. Dyako nova, In the breakthrough zone of the main forces of the 5th Rifle Corps, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was introduced under the command of General I.P. Korchagin - three mechanized and internal combustion engine tank brigades - with the task of capturing the Novosokolnikovo railway junction. The southern guards of Beloborodov delivered auxiliary strikes from the 21st Guards and 28th Rifle Divisions of the 3rd Shock Army and the right-flag 360th Division of the 4th strike of the Neuarmy. The 31st Rifle Brigade covered the left flank. I tank brigade.

Zhukov personally approved the plan. It was according to his "sovstu" that all the forces of the 3rd shock army were actually lined up in one echelon. Commander of Galicia wanted to leave the 2nd 1st Guards Division in reserve behind its left flank, but the Stavka representative ordered the division to be moved to the first echelon and thus "expand the breakthrough area and increase the initial impact force." The great commander Zhukov never understood why

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he needed operational reserves, no one was left "idle" with him. Everyone had to attack - 95608 people, 743 guns, 1346 mortars, 46 RS installations, 390 tanks. About 500 guns were to accompany the infantry in battle formations.

The enemy in the zone of the forthcoming offensive, not having enough troops, concentrated his efforts on the defense of the most important sectors. The Great Lukovo area was being dropped by units of General Scherer's 83rd Infantry Division and one security battalion. Yurod was turned into a powerful center of resistance prepared for all-round defense, saturated with fire weapons. Many buildings were turned into long-term fire towers that interacted with each other and covered streets and intersections with fire. The front line of defense passed 5 km from the city outskirts, Yuzhnes, in the Martyanovo area, the site was covered by two separate battalions. Between these two "groupings" and all around Velikie Luki there were only a few garrisons in separate populated areas.

Vrayons Novosokolnikov located reserves: the 3rd mountain division and the 55th regiment of 6-barreled mortars. The 20th motorized division was concentrated in the northeast of Nsvslya. In addition, the 29th Infantry Division was pulled up to the Opukhlika area against the southern flank of General Galitsky, and the 8th Panzer Division was transferred to the Nasva area, northeast of Velikie Luki, from the Kholm'sky direction. The headquarters of the 59th Army Corps, which arrived in Novosokolniki from Vitebsk, was supposed to unite all these formations.

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The operations of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began on November 25 in three directions at once. Two armies of the Western Front attacked the eastern front of the Rzhev salient north of Zubtsov, in a 40-kilometer section along the Vazuza and Osuga rivers. At the same time, the 22nd and 41st armies of the Kalinin front began

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whether a counter strike from the western front of the ledge. And the 3rd Shock Army launched an offensive against the northern wing of Army Group Center, trying to capture Velikie Luki from both sides.

On the night before the offensive, the weather in the zone of the 20th and 31st armies changed dramatically, snow fell, then a blizzard began. The gunners did not see the targets and fired on the areas, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of the artillery preparation, and although it lasted an hour and a half, its results were insignificant. It immediately became clear

as soon as at 9.20 the infantry went on the attack. The unsuppressed firing points of the enemy had strong opposition, the 31st Army General Major V.S. Polenov failed to break through the defense. The EU 88th, 336th and 239th Rifle Divisions, supported by the 332nd and 145th Tank Brigades, achieved only insignificant successes at the cost of heavy losses. To the south, the 20th army lost a little more - the 247th rifle division, with the support of the 80th and 140th tank brigades, crossed the Vazuza and captured a bridgehead on the west coast, the Commander immediately threw into battle his reserve - the 331st rifle division of Colonel P.E. Berestov. Under heavy enemy fire, units of the 20th Army slowly made their way forward, expanding the bridgehead. However, no breakthrough was achieved here either.

Then Zhukov and Konev decided to send reserves and a mobile group forward, waiting for the rifle units to gnaw through the main zone. Zhukov would not have been Zhukov if he had not been ready to use up the last soldier at hand in order to achieve his goal.

At dawn on November 26, units of the second echelon - the 8th Guards Rifle, 6th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps began to advance to the bridgehead. However, a quick massive strike did not work. Two hundred tanks, 30,000 soldiers and 10,000 cavalry stretched out in long columns along two narrow roads lost in the snow leading

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across the river to the west bank. As a result, the moving units suffered losses from German artillery fire before they entered the battle. Only by the middle of the day the 6th Panzer Corps (170 tanks), which, due to the illness of General 1etman, was commanded by Colonel P.M. Armand, crossed to the bridgehead. Three divisions of the cavalry corps were forced to linger on the eastern bank of the river until the next day.

Tankers immediately rushed forward. The 6th motorized rifle brigade captured the village of Kholm-Berezuisky and turned south. By evening, the 22nd Yatank battalion drove out the German garrisons from the fortified points in Bolshoi and Maly Kropotovo, and its 2nd tank battalion broke through the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad to the Lozhki. The 200th and 100th tank brigades occupied Grinevka and Podosinovka. This success did not come easy: the brigades lost up to half of their personnel and tanks, there were many wounded requiring evacuation, and it was also necessary to replenish fuel and ammunition. The corps went on the defensive.

At this time, the Germans were transferring a section of the breakthrough of the 27th Army Corps from the Rzhev area and

9th tank division from Sychevka.

The offensive of the mobile group resumed on November 28, with the approach of lagging formations. Together with the 6th tank corps, the 1st scooter-motor cycle brigade operated. Kryukov's cavalry corps also struck from the line of the 100th Tank Brigade northwest of Podosinovka. By the end of the day, Soviet troops advanced another 20 km. The headquarters of three units from the 9th Army were destroyed, 2 artillery regiments of the enemy were destroyed, and rear depots were captured. By the end of the day, the 22nd and 200th tank brigades, together with part of the forces of the 6th motorized rifle brigade, cut the Gurzhev-Sychevka railway and reached the line of Soustovo, Azarovo, Nikishino, where they were stopped by the German reserves that came to the rescue.

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However, the Soviet rifle units concentrated on the bridgehead did not enter the breakthrough. In addition, it was not possible to transfer a sufficient amount of artillery to the bridgehead, and the German 9th Panzer Division launched a counterattack in the Seperny direction along the Rzhsva highway, threatening to cut off the units that had broken through.

Zhukov believed that everything was still going well. On the night of November 29, he ordered the infantry divisions in the bridgehead to expand the breakthrough, the tank and cavalry units to continue the offensive to the west. Together with the troops of the Kalinin Front, they were to complete the encirclement and defeat of the enemy.

On the same night, the Germans struck from both sides on the flanks and rear of the broken Soviet grouping. Units of the 27th Army Corps attacked from the north, and units of the 39th Tank Corps attacked from the south. They closed the gap in the defense at the Lozhka site, Nikishevo. As a result, units of the 2nd cavalry corps, the 22nd and 200th tank brigades, the battalion of the 6th motorized rifle brigade, and the remnants of the scooter-motorcycle flight brigade, which were weakened in battles, were surrounded.

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The Kalinin Front, although it was advancing against both of its flanks, achieved significant success these days, the 41st Army, aimed at the left of the Flagrzhnev group, launched an attack on the city of Bely, Severis, along the Luchesa River, struck the 22nd Army. On the morning of November 25, the shock group of the 41st Army - the 6th Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps of General S.I. Povetkina (this included the 150th Novosibirsk division,

74th Altai, 75th Omsk, 78th Krasnoyarsk and 91st rifle brigades; the division had 13,754 chslovskas, brigades - 6,000 men each) and the 1st mechanized corps, despite the vengeance, which was unsuitable for an offensive, broke through the enemy's defenses and began to bypass Bely, trying to cut the highway to Dukhovshchiu

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In the evening of November 27, advance units of the 65th and 219th tank brigades of the Solomatn corps reached the Bely-Vladimirskeye road, interrupting one of the two most important communications of the 41st tank corps of General Harpe. The German defense formed a breakthrough 20 km wide and 30 km deep. However, the Soviet infantry and artillery in off-road conditions lagged far behind the tankers.

Why, instead of moving after the tanks and completing a deep envelopment, General Tarasov sent the 150th Rifle Division to the north, to storm the Bslogo. Its troops were unable to overcome the defenses of the enemy's 146th Infantry Division, despite the fact that the entire blow was concentrated against one of its regiments. Even the introduction of the 91st Rifle and 19th Mechanized Brigades into battle could not change the situation. On the morning of November 26, German reserves approached Bely - the 113th motorized regiment of the 1st Panzer Division and the fusilier regiment of the Great [Germany] SS motorized division. The rest of the 1st Panzer Division was thrown to the north against two Solomina tank brigades, which were straddling the Belyi-Vladimirskeye highway.

On November 27, General Solomatii requested reserves from the commander of the 41st Army - the 47th and 48th tank brigades. However, Tarasol did not correct them into a breakthrough - the commander conceived a new detour maneuver. 47th brigade of Colonel I.F. Dremova was sent northeast of Bely to try to close the encirclement around the city. On November 29, Dremov managed to bypass the city and reach the Bsly-Vladi Mirskoe highway, but he could not advance further.

To the north, on the first day of the offensive, the 22nd Army broke through the German defenses at the junction of the Ya6th Infantry Division of the 41st Tank Corps and the 110th Infantry Division of the 28th Army Corps. However, there was no continuous front in this direction, the main obstacle for the attackers at first was a deep snow cover and numerous minefields. In the next 2 days, General Yushkevich called into battle the entire Mskhapizi

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the forged corps of Katukov and ousted the German troops from the valley of the Luchesa River. Further onset of stagnation

It was ruined because Model transferred the last regiment from the Grossdeutschland division to the 23rd Army Corps zone. In response, General Yushkevich sent his last reserves into battle - the 114th rifle brigade and the 39th tank regiment. However, this did not help either, the Soviet units could not move further and reach the Olenino-Bely highway.

The situation became too difficult for our generals: off-road, snowstorm, lack of information, again - the Germans. The tank brigades disappeared into the forests and snows, the management still left much to be desired, there was no reliable communication with the units.

General D.A. Dragunsky recalls how he was given the task of finding a tank battalion that had perished in a swift offensive: "Torn off from everything and everyone, Dolgov's battalion lay down at the edge of the forest and for the third day did not move from its place (i.e., it did not perform any tasks. - Aet.). There was no telephone communication with the companies (subordinates. - Auth.) and the headquarters of the brigade (the authorities. - Auth.). The only radio station turned out to be packed in a box and hidden (1) somewhere in the convoy. In addition to everything, I was surprised to learn that Dolgov suffers from radiophobia. He also drummed into his subordinates that the enemy was allegedly hunting for every radio and it was on them that artillery fire was fired. At the same time, the battalion commander for three days of "lying on the edge" could not FIND out "which enemy is in front of the battlefield, who acts on the right and left."

From the north, the positions of the German 23rd Army Corps were attacked by the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front, which had three rifle divisions, four rifle and two tank brigades. She was opposed by two infantry divisions - the 253rd and 206th - and the 14th motorized divisions, reinforced by a couple of battalions hastily transferred here from the Grossdeutschland division.

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Since General Zygin was inflicting an auxiliary. strike, there was no reserve, the 39th Army could not break through the enemy defenses and reach the Olenino-Rzhev highway. Its parts advanced only 5 km, and then were thrown back to their original positions.

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In the meantime, a repetition of the scenario of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky battle was looming. The infallible Zhukov stepped on the same rake again. Ints resno, whom will he make guilty this time?

To the west of the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad, they were surrounded by part of the mobile group of the 20th Army. Food supplies were exhausted, ammunition and fuel were running out. An attempt to organize an air supply failed. Therefore, at dawn on November 30, by order of the front commander, units of the 6th Panzer Corps made an attempt to break through only in the Maloye Kropotkino area. At the same time, the troops of General Kiryukhin counterattacked from the east. But only the encirclement managed to break through to the village, the infantry advancing from the east could not do the same. The Germans meanwhile pulled up reserves and strengthened the defenses in this direction.

The command of the 6th Panzer Corps decided to fight its way to its north, through Bolshoe Kropotkino. On the night of November 30, the tankers delivered an unexpected blow to the northeast. At the same time, the 00th Tank Brigade with infantry was advancing towards them. In this battle, the commanders of the 200th tank and 6th motorized rifle brigades were killed, but on December 1, the encircled units broke through the enemy's barriers. Tank brigades lost most of their military equipment, so the 6th tank corps was withdrawn to the rear for resupply.

The 20th cavalry division of Colonel Kursakov could not break through to the east and therefore went west. After more than a month of raids on German

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in the rear, about a thousand cavalymen and partisans who had joined them went to the location of the 22nd Army,

and\*\*

The situation in the zone of the army of Gsner La Tarasov also became more complicated. The 9th and 12th Panzer Divisions approached the enemy's 41st Corps fortifications; on December 1, Solomatin's mechanized corps was forced to stop attacks and go on the defensive. After analyzing the situation, the commander of the Soviet corps came to the conclusion that a real threat of encirclement loomed over his formations. He pulled out vehicles to the rear, leaving in battle formations only tanks, tractors with guns, vehicles with ammunition. The measures taken by the front command to strengthen the flanks at the base of the clip came too late.

By the end of December, the Germans regained control of the Belyi-Vladimirskeye road. Colonel Dremon's 47th Tank Brigade, which was bypassing Belyi from the northeast, was cut off, and had to fight its way out of the encirclement. On December 7, the 30th German Panzer Corps, approaching from the reserve, went on the offensive from the south.



pus - the 19th and 20th tank divisions, as well as the 1st tank and other parts of the 41st corps. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to reach the rear of the mobile group of the Kalinin Front, surrounding the southeast of the populated points of Shiparsvo, Tsytsypa, Dubrovka, units of the 1st mechanized and internal combustion engine brigade of the 6th rifle corps.

General Zhukov was at that moment at the command post of the 41st Army in the Klemyatip tree. Having received reports on the situation, he ordered the encircled troops to remain in place. [General Solomatin was given the task of taking under his command all the units, once they were in the ring. Airplanes organized the delivery of ammunition and food to them, reserves were drawn up to break through the outer frontier: this one, the encirclement. All these measures were taken in order to keep the bridgehead occupied by tankers in the depths of the enemy defense, in order to then continue the offensive.

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Things were a little better in the Velikiye Luki region. On November 24, the forward regiments of four rifle divisions of the 3rd shock army, operating in the main direction, with the support of artillery and tanks, carried out reconnaissance in force.

Reconnaissance in force is the acquisition of information about the enemy by combat actions of specially assigned subdivisions. It is carried out in preparation for an offensive in order to clarify the outline of the front line and the enemy's system of fire. This means that a company, battalion or regiment rushed to the attack without hope of any success (for "reliability" they were often given a blatant combat mission), but during this time, scouts-observers identified and marked enemy firing points that needed to be suppressed. when deploying a "pasting" offensive.

As the textbook points out, reconnaissance in force is carried out in cases "when it is not possible to obtain the necessary information about the enemy by other means." As a rule, they did not know how to "obtain information" about the enemy in other ways: aviation was rarely used, especially during the period when the Germans dominated the air, and the data obtained was unreliable. Front-line reconnaissance was helpless, technical and radio communications were in their infancy, even systematic visual observation of the bouncer was not carried out. Therefore, the favorite methods of conducting reconnaissance in the Red Army became the acquisition of "language" and reconnaissance in force. But I bury an informed prisoner - a rarity. Who is the difficulty of the control: the razpedgroups sometimes moved away 100 meters from the front edge, spent the night in a neutral

ny lane, and in the morning they returned with reports of the difficulties of the raid. And on the nose of the next offensive, the authorities demand data on the forces of the Germans, and reconnaissance in force is organized. Basically, penal companies and battalions were used for such events - the most suitable case: a suitable case to "atone for the fault before the Motherland."

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One of these reconnaissances was described by Lieutenant V. Dyatlo, "Two divisions of our regiment participated in a ten-minute fire raid - and that's it. After the fire, some there was silence. Then the battalion commander jumped out of the trench onto the parapet: "Guys, ah! For the Motherland! For Stalin! Behind me! Hooray!" The penitentiaries slowly climbed out of the trenches and, as if waiting for the latter, as if nuving their rifles at the ready, they ran ... The Germans threw a series of red rockets towards the attackers and immediately opened a powerful mortar and artillery fire. The chains lay down, and we also lay down - a little behind in the longitudinal furrow. I couldn't raise my head. How to detect and to whom to piss off the enemy's targets in this hell? His artillery hit from covered positions and far from the flanks. Heavy guns were fired. Several tanks fired directly at the vodka, their blank shells whined overhead ..., Penalty boxes lay in the German trench in an open field and in small bushes, and the German "threshed" this field, plowing the earth, and bushes, and bodies people ... 'We withdrew with a battalion of penalized only 7 people, and there were all together - 306.

As you can see, in the sense of the information received, there is little sense. It was expensive to pay. Not only because the method itself is ineffective. According to science, in order to hide from the enemy the direction of the impending strike, reconnaissance in force must be carried out on a broad front. This means that in some hopeless battles, soldiers died on false directions, misleading the enemy.

And here is another reconnaissance in combat on the Don Front in the description of M. Abdulin: "The battalions stormed about the drag barriers, the anti-personnel web. In order to hold back the onslaught of our regiment, the Germans were forced to open fire with all types of fire weapons, which, in fact, was required by our command, which was clarifying the details of the counteroffensive. We were unable to break through the enemy's defenses, but our bossy task, while losing most of it personally

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th composition and reducing our section of the front line to actually one battalion, we completed. The picture of that first battle could only be grasped by consciousness

after its completion, when on the night of November 13-14, among the few survivors, I went into combat guards down to the neutral zone.

Light rain drizzled in the evening, then it froze sharply ... And then the full moon rose ... It looked like a many thousand sculptural composition of life-sized figures of soldiers frozen in an icy shell - lying on their backs, hunched over, sitting, crouched, with arms thrown up — urging us not to weaken the attacks... Ice-covered faces with wide-open eyes and screaming mouths... Piles of weaving on barbed wire, which pressed the EU to the ground, preparing a passage to the fascist trenches..."

So, "finishing the details" for the command, in one attack, the first and last, the 1034th regiment of the 293rd rifle division was killed. Note, not a penal battalion, but an accelerated graduation of cadets of the Tashkent Infantry School - they could not find a better application,

Another, completely original way of conducting reconnaissance, was told by General of the Army E.F. Ivanovsky: "Shortly after the death of A.I. Lizyukov, the command of the corps was temporarily taken over by a man whom none of our front-line soldiers knew. His style of working with the headquarters commanders also seemed somehow unusual. In the first conversation with me, he repeated several times that it would be necessary to better and deeper reconnoiter the enemy's firepower in the direction of the upcoming actions. He did not give any specific instructions, he did not offer advice.

In the evening we left for reconnaissance of the area. The commander looked at the front line for a long time through his large trophy binoculars and suddenly sets me the following task:

"We'll keep watch over there..." he nodded at the high stack of straw. - And you, Ivanovsky,

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take the jeep and drive across the field. The enemy will open fire on you, and we will spot the scythe.

"Wow, it's a task ..." I thought in amazement. "Something like a moving target for the German guards.

Grimly threw the due honor "and got into a squat, nimble car.

The corps commander with his assistants climbed onto the skirla. I drove the "jeep" along the front edge, hiding behind bushes only obliquely - where I was driving almost in full view of the Nazis, They immediately noticed, opened fire from different types of weapons, but for some reason not at me, but at ... skyrle. Near

mines lay down on it, machine-gun lines cut through it. I don't know how the Germans oriented themselves. Perhaps they discovered the big bosses on a stack by the sparkle of elegant binoculars in the sun. I see everyone rolling head over heels from the stack one after another, waving and crying.  
chat me:

"Get the car here as soon as possible, we need to evacuate!"

- It's better you come to me ... - I show them with gestures. "At least nothing is torn here."

Conclusion: ralvedka in combat in the Soviet version is o0ch cheating in order to "detect something" and report to higher authorities. Maximum - it allowed to clarify the outline of the front edge. Of course, this is a big deal if offensives are not easily launched even without these details, but it is impossible to open the system of a well-equipped enemy defense, when fire weapons have 3-5 replaceable positions, and are also echeloned in depth by such methods.

and\*\*

And this time, the reconnaissance of the Bosm did not bring the expected results: the units barely approached the front line of the German defense and zalzi, the firing points were far from completely revealed, the artillerymen, accordingly, did not receive the necessary data, which means that it was quite effective to suppress the enemy's fire system in front of could not attack.

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On the morning of November 25, General Galitsky moved the main forces into battle. Units of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps, delivering the main blow, immediately met strong enemy fire resistance. The thrust forward did not work; in the first day the corps moved up to 2-3 km in some directions. But, thanks to the overwhelming superiority ("war" with one German infantry division and separate garrisons), the Soviet offensive, although slowly, but developed. By the morning of November 28, the 357th Rifle Division of Colonel A.L. Kronika drove the Germans out of the village of Mordovishche and cut the Velikis Luki-Novosokolniki railroad. In the evening of the same day, Beloborodov's guards met with the advanced units of the 381st Rifle Division, closing the encirclement around the Velikoluksky garrison - about 7 thousand people. General Scherer managed to leave the city.

By this time, the 46th Guards Rifle Division had reached the Chernozem station and occupied the 21st Guards Division of General D.V. Mikhailov in 4 days

battles advanced only 4-5 km, and the 28th rifle division of General S.A. Knyazkova was engaged in storming the heights near the village of Polibino and repulsed Senkovo's psychic attacks from "drunken SS men" (who will go into a mental sober?) from the 10th regiment of the 1st SS infantry brigade that came to the rescue.

To develop the offensive in the main direction, the commander decided to bring the 18th mechanized brigade from the 2nd mechanized corps into the breakthrough. On the night of November 28, she was to concentrate 15 km southwest of Velikiye Luki and send a reinforced forward detachment to capture Novosokolniki. To the north, Colonel Maslov, also in accordance with the instructions of GALits, whom, sent one regiment of his 381st division with the 146th tank battalion to Velikiye Luki, and launched an offensive against Novosokolniki with two regiments.

The mechanized brigade with a fight went to the indicated area, but it managed to get to the railway junction Novosokolniki

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beat only by 16 o'clock on November 29. Several of its tanks even broke through to the outskirts, but were burned by anti-tank guns. Having used up almost all the ammunition, the brigade was forced to go on the defensive. southeastern approaches to the city. At this time, the regiment of the 381st Infantry Division was fighting on the north-east under the mortars of the city. His actions, inconsistent with the mechanized brigade, also gave results.

Another rifle regiment and the 34th mechanized brigade with a tank regiment of the 43rd mechanized brigade from the corps of General Korchagin were sent to Novosokolniki, which was supposed to unite the actions of all formations in this direction. The general attack began on the morning of December 3, but the troops acted separately, and again failed to achieve success.

In the meantime, the enemy proceeded to concentrate attack groups on the flanks of the Soviet troops. The 8th Panzer Division was hastily advancing from Nasva, and the 291st Infantry Division from the area of Opukhlika in Porechye. It was also supposed to send the 20th motorized division here. To repel the impending threat, General Galitsky covered himself from the northwest with the 3rd and 54th rifle brigades, as well as the 44th ski brigades, ordering them to organize a solid defense. The 26th rifle and 36th tank brigades from the same mechanized corps were then sent here. On the left flank, facing the enemy, the 28th Rifle Division, the 184th Tank Brigade, the 45th Ski Brigade, and two regiments of the 360th Division were deployed. Part of the forces was withdrawn from the Novosokolnichesky direction, the remaining troops crossed over to the defense on the eastern approaches to the city.

By December 10, after fierce fighting, the situation in the zone of the 8th shock army stabilized for a short time. The Soviet troops managed to encircle the German garrison in Velikiye Luki and repulse enemy attempts to break through to the city on their flanks. In the center, Soviet troops advanced 25-30 km, but could not occupy Novosokolniki.

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Former officer of the operational department of the army headquarters, Lieutenant General G.G. Semenov, analyzing the reasons for the failure, wrote: "By the beginning of the offensive in the direction of the main attack, we had superiority over the Nazis in forces and means. But many formations and units ... poorly knew the opposing enemy. They began to attack slowly, carefully. Due to the lack of a second-echelon army (Zhukov's art. - Auth.), soon after breaking through the enemy's defenses, all the troops were drawn into battles. A further increase in the efforts of the army was possible only at the expense of reserves from outside. The brigade use of the 2nd mechanized corps led someone to the fact that this relatively large mobile unit did not have a noticeable effect on the course of events. The results of the actions of the corps could become more significant if its main forces were directed to capture the city of Novosokolniki in the first days of the operation,

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Zhukov, however, believed that significant success would be achieved near Velikiye Luki and did not lose hope of achieving a similar one in the area of the Rzhev ledge. The Stavka directive, signed by him and Stalin on December 8, 1942, demanded that the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts defeat the enemy grouping in the areas of Rzhev, Sychevka, Olenino, Bely, by] January,

It is noteworthy that in his memoirs, Zhukov pretends that the offensive operation on two fronts began precisely after the issuance of the directive: "In the period from November 20 to December 8, the planning and preparation of the offensive were completed." In another place, the marshal clarifies once again: "On November 28, I was at the headquarters of the Kalinin Front, where I discussed the upcoming offensive operation with the command." Here are those times! For four days now, a fierce battle has been going on, the encirclement around the 6th tank corps is already closing, the troops of General Tarasov are unsuccessfully storming Be

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The Velikoluksky operation is in full swing, and the representative of the Headquarters, a special call from under Staligrad to coordinate the actions of Purkasva and Konev, is representing what is happening. If there were any "local battles" here, then Zhukov has nothing to do with it,

Mszhlutem, former chief of the artillery of the Kalipipsky Front, Colonel-General N.M. Khlebnikov recalls that "the orgies Konstantinovich arrived at the memory" as early as November 22 and was almost constantly at the front's command post or at the headquarters of the 41st Army - "very serious, a little gossip, catagorical in every judgment and assessment." And 3 days before that, on November 19, Zhukov was in the 3rd strike of the army. How is it so, George Konstaptipovich? Until December 8, there are already more than a hundred thousand soldiers in sigleglo, there is no one to "remember", and about what to "think about",

Reserves and populations were sent to the 20th Army for a new offensive. [eperal Kiryukhin received a fresh 5th tank corps and several units from the 3rd]-yarmni. The 6th armored corps, which was completed and understaffed (in its motorized rifle brigade there were only 170 active bayonets, 100 tanks were assembled in the 22nd and 100th tank brigades), was again put into action. The task of the Taikists was to break through the enemy defenses together with the infantry units to the fate of the Bolshoe and Maloye Kropotovo cops and withdraw the infantry from the Lozhka-Belokhvastovo line. In the future, in cooperation with the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, go to the forests of the south of Makrusha and check us in the west.

"The offensive," the coistatirust Tetman, "was carried out in the same direction as at the end of November. However, at this time, the use was successful, since it was carried out with smaller forces, while the enemy continued to pull up reserves ... "Recognizing the habit of Soviet commanders to hit the riza over and over again in the forehead on the same board, Kluge and Model ps doubted the dew, where they "pull up reserves."

The offensive began at 10:10 on 11 December. Almost immediately tank corps were brought into the battle. They are soo

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shallow to reach the village of Maloye Kropotovo, but without lagging infantry. The tankers then counterattacked by the enemy were forced to retreat to their original positions. The fighting west of Vazuza continued until the end of the month, until the troops of the Western Front were completely exhausted.

And again, Zhukov is here "out of business." Someone was on the Kalinin Front, and here is the result: "The command of the Kalinin Front in the person of Lieutenant General MA. Purkaeva coped with her task. The group of troops of the front, advancing south of the city of Bely, will succeed in

tearing the front, moved in the direction of Sychevka (is this about the completely encircled building of Solomatina? - Auth.). Group of troops of the Western Front, in turn, was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and move towards the troops of the Kalinin Front ... But it happened that the Western Front did not break through the enemy's defenses. In general, somewhere Konev screwed up, the wise Zhukov had to go to the CI of the Western Front, where he instantly figured out the situation: "... I came to the conclusion that it was useless to repeat the operation. The enemy once guessed our plan and managed to pull up significant forces from other sectors to the area of operation. It remains only to be surprised at the foresight of the enemy and the forgetfulness of our marshal,

The same directive of December 8 ordered the 39th and 22nd armies of the Kalinin Front to develop a strike in the general direction of Olenino, and the troops of the 41st Army were to "destroy the enemy grouping that had broken through in the Tsytsyno area", and then, no later than December 20, take possession of the city of Bely. New tanks. General Purkasv did not receive any corps, none of the assigned tasks of his army could not be completed.

The Siberians and tankers of Solomatina fought for a week in encirclement, repulsing all attacks of the enemy divisions closing the ring. Their supply by air was not difficult for the region due to non-flying weather; more than once, aviators dropped cargo at the enemy's location. At one o'clock

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tyakh completely ran out of fuel, ammunition and food were running out. Finally, Zhukov ordered the group to be withdrawn from the encirclement.

On the night of December 15-16, General Solomatina led the remnants of his troops to a breakthrough. Before that, he destroyed the remaining equipment and heavy weapons, gathered his units into a fist and struck in the western direction, taking the sick and wounded with him. From the outside of the front, with the support of the entire army artillery, the Germans attacked the 164th tank brigade of Colonel F.D. Artamonov. The losses of the 1st Mechanized Corps, according to the report of General Solomatina, amounted to 8 thousand killed and wounded and 150 tanks.

The total losses of the two Soviet fronts in the repeated Rzhev-Sychevsk operation are indirectly estimated at 250,000 men and about 800 tanks.

It was also difficult for the troops of General Purkaev to advance on Bely because on the morning of December 11, the enemy launched a counterattack in the Velikoluksky direction, and all the reserves had to be thrown there. After an unsuccessful attempt to release the besieged garrison from the northwest, the Germans moved the main



efforts in the area of Leshakovo, Konyushki. From here, along the shortest direction to Velikiye Luki, the 291st Infantry Division tried to break through on a 6-kilometer distance, which succeeded in pushing the units of the 9th Guards Division of General Prostyakov and on December 14 to capture the village of Gromovo. In the following days, both sides built up their forces in this direction.

The commander of the 3rd shock army received his orders from the fresh 8th Estonian Rifle Corps, Major General L.A. On December 16, Pernai, having thrown his 19th Guards Division into battle, recaptured Gromovo. The Germans, in response, pulled up the 20th motorized division and the 1st SS brigade, and on December 19 they struck again. For 2 days of fighting, they advanced to Alskseikovo. [general Galitsky (since Zhukov was at the command post almost non-stop these days, who personally monitored the use of

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the use of the arriving reserves, then in reality Galitsky did little to supervise} the follower sent the newly arrived 249th Rifle Division and the 100th Rifle Brigade to the threatened area. On December 24, the 44th and 45th ski brigades, as well as the 360th rifle division, were introduced into the battle. The army received 10 more artillery regiments. The village of Alekseykovo repeatedly passed from hand to hand.

On January 4, 1943, the enemy brought into battle the 205th Infantry Division, deployed from near Velez, from a number of settlements. On January 7, the German strike force was once again reinforced by the 331st Infantry Division, which had arrived from France. A day later, the Germans crossed the Velikiye Luki-Novosokolniki railway and continued to move forward, their advanced units were already 4-5 km from the city. At the same time, the nose of the northwest again went over to the offensive the 8th Panzer Division.

In January 3rd and 184th Tank Brigade and units of the 32nd Infantry Division, which arrived from the front reserve, launched flank attacks on the German clip. From the side of Velikiye Luki, the defensive line was occupied by the 100th and 36th tank, 47th mechanized, 57th engineering brigades, two regiments of the 357th rifle division. By January 12, having advanced in a month of bloody battles on. 15 km, both German groups finally stopped, they failed to break through to the encircled. Then they were driven back to their original positions by counterattacks by the 150th Infantry Division, the 23rd and 145th Tank Brigades and other units of the 3rd Shock Army.

At the same time, starting from December 13, four Soviet rifle divisions, one tank, one mechanized a detached brigade and the 13th Guards Tank Regiment with fire tanks continuously stormed the Great

Luke. It was only on January 16, 1943 that it was possible to completely suppress the resistance of the garrison and liberate the city.

Thus, by January 20, the 3rd shock army, which by the end of the operation already had eleven rifle divisions,

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two rifle, two ski, seven tank and four mechanized brigades, liberated an area of 650 km<sup>2</sup> and the city of Velikiye Luki. The railway junction of Novosokolniki remained in the hands of the progivnik. According to Soviet data, the Germans lost about 59,000 killed and wounded, 4,000 prisoners, 250 tanks, 770 guns and mortars. Trophies amounted to 190 guns and mortars, 22 armored vehicles, 40 steam locomotives, 155 vehicles, and 6 warehouses with military equipment and equipment.

A participant in the events, a former officer of the operational department of the putab of the 3rd shock army, general GG. Semenov, in his memoirs, cites one of the examples of Zhukovsky's military art on critical New Year's Eve days,

According to all the theoretical rules (both ours and the Germans), in order to liquidate an enemy strike force that had broken through in a narrow sector, it was considered most expedient to send reserves to the flanks of the enemy in order to expand the enemy and try to cut it down. That the Germans repeatedly demonstrated to Zhukov near Rzhev, Vyazma, Bryansk and Sychseвка, surrounding entire armies and corps. But our commander did not want to fight "according to the template", therefore "he demanded that the newly arrived divisions be deployed just before the start of the clip. And this decision turned out to be the most correct (!!). More and more obstacles arose before the Nazis. The Nazis gnawed through the battle lines of one division, and another was already in front of them. Thanks to this, the edge of the wedge was blunted: the enemy suffered heavy losses, his advancing grouping noticeably weakened. In the end, he had to stop."

It was free to fight without five minutes to the marshal! Throw all the tanks, you see, the caterpillars will get stuck in the meat, the wedge will become "blunt". Therefore, there is no need for Zhukov to study "templates". Umnikov, who invented all sorts of maneuvers, he shortened: "Now is not the time to shine with academic terminology. War does not tolerate scholasticism and superficiality."

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And after the war he even drew himself, opposing his original method of activity of the Eastern "professor type": "I had to master a lot of practical

theoretically, without sufficient, previously accumulated broad and versatile knowledge. It also had its positive side. Responsible for the matter, striving to act in the best way and feeling at the same time some or other problems in my general preparation, I tried to solve the problems that arose as fundamentally as possible, I tried to get to the root, and not allow myself to make the first superficial decision that came across ... Incidentally, However, some of our highly educated military professors who found themselves in the position of commanders of the Natskh or other fronts of the war did not show themselves on the positive side. In their solutions, things happened to be considered as elements of the surface. Sometimes they offered superficial solutions that did not fit into their professorial erudition.

That's how, "digging to the root" and solving the problem fundamentally, Zhukov thought of throwing rifle divisions right under the tank wedges. Indeed, wide and versatile knowledge" was not required for this. Therefore, having begun the Velikoluksky operation with 95 thousand soldiers and officers, the Soviet troops lost more than 104 thousand killed and wounded during the course of the operation.

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The offensive of the Western and Kalinin fronts failed. The troops of General Galitsky managed to at least liberate Velikie Luki, and the operation carried out by one 3rd shock army won its place in our history. annals".

In the meantime, in the 1990s, a number of Western historians suggested that Operation Mars was of strategic importance in the plans of the Soviet command, almost more than Operation Uranus. In the service

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Successful Paul Rzhev was to be followed by Operation Jupiter, surpassing the scale of the Stalingrad counteroffensive - a strike by the 5th and 33rd armies of the Western Front on Vyazma with the involvement of the strategic reserves of the Headquarters. In the future, the troops of the Western and Kalinisky fronts were to defeat the entire Army Group Center, and then break through to the Baltic Sea.

True, a prominent Soviet intelligence officer, General Sulo Platov, refutes this version. It follows from his memoirs that Stalin made a decisive bet on the Stalingrad operation, and the offensive on Rzhev served the purposes of grandiose disinformation of the German

General Staff and had a distracting character:

"Disinformation was sometimes of strategic importance. So, on November 4, 1942, the goal of "Eine" - "Max" (NKVD lieutenant Alexei Demyanov, he is also a communications officer in the Soviet Enshtab, "recruited" by German intelligence. - Auth.) reported that the Red Army would strike the Yeyemians on November 15 not under Stalingrad, and in the North Caucasus and near Rzhev. The Germans were waiting for an attack near Rzhev and repelled it. But the encirclement of the Paulus group near Stalingrad came as a complete surprise to them.

This is indirectly confirmed by the report to the headquarters of the OKH and OKW by the head of the "Russian department" of the Abwehr [elson], who, referring to the army in Moscow, reported that "the main blow in future Russian operations" should be expected in the sector of the "Center" group.

"Zhukov, who was unaware of this radio game," continues Sudoplatov, "paid a heavy price — thousands and thousands of our soldiers under his command were killed in the offensive near Rzhev. In his memoirs, he admits that the outcome of the offensive operation was unsatisfactory. But he never found out that the Germans were warned about our offensive in the Rzhev direction, which is why they sent so many troops there.

From this point of view, the goal of the Rzhev-Sychevskaya opera

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walkie-talkie has indeed been achieved. The price, as usual, did not interest anyone. Since Zhukov was deliberately not informed about all these subtleties, he fought in earnest, conscientiously laying down the "shock rate" of 1,000 killed and wounded per day in front of the German positions! The diversion operation cost more than Stalingrad.

Even the completely trustworthy Katukov doubted whether it was possible to "distract" the enemy so zealously or to use very considerable forces smarter. We acted disparately both in terms of tasks and time. I'll hide it, there were then conversations among the tankers: why not strike the enemy at the same time with the forces of three corps? In this case, we would certainly have achieved greater success, we would have created a tangible turning point in the combat operations of the Kalinin Front.

Now anyone will say that in November-December of 1942 the decisive battle took place on the Stalingrad lines. Consequently, our mechanized corps were given a very specific

From a distant point of view, the task is to tie up the enemy's reserves by active actions not in one, but in several directions and prevent the Hitlerite command from widely maneuvering its forces. Our actions did not only prevent the fascists from transferring part of the formations to support the grouping that had fallen on the right bank and a hopeless situation, but forced them to reinforce the troops operating on our front.

All this is clear, although now one can argue: could it not have been possible to solve the same problem by other methods, without exhausting rather large tank forces in ineffective battles? True, impenetrable forests and swamps prevented this. But still, it seems that the tank grouping in the Kalinin direction was not used to the full extent of its capabilities.

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Sudoplatov's version raises doubts about Zhukov's lack of information. After all, he was the first and only deputy of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, that is, in the military hierarchy he held the second post after Stalin.

According to the American military historian Devid M. Glantz, the reasons for the defeat lay in the fact that "Zhukov carried out the Mars operation in his characteristic manner. The Soviet attacks were massive, he did not spare human and material resources, did not take into account the unfavorable terrain and weather conditions. Striving for victory, he relied on pressure along the entire front and a simple maneuver with powerful tank and mechanized corps... Skillfully organized German tactical defense in relatively small "battle groups", making the most of the advantages of the terrain, held back the attacking Soviet mobile units, preventing them break into the operational rear of the Germans. The defenders exhausted the attacking infantry and cut them off from the tanks. Without succumbing to panic and holding only what was really necessary to hold, the German command gradually collected the reserves necessary for counterattacks and victory.

Zhukov himself reflected on this question:

"Understanding the reasons for the failed offensive of the troops of the Western Front, we came to the conclusion that the main one was an underestimation of the difficulty of the terrain, which was chosen by the command of the front (?) for delivering the main blow.

The experience of war (1) teaches that if the enemy's defense is located on a well-observed terrain, where there are no natural shelters from artillery fire, then such a defense can be easily broken by artillery.

Lerian and mortar fire, and then the offensive will surely succeed,

If the enemy defense is located on poorly observed terrain, where there are good shelters

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behind the reverse slopes of heights, in ravines ... then it is difficult to break such a defense with fire and break through, especially when the use of tanks is limited,

In this particular case, the influence of the terrain on which the German defense was located, well hidden behind the reverse slopes of the persected terrain, was taken into account.

All these revelations in the field of military art, worthy of a second-year cadet at most, are simply amazing. Well, you must! For almost a year, Zhukov's name was selflessly and unsuccessfully "cutting down" the Rzhev ledge, and now he finally figured out the local relief, and also "mastered practically" that the features of revenge must be taken into account when planning operations.

Even tank general Tetman, who did not participate in the battle due to illness, noticed more: "The attack was carried out on fortified positions occupied by the tank forces of the enemy, in a wooded and swampy area and a difficult meteorological situation, lto, and other things favored the enemy. We also lacked proper interaction with the infantry and reliable artillery and aviation support. The pshota lagged behind the tanks. The suppression of enemy strongholds, especially its anti-tank weapons, artillery fire and air strikes was not sufficiently organized ... Our reconnaissance and communications facilities were weak, which negatively affected the command and control of the troops.

Zhukov is not alone in his quest. Most of the Soviet military leaders were masters of stopography.

So, Eremenko unsuccessfully tries to organize defense on the outskirts of Stalingrad: "The area is extremely poor in forests. The open nature of the terrain naturally made it very difficult to camouflage the troops and their supply routes. The terrain ... did not present any obstacles to the movement of units of any kind of army ... To organize a stubborn defense, the relay

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ef terrain did not create favorable conditions,

water barriers also did little to help this (especially when defensive lines are created without taking them into account. - Auth.) ... In all respects, the theater of military operations was unfavorable for us.

But literally in the same place, counterattacks are carried out: "... the open steppe terrain of the combat area, which is difficult to hide, was inconvenient both for the concentration of troops and for their movement."

A chandelier interferes with a bad dancer, a relief for a general.

In 1942, in the battles for Rzhev, Vyazma, Sychevka, [Zhatsk and for the Zhukovsky "experience of war", the troops of two fronts lost up to one and a half million soldiers and commanders, simultaneously studying the local terrain. Zhukov did not manage to "defeat" anyone. Since the marshal, according to Admiral Kuznetsov, "zealously treated every leaf of laurel as a reward for the expected victory," the story was invented in hindsight, how Zhukov and Vasilevsky created a plan for the victorious Stalipgrad operation. But, firstly, everyone knows that there was no staff officer from Zhukov. Secondly, Zhukov, together with Vasilevsky, as representatives of the Stavka, really participated in the preparation of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. True, according to Rokossovsky, they were more of a hindrance than a help to the front commanders.

The Germans themselves left the Rzhev ledge, shortening the front line, in February 1943, without a fight.

## CONCLUSION

It is better to make fewer mistakes than to learn from mistakes,

Marshal M.N. Pukhachevsky

After the end of the war, it was time to write history and share the glory. First of all, the victory over Germany was declared the result of "a wise policy more

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the Vista Party" and proof of the advantages of the socialist system. The very fact of the Victory, thus, justified everything — the elimination of entire sections of the population (classes}, collectivization, famine, resettlement of peoples, mass repressions, purges of the army, total control over the individual — and confirmed the indisputable right of the Communist Party to continue to direct and instruct the Soviet people along the path "to the bright future of all mankind."

The main architect of the Victory was, of course, "the greatest leader and commander [ensralissimo of the Soviet Union I.V. Stalin: "The brilliant scientific foresight of events, the greatest skill of I.V. They began to find the right solutions to the most complex issues, the unbending will to win became the source of the strength of the Soviet people and the army.

Naturally, the Soviet waging art was also declared "the most skillful."

Marshal Vasilevsky wrote: "Stalin's strategy in the Great Patriotic War was distinguished by wisdom, depth of strategic plans, remarkable penetration into the enemy's plans and plans (well, for example, bypassing Moscow from the east. - Auth.), decisiveness in setting goals and mobilizing all possibilities for their achievement (the undoubted merit of Iosif Vissarionovich. - Auth.) ... Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the Soviet Armed Forces showed examples of stubborn defensive and decisive offensive actions, and also brilliantly carried out a number of counteroffensives, having mastered in practice this wonderful type of offensive . Stalip's tactics (was there such a thing? - Author) were distinguished by flexibility, a complete absence of a template, a wonderful art of maneuvering, a skillful combination of forms of struggle, persistent achievement of goals, an all-round use of technology and well-organized control of the howl

skami".

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In order to more clearly highlight the role of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, some "arrogant" commanders had to be "pushed" into remote districts or put on trial.

But the greatest dictators are not eternal. Not many years have passed since the death of Stalin, as his faithful colleague N.S. Khrushchev stated that it would be a good thing for the country if the will of all peoples had been changed to five times earlier (1): "If Stalin had died by the beginning of this world war, that is, by 1939, then the Great Patriotic War could have gone differently channel. The country would have better prepared for it. And so he took everything upon himself and made a mistake ... in the end, under the leadership of Stalin, we won, but with too many sacrifices, incredible losses, Without Stalin, the enemy would obviously have been defeated with fewer losses, "Iosif Vissarionovich would have seen his" little Marx" in those days when he was broadcasting tributes of the 20th Congress.

History had to be rewritten. Naturally, the main battle that decided the outcome of the war was the Battle of Stalingrad, and its main heroes were



Khrushchev and Eremenko. The military leaders who supported the new General Secretary in his undertakings were showered with awards and declared "prominent commanders." Dissenters, like marshals Yulovanov and Rokossovsky, were retired. In the new edition, the war was won, despite the mistakes of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who understood little about the ox business.

The unbending Marshal Zhukov was distinguished by a special "flexibility of the ridge". Since 1955, he has been an ardent fighter against the "cult of personality". "All the hostility that has accumulated towards Stalin," writes Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, - like a straightening spring, was felt these days in all of Zhukov's behavior. It was as if he was striving to become lost time and glory ... Stalin correctly and in time noticed Zhukov's dangerous aspirations to attribute everything to himself. Later, when Khrushchev also noticed "dangerous aspirations" and sent the marshal to a well-deserved rest, Erogy Konstantinovich in his memos

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Arach rated Stalin's role quite highly. And then to say: it is not possible for "Zhukov himself" to be a substitute for an unintelligent person.

A touching story from those times was told by Koi Stantin Simonov: "Zhukov said that he was excited and inspired then. shortly after the 20th Congress. It was a question of restoring the good fortune of people who were taken prisoner, mainly in the first period of the war, during our long retreats and huge encirclements ... Apparently, this question touched some of the strongest and deepest strings of his soul. He must have been thinking about this for a long time and for many years he could not but come to terms with the unjust and indiscriminate solution that this question had found earlier. He said bitterly that, according to English law, soldiers and officers who were captured continued to receive the prescribed salary for the entire time they were in captivity, and even with some kind of payback, connected with the severity of the situation in which they were.

"But what about us," he said, "pas Mekhlis came up with the idea that he put forward the formula "Everyone who is captured is a traitor to the motherland" and justified it by the fact that every Soviet person who faced the threat of captivity was obligated to put an end to life by suicide, that is, he demanded that in addition to the millions who died in the war, millions of more self-murderers would be added. More than half of these people were tortured by the Germans in captivity, died of starvation and disease, but, based on the theory of Mekhlis, it turned out that even when they returned, after going through this hell, they had to meet such an attitude at home that they would repent of that then, in the 41st or 42nd, they did not take their own lives.

Not to mention the exact accuracy of all Zhukov's words, their meaning boiled down to the fact that the shameful of the Mekhlis formula lies in the distrust of the soldiers and officers that lies at its core, in the unfair assumption that they were all captured because of their own cowardice.

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"Zhukov said that he considers it his duty as a military man to do everything now to provide for the most complete restoration of justice in relation to all who deserve this, not to forget anything, not to miss anything and restore the trampled dignity of all those who honestly fought and endured the tragedy of the captivity of soldiers and officers. "I've been thinking about it all these days and busy with it," he said.

Ochiartist orgies Konstantinovich! And what "excited and inspired" him on October 4, 1941, when he personally compiled code number 4976 for the troops of the Leningrad Front with the following content:

"Explain to all personnel that all the families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot and upon returning from captivity they will also be repressed."

Neither Stalin nor Mekhlis thought of this. For the sake of a career and another star, Zhukov was ready to shoot at anyone - his own and others, they dropped an atomic bomb on their troops. This is what Stalin liked about him.

On June 29, 1956, the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the elimination of the consequences of gross violations of the law in relation to former prisoners of war and members of their families" was adopted. Paragraph 8 of the resolution directly stated: "To the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (comrade Zhukov): a) review all cases of former prisoners of war on a personal basis ..."

Therefore, Zhukov, all "agitated", now - in the forefront of "rehabilitators", does not sleep at night, "restores justice and trampled dignity." Nikita Sergseovich Khrushchev called such people KVD - where the wind blows.

In the Brezhnev era, all that was left was to correct and varnish something obliquely. For example, Stalin was mistaken, but nevertheless he was an outstanding Commander-in-Chief Zerkhov. The Froites were led by a galaxy of outstanding commanders nurtured by the Communist Party, who beat "Hitler's warriors" according to all the rules of military art. Our sollats inspired by pla

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political workers, rushed through the embrasures and under the tanks, showing mass heroism. Data on huge losses, mass desertion, cooperation with the Germans, orders No. 270 and 275, reports on the work of detachments and the use of penal battalions, etc. —were buried in the archives for a long time.

With all the creative differences and personal ambitions, the fundamental thesis put forward by Stalin in a speech on February 9, 1949 had to remain unchanged for all Soviet historians, writers and memoirists: "Our victory means, first of all, that our Soviet social system (not Alexander G. thought of declaring the Patriotic War of 1812 as the cause of the "feudal-feudal system." — Auth.)... The war showed that the Soviet social The social system is in the polis a viable and stable form of organization of society... Our victory means, secondly, that our Soviet state system has won."

It is not difficult to guess that, in accordance with the new trends, when the vogue for anti-Stalinism passed, Zhukov's insomnia "over gross violations of the legitimacy."

In 1971, the marshal "with his characteristic directness and decisiveness" criticized A. Chakovsky's novel "Blockade": "The novel repeatedly suggests that the Soviet command achieved the execution of orders not by persuasion, by personal authority, without appealing to patriotic feelings of battle tsov and commanders, but under the direct threat of execution ... The teacher may get the impression that there were no courts-martial that judged crimes or other crimes, but there was arbitrariness of military commanders who, without any trial or investigation, shot subordinates. It is not clear from what

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Lew A. Chakovsky propagates this lie? Such propaganda (!) is certainly harmful and plays into the hands of our ideological opponents."

It is remarkable that Zhukov addressed the letter not to the writer Chakovsky, not to the editors of the Znamya magazine, which published the novel, but to P.N. To Demichev, so to speak, he signaled that he got it from the principled marshal and memoirists:

command mifronts. -Aut.) ... "

Zhukov got his way; it was "caponized", and "Memoirs and Reflections" began to be seriously referred to as a historical document.

Behind all these troubles, there was no time to count the fallen. Apparently, there was interest. Otherwise, somehow blekiug laurels tsa chele "great commanders."

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Let's sum up the study.

The irretrievable losses of the Red Army in 1942, according to the authors of the book "Secrecy Mark Shine", amounted to 3258216 people. [6neral D, Volkogondv rated them one and a half times higher - 5888235 soldiers and officers. However, this figure is also considered underestimated by many modern historians. In their opinion, we can talk about ns menss than 7.15 ml killed, captured, died from wounds and diseases. The German army in 1942 lost about 519 thousand people on the Eastern Front. That is, raising their eighth education, our generals laid down 13 Soviet soldiers for one killed German soldier. In the next year, 1943, "only" 10! Substantial progress!

The incurable vices of the Soviet aspen machine as the offspring of a totalitarian political system were contempt for human life (pompit

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V.V. Mayakovsky: "One is nonsense, one is zero ... One! Who needs it?!"), as well as the rigid centralization of power, which deprived the commanders at the forefront of any initiative. Commanders, commanders of divisions and regiments were only "gears", transmission links between the headquarters of the front and the front line. They were only required to drive the troops forward or "stand to the death" depending on the guidelines of higher authorities. "Any initiative must be punished" is another unforgettable slogan of the Soviet Army. This led to someone that Comrade Stalin had to personally introduce "new technologies" into the troops, compose instructions for them and even "allow" in some issues to show initiation:

"When conducting offensive operations, the command of fronts and armies sometimes look at the demarcation lines established for them as a fence and a partition, which cannot be violated, although

this would be required by the interests of the case and the changing situation during the operation.

As a result, our armies, when advancing, advance directly in front of themselves, in front of their demarcation lines, paying attention to their neighbors, without the mapper, which is caused by the situation, without the help of each other, and thereby facilitate the maneuver of the enemy and provide him with opportunities to strike us piecemeal. The Headquarters makes it clear that the dividing lines determine only the responsibility of the commanders for a certain section or strip of terrain in which they carry out the combat mission they have received, but they can not be considered as unchanging and intransigent partitions for the armies ...

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, explaining this, allows and grants the right to the commanders of the fronts to change the demarcation lines between the front armies during operations, to change the direction of the strike of individual armies, depending on the situation.

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Note the word "permits" - therefore, earlier, i.e. until the autumn of 1942, did not allow. And even then, the right to act in accordance with the changing situation was granted only to the front commanders, who personally set tasks for each division and brigade and perceived any initiative of their subordinates as an encroachment on their power.

Examples of this are endless.

"In the sector of our army," recalls General Zhadov, "dvs divisions were advanced, each with 12-13 thousand personnel, to conduct a private army operation. For some reason, both divisions followed the same road, so they stretched out into a long gut and were an excellent target for enemy aircraft. At this time, the commander of the front, Colonel General Ya.I. Cherevichenko. Knowing the deal in the pre-war service, I addressed the nemus with some reproach:

- Yakov Timofeevich, is it possible to advance divisions like that?

- Who planned it like that? - he asked.

- The divisions are moving forward according to the front plan, - answer til i.

"Immediately reschedule their advance as needed in accordance with the interests of the army," Cherevichenko ordered.

Head of Operations Department A.V. Vladimirsky, with his assistants and the chiefs of the military branches and services, quickly revised the plan for advancing divisions. We have found a way to provide each of them with two roads. The division commanders were given appropriate orders (in the interests of the cause). I reported to the front headquarters about the changes made in terms of concentration of formations. Notes, our initiative, although sanctioned by the commander of the front, was regarded as an unacceptable interference with the prerogatives of the Igtab of the front. Organizational conclusions followed: General Petrushevsky arrived with

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order, from which it was clear that I was removed from the post of chief of staff of the army.

Here is the deputy commander of the 62nd Army, General N.I. Krylov, who is concerned that he has not enough infantry on the right flank, but he cannot do anything: "The front command did not allow the front command to transfer rifle units here from other sectors. Then for the first time during the war (oily? - Auth.) I met with the same position, when not the army, but above it was determined where to stand for each regiment.

Similar problems haunted General Torbatov: "The Stavka letter (of January 10) contained a deep meaning and would have contributed to success if everything that was said in it had been exactly carried out. The nomes still received orders contrary to the requirements of the letter, and therefore were not successful. It is difficult to explain why such orders were received even from the commander... In that situation, it was natural that the division commander himself would choose objects for private operations, he himself would determine the strength of the detachment and the time for an attack using surprise. In such cases, the enemy usually had losses two, three, or even four times more than we did. It's another matter when they tell you everything from afar and order you to capture Maslova Pristap on January 17, Bezlyudovka on January 19, Arkhangelskoye it. on January 24. etc., indicating the hour of the attack, they will determine the forces (who do not correspond to either the task or your capabilities). In these cases, the result was almost always the same: we had no success and suffered losses two or three times more than the enemy.

Particularly incomprehensible to me were the persistent orders - despite the failure, to attack again, and from the same starting position, in the same direction for several days in a row, to advance, not taking into account that the enemy had already strengthened this sector. .. But it was a whole stage of the war, at which many of our commanders learned how not to fight and, therefore, how to fight hard, "

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But the 23rd Panzer Corps south of Stalingrad, in agreement with the army command, changed positions and retreated. But the command of the front, not having given permission to withdraw, regarded this as a violation of order No. 227, which could "play a negative role in the education of command personnel." The corps was ordered to verify the position. "The tankers boldly went forward," writes Marshal Golikov, who arrived to oversee the educational process, "despite the small number of their forces. This strike did not give great territorial successes, but attracted significant enemy forces, including its aviation, to the front section of the corps, which weakened the pressure of the Nazis on other sectors (to divert aviation with tanks is the contribution of the "goliks" to military art. - Auth.). The educational value of this event was also important (everyone must understand: his superiors are fearful of the enemy! - Auth.)".

Since the totalitarian pyramids are being built according to the same project, the German generals in 1942 faced exactly the same problem. All of them without exception complain that with the advent of Hitler to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, "instead of the orders adopted so far, which were imbued with confidence in the abilities and knowledge of the highest military commanders, a new type of order appeared, which set the task extremely narrowly and did not allow any initiative, finally, often demanding the fulfillment of the set task under threat, or even impossible tasks were set. Unwanted ones were eliminated. Instead of trust, the goal was to make the subordinate unquestioning. It looks like it, doesn't it?

Marshal Zhukov, in a conversation with the writer K. Simopov, also noted that "...Hitler, with his mistakes, helped the German General Staff to make mistakes, that he often prevented the General Staff from making more thoughtful, more correct decisions. And when in 1941, after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, he removed Brauchitsch, Bock, a number of other commanders and himself led the German

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some ground forces, he undoubtedly rendered us a serious service by this. After that, both the German general staff and the German commanders of the army groups became much more tied up than before. Their initiative turned out to be a shackle. The directives now coming from Hitler as from the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces became indisputable to a much greater extent than was required in the interests of the case. The level of independence that existed earlier in the German army in solving operational

The dismissal of Brauchitsch, with which it all began, was, of course, to our advantage."

Let us cite the last entry in the dieupic of the retired Halder; "In written orders, there is an increasing disregard for the correct use of words (do you know? - Auth.). Instead of thoughtful formulations, various emotionally colored words and expressions (destroy, destroy, prevent bypassing) even when this is generally impossible.

It is a paradox: while the self-owning Red Army strove to rise to the level of the Wehrmacht, in the days to come it adopted the most ugly "achievements" of the socialist system: the Russians had the habit of stubbornly adhering to the once set goal - a property from which the German command in subsequent years could have been of great benefit if it had not itself proved to be much more stubborn than the Russians.

Mugging under the influence of the "bacilli of national socialism", the air force lost the qualities that made it the best army in the world. Well, the Germans could kill anyone in quantity. The degradation of the German army sometimes suggests that, perhaps, the Russian "mental field" had such an influence on it? Or is it just the air in Russia like that?

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Nevertheless, the ratio of German and Soviet losses throughout the war remained extremely

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unfavorable for the Soviet side. Until the very end, they preferred to fight in the Red Army by numbers, to win - with great bloodshed, flooding the enemy with the corpses of untrained "disposable" soldiers. The art of war for most of the top military leaders has remained an alien concept.

In 1945, conducting the Berlin operation, Zhukov and Konev, having a 5-fold numerical superiority over the enemy, did not invent anything, but simply threw four tank armies into the city - 5388 units of armored vehicles. That's all art: "There is no reception against scrap"! Member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, General K.F. Telegin recalled that the commander had only one goal: "... do not hesitate, do not hesitate, look for a weak place ... But if this place is not there, heap on a mass of equipment, crush it. Let it cost us casualties and losses, but we should rush to Berlin as quickly as possible. (And why such a hurry? It turns out, mainly because Zhukov is afraid of



there was competition from Konev, who could enter Berlin first. —Aut.)...

Yes, we reckoned with the fact that we would have to suffer losses in tanks, but we knew that even if we lose half (the general talks about two thousand crews as inanimate objects. - Author), it will still be up to 2 we will introduce thousands of armored units into Berlin (and we did, despite the experience of Stalingrad! - Auth), and this will be enough to take the sgo. As a result, the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front alone during the two weeks of the operation amounted to 1940 tanks and self-propelled guns. Of these, half burned down in street battles, without having a significant impact on the outcome of hostilities.

The losses of the Soviet Army in the Patriotic War of 1941-1945 have not yet been counted. According to B. Sokolov, the total loss of killed and dead during the war with Germany amounted to 31.1 million servicemen. The irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in the fight against the USSR are estimated by him at 2.157 million. Just one comparison

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These figures allow a lot to be understood both in the "advantages of the socialist system" and in "the most overdose of military science."

“Such a progressive character is characteristic only of Soviet operational art, which is based on the only scientific theory of knowledge — Marxist-Leninist methodology, and this ensured its complete triumph in the Great Patriotic War over the “new” operational methods of the German fascist oxen school that had the most in Western Europe” .

Here we agree with the enlightened opinion of Lieutenant General Zlobin: SUCH is possible only with us, no other military school has risen to SUCH heights of operational art.

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